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Summary 
This dissertation presents a stock-flow consistent (SFC) model with an integrated input-output (IO) 
model for the study of the economic mechanisms by which capital assets might be stranded in the 
fossil fuel extraction and energy generation sectors. It assesses the major macroeconomic and 
financial implications of both capital asset stranding in these sectors and different transitions to a 
low carbon economy. The model is that of a pure credit economy that consists of three firm sectors, 
two household sectors and a banking sector. The three firm sectors are a fossil fuel energy sector 
(the ‘brown’ sector), a renewable energy sector (the ‘green’ sector), and a firm sector that produces 
non-energy goods (the ‘other’ sector). The two household sectors are an ‘ethical’ household sector 
and a ‘normal’ household sector.  
The model is used to investigate a number of claims from the stranded assets literature regarding 
the effects of different types of transitions to a low carbon economy (slow, fast, anticipated and 
unanticipated) and different changes in market conditions (due to changes in policy, financing 
conditions, technology or social norms). The results of the transition simulations support a number 
of the arguments made in the stranded assets literature, namely that faster transitions and 
unanticipated transitions are likely to strand more assets and have more disruptive effects on 
financial markets than slower transitions and anticipated transitions. The results of the market 
conditions simulations suggest that changes in market conditions that affect the real side of the 
economy are likely to lead to larger effects on demand and asset stranding than changes in market 
conditions that primarily affect firms’ borrowing costs. In addition, these simulations suggest that 
changes in market conditions are unlikely to have a large effect on the demand for different types of 
energy (and therefore on stranding) unless renewable energy becomes a close substitute for fossil 
fuel energy. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Since the beginning of the last century, the world’s air and sea surface temperature has risen by 
approximately 0.8°C, with around two thirds of this increase occurring since 1980. Human activity is 
extremely likely to have been the main cause of the observed warming since the middle of the 20th 
century (IPCC, 2013). The stock of carbon dioxide emissions, a large part of which have been 
produced through the burning of fossil fuels during the energy transformation process, is a key 
driver of the warming process (Allen et al., 2009). Projections indicate that future temperature 
increases will depend on human action. Increases can be kept to around 0.3°C if large-scale action is 
taken to reduce emissions, while increases of 4.8°C are likely if no action is taken (IPCC, 2015). 
The effects of temperature rises in the 4.8°C range are likely to be both serious and irreversible. The 
Stern Review (2006) estimates that an increase of this magnitude could result in a permanent 20% 
annual loss to world GDP and might even threaten the elements necessary for human life itself. Yet 
despite these dire forecasts, little progress has been made in decarbonising energy production. In 
2014, fossil fuels provided the same amount of global energy consumption (82%) as they did in 1979 
(IEA, 2014).1  
The need to take action on climate change led governments at the 2009 Copenhagen Conference to 
agree to endeavour to keep the maximum global average temperature increase to within a 2°C 
threshold above pre-industrial levels (UNFCCC, 2009). The Paris Climate Agreement built on the 2°C 
target by committing its 196 signatories to keep global temperature increases to “well below” 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels, while also working to limit temperature increases to 1.5°C (United 
Nations, 2015). 
Limiting temperature increases to a 1.5 - 2°C range will require a significant reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions over the next few decades. This is likely to require a large reduction in the amount of 
energy that is produced using fossil fuels (IPCC, 2015), given that (in 2014) the power and heat 
generation sector produced more greenhouse gases than any other sector (approximately 38% of 
total global emissions) (IEA 2016).  
                                                          
1 This is in spite of a large increase in investment in non-fossil fuel energy production, from $65 billion in 2000 
to $310 billion in 2011 (IEA, 2014). However, investment in fossil-fuel energy production doubled in real terms 
over the same period. By share, non-fossil fuel energy investment increased by just 7 percentage points (from 
9% to 16%), while fossil fuel investment accounted for 70%. The remaining 14% covered investment in energy 
transmission and distribution.  
16  
Because it is the stock of atmospheric carbon dioxide that influences the global temperature, rather 
than annual flows (Allen et al., 2009), it is useful to think in terms of a global ‘carbon budget’ that 
relates cumulative carbon emissions over a period of time to the probability of keeping temperature 
increases within a given temperature threshold. Each carbon budget can then be compared to the 
amount of carbon embedded in fossil fuel reserves and resources (as in Meinshausen et al. [2009], 
CTI [2011, 2013], IPCC [2014], IEA/IRENA [2017]), or the cumulative carbon emissions2 of current and 
planned capital assets (as in Guivarch and Hallegatte [2011], Pfeiffer et al. [2016, 2018]).3 Because 
both the carbon embedded in reserves and resources and the committed cumulative carbon 
emissions of current and planned capital assets exceeds the 1.5°C and 2°C carbon budgets, these 
comparisons give an idea of the quantity of assets (reserves, resources and capital assets) that will 
need to be left unburned or retired early – i.e. ‘stranded’ – to keep warming within 1.5°C or 2°C. 
Thus, it should be noted that stranded assets can be both unburnable reserves and resources, and 
the capital assets associated with fossil fuels (e.g. extraction and processing assets, power stations, 
etc.).  
In recent years a large and varied literature has grown up that attempts to estimate which assets are 
likely to be left unburned or retired early (i.e. which assets are likely to be stranded) (McGlade and 
Ekins [2015], Grant et al. [2017], Leaton and Grant [2017], CTI [2014a, 2014b], and Grant [2018]). 
Other papers have discussed and estimated the potential effects of asset stranding (CTI [2011], 
IPIECA [2014], Meyer and Brinker [2014], Nelson, [2014], Weyzig et al. [2014], Carney [2015], Grant 
and Spedding [2015], Battiston et al. [2016], Gros et al. [2016], Ploeg and Rezai [2016], Comerford 
and Spiganti [2017], IEA/IRENA [2017], Rozenberg et al. [2014, 2017]). A common finding of the 
literature that attempts to estimate the quantity of reserves at risk of stranding is that at least 60% 
of current fossil fuel reserves will need to be stranded to keep temperature increases to within 2°C 
(with a 50% probability) (Meinshausen et al. [2009], CTI [2011, 2013], IPCC [2014], IEA/IRENA 
[2017]). Breaking this down by fossil fuel type, McGlade and Ekins (2015) find that adhering to a 2°C 
carbon budget will result in the stranding of around four fifths of coal reserves, half of gas reserves, 
                                                          
2 Committed cumulative carbon emission are defined by Pfeiffer et al. (2018, p.1 - 2) as “the cumulative 
emissions an asset would emit over its remaining lifetime under normal economic conditions, i.e. if it were to 
be operated at normal utilization”. 
3 It is also possible to compare the normal output capacity of capital assets in the fossil fuel sector to the 
projected demand for the output of these capital assets under a demand trajectory that is consistent with a 
1.5°C or 2°C carbon budget (as in Grant et al. [2017], Leaton and Grant [2017], CTI [2014a, 2014b], and Grant 
[2018]).  
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and a third of oil reserves. On the capital assets side, Pfeiffer et al. (2018) report that the 
commitment year4 for fossil fuel power plants that would have given a realistic chance of keeping 
warming within 2°C was 2011. A number of other studies (e.g. Grant et al. [2017], Leaton and Grant 
[2017], CTI [2014a, 2014b], and Grant [2018]) show that currently planned capital investments by 
fossil fuel firms5 are significantly in excess of what will be required in a 2°C scenario. For example, 
Leaton and Grant (2017) find that around one third of the potential capital expenditures to 2025 in 
the upstream oil and gas sectors will not be required in a 2°C scenario.  
The stranded assets literature emphasises a number of factors related to a transition to a low carbon 
economy that might affect the quantity of stranded assets. First, and as discussed above, the 
literature stresses the importance of fossil fuel firms being able to anticipate the transition to a low 
carbon economy, so they do not produce or develop unnecessary capital equipment or reserves and 
resources. Second, the literature argues that delaying a transition to a low carbon economy, given a 
particular carbon budget, will mean the transition has to be completed faster, and that faster/more 
disjointed transitions are likely to lead to higher levels of asset stranding (IEA [2015a], IEA [2016] and 
IEA/IRENA [2017]). One reason for this is that faster transitions imply a faster fall in the demand for 
fossil fuel firms’ outputs relative to the rate at which these firms’ assets decline/depreciate.  
More generally, the stranded assets literature emphasises that the relatively long lifespans and 
payback periods for many fossil fuel assets puts these assets at risk of stranding due to (unexpected) 
changes in market conditions. It is important to note that while the factors that might drive a change 
in market conditions could be the cause of a transition to a low carbon economy, or related to it, 
they could also happen independently of any transition. The literature identifies a number of factors 
that might cause market conditions to change. These include a change in government policy or 
regulations (e.g. a carbon tax), a change in financing conditions (e.g. a divestment campaign), a 
change in economic conditions (e.g. a change in the market price of a good), a change in social 
norms (that leads to a reduction in the demand for fossil fuels), or an energy innovation that either 
lowers the cost of renewable energy (e.g. an improvement in the renewable sector’s energy return 
                                                          
4 In Pfeiffer et al. (2018), the commitment year is the year in which the stock of fossil fuel power plants reaches 
a level that commits the world to 2°C warming. 
5 The terms ‘fossil fuel firms’ and ‘fossil fuel sector/s’ will be used throughout this dissertation to refer to the 
firms and sectors that supply fossil fuels or energy from fossil fuel power plants. As such, it includes firms in 
the mining sector, the upstream and downstream oil and gas sectors, and the power sector. The term ‘fossil 
fuel assets’ will be used as a catch all term that covers the reserves, resources, and capital assets owned by 
fossil fuel firms. 
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on energy invested) or improves its functionality (e.g. an improvement in battery technology). A 
number of these factors are discussed in Generation Foundation (2013), Paun et al. (2015) and 
Caldecott (2017).  
A major concern in the stranded assets literature is that the stranding of fossil fuel assets might have 
a number of negative economic effects (CTI [2011], IPIECA [2014], Nelson, [2014], Weyzig et al. 
[2014], Carney [2015], Grant and Spedding [2015], Battiston et al. [2016], Gros et al. [2016], Ploeg 
and Rezai [2016], Comerford and Spiganti [2017], IEA/IRENA [2017], and Rozenberg et al. [2014, 
2017]). This concern is based on three observations. First, the market value of a firm depends 
(theoretically) on its future free cash flows. Hence, the stranding of an asset that generates cash 
flows will negatively affect that firm’s market value. It may also affect the ability of a firm to meet its 
other financial obligations. Second, a large quantity of assets are at risk of stranding (e.g. around 
65% of reserves [Meinshausen et al, 2009], and around a third of upstream oil and gas companies 
planned capital expenditures to 2025 [Leaton and Grant, 2017]). As such, the potential size of the 
negative effect on a firm’s market value (and ability to meet its financial obligations) is also large. 
Third, the size of the fossil fuel sector is large relative to the size of the global economy (globally, the 
sectors with the largest CO2 footprints make up around one third of equity and fixed income assets 
[Carney, 2015]). As such, those that hold assets issued by fossil fuel firms (both debt and equity) 
might end up suffering significant losses. These losses could then negatively affect other parts of the 
financial system and the rest of the economy. Countries in which fossil fuel firms raise a significant 
amount of capital are likely to be particularly exposed (CTI, 2011, 2013).  
Although the stranded assets literature is relatively large and varied, at the time of writing (June, 
2018) only a small number of papers have attempted to investigate the macroeconomic and 
financial effects of stranded assets using an economic model (Comerford and Spiganti [2017], Ploeg 
and Rezai [2016], Rozenberg et al. [2014, 2017]). However, these papers mainly focus on the ‘real’ 
effects of stranding – they do not attempt to investigate how asset stranding might affect the 
market values of fossil fuel firms, or how changes in the market values of these firms might feedback 
and affect the real economy.6 As such, the modelling of the main mechanism by which stranding is 
hypothesised to affect the economy (as argued in the rest of the stranded assets literature) – i.e. via 
the market value of financial assets – remains something of a gap in the literature. Filling this gap in 
the literature (for the stranding of capital assets) is the primary motivation for the research in this 
                                                          
6 Where the ‘real’ economy is the part of the economy that produces goods and services, while the financial 
economy is the part of the economy where financial assets are bought and sold.  
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dissertation. Thus, the primary aim of this dissertation is to model the economic mechanisms by 
which capital assets might be stranded, and the major macroeconomic and financial implications 
of both capital asset stranding and different transitions to a low carbon economy. The specific 
research questions this dissertation attempts to answer will be presented in Chapter 2, Section 2.6.  
The modelling approach used in this dissertation is the stock-flow consistent (SFC) approach. This 
approach was chosen as it has a number of features that will be important to the study of stranded 
assets. Perhaps the most important of these is that SFC models are able to integrate the real and 
financial sides of the economy into a single coherent framework (Nikiforos and Zezza, 2017). This is 
particularly important given that capital asset stranding (i.e. the stranding of real assets) is likely to 
affect the economy via its effect on the market value of fossil fuel companies (i.e. via financial 
markets). 
1.1 Dissertation structure 
The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on stranded assets. It discusses the empirical estimates of stranded 
assets, the factors that might cause assets to be stranded, and the potential financial and economic 
effects that might result from assets being stranded.  
Chapter 3 introduces the stock-flow consistent (SFC) methodological approach that is used to 
investigate the research questions. It also presents some of the theoretical and the empirical SFC 
literature. 
Chapter 4 presents a stock-flow consistent (SFC) model with an embedded input-output (IO) model 
that it is able to explore issues related to asset stranding and the transition to a low carbon 
economy. The chapter also provides a number of justifications for the model’s chosen structure. 
Chapter 5 introduces the parameter regimes each simulation is carried out under. Two sets of 
parameters are varied – those that determine how sensitive households and firms are to the price of 
energy goods, and those that determine how sensitive households are to the returns on financial 
assets. These parameter regimes are crucial to answering research questions (x) and (xi) (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.5). This chapter also presents the calibration of the model’s parameters.  
Chapter 6 introduces and presents the results of the simulations that investigate the effects of 
different types of transition to a low carbon economy. Four different transitions are simulated: a 
fast/unexpected transition; a fast/expected transition; a slow/unexpected transition; and a 
slow/expected transition. These simulations are intended to answer research questions (i) to (iii), 
and (x) and (xi) (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5). 
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Chapter 7 introduces and presents the results of the simulations that investigate the effects of 
various changes in market conditions. Five different changes are simulated: the introduction of a 
carbon tax; a change in agents’ preferences for purchasing securities from the fossil fuel sector; a 
change in banks’ preferences for lending to each energy sector at a particular rate of interest; an 
increase in the energy return on energy invested (EROEI) in the renewables sector; and a change in 
agents’ preferences for purchasing goods from the fossil fuel sector. These simulations are intended 
to answer research questions (iv) to (xi) (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5).  
Chapter 8 draws together the findings of the simulation experiments from Chapters 6 and 7, and 
discusses these findings with reference to the arguments put forward in the stranded assets 
literature. The policy implications of the research are also considered, as are the model’s 
shortcomings. Finally, a number of potential avenues for future research are discussed.  
Chapter 9 provides a short conclusion to the dissertation.  
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Chapter 2: The stranded assets literature 
The 2015 Paris Climate Agreement committed 196 nations to keep global temperature increases to 
“well below” 2°C (degrees Celsius) above pre-industrial levels, with a target of 1.5°C (United Nations, 
2015). Limiting temperature increases to 1.5 - 2°C will require a significant reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions over the next few decades, which will itself require a decrease in the amount of 
energy that is produced using fossil fuels (IPCC, 2015). The decline in the demand for fossil fuels will 
mean that a large proportion of fossil fuel reserves will need to remain unburned, or ‘stranded’ 
(Meinshausen et al. [2009], CTI [2011, 2013], IPCC [2014], McGlade and Ekins [2015], IEA/IRENA, 
[2017]). In addition, the fall in the demand for fossil fuels may also lead to the stranding of a 
significant quantity of the capital assets associated with these fossil fuels – such as those connected 
with the fossil fuel extraction, processing, transport and electricity generation sectors (CTI [2014a, 
2014b], Grant et al. [2017], Leaton and Grant [2017], Grant [2018]).  
The stranding of fossil fuel reserves and the capital assets associated with them is likely to affect 
both the firms whose assets are stranded and, to the extent that this in an unexpected 
phenomenon, those that invest in and lend to these firms. Jobs will be lost, financial assets will 
decrease in value, debts may be defaulted on and governments will lose an important source of 
revenue (Nelson et al., 2014). The more abrupt the change in demand for fossil fuels, the larger 
these negative effects are likely to be (Carney [2015], CTI [2013], Weyzig et al. [2014], Battiston et al. 
[2016], Gros et al. [2016]). In addition, abrupt transitions are likely to affect Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and may even threaten financial stability (Carney [2015], Battiston et al. [2016], Gros et al. 
[2016]).  
This chapter presents the literature on stranded assets. The chapter itself is split into four sections. 
Section 2.1 defines the term ‘stranded assets’. Section 2.2 looks at how a transition to a low carbon 
economy may cause asset stranding. Section 2.3 looks at how changes in market conditions might 
cause asset stranding. Section 2.4 examines how asset stranding might affect firms, investors, and 
the economy. Section 2.5 summarises the main claims of the stranded assets literature. Finally, 
Section 2.6 concludes and presents the research questions that motivate the rest of this dissertation. 
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2.1 Defining stranded assets 
The term ‘stranded assets’ has been defined in the literature in a number of ways. Table 2.1 provides 
a number of the most commonly used definitions. 
Table 2.1: Definitions of stranded assets 
Study Definition of stranded assets 
Caldecott et al.    
(2013b, p.2) 
“assets that have suffered from unanticipated or premature write-downs, 
devaluations, or conversion to liabilities”. 
Generation 
Foundation 
(2013, p.21) 
“an asset which loses economic value well ahead of its anticipated useful life, 
whether that is a result of changes in legislation, regulation, market forces, 
disruptive innovation, societal norms, or environmental shocks”. 
IEA            
(2013b, p.98) 
“those investments which have already been made but which, at some time 
prior to the end of their economic life (as assumed at the investment decision 
point), are no longer able to earn an economic return, as a result of changes in 
the market and regulatory environment brought about by climate policy”. 
Paun et al. 
(2015, p.3) 
Assets “which have suffered from devaluations or conversion to liabilities prior 
to the end of their economic life”. 
IEA/IRENA 
(2017, p.80) 
“the remaining book value of assets substituted before the end of their 
anticipated technical lifetimes, and without recovery of any remaining value, to 
achieve 2050 decarbonisation targets.” 
CTI           
(2018a) 
“fossil fuel supply and generation resources which, at some time prior to the 
end of their economic life (as assumed at the investment decision point), are 
no longer able to earn an economic return (i.e. meet the company’s internal 
rate of return), as a result of changes associated with the transition to a low-
carbon economy”. 
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If we consider these for a moment, we can see that the definitions found in Generation Foundation 
(2013), IEA (2013b), IEA/IRENA (2017) and CTI (2018a) contains two elements. The first element is an 
effect or action, which, if achieved, causes the asset to be defined as stranded (e.g. the loss of an 
economic return, a devaluation, etc.). The second element is a cause – i.e. something that causes the 
effect or action to occur (e.g. a transition to a low carbon economy, climate change legislation). The 
definitions of Paun et al. (2015) and Caldecott et al. (2013b) only contain effects/actions. 
The definitions have some similarities. For example, IEA (2013b) and CTI (2018a) both base their 
definitions on the loss of an economic return, although CTI (2018a) define the cause of the loss as a 
transition to a low carbon economy, while IEA (2013b) define the cause as climate policy. Similarly, 
to CTI (2018a), IEA/IRENA (2017) focus on a transition to a low carbon economy as the cause of asset 
stranding, although unlike CTI (2018a), they base their definition on a loss in book value. Unlike 
IEA/IRENA (2017) and CTI (2018a), the Generation Foundation (2013) do not argue that a transition 
to a low carbon economy is a cause of stranding, rather they focus on a change in legislation (like 
IEA, 2013b) along with market forces, disruptive innovation, societal norms, and environmental 
shocks. 
The differences between these definitions show that there is not a consensus as to how to define 
stranded assets. In particular, there is some disagreement about what might cause assets to be 
stranded.  As I hope the rest of this chapter will make clear, asset stranding can be caused by a large 
number of different factors, including both a transition to a low carbon economy and by a change in 
market conditions (see Section 2.3). As such, the ‘cause’ parts of the above definitions are somewhat 
superfluous. Removing the cause from the definition (as do Paun et al. [2015] and Caldecott [2017]) 
allows the definition to focus on what asset stranding actually is – which is, at a very basic level, 
unanticipated or premature lost value (IEA/IRENA, 2017). Indeed, Caldecott (2017) argues that the 
definition in Caldecott et al. (2013b) is a meta definition that encompasses all of the definitions. 
Thus, in what follows, Caldecott et al.’s (2013b) definition will be used to define stranded assets.  
2.2 Asset stranding due to a transition to a low carbon economy  
This section presents the literature that attempts to estimate the assets that are at risk of stranding 
due to a transition to a low carbon economy. Section 2.2.1 looks at these estimates at the global 
level, while Section 2.2.2 presents the estimates by fossil fuel type, region and company. Section 
2.2.3 looks at how the speed of a transition to a low carbon economy might affect asset stranding. 
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2.2.1 Global estimates of potential asset stranding  
Carbon dioxide can remain in the atmosphere for several centuries, and it is the stock of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide, rather than annual flows, that influences the overall global temperature 
(Allen et al., 2009). Thus, it is useful to think in terms of a global ‘carbon budget’ that relates 
cumulative carbon emissions over a period of time to the probability of keeping temperature rises  
within a specific threshold (e.g. 1.5°C or 2°C). These carbon budgets can then be compared to the 
amount of carbon embedded in fossil fuel reserves and resources. Because the carbon embedded in 
reserves and resources exceeds the 1.5°C and 2°C carbon budgets, these comparisons can give an 
idea of the quantity of fossil fuel reserves that will need to be left unburned – i.e. stranded – in order 
to adhere to a 1.5°C or 2°C carbon budget. 
The first paper to compare a 2°C carbon budget to an estimate of the amount of carbon embedded 
in reserves was Meinshausen et al. (2009).7 It argues that around 65% of all fossil fuel reserves will 
need to remain in the ground in order to keep temperature rises within 2°C (with a 50% probability). 
The paper went on to become one of the most cited environmental studies in recent years8 and 
inspired a number of other studies on the subject. The results of these studies are summarised in 
Table 2.2. As the table makes clear, even if we take the most optimistic estimate for the 2°C carbon 
budget and the most pessimistic estimate for the amount of carbon embedded in reserves, at least 
65% of current fossil fuel reserves will need to be left unburned to keep global warming within a 2°C 
threshold (with a 50% probability).  
It should be pointed out that all of the studies in Table 2.2 use a 2°C threshold, rather than the 1.5°C 
target from the Paris Climate Agreement. Likewise, much of the literature on stranded assets 
presented in subsequent sections assumes a 2°C warming threshold. The main reason for this is that 
much of the stranded assets literature was published before the Paris Climate Agreement. In 
addition, only a small amount of research has been published that explores how a 1.5°C target might 
be achieved (exceptions include Rogelj et al. [2018] and van Vuuren [2018]). Consequently, in what  
                                                          
7 According to IEA (2013c, p.17): “Resources are those volumes that have yet to be fully characterised, or that 
present technical difficulties or are costly to extract, for example where technologies that permit their 
extraction in an environmentally sound and cost-effective manner are still to be developed. Reserves are those 
volumes that are expected to be produced economically using today’s technology; they are often associated 
with a project that is already well-defined or ongoing”. 
8 According to Griffin et al. (2015), Thomson Reuters' Web of Science ranks Meinshausen et al. (2009) in the 
top 0.1% of science papers published in 2009. 
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9 CTI (2018b) point out that care should be taken when comparing carbon budgets, as the results of each study 
are often not directly comparable. There are a number of potential reasons for this. For example, studies often 
differ by the time periods they cover, the types of carbon emissions they consider, the interpretation of when 
the pre-industrial period ends, and the probability they place on the carbon budget keeping warming to within 
2°C. Moreover, the method used to calculate carbon budgets vary by study. 
10 IPCC (2014) presents multiple scenarios. The scenario presented here is for the 500 parts per million (ppm) 
CO2 equivalent in 2100, with overshoot to 530ppm CO2 equivalent. 
Table 2.2: 2°C carbon budgets9 and carbon embedded in reserves and resources 
Study 
Estimate of 
carbon budget in 
gigatonnes (Gt) 
of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) equivalents 
CO2 embedded in 
fossil fuel 
reserves/ 
resources in Gt 
Time period 
covered by 
carbon budget (in 
years) 
Probability of 
keeping within 
2°C temperature 
rise 
Meinshausen     
et al.                  
(2009) 
1000 
2,800                      
(in reserves) 
2000 - 2050 
50% 
1440 25% 
CTI                        
(2011) 
565 
2795                   
(in reserves) 
2000 - 2050 
80% 
886 50% 
CTI                        
(2013) 
900 
2860                   
(in reserves) 
2013 - 2049 
80% 
1075 50% 
IPCC           
(2014)10 
860 - 1180 - 2011 - 2050 33 - 66% 
McGlade            
and Ekins            
(2015) 
- 
2900                   
(in reserves).  
11,000               
(in resources). 
- - 
IEA/IRENA           
(2017) 
880 - 2015 - 2100 66% 
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follows, much of the discussion of stranded assets will focus on the 2°C threshold rather than the 
more ambitious 1.5°C target. 
Each carbon budget can also be compared to the ‘committed cumulative carbon emissions’ of the 
current and planned capital assets used in the transport and energy production sectors. (See 
Chapter 1, Footnote 2, for the definition of committed cumulative carbon emissions). If estimates of 
committed cumulative carbon emissions exceed the 1.5°C and 2°C carbon budgets, the comparison 
will give an idea of the quantity of capital assets (in the power generation and transport sectors) that 
will need to be retired early – i.e. stranded – in order to adhere to a 1.5°C or 2°C carbon budget. 
Davis et al. (2010) look at how the emissions from the energy sector (including transportation) are 
likely to impact future carbon emissions and warming. They find that this existing infrastructure will 
lead to mean warming of 1.3°C in 2060, concluding therefore that “the sources of the most 
threatening emissions have yet to be built” (Davis et al., 2010, p.1330). Guivarch and Hallegatte 
(2011) argue that the results of Davis et al. (2010) “could easily, but erroneously, lead to the 
conclusion that the climate policies needed to reach the 2°C target can disregard existing 
infrastructure and focus on what is still to be built” (Guivarch and Hallegatte, 2011, p.801). They 
point out that Davis et al. (2010) ignore non-CO2 greenhouse gases and do not take account of 
inertias in future emissions due to the existing transport infrastructure. They find that taking account 
of these factors leads to warming in 2060 of 1.71°C in their ‘Middle’ scenario and 1.78°C in their 
‘Upper scenario’. The authors conclude that ”these results show that reaching the 2°C target without 
capital retrofit or early retirement appears extremely difficult” (Guivarch and Hallegatte, 2011, 
p.804), in particular because the scenario they carry out their analysis under (the Image RCP 3PD 
scenario from van Vuuren et al. [2007]) is “particularly optimistic”. 
Pfeiffer et al. (2016, 2018) provide estimates of the committed cumulative carbon emissions of the 
global stock of electricity generation assets. Pfeiffer et al. (2016) estimate the commitment year for 
fossil fuel power plants to be 2017 (see Footnote 4, Chapter 1, for a definition of the commitment 
year). Pfeiffer et al. (2018) perform the same analysis using an updated dataset, which brings 
forward the estimate for the commitment year for 1.5 - 2°C warming to 2011. For 2 - 3°C warming, 
they estimate the commitment year to be 2014. These findings imply that between 10 to 20% of the 
operating capacity of fossil fuel power stations would need to be stranded, if the construction of 
planned and under construction fossil fuel generators is suspended straight away. The authors argue 
that this stranding would occur mostly in Asia, due to the high proportion of current (64%) and 
planned (65%) committed emissions that are located there.  
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2.2.2 Regional, firm and asset level estimates of potential asset stranding  
Comparing a carbon budget to the carbon embedded in fossil fuel reserves or committed cumulative 
carbon emissions only identifies the overall quantity, or proportion, of fossil fuel reserves or 
generation assets to be stranded. While these figures are interesting in their own right, the 
implications of the stranded assets thesis only become clear once the individual assets or groups of 
assets at risk of stranding are identified.  
In order to identify the individual assets at risk of stranding, it is first necessary to specify a pathway 
for carbon emissions over a period of time (an emissions pathway) that exhausts a given carbon 
budget. This emissions pathway can then be split between emissions from different sources – 
creating a demand projection for each energy source that is consistent with the overall emissions 
pathway. As discussed in Section 2.2.2, demand projections can also be split by region or market. 
The next step is to calculate the stocks of reserves and capital assets that are required (through 
time) to supply the demand projection. These stocks can then be compared against current and 
planned stocks of fossil fuel reserves and capital assets. An excess stock of reserve and capital assets 
can then be identified (usually by cost), with unneeded assets said to be at risk of stranding (Section 
2.2.2). 
2.2.2.1 Emissions pathways 
An emissions pathway shows the level of carbon emissions over a period of time that exhausts a 
given carbon budget. There exists a large number of studies that detail emissions pathways 
consistent with keeping global warming within 2°C, but hardly any studies that look at the emissions 
pathways consistent with the 1.5°C threshold (van Vuuren, 2018). While it is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation to discuss the emissions pathways literature in any detail, a few points will be made 
regarding how negative emissions and carbon capture and storage technologies can influence 
emissions pathways, and through this impact the level of stranded assets. 
Negative emissions technologies such as Bioenergy combined with Carbon Capture and Storage 
(BECCS) remove CO2 from the atmosphere and store it underground. According to van Vuuren 
(2018), 104 of the 114 2°C scenarios assessed by the IPCC involved significant use of a negative 
emissions technology (most commonly BECCS plus reforestation). The ability to remove CO2 from 
the atmosphere later in the century allows more fossil fuels to be burned than would otherwise be 
the case, thereby reducing the speed at which any energy transition has to take place. It also means 
that the energy sector can absorb carbon from the atmosphere later in the century. However, a 
number of authors (e.g. Anderson and Peters [2016], de Coninck and Benson [2014], IEA/IRENA 
[2017], Smith et al. [2016]) have called into question the viability of deploying BECCS at the scale 
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commonly depicted in the literature. If BECCS is not available at these levels, fossil fuel use may 
need to be lower than is assumed in the scenarios where it is used to keep global warming to within 
1.5 - 2°C.  
Carbon capture and storage (without bioenergy) allows for the continued use of fossil fuel fired 
power plants without emitting carbon into the atmosphere. The 450 scenario in IEA (2013a, 2015a), 
assumes significant uptake of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology prior to 2050, with either 
60% (IEA, 2013a) or 75% (IEA, 2015a) of coal-fired power plants fitted with CCS technology by 2050. 
However, a number of authors have argued that the deployment of CCS technology will be relatively 
limited before 2050. For example, in their study of stranded assets, McGlade and Ekins (2015) 
assume that CCS has a slow build rate and is only introduced after 2025, so that CCS only allows for 
around 6% more coal, 3% more gas, and 2% more oil to be burned globally (until 2050). CTI (2013) 
and Grant and Spedding (2015) also contend that CCS is unlikely to significantly enable increased 
fossil fuel consumption before 2050, with Grant and Spedding (2015, p.42) arguing that “even 
aggressive CCS deployment is likely to increase permissible consumption of fossil fuels (chiefly coal 
and natural gas) by only 12 - 14%”.  
The key point to take from the above is that negative emissions technologies and CCS often play an 
important role in 1.5°C and 2°C scenarios, even though there is evidence to suggest that they may 
not be available at the assumed levels. If these technologies are not available at the assumed levels 
then less fossil fuels will be able to be burned while keeping warming to within a particular threshold 
– with more stranding the likely result. Conversely, if these technologies are available at a higher 
level than is assumed in the literature, then more fossil fuels will be able to be burned while keeping 
warming within a particular threshold, and consequently the likely quantity of stranded assets will 
be lower.  
2.2.2.2 Demand projections  
The underlying principle in constructing a demand projection that is consistent with a particular 
emissions pathway (and therefore with a particular carbon budget) is that for each primary energy 
supply (e.g. coal, gas, solar, etc.) that supplies a primary energy demand (power, transport, etc.), an 
energy supply that produces more carbon should be substituted with an energy supply that 
produces less carbon, where possible. Consequently, the determination of a demand projection 
depends on two features of each type of energy supply. First, the amount of carbon emitted by the 
energy supply, and second, the potential ease with which the demand for the energy supply can be 
reduced. In general, demand reductions are only possible via substitution with other energy sources 
(i.e. an increase in energy supplied from another source leaving the overall supply of energy 
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unchanged) or through efficiency savings (i.e. a reduction in the overall demand for energy or a 
reduction in the demand for energy from that source). 
For example, in electricity generation (a primary energy demand), it is both possible and desirable to 
substitute gas for coal (types of primary energy supply). This is because coal-fired power plants 
produce around double the emissions of combined-cycle gas-fired power plants (IEA, 2013b), and 
because coal and gas-fired power plants have similar features (they are both dispatchable and they 
can both be ramped up and down quickly at low cost).11 Conversely, it may be more difficult to 
substitute electricity generated by coal and gas-fired power plants with electricity generated from 
other sources (with the exception of hydroelectric energy). Nuclear power plants cannot be ramped 
up and down quickly (if at all) or at a low cost, while renewables (without storage technology) are 
intermittent (i.e. not dispatchable). However, if coal-fired power plants are being used for base load 
rather than for peak load electricity generation, nuclear energy will also be a good substitute for gas. 
Conversely, in transport (a type of primary energy demand), it may be more difficult to reduce the 
demand for oil (a type of primary energy supply) by substituting oil for other energy sources, at least 
in the short to medium term. There are two main reasons for this. First, in most places the 
infrastructure required to support electric vehicles is not yet in place (IEA, 2015b). Second, electric 
batteries, biofuels and natural gas face energy density issues that limit their use for long distance 
travel and certain types of freight transport (Meyer and Brinker [2014], IEA [2015b]).  
Consequently, a reduction in oil demand for use in transport will have to come from either efficiency 
savings in vehicles or a reduction in vehicle use. Both Spedding et al. (2013) and Paun et al. (2015) 
argue that efficiency savings in personal transport are possible, with Spedding et al. (2013) arguing 
that a 40% improvement in the mileage per gallon of personal transport vehicles is possible by 2020. 
Since personal transport accounts for 60% of the demand for oil for use in transport, these efficiency 
savings are equivalent to a reduction in the demand for oil of around 30%, or 6 - 7 million barrels a 
day (Spedding et al., 2013). In addition to efficiency savings via improvements in vehicle efficiency, 
the overall demand for oil might also be reduced by replacing oil-fired power plants with other, less 
polluting forms of electricity generation. 
As a result of the above, demand projections consistent with a 1.5 - 2°C threshold often envisage 
relatively large reductions in coal consumption, smaller (although still significant) reductions in oil 
consumption, and relatively stable levels of gas consumption to 2040 - 2050. Likewise, the energy 
                                                          
11 Although the production and distribution of natural gas results in methane emissions which offset part of 
this gain (IEA, 2013b). 
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transitions literature often presents scenarios in which coal-fired power plants are replaced, at least 
initially, with gas-fired ones, before being replaced with even lower carbon-producing forms of 
electricity production later on (see for example: Bowen and Fankhauser [2012], CCC [2013], National 
Grid [2014], IEA [2013a]). Examples of demand projections that keep warming within (or well within) 
2°C can be found in the IEA World Energy Outlooks (e.g. IEA 2013a, 2015a, 2016, 2017a).  
The 2016 World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2016) presents a demand projection (the 450 Scenario) for the 
period 2014 - 2040 that is consistent with keeping warming within 2°C. In the projection the demand 
for coal falls from 3,926 - 2,000 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) per annum (p.a.), the demand 
for natural gas increases from 2,893 - 3,301 Mtoe p.a., and the demand for oil falls from 4,266 - 
3,326 Mtoe p.a. (all between 2014 - 2040).  
The 2017 World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2017a) replaces the 450 scenario with a ‘Sustainable 
Development Scenario’ that is “consistent with the direction needed to achieve the objectives of the 
Paris Agreement, including a peak in emissions being reached as soon as possible, followed by a 
substantial decline” (IEA, 2017a, p.38). The change in the target level of warming between the 2016 
and 2017 World Energy Outlooks – from within 2°C to well within 2°C – leads to a small reduction in 
the overall level of fossil fuel use compared to IEA (2016). As such, IEA (2017a) present a demand 
projection for the period 2015-2040 in which the demand for coal falls from 3,837 - 1,777 Mtoe p.a., 
the demand for natural gas increases from 2,938 - 3,458 Mtoe p.a., and the demand for oil falls from 
4,327 - 3,306 Mtoe p.a..  
2.2.2.3 Estimating stranded assets  
Within the literature, two approaches have been used to identify assets at risk of stranding at the 
regional, firm, or asset level. In the first approach, a mathematical model is used to predict stranded 
assets at a global or regional level, while in the second approach a carbon supply cost curve 
methodology is used to predict stranded assets at the market or company level. While the 
approaches do have their differences, at their core they both utilise a supply and demand 
framework to compare demand estimates for each energy source against the reserve and capital 
assets that are necessary to supply that level of demand. More precisely, they compare a demand 
projection (that is consistent with a particular carbon budget) for each energy source (in each 
market, through time), against an estimate of the fossil fuel reserves and associated capital assets 
that are required to supply that level of demand (in each market, through time). The actual 
individual assets at risk of stranding are then identified based on relative costs or some other 
criteria.  
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The first (model) approach is used by McGlade and Ekins (2015), IEA (2013a, 2013b, 2015a, 2015b, 
2016, 2017a) and IEA/IRENA (2017). McGlade and Ekins (2015) use the TIAM - UCL integrated 
assessment model (as presented in Anandarajah et al. [2011]) to determine the distribution of 
stranded assets that maximises social welfare whilst giving a 60% chance of staying within a carbon 
budget of around 1,100 gigatonnes (Gt). Conversely, IEA (2013a, 2013b, 2015a, 2015b, 2016, 2017a) 
and IEA/IRENA (2017) use the World Energy Model (IEA, 2017b) to provide “quantitative projections 
of long-term energy trends” (IEA, 2015a, p.34). Thus, unlike in McGlade and Ekins (2015), the 
purpose of the IEA reports (2013a, 2013b, 2015a, 2015b, 2016, 2017a) is not to directly identify 
assets at risk of stranding, but rather to discuss world energy trends. However, because one of the 
primary outputs of their model is energy demand and supply by energy source and region, these 
reports often contain predictions about stranded assets. This is particularly true of the IEA/IRENA 
(2017) paper. 
The second (carbon supply cost curve) approach is used by CTI (2014a, 2014b), Grant et al. (2017), 
Leaton and Grant (2017), and Grant (2018).12 The carbon supply cost curve methodology works by 
calculating the breakeven price13 of bringing fossil fuel assets from different sources to a market, and 
then lines up each asset from the lowest to the highest breakeven price to create a supply curve for 
that market. A demand projection consistent with a 2°C carbon budget (from the IEA’s 450 Scenario) 
for that asset/market is then overlaid onto the supply curve. All the assets to the right of where the 
demand curve crosses the supply curve are then labelled as being at risk of stranding. The underlying 
logic of the approach is that, for each fossil fuel type in each market, only those projects with the 
lowest breakeven price should be produced to meet a given a level of demand.  
Before moving on, it is worth noting that both the model and the carbon supply cost curve 
approaches consider the issue of stranded assets from an economic perspective – they attempt to 
ascertain an economically optimal distribution of stranded assets. In the real world, however, factors 
other than economics are likely to play an important role in determining the distribution of stranded 
assets both between and within countries. For example, Ritchie and Dowlatabadi (2015a) point out 
                                                          
12 The method used by Grant et al. (2017) is similar to the carbon supply cost curve, only curves are 
constructed using net cash margin (i.e. the value of the products less cash costs) rather than costs. This is 
because the report by Grant et al. (2017) focuses on downstream oil and gas assets. These assets often 
produce multiple products with different prices and yields, so that the simple cost curve is not appropriate. 
13 The breakeven price is the price of either oil or gas that is required to give the project a net present value of 
zero when using an internal rate of return of either 10% (CTI, 2014a and 2014b) or 15% (Leaton and Grant, 
2017). 
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that international debt and debtor relationships will put pressure on state-owned companies to 
monetise their reserves. They also argue out that nations that derive a significant amount of their 
income from fossil fuels (like Saudi Arabia) are likely to continue to extract and sell their reserves 
until they are able to supplement these revenues with other sources of income. Given these 
pressures, it is probably better to consider the distributions of stranded assets presented in the next 
section as an ideal, rather than a likely outcome. Achieving the economically optimal outcome is 
likely to require a method to compensate those countries that stand to lose from a transition to a 
low-carbon economy.  
The rest of this section presents empirical estimates of stranded assets. The section is split into three 
parts. Part (a) deals with coal assets, part (b) gas assets, and part (c) oil assets.  
(a) Coal and coal related assets  
McGlade and Ekins (2015) find that maximising social welfare whilst keeping temperature increases 
to within 2°C results in the stranding of 88% (without CCS) or 82% (with CCS) of coal reserves by 
2050. IEA/IRENA (2017) find that almost 80% of coal reserves will be stranded by 2050. The 
discrepancy between the results can be partly explained by IEA/IRENA (2017) assuming a 
significantly higher uptake of CCS than McGlade and Ekins (2015). Looking by region, McGlade and 
Ekins, (2015) find that the Middle East has the highest percentage of its coal reserves stranded 
(99%), while the Other Developing Asian (ODA) countries have the lowest (60%). The percentage of 
coal reserves stranded for Europe and the US are found to be 89% and 95%, respectively (McGlade 
and Ekins, 2015). 
The literature argues that a reduced demand for coal (see Section 2.2.2.2) will make most of the new 
investment in coalmines and coal-fired power plants unnecessary. On the mining side, CTI (2014b) 
estimate that existing coalmines almost meet the projected global demand for coal, while IEA 
(2015a) find that around 75% of coking and steam coal production demand until 2040 can be 
supplied by the ‘in-situ’ reserves of currently operating mines (in-situ reserves are a sub-set of 
proved reserves). Nevertheless, a number of companies continue to invest based on projections of a 
stable or increasing demand for coal. Caldecott et al. (2013b) identify a number of large Australian 
coalmines whose planned investment expenditures put them at risk of stranding. They point out that 
these companies are investing based on the assumption of increasing or stable demand from China, 
even though China plans to reduce its demand for coal due to environment-related factors.  
On the electricity generation side, IEA (2015a) point out that keeping temperature increases within 
2°C means that coal-fired plants will have to reduce their share of global electricity generation from 
40% to 12% by 2040, and that 75% of the remaining capacity will need to be generated by CCS 
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equipped plants. Such a high CCS uptake may however be unrealistic – a number of authors (e.g. CTI 
[2013], de Coninck and Benson [2014], McGlade and Ekins [2015]) have argued that there are 
relatively limited prospects for adopting CCS at scale before 2050. If these authors are correct, then 
the overall percentage of electricity generated by coal-fired power plants will have to fall 
significantly below the 12% envisaged by IEA (2015a). This percentage will be reduced further if 
temperature increases are to be kept within the 1.5°C threshold, and even further still if negative 
emissions technologies and/or CCS are not available at the assumed scale (as in van Vuuren et al., 
2018).  
Different types of coal-fired power plants produce different amounts of pollution and use different 
amounts of water. As such, different types of power plants may have different risks of being 
stranded by climate change, clean air, and water use legislation. For example, Caldecott et al. (2015) 
argues that ‘subcritical’ coal fired power plants are more likely to be stranded by climate change, air 
quality, or water usage legislation, as these plants are the least efficient and most polluting type of 
coal fired power plant, emitting 75% more carbon and using 67% more water than the average 
‘advanced ultra-supercritical’ coal fired power plant (the most up-to-date type of coal-fired power 
plant).14 At the country level, Caldecott et al. (2015) identify Indian and Chinese coal-fired power 
plants as being particularly susceptible to regulations related to air pollution and water use, while at 
the regional level, Nelson et al. (2014) identify developing countries as being at risk of asset 
stranding in the future, as these countries are currently planning to significantly increase their 
subcritical generation capacity.  
The idea that subcritical plants are more at risk of stranding can also be found in IEA (2013a). In their 
2°C demand projection, IEA (2013a) assume that the construction of new subcritical plants is 
stopped, that the output of subcritical plants that are in operation but have not yet repaid their 
investment costs is reduced, and that the subcritical plants that are still in operation and have repaid 
their investment costs are retired or idled. These actions lead to a quarter (290 gigawatts) of 
subcritical generation being closed by 2020 (IEA, 2013a).  
(b) Gas and gas related assets 
McGlade and Ekins (2015) find that maximising social welfare whilst keeping temperature increases 
to within 2°C results in the stranding of 52% (without CCS) or 49% (with CCS) of natural gas reserves 
by 2050. According to IEA/IRENA (2017), almost 40% of gas reserves will be stranded by 2050. Once 
                                                          
14 According to Caldecott et al. (2015), of the electricity generated by coal-fired power plants, 75% comes from 
‘subcritical’ plants, 22% is from ‘supercritical’ plants, and 3% is from ‘ultra-supercritical’ plants. 
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again, the discrepancy between the results can be partly explained by IEA/IRENA assuming a 
significantly higher uptake of CCS than McGlade and Ekins (2015). McGlade and Ekins (2015) find 
that different regions experience markedly different levels of stranding. The Middle East has the 
highest percentage of its gas reserves stranded (61%), while America and Europe have the lowest 
(both 6%). 
The small increase in the projected demand for natural gas until 2040 (see Section 2.2.2.2) means 
most of the capital assets associated with natural gas extraction and processing are not at risk of 
stranding. However, Leaton and Grant (2017) argue that the planned investment expenditures of 
companies in this sector will produce an amount of capital in excess of what is required to supply the 
demand for gas in a 2°C world, and that this will put gas capital assets at risk of stranding.15 For 
example, in their study Leaton and Grant (2017) estimate that around 31% of the planned upstream 
capital expenditures by gas companies are unnecessary. Breaking down their analysis by market, the 
authors find that the percentage of unnecessary capital expenditures to be 60% in the liquid natural 
gas market, 60% in the North American market, and 37% in the European market (conversely, the 
rest of the world requires all of its capital expenditures). Interestingly, the authors note that despite 
their high costs, capital expenditures that seek to extract natural gas from shale plays are at a low 
risk of stranding, as the majority of the gas from these plays is produced in the first couple of years. 
Despite there being a slight increase in the projected demand for natural gas until 2040, the IEA 450 
Scenario (IEA, 2015a) estimates that the share of electricity generated by gas-fired power plants will 
need to fall from 22% to 16% between 2020 and 2040. Nevertheless, and despite concerns over 
fugitive emissions, gas is often seen as a bridging fuel for a transition to a low-carbon economy. 
However, adhering to a 2°C carbon budget implies that newly built gas-fired power plants will need 
to be replaced at some point in the future, potentially before the end of their economic lives.  
Gas-fired plants may also be stranded if they end up operating at a lower than expected level of 
capacity utilisation. For example, in the IEA 450 Scenario (IEA, 2013a), gas-fired power plants are 
only used as a back-up to intermittent renewables electricity generation, so that the capacity 
utilisation of these plants is predicted to be just 15% (versus 30% in the New Policies Scenario). A 
below normal level of capacity utilisation calls into question these plants’ commercial viability, 
unless the plant owners are compensated for maintaining their capacity. Without these 
compensating payments, these assets are likely to be written down, and as such will be classified as 
stranded according to the definition of stranded assets found in Caldecott (2013b). 
                                                          
15 Although the new capital assets will not necessarily be those that are stranded.  
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(c) Oil and oil related assets 
Estimates of the amount of oil reserves at risk of stranding vary by study. For example, for their 2°C 
demand projection, IEA (2013a) find that 55% of oil reserves will be stranded by 2035 while IEA 
(2015a) estimate that 40% (in the New Policies Scenario)  50% (in the 450 Scenario) of oil reserves 
will be stranded by 2040. McGlade and Ekins (2015) find that maximising social welfare whilst 
keeping temperature increases to within 2°C results in the stranding of 35% (without CCS) or 33% 
(with CCS) of oil reserves by 2050. IEA/IRENA (2017) estimate that almost 50% of oil reserves are at 
risk of stranding.  
McGlade and Ekins (2015) also break down the level of stranding by region. Canada is estimated to 
have the highest percentage of its oil reserves stranded (75%), while America has the lowest (9%) 
(without CCS). The Middle East, where most of the world’s proved oil reserves are located, is 
projected to have 38% of its reserves stranded (in both CCS scenarios). These results correspond 
with the geographical distributions discussed by Spedding et al. (2013), CTI (2014a), and Leaton and 
Grant (2017), who all argue that unconventional reserves (e.g. oil sands, deepwater oil, West Africa 
and US shale oil and heavy oil) are most at risk of being stranded due to their high extraction and 
processing costs.  
Despite the projected fall in the demand for oil until 2040 (see Section 2.2.2.2), the literature argues 
that most of the upstream oil sector’s already existing capital assets are not at risk of stranding. For 
example, IEA (2013a, 2015a) and IEA/IRENA (2017) argue that current upstream oil capital assets are 
unlikely to be stranded, because 2°C oil demand projections (up until 2050) significantly exceed the 
amount of oil in currently developed reserves. IEA (2015) points out that 2°C demand projections 
will require an additional amount of reserves to be developed that are equivalent “to between 50 - 
60% of today’s proved oil and gas reserves” (IEA, 2015a, p151). Hence, as long as upstream 
producers invest appropriately, wasted capital expenditures will be limited by previously incurred 
exploration costs (which only account for around 15% of total upstream capital expenditures) (IEA, 
2013a).  
It is not, however, a foregone conclusion that companies in the upstream sector will adjust their 
investment expenditures in line with a 2°C carbon budget. For example, Leaton and Grant (2017) 
find that 33% of oil companies’ planned business-as-usual capital expenditures up until 2025 will not 
be needed in a 2°C world. This is an example of the point raised by Grant and Spedding (2015) in 
their response to Meyer and Brinker (2014). There, Grant and Spedding (2015, p.7) argue that: 
“every dollar released from proved reserves that is reinvested into new resources merely shifts value 
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forward, often by 10 - 20 years, transferring it to future projects which are at greater risk from 
market, policy and technology changes”. 
IEA (2013a) discusses the risk of capital assets being stranded in the downstream sector. They argue 
that current downstream capital assets are at considerable risk of stranding if there is a downturn in 
the demand for oil. The reason for this is that “refinery investments are large, capital intensive and 
long-term, and need high utilisation rates to make an economic return” (IEA, 2013a, p.436). Grant et 
al. (2017) analyse the effect of such a fall in demand on the oil industry’s refining assets (using the 
IEA 450 Scenario demand projection). They find that maintaining industry utilisation levels at 75% in 
a 2°C world would mean that approximately a quarter of existing oil refinery capacity would need to 
close.  
Spedding et al. (2008) also focus on downstream assets. In their paper, they argue that because 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries are likely to take the 
lead on climate change policy, oil refineries located in these countries are more likely to be subject 
to environmental legislation than those located in non-OECD countries. Interestingly, the IEA’s 450 
scenario (IEA, 2015b) makes a similar assumption.16 If oil refineries located in OECD countries are 
subject to environmental legislation while those located in non-OECD countries are not, OECD 
located refineries will be put at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis those located in non-OECD 
countries – potentially putting these refineries at risk of stranding. The stranding of fossil fuel assets 
may therefore result from climate policies not being universally adopted.  
2.2.3 Asset stranding due to the speed of a transition to a low carbon economy 
The speed of a transition to a low carbon economy may also affect the level of stranding, with faster 
transitions increasing the risk of stranding – even if firms are able to correctly estimate the demand 
trajectory for their output as the point at which the transition starts, and adjust their investment 
expenditures accordingly. This is because faster transitions imply a faster fall in the demand for fossil 
fuel firms’ outputs, relative to the rate at which these firms’ assets decline/depreciate. For example, 
oil fields will be stranded if the rate at which the demand for oil falls exceeds the rate at which oil 
fields naturally decline (on average). Similarly, fossil fuel power stations will be stranded if the 
                                                          
16 In the IEA 450 Scenario post 2020:  
“a CO2 price is adopted in the power generation and industry sectors in OECD countries and other 
major economies, at a level high enough to make investment in low-carbon technologies 
commercially attractive. This policy is implemented first in OECD countries and then progressively 
extended to other major economies.” (IEA, 2015b, p.33) 
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demand for electricity generated by fossil fuel power stations falls at a faster rate than the capacity 
of fossil power stations falls due to normal end of life plant closures. 
The relatively high natural rate of decline for oil and gas fields acts as a natural hedge against the 
stranding of these assets, as long as the transition to a low carbon economy occurs over a 
sufficiently long period of time. For example, in the IEA/IRENA (2017) 66% 2°C Scenario, the 
maximum decline in oil demand is just over 3.5% a year, while the maximum decline in gas demand 
is less than 2.5% a year. This compares to an observed decline rate for conventional oil and gas fields 
that have passed their point of peak production of around 6% a year (or 9% a year if all investment 
in the field stops) (IEA [2016], IEA/IRENA [2017]). Hence, absent a very fast transition, these assets 
are unlikely to be stranded. Conversely, the relatively long lifespans/low deprecation rates of many 
of the capital assets associated with the fossil fuel sector puts these assets at risk of stranding due to 
a faster transition. For example, and as outlined above, fossil fuel power plants have an average 
lifespan of 40 years (Pfeiffer et al., 2016), while downstream assets are also very long lived (IEA, 
2013a) 
IEA/IRENA (2017) model how a ‘disjointed’ transition may affect stranding. In their model, they 
assume that no action is taken on climate change between 2015 and 2025, so that governments and 
companies invest on a business as usual basis. In 2025, a sudden shift in policy occurs that aims to 
keep warming within 2°C (with a 66% chance). This delay in action increases the speed of the 
transition (when compared to their normal, ‘undisjointed’ 66% 2°C scenario). They find that: 
“This is a hugely disruptive case for energy markets and the abrupt change in 2025 would pose 
enormous challenges to the industry. For example, from 2025, oil demand would need to fall by 
around 4% per year to 2050, one-third greater than the rate seen over the same period in the 66% 
2°C Scenario. Gas demand would need to decline 50% faster than in the 66% 2°C Scenario, while 
the pace of decline for coal would be over twice as fast. For a transition to materialise at such a 
pace, massive policy intervention would be required, leading to an unprecedented ramp up of 
capacity for low-carbon infrastructure.” (IEA/IRENA, 2017, p.112) 
The faster fall in demand leads to three times as much stranding as in the undisjointed 66% 2°C 
scenario  – stranded assets in the power sector are $80 billion (25%) higher, stranded assets in the 
upstream oil sector exceed $1 trillion, and stranded assets in the natural gas sector exceed $300 
billion. Coal has less of its assets stranded ($7 billion). IEA/IRENA (2017, p.113) point out that these 
results imply that “a disjointed energy sector transition would significantly increase the value of 
cumulative stranded assets, demonstrating the importance of early action on emission reductions to 
avoid unnecessary losses”. 
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IEA (2016) conduct a disjointed transition scenario for the oil industry, although unlike IEA/IRENA 
(2017), they experiment by varying the date at which the policy shift occurs (2025 vs. 2030). They 
also use the IEA 450 scenario – i.e. a 50% chance of 2°C scenario – rather than a 66% chance of 2°C 
scenario (as do IEA/IRENA, 2017). As in IEA/IRENA (2017), a disjointed transition is found to 
significantly increase asset stranding, with later shifts leading to more severe impacts. IEA (2016, 
p.159) thus argue that “the overall message is clear: the later the transition to a 2 °C trajectory is 
deferred, the more difficult and disruptive it promises to be for the upstream oil industry”.  
2.3 Asset stranding due to a change in market conditions  
The previous section pointed out that keeping temperature increases to within 1.5 - 2°C will 
necessitate the stranding of some fossil fuel capital assets and reserves. It also pointed out that 
more capital and reserves are being developed/produced than will be needed in a 1.5 - 2°C world, 
and that this unneeded investment will lead to the stranding of additional reserves and capital 
assets. As such, the previous section argued that some stranding is inevitable, but that additional 
stranding can be avoided if fossil fuel firms are able to anticipate the transition to a low carbon 
economy and adjust their investment expenditures accordingly. The previous section therefore 
emphasised the importance of expectations in determining the overall quantity of assets that might 
be stranded due to a transition to a low carbon economy. It also argued that early action will be 
important to avoid additional stranding.  
As well as arguing that a transition to a low carbon economy is likely to strand assets, the literature 
also emphasises that many of the assets in the fossil fuel sector are relatively long lived and have 
long payback periods, and that these long lifespans/payback periods expose these investments to 
stranding via unexpected future changes in market conditions. This is particularly true for certain 
capital assets. For example, and as outlined above, fossil fuel power plants have an average lifespan 
of around 40 years (Pfeiffer et al., 2016). Likewise, the capital assets in the downstream industry are 
also relatively long lived (IEA [2013a], Grant et al. [2017]). This section discusses a number of 
different factors that might cause market conditions to change.  
It is important to note that while the factors that lead to a change in market conditions could be the 
cause of, or related to, a transition to a low carbon economy, they could also happen independently 
of any transition. Unlike the last section, the point here is not to quantify those assets at risk of 
stranding due to a transition to a low carbon economy; rather, it is to outline the factors that could 
cause market conditions to change, and, in so doing, strand assets.   
A change in market conditions that renders an asset unprofitable does not necessarily mean that the 
asset will be stranded straight away – the asset’s owner could keep operating the asset and hope 
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that market conditions change. Different types of producers (e.g. state/private, large/small, 
diversified/non-diversified) will have differing abilities to withstand losses. If the producer does 
choose to stop operating the asset, then they must decide between a permanent decommissioning 
and a temporary mothballing. This choice will depend on the relative costs of the two options, and 
probability the producer attaches to further changes in market conditions in the future (Paun et al., 
2015). 
The rest of this section presents the different factors identified in the literature that could cause 
market conditions to change. These factors are categorised under five headings: economic 
conditions, energy innovations, regulations and policy, financing conditions and social norms. These 
categories draw on and expand those found in Paun et al. (2015).  
2.3.1 Stranding due to a change in economic conditions  
Stranding due to a change in economic conditions refers to stranding that occurs due to a change in 
the price a firm is able to sell its output at (given costs), or a change in a firm’s costs (given prices). In 
stranding due to economics, these changes in prices/costs are caused by a change in the demand for 
the firm’s goods, or by changes in the supply of goods by other firms. For example, an oil producer 
with higher costs could find its assets ‘stranded by economics’ if the market price of oil falls due to 
an increase in the supply of oil by producers with lower costs, so that the continued operation of its 
assets becomes unprofitable. Another example of stranding by economics would be for an increase 
in the price of coal to make a coal-fired power plant uncompetitive as compared to a gas-fired power 
plant. Crucially, in ‘stranding by economics’ the change in prices/costs are not a result of a change in 
government policy, regulations, financing conditions, social norms, or an energy innovation (which 
are treated separately – see Section 2.3.2 - 2.3.5).  
Caldecott et al. (2016) point out a number of economic factors that could strand coal-fired power 
plants. First, they point out that fossil fuel firms could be affected by the ‘utility death spiral’. The 
utility death spiral is where the growth of distributed energy resources (e.g. rooftop solar PV) leads 
utilities companies to increase their prices to maintain profits (given the need to cover their fixed 
costs). This makes distributed resources even more competitive, which leads to more switching, and 
so further price rises. Second, they argue that increases in centralised renewable generation will 
lower the price of electricity on wholesale markets, which will then affect the profitability of fossil 
fuel companies. Third, they argue that an increase in the number of gas-fired power plants could 
lead to the stranding of coal-fired power plants if the price of gas and coal (and other costs) moves 
so as to make electricity from gas-fired power plants more competitive. Fourth, they point out that 
coal-fired power plants use a large amount of water, and that water scarcity that leads to an 
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increase in water pricing might strand coal-fired power plants. Fifth, they point out that changes in 
exchange rates could strand coal assets that produce output for export.  
Lewis et al. (2014b) provide an interesting dynamic interpretation of the stranding by economics 
argument. They argue that while oil assets could be stranded by a fall in demand, a more likely 
scenario over the next 10 - 20 years (given they do not expect significant action on climate change) is 
that the demand for oil (and so the price of oil) will continue to increase. They point out that an 
upward trajectory in the price of oil combined with a downward trajectory in the price of renewable 
energy and electric vehicles (due to falling costs) will increase the demand for electric vehicles (EVs). 
The consequent fall in petroleum vehicle sales will lead to a fall in the demand for oil and so its price, 
and this could then strand oil assets that were produced in the expectation of higher prices (as in 
Paun et al., 2015). These effects could be accelerated through government subsidies for EVs or 
through lower EV costs that result from learning by doing or economies of scale. Consequently, in 
Lewis et al.’s (2014b) formulation, both lower and higher oil prices could eventually strand oil assets.  
2.3.2 Stranding due to energy innovation 
Stranding by energy innovation refers to stranding that occurs due to a change in market conditions 
that is caused by a technological innovation. A number of technological innovations could cause 
stranding by reducing the demand for fossil fuels and energy from fossil fuel power stations. For 
example, an improvement in energy efficiency (e.g. in cars, buildings, etc.) could lead to a reduction 
in the demand for fossil fuels. Alternatively, technologies could be adopted (such as smart meters) 
that encourage the consumption of energy when energy produced using renewable sources is 
plentiful (Heinberg et al., 2016). Another possibility is that a technological innovation could reduce 
the cost of renewable energy, and so lower the demand for fossil fuels. Finally, a technological 
innovation (e.g. in energy storage) could increase the uses to which renewable energy could be put, 
or the times when renewable energy could be supplied.  
An improvement in energy storage technology is an example of a technological innovation that 
might increase the uses to which renewable energy could be put and the times at which renewable 
energy could be supplied. This is because most renewable energy can only be supplied intermittently 
– e.g. wind turbines only provide energy when the wind is blowing. Conversely, fossil fuel power 
stations are able to dispatch energy on demand. Because there is a demand for energy that can be 
dispatched on demand, regardless of the weather, there is a demand for energy from fossil fuel 
power stations. However, technological improvements in battery (or storage) technology that allow 
renewable energy to be stored until it is needed could decrease the need for fossil fuel power 
stations, and in so doing “transform the energy economy” (Paun et al., 2015, p.15).  
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Similarly, improvements in storage (i.e. battery) technology could significantly increase the demand 
for electric vehicles: 
“Storage also has important implications for the transport sector. Currently, batteries are an 
expensive and bulky component in electric vehicles (EVs). A step-change would clear an important 
hurdle in their ability to take significant market share from traditional petroleum-burning engines, 
would significantly change the demand profile for oil (the transport sector currently uses oil for 
95% of its energy).” (Paun et al., 2015, p.11) 
2.3.3 Stranding due to a change in regulations or policy 
Stranding due to regulations or policy refers to stranding that is caused by a change in government 
policy or regulation that makes the sale or operation of an asset unprofitable. Policies and 
regulations may be introduced for a number of reasons – e.g. due to concerns about climate change 
or the effects of particulate matter and non-greenhouse gas pollutants on human health, or in 
response to an environmental disaster or an increase in extreme weather events. 
Policies and regulations that target the energy sector can be categorised into two groups – those 
that penalise high-carbon industries (e.g. a carbon tax) and those that help low-carbon industries 
(e.g. a renewable subsidy). Policies and regulations may also strand fossil fuel assets by targeting 
other, related, sectors. For example, policies that increase vehicle efficiency, subsidise electric 
vehicles, or increase the cost of gasoline-powered vehicles could all lead to a fall in the demand for 
oil.  
Spedding et al. (2008, 2013) and Paun et al. (2015) contain a number of examples of regulations and 
policies that might lead to stranding. Spedding et al. (2008, 2013) argue that the capital assets in the 
downstream oil sector in OECD countries are at risk of stranding due to the introduction of climate 
change policies that target these sectors. In their modelling work, IEA (2015b) also assume that 
OECD countries adopt a CO2 price before non-OECD countries (see Footnote 17). Spedding et al. 
(2013) argue that oil assets may be stranded due to policies or regulations that aim to increase the 
efficiency of vehicles (and so reduce the demand for oil). Paun et al. (2015) argue that the Exxon 
Valdez disaster may be influencing the decision to develop offshore Arctic reserves, and that coal 
power plants in cities and oil used in road and sea transport are at particular risk of stranding due to 
new regulations that are designed to limit CO2 emissions, sulphur oxides and particulate matter.  
2.3.4 Stranding due to a change in financing conditions 
Stranding due to a change in financing conditions refers to stranding that occurs because of a change 
in the cost or availability of financing. A change in financing conditions might occur because a 
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significant proportion of investors divest from the financial assets issued by fossil fuel firms (or 
increase their demand for financial assets issued by firms in the renewable sector). Similarly, a 
change in financing conditions could occur if banks alter the terms on which they offer loans to a 
sector, or ration the credit they grant to a sector. Changes in financing conditions strand assets by 
changing a firm’s costs relative to the market price, or by preventing a firm from obtaining the 
financing it needs to continue operating an asset.  
Divestment campaigns aim to encourage investors to divest themselves from a firm or sector’s 
assets. In theory, divestment is assumed to affect firms that are divested from by lowering the price 
of their securities and so increasing their cost of capital. The increased cost of capital could then 
strand assets by making their continued operation unprofitable. Divestment may also discourage 
firms from undertaking future projects by increasing their cost of capital. 
However, for a divestment campaign to significantly affect costs (and therefore lead to stranding), 
three conditions have to be fulfilled. First, the divestment must be large enough to materially affect 
the price of the divested security. Second, the fall in the price of the security must not lead other 
investors to increase their demand for the security by an equivalent amount (offsetting the effect on 
the securities price). Third, the firm that is divested from must not be able to substitute (at a similar 
cost) other forms of financing (e.g. bank loans) with the securities targeted by the divestment 
campaign. Likewise, for a bank, the act of increasing the interest rate it charges a firm or refusing to 
lend to a firm is unlikely to have a significant economic effect if the targeted firm or sector is able to 
borrow at a similar rate of interest from other banks or investors.  
The potential effectiveness of a divestment campaign in affecting the total production or 
consumption of fossil fuels may also be limited by state involvement in the fossil fuel sector. State-
owned companies are projected to own 50 - 70% of fossil fuel reserves (Nelson et al., 2014) and 
account for around 50% of oil production to 2050 (CTI, 2013). Ritchie and Dowlatabadi (2015a) point 
out that state-owned companies have access to sources of funding (such as taxes and sovereign 
wealth funds) that cannot be divested from. Hence, even if divestment campaigns are able to reduce 
the demand for securities issued by fossil fuel companies and so affect their investment and output, 
state-controlled companies may be able to increase their investment and output in response.  
These issues lead Ansar et al. (2013) to argue that divestment campaigns may be more effective in 
countries with less well-developed financial markets, and when employed against coal companies 
(because coal companies are relatively illiquid, have smaller market capitalisations, and because 
more of the coal mining sector is privately owned). Conversely, divestment is likely to be less 
effective in countries with well-developed financial markets, or when employed against oil and gas 
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companies (because oil and gas companies are relatively liquid, have larger market capitalisations, 
and because more of the oil and gas sector is state owned). 
Although the direct effects of a divestment campaign may be limited, indirect effects can be much 
larger. For example, divestment campaigns generate publicity that can stigmatise firms and 
industries. Ansar et al. (2013) identify a number of routes by which stigmatisation might affect a firm 
or sector. First, they point out that stigmatisation can affect a company’s image, and this can ‘scare 
away’ suppliers, subcontractors, employees (potential and current), and customers. Second, they 
argue that governments and politicians prefer not to deal with stigmatised firms, and as such these 
firms may be prevented them bidding for contracts, licences or property rights issued by the 
government. Third, they highlight that governments may target stigmatised firms with legislation – 
leading to an increase in ‘legislative uncertainty’ for a firm or sector. 
Ansar et al. (2013) argue that these combined effects will increase the level of uncertainty around a 
firm’s future cash flows. In response to this change in conditions, other investors that were not 
initially involved in the divestment campaign are likely to divest (at least partially) from the firm’s 
securities, which could lead to a permanent reduction in the firm’s share price and an increase in the 
cost of its debt. Debt availability (including from banks) may also be reduced. These changes are 
likely to reduce capital investment and could even reduce the availability of working capital (which 
could threaten the firm’s ability to continue as a going concern). Combined, these effects could lead 
shareholders to demand a change in the firm’s management, board, or even its business model and 
practices (Ansar et al., 2013).  
As well as encouraging divestment from the fossil fuel sector, a divestment campaign may also 
encourage ‘divesting investors’ to invest their divested funds into securities issued by the renewable 
or low-carbon sectors – increasing the potential for “disruptive innovation in the energy supply” 
(Ansar et al., 2013, p.16). However, Ritchie and Dowlatabadi (2015b) argue that were this to happen, 
revenues in the renewables sector would not be high enough to support the resulting valuations, 
and that this could lead to a ‘renewable energy bubble’. They go on to argue that the bursting of this 
bubble could sour market perceptions of renewable companies for several years – with potential 
negative effects for the sector’s ability to finance its future investment expenditures.  
2.3.5 Stranding due to a change in social norms 
Stranding due to a change in social norms refers to stranding that is caused by households and firms 
reducing their demand for fossil fuels. Crucially, the change in demand is not a result of a change in 
prices (which would be stranding due to economics) or due to a change in the functionality of 
renewable energy (which would be stranding due to energy innovation). Social norms could change 
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for the same reasons that policy might change (see Section 2.2.3) – for example, norms could change 
due to an increase in extreme weather events, in response to an environmental disaster, or due to 
concerns about human health. They might also change due to a divestment campaign that increases 
the public’s understanding of the damage done by fossil fuels. Both the Generation Foundation 
(2013) and Caldecott (2017) discuss changing social norms as a possible cause of asset stranding.   
2.4 Potential effects of asset stranding 
This section looks at how asset stranding might affect firms, investors and the broader economy. The 
section is split into four parts. The first two parts look at the firm and investor-level effects of 
stranding, while the second two parts look at the macroeconomic effects of stranding. Section 2.4.1 
discusses the potential theoretical effects of asset stranding for a firm and its investors, while 
Section 2.4.2 looks at the empirical estimates of these effects. Section 2.4.3 looks at the evolution of 
the carbon bubble theory and other concepts related to stranding at the macroeconomic level, while 
Section 2.4.4 discusses the literature that attempts to estimate these macroeconomic effects.  
2.4.1 Theoretical firm and investor-level effects of stranding 
For a firm, the stranding of an asset will potentially affect the value of the payments it makes and 
receives, and the value of the assets it owns and the liabilities it issues (i.e. its balance sheet). On the 
payments side, the stranding of an asset implies an unexpected fall in the income the asset 
generates (or was expected to generate), or an unexpected increase in the costs associated with the 
sale or operation of the asset. The stranding of an asset may also lead the firm to acquire a new 
liability related to the asset’s decommissioning. Ceteris paribus, a reduction in income and/or an 
increase in costs means lower profits (likewise lower future revenues implies lower future profits). 
Cash flow may also be reduced, potentially impairing the firm’s ability to meet its financial 
obligations (e.g. loan repayments). 
Regarding the assets and liabilities a firm owns and issues, a reduction in the income stream 
generated by an asset means that, from an accounting perspective, the asset is impaired, and will 
need to be written down on the firm’s balance sheet. In addition, the firm may have to add an 
additional liability to its balance sheet to account for any costs related to the decommissioning of 
the asset. Any write-down in assets and/or addition to liabilities will reduce the firm’s revaluation 
reserve and therefore its equity position. The firm may even become insolvent if the size of the 
write-down or the addition to liabilities is large enough relative to the firm’s initial equity position.  
The overall effect of stranding on a firm will depend on a large number of factors. These include, but 
are not limited to: the size of the lost income stream (relative to the firm’s total income), the 
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amount of upfront capital expenditure associated with the stranded asset (relative to the firm’s total 
income), the timing of the capital expenditure (relative to the timing of the stranding), and the 
method used to finance the stranded asset.  
The importance of the size of upfront capital expenditure on the effects from stranding can be seen 
when comparing the potential effects of stranding across the oil, gas and coal industries. While coal 
is expected to experience the largest fall in demand in both a 1.5 and a 2°C transition, the financial 
risk from stranding is loaded onto oil and gas companies due to their higher levels of capital 
expenditure. For example, IEA/IRENA (2017, p.111) point out that while capital can make up 50 - 
75% of the total cost of a new oil project, it often makes up less than 15% of the total cost of a new 
greenfield coal mine.  
The effects of stranding on a firm are likely to feed through and affect the value of the securities 
issued by that firm. Theoretically, the market value of a company should be equal to the present 
value of all its future free cash flows. Therefore, the stranding of an asset that the market had 
assumed would generate free cash flows will negatively affect a company’s share price. For a state 
owned firm, asset stranding may affect the price and yield on government bonds (Weyzig et al., 
2014).  
2.4.2 Empirical firm and investor-level effects of stranding  
The previous section looked at some of the theoretical firm and investor-level effects of asset 
stranding. This section presents the results of a number of studies that attempt to estimate the firm 
and investor-level effects of asset stranding and those things that might cause assets to be stranded.  
The previous section argued that asset stranding is likely to negatively affect the market value of 
fossil fuel companies. McKinsey and Carbon Trust (2008) calculate that around 80% of the market 
value of exploration/production companies comes from the financial flows expected from proved 
reserves (a subset of total reserves). As such, the stranding of proved reserves is likely to significantly 
affect the market value of fossil fuel companies. An example of such an effect occurred in 2004, 
when Royal Dutch Shell announced that they had overestimated the size of their proved reserves by 
around 20%. This led, almost immediately, to a fall in their share price of around 10% (CTI, 2013). 
This event is often cited as an example of the importance of the quantity of proved reserves to an 
upstream company’s market value (Mathieu, 2015).  
Another interesting example of how a change in information can materially affect the market value 
of fossil fuel companies can be found in Griffin et al. (2015). This study looks at how the publication 
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of Meinshausen et al. (2009) affected the share price of 63 U.S. oil and gas firms.17 The authors find 
that the stock price of the firms in their study dropped by an average of 1.5 - 2% in the three-day 
period around the publication of Meinshausen et al. (2009), but that subsequent media stories 
about the article (in 2012 - 2013) had a much smaller effect.  
The share price effect found in Griffin et al. (2015) is significantly smaller that the share price effect 
that was observed for Shell in 2004. This is despite the fact that Meinshausen et al. (2009) argue that 
almost two thirds of fossil fuel reserves will need to be stranded to keep temperature increases to 
within 2°C, whereas in 2004, Shell’s proved reserves only fell by 20%. Although Griffin et al. (2015) 
provide a number of explanations as to why share prices didn’t fall by more, they fail to consider 
most likely cause, which is that oil and gas firms’ market values are primarily determined by their 
proved reserves (which is what Shell revised) rather than their total reserves (which is what 
Meinshausen et al. [2009] focus on). McKinsey and Carbon Trust (2008), Meyer and Brinker (2014) 
and IPIECA (2014) also make the argument that upstream oil and gas company market values 
primarily depend on their proved reserves, rather than their total reserves. Regarding the 
definitions, according to IPIECA (2014, p.2):  
“The IEA defines a reserve as a discovered and positively appraised resource. However, publicly-
listed companies use a narrower definition of reserves for U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission reporting: a quantity of oil and gas that is close to investment decision for 
development and production (i.e. it represents a well-defined quantity and a commercially viable 
project). Company reserves represent a subset of the reserves listed by the IEA. Resources 
describe the longer-term potential of unexplored, inaccessible or presently non-commercial 
hydrocarbons”. 
Other studies have attempted to estimate the effect of stranding and/or a fall in demand (i.e. prices) 
for fossil fuels on the market value of particular companies. For example, in their study, Spedding et 
al. (2013) analyse the effect of unburnable reserves and a fall in demand on the market 
capitalisation of a number of upstream oil and gas companies. The authors find that the risks due to 
unburnable reserves (i.e. reserves that will not be needed in a 2°C world) are relatively small. Statoil, 
which is found to have 17% of its market capitalisation at risk, is the largest potential loser. 
Conversely, the risks due to a fall in demand (i.e. prices) are found to be much larger. A fall in oil and 
gas prices to $50 a barrel/$9 per one million British Thermal Units (BTU) puts 37 - 52% of each firm’s 
                                                          
17 Meinshausen et al. (2009) was the first paper to outline the discrepancy between the quantity of CO2 in a 
2°C carbon budget and the amount of CO2 embedded in fossil fuel reserves. 
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market capitalisation at risk. Together, the stranding of assets and the fall in prices is found to put 40 
- 60% of the market capitalisation of these companies at risk.  
Canoils (2015) looks at how 50 of the largest Canadian oil and gas companies have been affected by 
changes in the market price of oil in the past and how further price changes may continue to affect 
these companies in the future. The authors report that the 2014 September-December oil price fall 
(from $90 to around $60 per barrel), was associated with a fall in market capitalisation of the 
companies in their study from Can$151bn to Can$84bn. Looking forward, the authors argue that 
“less than 20% of leading Canadian oil and gas companies with oil-weighted production will be able 
to sustain their business long-term at US $50 a barrel” (CanOils, 2015, p.3). The results of this study 
are significant because they show how sensitive oil and gas company valuations can be to changes in 
the oil price, and how price changes could strand a significant quantity of fossil fuel assets.  
Redmond and Wilkins (2013) look at how a fall in the oil price might affect oil companies’ credit 
ratings. They find that a fall in the price of oil (to $65 a barrel) leads to a decline in the credit ratings 
of smaller, less diversified companies (such as Canadian oil producers), whereas larger, more 
diversified companies – such as oil majors – are less likely to be affected. The results of Redmond 
and Wilkins (2013) and Canoils (2015) therefore tie in with the arguments of Leaton et al. (2014), 
who identify Alberta, Canada, as the region most at risk from stranding, and McGlade and Ekins 
(2015), who estimate that 74% of Canada’s oil reserves are at risk of stranding in a 2°C world. 
Robins et al. (2012) perform a similar type of analysis to Spedding et al. (2013) for mining 
companies. In their study, the authors attempt to quantify the effect of a fall in the demand for coal 
on the market capitalisation of a number of major global diversified miners listed in London. In the 
‘low demand’ scenario, the discounted cash flows from the companies’ coal assets fall by 44%, while 
their market capitalisation falls by 4 - 15%. The reason for the differential between the fall in 
discounted cash flows and the fall in equity prices is that coal only accounts for 10 - 33% of these 
companies’ total earnings. This study shows how important diversification of income streams is to 
protect the market value of a company when its assets are stranded. For a pure coal mining 
company, the fall in the market value would likely be far larger.  
IEA/IRENA (2017) point out another reason why coal mining companies may not be overly affected 
by the stranding of their coal assets – the majority of stranded mines will have recovered their 
investment costs before they are closed. IEA (2015a) and IEA/IRENA (2017) also point out that coal 
mining is not a capital-intensive activity. To quote IEA/IRENA (2017, p111): 
“over the lifetime of a mine, the costs of labour and the fuel and power required for the mining 
equipment far outweigh the capital expenditure necessary. For example, while capital often 
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comprises around 50 - 75% of the total costs of a new oil project, it can represent less than 15% of 
total expenditure for a new greenfield coal mine” 
IEA (2015a) calculate that there are around 6 - 7 million people employed in coal mining sector 
worldwide. Hence, the primary effect of a fall in demand for coal will be to increase unemployment 
levels, rather than to strand capital assets. IEA/IRENA (2017) forecast a 20% reduction in current 
direct coal mining employment due to asset stranding. 
Other studies look at how asset stranding, government policy to fight climate change and different 
transitions to a low-carbon economy might affect firms’ profitability and net present value. The 
Carbon Trust (2008) looks at how the value of certain industries might be affected by the transition 
to a low-carbon economy that stabilises atmospheric concentrations of CO2 equivalents at 550 ppm. 
It concludes that the demand for oil will need to peak in 2020, and that 35% of upstream oil sectors’ 
net present values and 30% of downstream oil sectors’ net present values are at risk.   
Spedding et al. (2008) look at the impact of companies having to purchase emissions credits (at $40 
for each tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent) for the various parts of their operations under three 
different scenarios. In the first scenario, the emissions credits policy is only implemented in OECD 
countries. Consequently, the policy’s effects fall primarily on those companies that are biased 
towards downstream activities, as these assets tend to be located in OECD (and specifically 
European) countries. The authors find that company net operating profit after tax falls by an average 
of 4% (and up to 7%). In the second scenario, the policy is implemented globally, so that the 
upstream segments of the industry are also captured. Consequently, the net operating profit after 
tax of the companies in the study falls by an average of 6% (and up to around 14%). In the third 
scenario, the authors look at the effects of the policy on each company’s overall reserve base, rather 
than just their proved reserves. The authors find that the average cost of carbon for the sector is 
around 10% of the enterprise value of each company (and up to around 22%).  
Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership (CISL, 2016) attempt to identify the effects of two 
policy packages on the profitability of companies in the electric utility, oil refining and gas 
production sectors in Alberta, California, the United Kingdom and Germany. The two policy scenarios 
covered in the report are a ‘transition’ scenario that looks at the effect of implementing a number of 
climate change policies, and a ‘carbon price’ scenario that looks at the effect of just implementing a 
€45 carbon price. The authors find that the effects of each scenario differ by company, sector and 
region. For example, under the ‘transition scenario’ the average profitability of utilities companies 
falls by 167% in the UK, 3% percent in Alberta, but rises by 84% in Spain, while the impact on oil and 
gas companies in each region/country are negligible. Conversely, in the €45 carbon price scenario, 
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utilities profits increase by 10% in the UK, 64% in Spain, but fall by 64% in Alberta, while oil and gas 
sector margins decrease by 6 - 15%. 
2.4.3 Theoretical macroeconomic effects of stranding 
Section 2.2 presented evidence that a significant quantity of fossil fuel reserves and capital assets 
are at risk of stranding due to a transition to a low carbon economy. Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 argued 
that stranding is likely to negatively affect fossil fuel firms’ market values. The carbon bubble thesis, 
as presented by CTI (2011) and Grant and Spedding (2015), simply combines these two insights (on 
stranding and its effects) at the macroeconomic level.  
CTI (2011) contains the first presentation of the ‘carbon bubble thesis’. The paper starts by pointing 
to the research that shows that that a significant proportion of fossil fuel firms’ reserves will need to 
remain in the ground if warming is kept within 2°C (e.g. Meinshausen et al. [2009]). It then points 
out that because the value of fossil fuel firms depends on their reserves, asset stranding will lead to 
a reduction in these firms’ market values. The assumption that fossil fuel firms are overvalued leads 
the authors to conclude that financial markets are carrying a ‘carbon bubble’ that could burst when 
investors recognise the risks that asset stranding poses to the continued profitability of fossil fuel 
companies. 
The carbon bubble thesis, as presented in CTI (2011), has been criticised by both Meyer and Brinker 
(2014) and IPIECA (2014). Focussing on oil and gas companies, these authors point out that CTI 
(2011) and the IEA both use a definition of reserves than is broader than the definition of ‘proved 
reserves’ used by investors and oil and gas companies (as discussed in Section 2.4.2). Meyer and 
Brinker (2014) and IPIECA (2014) argue that oil and gas companies’ market valuations depend 
primarily on the value of their proved reserves rather than their total reserves – which is what CTI 
(2011) focus on. They then point out that because 90% of fossil fuel companies proved reserves will 
be monetised in the next 10 to 15 years (i.e. before carbon budgets are used up) the current risk to 
the market values of these firms is small.18  
Another argument put forward by Meyer and Brinker (2014) against the carbon bubble thesis is that 
energy transitions take time. Consequently, they contend that firms and investors will ”see it 
coming” – that is, they have time to change their business models and investment strategies to avoid 
                                                          
18 These results are similar to those of McKinsey and Carbon Trust (2008), who calculate that around 80% of 
the market value of exploration/production companies comes from the financial flows expected from proved 
reserves, and that around 50% of this value will be monetised in the next 10 years. 
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the negative effects from asset stranding. As a result, they argue that the market value of energy 
companies is unlikely to suddenly fall.  
In response to Meyer and Brinker’s (2014) and IPIECA’s (2014) criticisms, Grant and Spedding (2015) 
modify the arguments put forward in CTI (2011), shifting their focus from fossil fuel firms’ reserves 
(as defined by the IEA) to their planned investment expenditures. They argue that that these 
investment expenditures will produce an amount of capital and proved reserves that are in excess of 
what will be needed to fulfil the demand for fossil fuels in in a 2°C world. Consequently, these 
investment expenditures are converting an increasing quantity of reserves into ‘proved’ reserves 
(i.e. reserves that are at risk of being stranded in the future). Hence, they argue that the actions of 
firms and investors risk inflating a carbon bubble in the near future.  
Grant and Spedding (2015) also argue that a carbon bubble might exist today. They point out that 
the market value of fossil fuel firms depends (at least partly) on their unproved reserves and 
resources – and that because some of these reserves are at risk of stranding (in a 2°C world), fossil 
fuel firms are overvalued today. They also emphasise the possibility of a rapid and unexpected 
change in market conditions that strands capital assets and proved reserves, due to either a change 
in government policy, a sudden technological improvement, or a rapid change in market prices (the 
price angle is also emphasised by Spedding et al. [2013], Lewis et al. [2014a] and Canoils [2015]). 
Indeed, and as discussed in Section 2.4.2, changes in market conditions have already affected the 
value of fossil fuel companies: Canoils (2015) show that the 2014 September-December fall in oil 
prices (from $90 to $60 per barrel) wiped nearly 50% off the market value of Canadian oil 
companies.  
Another point made by Grant and Spedding (2015) is that while a rapid transition to a low-carbon 
economy may be unlikely, the longer action on climate change is delayed the more likely and 
necessary a rapid transition becomes. Delays could be caused due to uncertainty about the future 
composition of energy demand, which could itself be caused by uncertainty around government 
policy or delays in policymaking (Nelson et al. 2014). This point is also supported by both IEA (2015a) 
and IEA/IRENA (2017). IEA (2015a, p.151) argue that an “inconsistent or stop-start, approach to 
climate change policies by governments … would lead to substantially more market disruption, price 
volatility and a higher risk of stranded investments than a well-ordered transition”. Carney (2015) 
points out that a rapid transition may be inevitable, because economic actors (such as governments, 
central banks, firms and households) only consider relatively short time horizons when making their 
decisions. Carney (2015) refers to this as the ‘tragedy of the horizon’.  
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Faster transitions, in which fossil fuel assets are repriced more rapidly, are likely to have destabilising 
effects on financial markets that could then “spark a pro-cyclical crystallisation of losses and a 
persistent tightening of financial conditions” (Carney, 2015, p.2). Gros et al. (2016) argue that a late 
and abrupt transition to a low-carbon economy would likely require carbon emissions to be limited 
via quantity constraints (rather than through action on prices). They argue that these quantity 
constraints would negatively affect GDP and fossil fuel asset values, lead to an increase in energy 
costs, and, to the extent that stranded assets were financed with debt, cause debt repayment 
problems. As in Carney (2015) and Battiston et al. (2016), they warn that the impacts on GDP, asset 
prices and debt repayment could reinforce each other, causing further falls in GDP and losses to 
financial intermediaries. The worst-case scenario would see these losses exacerbated by extreme 
weather events related to climate change (Gros et al., 2016), something that would pose particular 
risks to the insurance sector (Nelson et al. [2014], Carney [2015]). 
Drawing on these ideas, Comerford and Spiganti (2017) present a theoretical model that links the 
carbon bubble with the financial accelerator mechanism of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). They show 
that the bursting of a carbon bubble may impair the speed of any transition to a low-carbon 
economy, as a fall in asset values reduces the value of entrepreneurs’ collateral and so their ability 
to borrow to invest in low-carbon capital. It should however be noted that the model assumes a 
single mass of entrepreneurs that both invest in green capital and own the high-carbon assets that 
decline in value – something that may not occur in reality.  
2.4.4 Empirical macroeconomic effects of stranding  
The effect on financial markets from the bursting of a carbon bubble could be significant. Globally, 
the sectors with the largest CO2 footprints (natural resources and extraction, power utilities, 
chemicals, construction and industrial goods) make up around one third of equity and fixed income 
assets (Carney, 2015). However, these assets are not distributed equally between the world’s 
financial markets, and, as a result, different investors, markets, and countries will be affected in 
different ways. Countries in which fossil fuel firms raise a significant amount of capital may find 
themselves particularly exposed. CTI (2011) identify the UK, Brazil, Russia, Australia and Canada as 
being particularly at risk, as 20 - 30% of the value of their stock exchanges is linked to fossil fuels. 
Conversely, fossil fuel companies only make up 11% of the market capitalisation of the Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P) 500 index, and less than 10% of the Paris stock exchange (Weyzig et al., 2014).  
Weyzig et al. (2014) and Battiston et al. (2016) attempt to estimate the losses to investors that might 
result from a transition to a low-carbon economy. Weyzig et al. (2014) find that the level of 
uncertainty surrounding a transition is a key determinant of the losses felt by large European 
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investors. They find that when there is a quick and decisive transition to a low-carbon economy, 
average losses as a percentage of total assets are around 3% for pension funds, 2% for insurance 
companies and 0.4% for large banks. Conversely, the authors argue that losses will be significantly 
higher if the transition is slow and uncertain, and higher still if no action is taken (because slower 
transitions lead to losses that stem from climate change). The authors claim that the European 
Commission’s 2030 energy and climate targets will lead to a slow and uncertain transition.  
The small size of the potential losses highlighted by Weyzig et al. (2014) leads Mathieu (2016) to 
conclude that financial markets are not currently at risk from a carbon bubble bursting. However, 
Battiston et al. (2016) warn that by only focussing on direct exposures, Weyzig et al. (2014) may 
underestimate the potential losses to financial actors. They point out that links between financial 
institutions, indirect asset holdings, indirect exposures, and second round effects can serve to 
amplify shocks and interfere with estimates of default probabilities. The authors use network 
analysis to incorporate the exposures that stem from these indirect and second round effects. They 
find that while Euro Area financial actors’ direct exposures to ‘climate relevant sectors’ are small (at 
3 - 12% of total assets), their indirect exposures are much larger (at 40 - 54% of total assets). In 
addition, the authors find that climate mitigation policies increase the volatility on 20 - 40% of 
investors' equity assets, 40% of pension fund assets, and 40% of bank assets (which is significantly in 
excess of bank capital). The paper thus shows that while direct exposures may be small, indirect 
exposures can be much larger, and could lead to significant losses for financial actors.  
Nelson et al. (2014) estimate the ‘stranded value’ that will result from the stranding of fossil fuel 
assets. The authors define ‘stranded value’ as the overall reduction in a discounted profit stream due 
to stranding. These profit streams are then divided between royalties, taxes and corporate profits so 
as to apportion stranded value between government and the private sector. The authors estimate 
total global losses from stranding to be in the region of $25 trillion, with 80% of these losses falling 
on governments (in the form of lower profits, taxes, and royalties), although upon removing 
transfers between governments and their citizens, this amount fall to $15 trillion, with $10 trillion 
borne by governments. Nelson et al. (2014) argue that losses fall disproportionately on governments 
for two primary reasons. First, governments own the majority (50 - 70%) of global oil, gas, and coal 
resources, and second, around half of all the production in the commercial oil and gas sector occurs 
under production sharing contracts that tend to penalise governments when prices fall (which is 
likely to happen if the demand for oil and gas falls).  
It is worth making two points in response to Nelson et al. (2014). First, and as already mentioned, 
Nelson et al. (2014) focus on ‘stranded value’, rather than on stranded assets. While there is nothing 
wrong with looking at stranded value per se, the authors fail to consider that a transition will most 
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likely lead to an increase in profits in the low-carbon and renewable sectors, and that this could 
offset the fall in profits in the fossil fuel sector. The overall effect of a transition on ‘stranded value’ 
might therefore be positive or negative, depending on the energy price that emerges, the 
technologies used in the energy sector’s production process (Battiston et al., 2016), and the tax 
regimes that governments choose to implement. That said, the transition will have significant 
distributional effects between both companies and countries.  
Second, although privately-owned companies only own around 20% of proved oil and gas reserves, 
they account for around half of all oil production up to 2050 (CTI, 2014a) and around sixty percent of 
the sector’s unneeded capital expenditures (CTI, 2013). The reason private sector companies 
account for a higher proportion of unneeded capital expenditures is because these companies tend 
to own reserves with relatively high development costs, while publicly owned companies (such as 
Saudi Aramco) tend to own reserves with relatively low development costs. Said another way, 
private companies dominate the upper segments of the various carbon supply cost curves, while 
publicly-owned companies are disproportionately represented in the lower segments. It is for this 
reason that both Spedding et al. (2013), CTI (2014a) and Grant (2018) argue that private companies 
are likely to be the biggest losers from stranding.  
2.5 Claims of the stranded assets literature 
This chapter presented the stranded assets literature. The main claims of the stranded assets 
literature can be summarised as follows: 
(1) A transition to a low carbon economy will strand assets. Part of the current stock of fossil 
fuel reserves will need to be left unburned to keep temperature increases within 1.5 - 2°C. 
Likewise, part of the current stock of capital assets held by fossil fuel firms will need to be 
retired early to keep temperature increases within 1.5 - 2°C. Examples of these arguments 
can be found in Section 2.1 and 2.2. See also Meinshausen et al. (2009), Guivarch and 
Hallegatte (2011), CTI (2011, 2013), IPCC (2014), IEA/IRENA (2017) and Pfeiffer et al. (2016, 
2018). 
(2) An unexpected transition to a low carbon economy will strand more assets than an expected 
transition to a low carbon economy. The fossil fuel industry is currently producing capital 
equipment and developing reserves and resources that will not be required if temperature 
increases are to be kept within 1.5 - 2°C. Thus, the literature emphasises that in order to 
avoid stranded assets, fossil fuels firms need to be able to anticipate the transition to a low 
carbon economy and adjust their investment expenditures accordingly. Examples of these 
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arguments can be found in Section 2.2. See also CTI (2014a, 2014b), Grant et al. (2017), 
Leaton and Grant (2017) and Grant (2018).  
(3) A faster/more disjointed transition to a low carbon economy will strand more assets than 
slower/less-disjointed transition to a low carbon economy. Delaying a transition to a low 
carbon economy, given a particular carbon budget, will mean the transition has to be 
completed quicker. Faster and/or more disjointed transitions are likely to lead to higher 
levels of asset stranding, both because new reserves will be developed and new capital 
assets will be built that are not subsequently required, and because the speed of the change 
in demand might exceed the rate at which the output (oil, coal, gas, energy provided by 
fossil fuel-fired power stations) of firms in the fossil fuel sector naturally falls. Examples of 
these arguments can be found in Section 2.2.3. See also IEA (2015a), IEA (2016) and 
IEA/IRENA (2017).  
(4) Unexpected changes in market conditions may strand assets. Some of the capital assets in 
the fossil fuel sector are very long lived, and this puts these assets at risk of stranding due to 
unexpected changes in market conditions. Market conditions can change for a number of 
reasons, including due to a change in policy or regulations, a change in economic conditions, 
a technological innovation, or a change in financing conditions. Examples of these arguments 
can be found in Section 2.3.  
(5) Asset stranding will mainly affect the economy via financial markets. The stranding of a 
firm’s assets is likely to have a significant effect on its market value and potentially its ability 
to meet its financial obligations. Because the sectors with the largest CO2 footprints make up 
around one third of equity and fixed income assets (Carney, 2015), losses on financial 
markets could be large – especially if one considers second round and indirect effects 
(Battiston et al., 2016). Because companies’ financial and real assets are not distributed 
equally between countries different investors, markets, and countries will be affected in 
different ways. Countries in which fossil fuel firms raise a significant amount of capital may 
find themselves particularly exposed (CTI, 2011).  
(6) Different types of transitions and changes in market conditions are likely to lead to different 
economic effects. Faster transitions are likely to be more disruptive in terms of their 
economic effects. Similarly, the level of uncertainty surrounding a transition may lead to 
larger losses for financial actors. Examples of these arguments can be found in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.4. See also Carney (2015), CTI (2013, 2015), Weyzig et al. (2014), Battiston et al. 
(2016) and Gros et al. (2016). 
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2.6 Conclusions and research questions 
This chapter reviewed the literature on stranded assets. Section 2.1 presented a number of 
definitions of stranded assets. Section 2.2 looked at the reserve and capital assets at risk of 
stranding. It pointed out that keeping global temperature increases to within a 1.5 - 2°C threshold 
will place fossil fuel assets at risk of stranding, and that additional assets will be at risk of stranding if 
firms and governments incorrectly estimate the demand trajectory for fossil fuels, or if they attempt 
to transition too quickly. Section 2.3 argued that the long lifespans of some of the assets in the fossil 
fuel sector puts these assets at risk of stranding due to unexpected changes in market conditions. 
The section presented five factors that might cause market conditions to change: economic 
conditions, energy innovations, regulations and policy, financing conditions, and social norms. 
Section 2.4 discussed the potential theoretical and empirical effects from stranding. It was argued 
that asset stranding would affect both the firms whose assets are stranded and those that invest in 
and lend to these firms, as well as the economies where the assets are located and the economies 
where the affected firms raise their capital. Section 2.5 summarised the main claims of the stranded 
assets literature.  
Although there is a large and varied literature on stranded assets, only a small number of papers 
have looked at the stranded assets issue using an economic model. In fact, as far as I am aware, as of 
May 2018, there are only four papers that present macroeconomic models that include stranded 
assets (Comerford and Spiganti [2017], Ploeg and Rezai [2016], and Rozenberg et al. [2014, 2017]). 
However, these papers do not investigate the economic effects of stranding that are discussed in 
much of the rest of the stranded assets literature – i.e. those parts that suggest that stranding will 
primarily affect the economy via its effects on the value of financial assets issued by fossil fuel firms 
(see Section 2.4). Neither Ploeg and Rezai (2016) (who use a general equilibrium model) nor 
Rozenberg et al. (2014, 2017) (both using a Ramsey model) include any financial assets in their 
models. Instead, these papers utilise models that focus on the ‘real’ effects of stranding. 
Comerford and Spiganti (2017) (who use a financial accelerator model based on Kiyotaki and Moore 
[1997]) do include a financial asset in their model. However, this asset is bank loans rather than 
equities or bonds. Thus, rather than stranding affecting the economy via its effect on equity or bond 
values, instead stranding is hypothesized to affect the economy via collateral values, which then 
limit the amount entrepreneurs’ can borrow (to finance green investment). While this is an 
interesting hypothesis, it is perhaps telling that this mechanism is not discussed elsewhere in the 
stranded assets literature. As a result, the models that have been used to investigate the effects of 
stranded assets (Comerford and Spiganti [2017], Ploeg and Rezai [2016], and Rozenberg et al. [2014, 
2017]) do not investigate the main mechanism by which stranding is hypothesised to affect the 
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economy (as argued in the rest of the stranded assets literature) – that is, via their effects on 
companies’ market values.  
There was also a stock-flow consistent (SFC) model on stranded assets being developed by Godin et 
al. (2017). However, I recently learned from one of the authors that there are some problems with 
the model that have significantly altered their results (this is why the paper is not discussed in this 
chapter). As such, the economic modelling of the causes and the macroeconomic and financial 
implications of stranded assets remains something of a gap in the literature. Filling this gap is the 
primary motivation for the research in this dissertation.  
More specifically, the aim of this dissertation is to investigate the validity of the claims made by 
various parts of the stranded assets literature (as outlined in section 2.5) using an SFC model (see 
Chapter 3 for an introduction to SFC models). The claims from Section 2.5 can be distilled into a 
number of research questions, which can be further subdivided into three groups: i) research 
questions that relate to a transition to a low carbon economy; ii) research questions that relate to a 
change in market conditions; and iii) research questions that relate to both a transition to a low 
carbon economy and a change in market conditions. These groupings reflect the distinction in the 
literature between asset stranding that is caused by a transition to a low carbon economy versus 
asset stranding that is caused by a change in market conditions.  
2.6.1 Research questions related to a transition to a low carbon economy 
The stranded assets literature argues that asset stranding is likely to be influenced by the speed and 
the degree to which a transition to a low carbon economy is anticipated (see Section 2.2). As such, 
the research questions relating to different types of transition to a low carbon economy are as 
follows: 
(i)  Does the extent to which a transition to a low carbon economy is anticipated by fossil fuel 
firms affect the level of capital asset stranding that takes place?  
(ii)  Does the speed of a transition to a low carbon economy affect the level of capital asset 
stranding that takes place? 
(iii)  What are the economic and financial effects of different types of transitions to a low 
carbon economy and the stranding of capital assets these transitions bring about? 
2.6.2 Research questions related to unexpected changes in market conditions  
The stranded assets literature argues that the long lifespans of fossil fuel assets exposes these assets 
to risks from unexpected changes in market conditions, which can then lead to asset stranding. In 
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Section 2.3 the various factors that might lead to a change in market conditions are categorised 
under five headings: economic conditions, energy innovation, government policy and regulation, 
financing conditions, and social norms. As such, the research questions that relate to changes in 
market conditions are as follows:  
(iv)  To what extent is the introduction of a carbon tax (i.e. a change in policy) likely to lead to 
the stranding of capital?  
(v)  To what extent is a change in agents’ preferences for purchasing securities from the fossil 
fuel sector (i.e. a change in financing conditions) likely to lead to the stranding of capital?  
(vi)  To what extent is a change in banks’ preferences regarding the interest rate they charge 
energy firms (i.e. a change in financing conditions) likely to lead to the stranding of capital?  
(vii)  To what extent is an increase in the energy return on energy invested (EROEI) (i.e. a change 
in energy innovation) in the renewables sector likely to lead the stranding of capital?  
(viii)  To what extent is a change in households’ preferences for purchasing goods from the fossil 
fuel sector (i.e. a change in social norms) likely to lead to the stranding of capital assets?  
(ix)  What are the economic and financial implications of these changes in market conditions 
and the stranding of capital assets these changes bring about? 
2.6.3 Research questions related to a transition to a low carbon economy and a 
change in market conditions 
The stranded assets literature argues that an energy innovation (e.g. an improvement in storage 
technology) could lead to asset stranding by increasing the uses to which renewable energy could be 
put and the times at which renewable energy could be supplied (see Section 2.3). In addition, the 
stranded assets literature argues that asset stranding is likely to influence the broader economy 
through financial markets (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4). Given these arguments, it will be interesting 
to see how sensitive the answers to research questions (i) to (ix) are to different assumptions 
regarding: i) the ease of substitution between renewable and fossil fuel energy; and ii) the sensitivity 
of agents to the relative returns on financial assets. As such, the research questions that relate to 
both a transition to a low carbon economy and a change in market conditions are as follows: 
(x)  To what extent are the answers to research questions (i) to (ix) sensitive to assumptions 
about the degree of substitutability between different sources of energy?  
(xi)  To what extent are the answers to research questions (i) to (ix) sensitive to assumptions 
about the responsiveness of agents to the returns on financial assets?  
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Chapter 3: The stock-flow consistent (SFC) methodology and 
literature 
This chapter introduces the stock-flow consistent (SFC) methodological approach to macroeconomic 
modelling and reviews the currently available SFC literature. As outlined in the previous chapter, the 
stranded assets literature argues that the stranding of capital or fossil fuel reserves is likely to affect 
the economy via its effect on the market value of fossil fuel firms. It is, therefore, important that any 
macroeconomic model of stranded assets is able to include both real assets (either capital or 
reserves) and financial assets with a variable price (such as equites or bonds), and that the financial 
and real sides of a model are able to affect and interact with each other. Without these interactions, 
it will not be possible to model all the effects of asset stranding (as presented in the Chapter 2). 
As such, this chapter introduces a modelling approach that is able to integrate the real and financial 
sides of the economy – the SFC methodology – along with some of the related literature. This 
approach is used in the following chapter (Chapter 4) to produce an SFC model that is able to 
investigate a number of issues related to the stranded assets thesis.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 introduces the SFC methodological 
approach. Section 3.2 and 3.3 discuss the empirical and theoretical SFC literatures. Section 3.4 
concludes. 
3.1 The SFC methodological approach19 
The SFC methodology is based on a comprehensive accounting framework that ensures that both 
the transactions between sectors (i.e. flows) and the asset and liability positions that result from 
them (i.e. stocks) are logically and consistently integrated with each other. One of the main 
advantages of the SFC approach is that it integrates the real and financial sides of the economy into 
a single coherent framework (Nikiforos and Zezza, 2017). Thus, the SFC approach allows the 
practitioner to describe and model economic systems as an organic whole. The ability to model the 
interactions between the ‘financial side’ and the ‘real side’ of the economy will be particularly 
important for the investigation of the stranded assets thesis, given that one of the main ways in 
which stranding is likely to affect the economy is via financial markets (Battiston et al. [2016], Carney 
[2015], CTI [2011, 2013], Gros et al. [2016], Weyzig et al. [2014]). 
                                                          
19 This section draws heavily on Godley and Lavoie (2007a), Caverzasi and Godin (2015), and Nikiforos and 
Zezza (2017). 
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The rest of this section is organised as follows. Section 3.1.1 introduces the SFC modelling approach. 
Section 3.1.2 presents three types of SFC models. Section 3.1.3 describes the SFC accounting 
framework. Section 3.1.4 discusses the some of the common SFC behavioural assumptions. Section 
3.1.5 examines different methods for solving an SFC model.  
3.1.1 General features of SFC models 
SFC models are a type of macroeconomic model that originated from the national accounting 
principles developed by Morris Copeland (Copeland [1947, 1949]). These models have a number of 
key features20:  
(1) SFC models include a number of macroeconomic sectors. 
(2) SFC models can incorporate a number of assets with different rates of return. 
(3) SFC models are based on a comprehensive accounting framework that logically and 
consistently integrates flows and stocks. 
(4) SFC models contain behavioural equations that draw on post-Keynesian theory.  
(5) SFC models are precise with regards to time. 
The first characteristic of the SFC approach is that the model is divided up into several sectors, which 
transact with each other in a number of ways. They are able to produce real assets (e.g. capital, 
housing, inventories) and issue financial assets (e.g. equities, bonds, bills), each with their own rate 
of return (the second feature of SFC models outlined above).  
Sectors typically found in SFC models are: a government sector, a central bank sector, a banking 
sector, a firm sector, a household sector, and a foreign sector. However, other combinations are 
possible. For example, sectors may be aggregated together to simplify the model. Common 
aggregations include the government with the central bank (to create a public sector), the central 
bank with banks (to create a banking sector) and firms with households (to create a private sector). 
It is also possible to split sectors into a number of smaller sectors. Common types of disaggregation 
include splitting the household sector between different types of income earners (e.g. wage earners 
versus profit and interest earners) and the firm sector into a number of subsectors (e.g. a power 
                                                          
20 In his Nobel memorial lecture, Tobin (1982) also identifies a number of these features as being characteristic 
of his approach to model building. However, Tobin’s approach differs from the SFC approach (as defined here) 
in that its behavioural component draws on mainstream economic theory. Nevertheless Tobin’s contribution 
undoubtedly inspired and was crucial to the development of the post-Keynesian SFC models. 
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sector and an ‘everything else’ sector, as in Berg et al. [2015]). The types of sectors and assets that 
are included in an SFC model will of course depend on the aims of the modeller.  
As mentioned above, the sectors in SFC models transact with each other in a number of different 
ways. Typically, sectors engage in two types of transactions – buying and selling. These transactions 
can be further broken down between GDP related transactions and non GDP related transactions. 
Common GDP related transactions on the expenditure side include consumer spending, government 
spending, investment spending, and spending on exports and imports. Common GDP related 
transactions on the income side include wage payments, profits payments, interest payments and 
rent payments.  
The second type of transaction relates to non-GDP related transactions (i.e. those transactions 
related to the sale and purchase of financial and pre-existing real assets), as well as the second 
component of SFC models – that SFC models can incorporate a number of assets with different rates 
of return. Examples of financial assets that are commonly found in SFC models include central bank 
reserves, cash, bank deposits, bills, government bonds, commercial bonds and equities. Examples of 
pre-existing real assets that have been included in SFC models and that are available for resale (and 
so do not count in GDP) include housing and gold (in some open economy SFC models). Non-GDP 
transactions are used by sectors to cover their surplus or deficit positions (financing decisions), to 
alter the composition of the assets side of their balance sheet (portfolio allocation) and to adjust the 
liabilities side of their balance sheet (funding decisions). Taken together, these decisions affect the 
composition and size of each sector’s balance sheet.  
This leads us to the third characteristic of SFC models – that transactions between sectors (i.e. flows) 
and the asset and liability positions that result from them (i.e. stocks) are logically and consistently 
integrated with each other through a comprehensive accounting framework. Four principles 
underpin the accounting framework used in SFC models (Nikiforos and Zezza, 2017). First, the model 
should be ‘flow consistent’ – i.e. each payment should come from somewhere and go to 
somewhere. Second, the model should be ‘stock consistent’ – i.e. each financial asset should have an 
offsetting financial liability. Third, the model should be ‘stock-flow consistent’ – i.e. an imbalance 
between a sector’s total inflows and total outflows means that its asset/liability position is changing. 
Fourth, the model should adhere to the ‘quadruple entry principle’ – i.e. each transaction must 
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involve four accounting entries.21 Taken together, these four principles reduce the degrees of 
freedom in the model and so the possible outcomes (e.g. not every sector can run a surplus at the 
same time; in fact, the sum of net lending across all sectors must always be equal to zero). The 
accounting framework of SFC models is explained in more detail in Section 3.1.3.  
SFC models also contain a behavioural component (explained in more detail in Section 3.1.4). This 
component consists of a series of equations that determine all the non-accounting relationships 
contained in the model. Thus, the behavioural component determines the magnitude of the 
transactions specified by the accounting section of the model. For example, while the accounting 
component of a model might specify that households purchase consumption goods from firms, the 
behavioural component will determine how many of these goods are purchased. So far, the SFC 
literature has mainly constructed its behavioural relationships along post-Keynesian lines (the fourth 
feature of SFC models outlined above). However, in a few cases, the SFC methodology has been used 
with more mainstream theoretical approaches. Examples include the constant elasticity of 
substitution production function in Jackson and Victor (2016) and the Cobb-Douglas production 
function in Burgess et al. (2016). 
Finally, the fifth characteristic of SFC models is that they are precise with regards to time. The 
concept of time enters into SFC models through the interactions and links between periods. One of 
the ways in which periods can be linked together is through lags in equations. As pointed out by 
Godley and Lavoie (2007a, p.13), the inclusion of lags ensures “that causes precede effects, so that 
we keep the time-sequence right and understand the processes at work”. Lags may also be used in 
relation to the formation of expectations. A second way in which periods are linked together is 
through each sector’s stocks, and the effect these stocks have on each sector’s flows. In SFC models, 
the long-run is simply a succession of short periods. In each short period, sectors transact with each 
other, with these transactions eventually leading to a temporary equilibrium characterised by a 
stability of flows both between and within sectors. As long as the model is not in a ‘steady state’ (i.e. 
a long-run equilibrium – see below for a definition), these transactions will lead to a redistribution 
and/or a repricing of the stocks held by each sector. At the start of the next period, the new stock 
position (relative to the position at the beginning of the previous period) will lead to new flows and 
therefore a new temporary equilibrium. Thus, the model’s stocks, as represented in the balance 
                                                          
21 For example, the sale of a good requires an increase in the seller’s income and therefore an increase in their 
assets (or a reduction in their liabilities), as well as an increase in the buyer’s expenditure and so a reduction in 
their assets (or an increase in their liabilities). 
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sheet matrix, form a link between each period. Only once both the flows and stocks are in a constant 
relationship to each other has the model reached a long-run equilibrium or ‘steady state‘.   
In SFC models, the terms ‘steady state’ or ‘stationary state’ imply the model is in a long run 
equilibrium. Godley and Lavoie (2007a, p.71) define these two states as follows:  
“[a steady state is] a state where the key variables remain in a constant relationship to each other. 
This must include both flows and stocks, and not flows only as with short-run (temporary) 
equilibria. When, in addition, the levels of the variables are constant, the steady state is a 
stationary state. In general, the steady state will be a growing economy, where ratios of variables 
remain constant. Whether we are in a stationary state or a steady state with growth, we may then 
speak of the long-run solutions.” 
A number of the features outlined above will be crucial to investigating the economic effects of 
stranded assets. Being able to divide the model economy into a number of sectors that transact with 
each other in different ways will be important in modelling both different transitions to a low-carbon 
economy and the extent to which unexpected changes in market conditions (identified in Section 
2.3) might lead to stranding. For example, splitting the firm sector into a fossil fuel sector, a low-
carbon sector and a sector that sells non-energy goods will be crucial in looking at the effects of 
different types of transitions and changes in energy efficiency, policies, financing conditions and 
social norms. Likewise, splitting the household sector in two will be crucial to investigating the 
distributional effects of part of the household sector divesting from fossil fuel company goods or 
financial assets.  
Similarly, that SFC models are able to include a number of financial assets with different rates of 
return, and that SFC models are based on a comprehensive accounting framework that logically and 
consistently integrates flows and stocks, will be crucial in looking into one of the main arguments of 
the stranded assets thesis (as laid out in Chapter 2) – i.e. that the stranding of capital or fossil fuel 
reserves is likely to affect the economy via its effect on the market value of fossil fuel firms. For 
example, and as laid out in Chapter 2, a divestment campaign is likely to affect the value and rate of 
return of fossil fuel firms’ securities, which may then feed in and affect these firms’ costs, prices and 
investment expenditures, as well as how other non-divesting agents choose to allocate their wealth 
between different financial assets. Price changes are likely to affect the demand for different types 
of energy goods and consequently firm profits, and through this, the rate of return and value of each 
sector’s financial assets. These changes may then feedback and affect firm costs, prices, etc. Thus, 
divestment is likely to affect both the financial and real sides of the economy, and these impacts 
may interact with and reinforce each other through time. As such, a model is required that is able to 
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includes multiple financial assets and interactions between the real and financial sides of the 
economy.  
3.1.2 Types of SFC models  
SFC models can be categorised into one of three groups depending on the extent to which they 
attempt to replicate the features of a real economy: fully empirical SFC models (Section 3.1.2.1), 
empirical SFC models (Section 3.1.2.2), and theoretical SFC models (Section 3.1.2.3). 
3.1.2.1 Fully empirical SFC models  
Fully empirical SFC models replicate the main features of a particular economy. They do this by 
including the sectors, flows and stocks that are important in that economy, by calibrating the 
parameters in the model through econometric estimation, and by setting stock and lagged flow 
variables on national accounts data (where possible). Fully empirical SFC models include the Levy 
Institute’s U.S. model (outlined in Godley [1999], Godley et al. [2007b], and Zezza [2009]), the Levy 
Institute’s Greece model (Papadimitriou et al., 2013a), Kinsella and Tiou-Tagba Aliti’s (2012) Ireland 
model and Burrows et al.’s (2016) U.K. model.22 Fully empirical SFC models can be used to provide 
conditional projections for the replicated economy (when parameter values are ‘estimated’, as in 
the Levy Institute models) or run simulations on past data (when parameter values are ‘calibrated’, 
as in the Ireland model).23  
                                                          
22 Older SFC empirical models include Godley and Zezza’s (1986) Italy model, Godley and Zezza’s (1989) 
Denmark model, and Davis’ (1987) U.K. model. 
23 The parameters in the Levy Institute models are estimated econometrically and are assumed constant over 
the entire modelling period. Consequently, when running simulations on past data, the model's results will 
diverge from actual outcomes (with the divergence in part dependent on the stability of the parameters 
values). The benefits of this approach is that the model can be used for forward projections, although the 
further forward in time one projects the more likely it is that the projections will diverge from actual outcomes 
(Caverzasi and Godin, 2015). A downside to this approach is that the model is vulnerable to the Lucas critique, 
as the estimated parameter values are likely to change over time.  
The parameters in the Ireland model are not estimated. Instead, they are calibrated through a technique 
Kinsella and Tiou-Tagba Aliti (2013b) refer to as ‘Dynamic Empirical Simulation’. Unlike econometric 
estimation, this form of calibration involves finding values for the parameters in each period so that the model 
replicates the data, with fixed parameters estimated only when necessary (such as when there is more than 
one parameter per independent equation) (Caverzasi and Godin, 2015). Because parameter values vary in each 
64  
3.1.2.2 Empirical SFC models 
Empirical SFC models, such as the one by Le Heron (2011), lie somewhere between the fully 
empirical models described in the previous Section and the theoretical models discussed in the next 
section. Caverzasi and Godin (2015, p.178) define ‘empirical models’ in relation to ‘fully empirical 
models’: 
“in fully empirical models, not only are all the parameters estimated, but—starting from the 
present state of economy—the models are also applied to predict variations in endogenous 
variables based on different scenarios. Empirical models extract stylised facts from empirical data 
and then conduct simulations on the impact of these facts. The simulations start from a steady 
state that is not necessarily connected to the present situation.” (Caverzasi and Godin, 2015, 
p.178) 
3.1.2.3 Theoretical SFC models 
Theoretical SFC models are used to explore or illustrate economic theories. Because these types of 
models are not used for making projections, their structure does not need to reflect a particular 
economy, their parameters do not need to be estimated econometrically, and their stocks and 
lagged flows do not need to be estimated from national accounts data. Instead, these models can be 
as simple or complex as the research questions require. Chapter 4 of this dissertation presents a 
theoretical SFC model for the investigation of the stranded assets thesis. 
3.1.3 The accounting component of SFC models 
This section describes the accounting component of SFC models in more detail. 
The accounting component of an SFC model determines the model’s structure and the types of 
transactions that each sector is able to undertake. It consists of a series of equations that specify the 
transaction and balance sheet relationships between and within each sector. It also covers changes 
in the value of assets that result from changes in their price. These accounting relationships are 
commonly represented using three matrices – a transactions matrix, which shows the transactions 
between and within each sector (Section 3.1.3.1); a balance sheet matrix, which illustrates the asset 
and liability positions of each sector (Section 3.1.3.2); and a revaluation matrix, which tracks changes 
to asset values due to a change in asset prices (Section 3.1.3.3).   
                                                          
period these models cannot be used to make projections or forecasts. Instead, calibrated models are used to 
run simulations on past data. 
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3.1.3.1 The transactions matrix 
Matrix 3.1 shows an example of a transactions flow matrix for a closed economy without a 
government or central bank. A number of features should be noted about the transaction matrix.  
First, variables appear with either a plus or a minus sign. Variables that appear with a positive sign 
are a source of funds, while variables that appear with a negative sign are a use of funds. For 
example, the wage bill (WB) are a source of funds for the household sector, but a use of funds for 
the firm sector. Variables are always measured in current prices. The triangle (Δ) symbol represents 
a ‘change in’ a variable. 
Second, the matrix is split into two parts. The section above the bold line covers changes to non-
financial assets, as well as income and expenditure flows, whereas the section below the bold line 
deals with financial flows, namely changes to net financial asset positions, along with borrowing and 
saving. Everything above the bold line therefore corresponds to the current and capital parts of the 
national accounts (the National Income and Expenditure Accounts in the U.S.), whereas the section 
Matrix 3.1: An example transaction matrix 
 Households 
Firms Banks 
Sum 
Current Capital Current Capital 
Consumption - C + C    0 
Investment  + I - I   0 
Amortisation funds  - AF + AF   0 
Wage bill + WB - WB    0 
Profits + F - F    0 
Interest on loans  - rlL  + rlL  0 
Interest on deposits + rdM   - rdM  0 
Changes in bank deposits - ΔM    + ΔM 0 
Changes in equity - pE ∙ Δe  + pE ∙ Δe   0 
Changes in loans   + ΔL  - ΔL 0 
Sum 0 0 0 0 0  
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below the line corresponds to the financial accounts (the Flow-of-Funds tables in the U.S.). The two 
sections are linked via each sector’s net lending/saving position – any income that is not spent must 
be allocated to a financial asset (i.e. used to purchase a financial asset), while a surplus of 
expenditure over income necessitates borrowing from another sector or the sale of financial assets.  
Third, each column represents that sector’s total income, expenditure, borrowing and saving. For 
example, if we take the household sector column we can see that wages and interest on deposits are 
the two sources of funds. Households then need to decide how to split their income between 
spending and saving. Spending involves buying consumption goods from firms, while saving involves 
‘placing’ any unspent income into bank deposits or buying equities. By necessity, the sources and 
uses of funds – payments in, payments out, borrowing and saving/lending – for each sector must 
sum to zero. 
Fourth, each row represents a transaction between sectors. For example, the first row shows 
consumption goods being bought by households and sold by firms, whereas the two rows above the 
bold line show transfers of interest from banks to households (on deposits) and from firms to banks 
(on loans). As with the columns, each row must also sum to zero – each outflow of funds by a sector 
(or sectors) must be matched by an inflow of funds into another sector (or sectors). 
The fifth feature relates to the ‘watertight’ accounting structure of the model, as discussed in the 
previous two paragraphs. Because each transaction must have a counterpart somewhere else in the 
transaction matrix, and because the budget constraint of each sector must add up to zero, if we 
know the transactions of every sector but one we also know the transactions of the final sector.24 
This applies both ex-post, as agents assess realised outcomes, and ex-ante, when agents form 
expectations. Godley and Lavoie (2007a, p.14) refer to this as a “system wide consistency 
requirement”. This principle follows logically from the accounting framework imposed on the model. 
Sixth, by convention, the firm sector and the bank sector both have a current account and a capital 
account, (although this need not always be the case). The current account deals with income and 
expenditure flows, while the capital account deals with flows related to a change in a sector’s asset 
and liability position.  
3.1.3.2 The balance sheet matrix 
Within the transactions matrix, each transaction implies a payment and thus a redistribution of 
resources, with the section below the bold line specifically dealing with the financing of these  
                                                          
24 This is often referred to as Walras’s Law in the context of general equilibrium models. 
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transactions. This implies the need for another matrix – the balance sheet matrix – to keep track of 
additions and subtractions to each sector’s assets and liabilities.  
The balance sheet matrix shows the assets and liabilities of each sector at the end of each period. 
These assets/liability positions form a link between the preceding period of time (which gave rise to 
those asset positions), and the subsequent period of time. Matrix 3.2 shows the balance sheet 
matrix that corresponds to the transactions matrix (Matrix 3.1) 
As with the transactions matrix, each column pertains to a different economic sector, while each row 
relates to a type of asset/liability. Assets are represented with a positive sign, and liabilities with a 
negative sign. For example, bank deposits (M) are an asset of the household sector and a liability of 
the banking sector. Because each financial asset has an offsetting financial liability, each row that 
deals with financial assets must sum to zero (as is the case with the transaction matrix). Conversely, 
the creation of a real asset does not imply the creation of an offsetting liability, and as a result the 
rows that record non-financial assets will not sum to zero (and consequently neither will one or 
more of the columns).  
This means that a model economy that only contains financial assets will have a zero net worth. 
Conversely, if a model economy contains non-financial assets (e.g. fixed capital), then it will have a 
positive net worth equal to the value of these non-financial assets.  
3.1.3.3 The revaluation matrix 
The revaluation matrix (Matrix 3.3) tracks changes in the market value of an asset from the previous 
period to the current period due to a change in its price. As with the balance sheet and transactions  
Matrix 3.2: An example balance sheet matrix 
 Households Firms Banks Sum 
Deposits + M  - M 0 
Fixed Capital  + K  + K 
Loans  - L + L 0 
Equity + pE ∙ e - pE ∙ e  0 
Balance - VHH - VF 0 - K 
Sum 0 0 0 0 
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matrices, each column pertains to a different economic sector, while each row relates to a type of 
asset/liability. Assets are represented with a positive sign, and liabilities with a negative sign.  
Because each financial asset has an offsetting financial liability (so that financial assets and liabilities 
sum to zero), changes in the value of financial assets must also sum to zero. The same is not true of 
capital, which will take a positive value (as long as its price does not fall to zero).  
3.1.3.4 Interpreting the matrices 
Taken together, the transactions, balance sheet and revaluation matrices describe the development 
of the system through time. At the beginning of a period, the balance sheet matrix shows the asset 
and liability positions of the various sectors. Within the period, the configuration of the transactions 
matrix and the behavioural equations determines the flows between sectors. These transfers and 
any capital gains or losses will lead to a new balance sheet position at the end of each period.  
Starting with the transactions matrix (Matrix 3.1), we can see that firms take out loans (L) from 
banks and issue equities to households (e) with price (pE). They do this in order to finance their net 
investment (I) in capital equipment (K). Depreciation is covered through amortisation funds (AF). 
Firms hire households to produce their output, to whom they pay a wage bill (WB). They also pay 
profits (F) to equity holders (households), and interest to banks at interest rate (rl) (on the money 
they have borrowed). Households receive a wage bill (WB) from selling their labour to firms and use 
the resulting income to buy consumption goods from firms (C). The rest of their income is saved as 
bank deposits (M) or as equities (e). The household sector receives interest payments from the 
banking sector on their deposits at rate (rd) and profits (F) from the firm sector on their equity 
holdings.  
The balance sheet matrix (Matrix 3.2) shows the asset and liability positions that result from (and 
partly cause) the flows detailed in the transactions matrix. Starting with the banking sector, we can 
see that loans (L) show up as an asset, while bank deposits (M) show up as a liability. Since deposits 
are created through lending, and destroyed when loans are repaid, loans are at all times equal to 
deposits (so that the banking sector has a net worth of zero). For the firm sector, we can see that 
Matrix 3.3: An example revaluation matrix 
 Households Firms Banks Sum 
Equity + ΔpE ∙ e(-1) - ΔpE ∙ e(-1)  0 
Fixed capital  + Δpk ∙ k(-1)  + Δpk ∙ k(-1) 
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loans and equities show up as a liability, while capital is an asset. Essentially, firms are borrowing 
from banks and selling equity to households to finance the construction of new capital. The net 
worth of the firm sector can be either positive or negative depending on the price of equity (pE) and 
the price of capital (pk). For the household sector, we can see that bank deposits and firm equities 
show up as assets, and that the sector has no liabilities. Hence, households have a positive net worth 
that is equal to the value of bank deposits plus the market value of equities. Finally, if we look at the 
economy as a whole, we can see that the financial assets are equal in value to financial liabilities. As 
a result, the overall net worth of this model economy is equal to the value of the capital stock.  
3.1.4 The behavioural component of SFC models 
This section describes the behavioural component of SFC models in more detail. 
The behavioural component of an SFC model contains the model’s (non-accounting) theoretical 
assumptions. Thus, the equations that make up the behavioural component of an SFC model 
determine the magnitude of the transactions specified in the accounting section of the model. 
According to Nikiforos and Zezza (2017), SFC models include five types of behavioural assumptions. 
The first type of behavioural assumption relates to each sector’s spending decisions – each sector 
needs to decide how much to spend, and who to spend with. For example, in the example SFC model 
above (Figures 3.1 to 3.3), households need to decide how much to consume (and how much to 
save) and firms need to decide how much to invest. Household consumption is usually a function of 
real income and real wealth, while (in growth models) real investment is usually a function of at least 
one out of the cost of capital, retained profits, the degree of indebtedness, Tobin’s q,25 and the level 
of capacity utilization. In stationary state models, investment is usually determined as a function of 
expected sales and a target capital-output ratio (i.e. an accelerator function).  
The second type of behavioural assumption relates the financing of each sector’s expenditures. For 
example, firms need to finance their investment expenditures, consumers their consumption 
expenditures, and governments their spending. In some cases, expenditure may be covered by 
income, while in others, the sector may need to incur a liability or sell off assets to make the 
necessary payments. For example, a firm might finance its investment expenditures through 
                                                          
25 According to Brainard and Tobin (1977, p.235), the q ratio is: 
“the ratio between two valuations of the same physical asset. One, the numerator, is the market 
valuation: the going price in the market for exchanging existing assets. The other, the denominator, is 
the replacement or reproduction cost: the price in the market for newly produced commodities.” 
70  
retained earnings, borrowing from banks, or by issuing some form of security (e.g. bonds or 
equities). In most SFC models, these decisions are determined through linear functions, although 
specifications that are more complicated are also possible (Nikiforos and Zezza, 2017). 
The third type of behavioural assumption relates to how sectors choose to allocate their wealth 
between different assets. This portfolio allocation decision usually follows the approach laid out in 
Tobin (1969). In this method, asset purchases are usually a function of each asset’s expected relative 
rate of return (e.g. yield and/or capital gains) and an exogenous preference for holding each asset 
(although this preference can also be set endogenously). Other factors may also be included, such as 
the transactions demand for money. 
The fourth type of behavioural assumption relates to productivity growth, wages, and inflation. 
According to Nikiforos and Zezza (2017), productivity is either fixed (in stationary state models) or 
set to grow at an exogenous rate (in growth models), prices are normally determined as a mark-up 
over some definition of costs, and inflation, when it is included, is usually a result of a conflict 
between workers and entrepreneurs (as in Godley and Lavoie, 2007, ch.9, p.302). 
Finally, the fifth type of behavioural assumption relates to the banking sector (i.e. the central bank 
and/or the commercial banks). For a central bank, the assumptions relate to monetary policy targets 
(e.g. inflation and/or growth) and tools (e.g. setting the interest rate on different assets). For 
commercial banks, typical assumptions include those that relate to the interest rate banks charge on 
loans and deposits, and the extent to which credit is rationed (Nikiforos and Zezza, 2017). 
For the most part, the behavioural equations used in SFC models have been based on post-
Keynesian theory. However, there is no reason why the SFC methodology could not be used with a 
more orthodox set of assumptions, if desired. The use of post-Keynesian theoretical assumptions 
leads to a number of differences with mainstream models. First, SFC models are demand, rather 
than supply-led – as Nikiforos and Zezza (2017, p.46) point out, “SFC models do not assume Say’s law 
and full employment in the short run or that the economy will converge towards such a state in the 
medium/long run.” Second, deposits are created by banks when they expand their balance sheets 
(for example by making loans), and central bank money is supplied on demand to the banking 
sector. This contrasts with the loanable funds/money multiplier approach pursued in much of the 
mainstream literature (Ryan-Collins et al., 2012). Third, expectations are treated quite differently in 
the SFC approach. For example, Godley and Lavoie (2007a, p.16) point out that in their models, 
economic agents do not form expectations under a ‘rational expectations’ hypothesis, and instead 
display “a kind of procedural rationality”. The authors go on to point out that how expectations are 
formed is not crucial to the outcomes of SFC models. The reason for this is that stock-flow 
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consistency places the model “on a kind of autopilot” (Godley and Lavoie, 2007a, p.16). Essentially, 
mistaken expectations lead to an unexpected change in stocks, and this change then affects the 
agents’ subsequent behaviour. Consequently, and in contrast to many orthodox models, it is not 
necessary to assume that economic agents understand how the economy functions, or have perfect 
information. 
Stock build-ups due to errors in expectations highlight another important principle of many SFC 
models – namely, in order to operate in an uncertain world, each sector requires a ‘buffer’ that is 
able to react flexibly when expectations are thwarted. One example of this is the inventories that 
firms build up (or run down) when sales are lower (higher) than expected. The existence of 
inventories also allows a kind of disequilibrium to exist in these models, as supply does not need to 
always equal demand.  
3.1.5 Solving and analysing SFC models 
Once the model’s accounting and behavioural equations have been specified, it is possible to solve 
the model. In practice, most SFC models are solved via numerical simulation. However, it is also 
possible to derive an analytical solution to simpler SFC models.26 The rest of this section discusses 
the numerical (Section 3.1.5.1) and analytical (Section 3.1.5.2) simulation methods, along with the 
methods of analysis that correspond with each simulation technique.  
3.1.5.1 The numerical simulation method 
The numerical simulation method can be summarised as being a solution method that first specifies 
the value of the model’s parameters, starting stocks and lagged variables, before using a computer 
program to solve the model. Thus, the results of a numerically simulated model are only true for the 
chosen values of these parameters/stocks/flows.   
In general, there are three possible approaches for choosing the parameter/stock/flow values. The 
first of these is to base the values on empirical estimates. This means estimating parameter values 
econometrically, and basing stock, lagged and exogenous variables on estimates from the national 
accounts. The second approach is to base the values on ‘stylised facts’, while the third is to choose 
these values for their convenience. A mixture of these approaches is also possible. In general, the 
approach taken will depend on the aims of the modeller.  
                                                          
26 Because the model presented in Chapter 4 is relatively complex, it is solved using the numerical simulation 
method. 
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Once values have been obtained for the parameters, stocks, and lagged and exogenous flow 
variables, the model can be solved via numerical simulation, and the results analysed. Several 
outcomes of a numerical simulation are possible. For most of the theoretical SFC literature, 
numerical simulation leads to a steady state. It is also possible that the numerical simulation will lead 
to a recurring cycle, cycles within cycles (such as in Ryoo [2010]), or explosive behaviour (such as 
accelerating towards positive or negative infinity or collapsing to zero). What happens will depend 
upon the structure of the model and the values chosen for the parameters, starting stocks, and 
lagged and exogenous flow variables.  
There are two methods for analysing numerically simulated SFC models (Caverzasi and Godin, 2015). 
In the first type, the model starts from a steady state (or recurring cycle). The model is then shocked 
by altering the value of a parameter or exogenous variable. The outcome of this shock can then be 
analysed. For example, if the model finds a new steady state (or recurring cycle) then the two steady 
states (or cycles) can be compared with each other, along with the transition between them. 
In the second type of analysis, the model does not start from a steady state (or recurring cycle). 
Instead, the model is numerically simulated, and the result of the simulation is then analysed. The 
model may also be simulated again under a different set of assumptions (e.g. regarding parameter 
values, starting stocks, etc.) and the differences between the outcomes analysed (Caverzasi and 
Godin, 2015). This type of analysis is suited to models that might not find a steady state (or cycle). It 
is also the type of analysis performed on the empirical SFC models. 
The first method of analysis (shocking the model) is used extensively in Chapters 6 and 7 (the 
simulation chapters) to analyse the effects of different types of transitions and changes in market 
conditions. Each simulation is also performed under a number of different parameter regimes, so as 
to better understand how the effect of each shock depends on particular assumptions (see Chapter 
5). 
An advantage of using the numerical simulation method over the analytical method is that it allows 
models of greater complexity to be solved (Caverzasi and Godin, 2015). However, the method also 
has some drawbacks. For example, the steady state is usually dependent on the values taken by the 
model parameters. Different parameter values may lead to different steady states, and there is no 
way of knowing how many other steady states exist or how stable these steady states are (Lavoie 
and Godley, 2001). The results of simulations may also depend on the model’s parameter values.  
Another issue with the numerical simulation method is that the causal structures in complex models 
may be difficult to determine. While this is not a direct result of the simulation method itself, the 
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ability to solve numerically facilitates the construction of more complex models. Indeed, Dos Santos 
and Macedo e Silva (2009, p.8) point out that this:  
“inner complexity—and, in some cases, arbitrariness—may have been acting as a major obstacle to 
the diffusion of the approach and to the fluidity of the conversation among the many heterodox 
currents. Happily enough, we think there is an alternative: a simpler SFC model which can 
simultaneously satisfy some of the heterodox demands for realism and convey at least some of the 
most important intuitions of the approach, while allowing for analytical solutions for some 
interesting conceptual experiments. There is room, thus, for recasting (old and new) heterodox 
issues both in SFC analytical models and in computer simulations.”  
3.1.5.2 The analytical solution method  
Along with the numerical simulation method, it is also possible to derive analytical solutions for 
some of the simpler SFC models. Examples of analytical solutions can be found in Godley and Lavoie 
(2007a), Dos Santos and Zezza (2008), Dos Santos and Macedo e Silva (2008), and Ryoo and Skott 
(2013). The analytical solution method (as used in Dos Santos and Macedo e Silva, 2008) relies on 
the fact that in a steady state, all stocks and flows will grow at the same rate (by definition), so that 
the ratios between all the variables are fixed. Thus, in the steady state, the determinants of these 
ratios will also be equal to each other. It is, therefore, possible to set up a series of equalities that 
can be rearranged to obtain equilibrium conditions for various parameters. These solutions can be 
presented graphically, as in Godley and Lavoie (2007a) and Dos Santos and Macedo e Silva (2009) 
(who present the algebraic solutions found in Dos Santos and Zezza, 2008).  
A major difference between the two approaches to solving SFC models is that the analytical method 
does not require the specification of the model’s parameter values, starting stocks or lagged or 
exogenous flow variables. Instead, the model’s solution is presented as an equilibrium condition. 
This is a major benefit of the analytical method: the solution is able to illuminate linkages and 
dependencies that may not be obvious from solving the model numerically or looking at the model’s 
equations. The drawback of the analytical approach is that it may not be possible to solve complex 
models. Thus, a desire to employ the analytical method may result in simpler models and a loss of 
realism. 
3.2 The empirical stock-flow consistent literature 
This section examines the empirical SFC literature, with a particular focus on the Levy Institute’s 
‘Strategic Analysis’ papers. Section 3.2.1 covers the Levy Institute models for the U.S. (Godley [1999], 
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Godley et al. [2007b], Zezza [2009]) and Greece (Papadimitriou et al., 2013a), while Section 3.2.2 
discusses the Ireland model of Kinsella and Tiou-Tagba Aliti (2012).  
3.2.1 The Levy Institute’s Strategic Analysis papers 
This section looks at the Levy Institute’s full empirical SFC models (as covered by their Strategic 
Analysis papers). The first part discusses some of the theories used in the models. The second part 
examines the models’ methodological approach. Finally, the third part discusses the results of the 
literature itself.  
3.2.1.1 Theoretical background 
This section introduces two components that are crucial to understanding the Levy Institute’s 
Strategic Analysis papers: the ‘sectoral balances approach’ (Section a) and the ‘New Cambridge 
Hypothesis’ (Section b). 
(a) The sectoral balances approach 
The sectoral balances approach is a macroeconomic framework for analysing surplus and deficit 
relationships between the public, private and external sectors. It is based on a macroeconomic 
identity that is derived from the national accounting identity that specifies the relationship between 
aggregate spending and income. In order to derive the sectoral balances identity, Godley et al. 
(2007b) start by specifying the well-known national accounting identity for real (inflation-adjusted) 
national income (Y):27 
Y = C + I + G + X - M 
Where (C) stands for consumption, (I) stands for investment, (G) stands for government spending, 
(X) stands for exports plus property income and foreign transfers, and (M) stands for imports. To get 
to the sectoral balance identity, taxes (T) are subtracted from both sides and the equation is 
rearranged to get:  
Y - T - C - I = (G - T) + (X - M) 
Where: 
Y - T - C = S  
Where (S) stands for private saving. Equivalently, this can be expressed as: 
                                                          
27 Zezza (2009) presents an alternative derivation that splits the private sector into households and businesses. 
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PNS = PSBR + BP 
Where (PNS) stands for the private sector’s financial surplus, (PSBR) stands for the public sector’s 
financial deficit, and (BP) is the current account balance. The implication of the equation is that the 
deficits and surpluses of each sector must, as a matter of accounting and logic, sum to zero. Put 
another way, if two sectors are running deficits, the other sector must be running a surplus equal to 
the sum of these deficits.  
It is important to note that quite different economic situations could result in similar sectoral 
balances. As a result, the usefulness of the equation is aided when it is incorporated into either an 
underlying narrative or an economic model. For example, take the case of an increase in the current 
account surplus along with a fall in the government deficit. If this is caused by an increase in exports, 
then the underlying story would be one of economic expansion. However, if this is caused by a 
reduction in government spending, then the story would instead be one of economic contraction 
(Godley et al., 2004). 
(b) The New Cambridge Hypothesis 
The Levy Institute models assume that the New Cambridge Hypothesis holds in the medium-run. The 
New Cambridge Hypothesis is related to the sectoral balances approach. It assumes that: 
“the private sector's net stock of financial assets grows broadly in proportion to the flow of money 
income. A general formulation would be that the net stock of financial assets at the end of any 
period is proportional to a weighted average of income flows in the current and previous period” 
(Anyadike-Danes, 1982, p.3) 
Using the terminology in the previous section, the New Cambridge Hypothesis is thus an assumption 
about the stability of the private sector balance relative to income. Given the sectoral balance 
framework, the New Cambridge Hypothesis implies that any increase in a nation’s budget deficit will 
be quickly translated into an increase in the nation’s current account deficit (and vice-versa). The 
relationship between a country’s current and government deficits is known as the ‘twin-deficits’ 
issue (see Godley and Lavoie [2007a, Chapter 6] especially Equation 6.32 and the surrounding text).  
At a more general level, the New Cambridge Hypothesis is based on the idea that economic agents 
have desired stock-flow norms, so that a movement away from these norms implies that there will 
be a movement back towards them again in the future. As we will see, the inclusion of the New 
Cambridge Hypothesis into the Levy Institute’s models partly explains why these models predicted 
an imminent slowdown in growth between 1999 and 2007. 
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3.2.1.2 The modelling approach  
The Levy Institute papers use an empirically calibrated model of the U.S. economy (outlined in 
Godley [1999], Godley et al. [2007b], and Zezza [2009]) to derive a series of conditional projections 
regarding the future path of the economy. The approach is used to determine whether an economic 
expansion is sustainable over the medium-term (a period defined as 5 to 15 years), given certain 
exogenous factors.  
The approach itself consists of a number of components. First, and as outlined above, the structure 
of the model is based on the sectoral balances identity. Second, the model assumes that the New 
Cambridge Hypothesis holds in the medium-run, so that changes in the government balance are 
reflected in the external balance and vice-versa. Third, the approach exogenises a number of the 
variables, such as U.S. GDP, the government deficit, the interest rate set by the central bank, the 
exchange rate and the level of world GDP (which determine the demand for US exports) (Godley et 
al., 2007b).  
The model is solved via numerical simulation in order to give a conditional projection of the future 
path of the U.S. economy. These conditional projections depend on the values taken by the 
exogenous variables. The process of exogenising different variables, therefore, allows a series of 
‘what if’ questions to be asked, such as “what would the private sector balance have to be to enable 
GDP growth of 3%, given assumptions about the budget deficit and demand for US exports?” The 
projections that result from each ‘what if’ question give a path for the sectoral balances. The 
plausibility of each of these paths and their relation to other factors can then be analysed by 
comparing them against the relevant historical norms. Because the exogenous assumptions are 
usually based on estimates given by government departments and international institutions, the 
‘what if’ questions/projections are able to test the plausibility of official estimates.  
For example, the model might show that an economic expansion is being driven by an increase in 
the household sector’s debt-to-income ratio (in excess of historical norms). Because the model 
assumes that the New Cambridge Hypothesis holds in the medium-term, this increase would be 
expected to reverse itself. The model would, therefore, project an end to the economic expansion 
and potentially a forthcoming recession, in the absence of an increase in demand from another 
sector (e.g. the government or external sector). It may also be suggestive of an impending financial 
crisis, given that increases in the private sector’s debt-to-income ratio are associated with an 
increase in financial fragility (Minsky, 1992).  
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3.2.1.3 The Levy Institute’s U.S. model 
This section presents the literature on the Levy Institute’s U.S. model. The section is organised in 
three parts to reflect the economic phases of the U.S. economy since the publication of the first Levy 
Institute Strategic Analysis paper (Godley, 1999): the period around the early 2000s recession 
(Section a), the period leading up to and immediately after the 2007 - 2008 global financial crisis 
(Section b), and the period following the global financial crisis (Section c). 
(a) Papers published in the run-up to and during the early 2000s recession (1999 - 2003) 
Godley (1999) marks the first major publication in the Levy Institute’s ‘Strategic Analysis’ series. 
Using data from the flow of funds tables, Godley (1999, p. 2) identified seven unsustainable 
processes in the U.S. economy: 
“(1) the fall in private saving into ever deeper negative territory, (2) the rise in the flow of  net 
lending to the private sector, (3) the rise in the growth rate of the real money stock, (4) the rise in 
asset prices at a rate that far exceeds the growth of profits (or of GDP), (5) the rise in the budget 
surplus, (6) the rise in the current account deficit, (7) the increase in the United States’ net foreign 
indebtedness relative to GDP.” 
He then argues that these unsustainable processes mean that the growth projections of the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) are unlikely to come to pass, as they would necessitate (given 
assumptions about fiscal policy and the trade balance) a record increase in the private sector deficit. 
As a result, and contrary to the prevailing economic consensus, Godley warned that the U.S. 
expansion would not last (unless there was a change in government policy).  
The U.S. subsequently experienced a slowdown in growth and several negative or zero growth 
quarters between 2000 and 2002. However, the magnitude of the downturn was smaller than 
Godley (1999) predicted. This was largely the result of the unexpected increase in discretionary fiscal 
policy between 2002 and 2003 (which was due to the Iraq war). 
Between 2001 and 2003, a number of strategic analysis papers were published that analysed the 
recession and explored possible routes back to growth (Godley and Izurieta [2001a, 2001b, 2002], 
Papadimtriou et al. [2002, 2003]). These papers argued that the primary cause of the recession was 
a reduction in business sector spending (relative to income), even as the household sector continued 
to increase its spending (relative to income). They show that the CBO projections of government and 
external sector surpluses imply that private sector expenditures would need to continue to rise 
relative to private incomes (i.e. the private sector deficit would need to increase). The authors view 
this outcome as both unlikely and unwise, and instead recommend that demand be sustained by an 
increase in the government deficit. However, they also warn that an increase in the government 
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deficit of the magnitude required to prevent the economy falling into a serious recession would be 
likely to lead to a large increase in the current account deficit (the twin deficits problem). Further, 
they point out that if growth is to be sustained in the medium-run, then the increase in the nation’s 
current account deficit will need to be reversed, perhaps via a depreciation of the dollar.  
Ultimately, the predictions contained within these papers regarding the effect of the fiscal deficit on 
the current account were born out by subsequent events: in 2002, the government balance shifted 
from surplus to deficit (due to tax cuts and war expenditures) and this led to both an economic 
recovery and a worsening of the current account deficit. However, the Strategic Analysis papers 
failed to anticipate that the recovery would lead to a resumption in the deterioration in the private 
sector balance and so an increase in financial fragility. It is conjectured here that this may have been 
due to the inclusion of the New Cambridge Hypothesis.  
(b) Papers published in the run-up to the Global Financial Crisis (2004 - 2008) 
In the years that followed the early 2000s recession, the Levy Institute published a series of papers 
that addressed the sustainability of driving growth with increasing private and public deficits.  
Papadimitriou et al. (2004) investigated the effect of the private sector deficit returning to balance 
on the government deficit. They found that this situation would be unsustainable even if interest 
rates were held constant, as it would lead to an increase in the government’s debt burden and 
current account deficit relative to GDP. The authors ran two additional simulations to investigate the 
effect on the government deficit and the economy due to different types of fiscal consolidation. 
They found that spending cuts would lead to higher unemployment, lower growth, and a larger 
government debt than tax increases would.  
Godley (2003), Godley et al. (2004, 2005), Chilcote et al. (2006a), and Hannsgen et al. (2006) all 
looked at the issue of external imbalances. Godley (2003) warned of an increasing current account 
deficit (to 6% by the end of 2007) due to high levels of U.S. growth (relative to growth in the rest of 
the world) and a high U.S. income elasticity of demand for imports (relative to the foreign income 
elasticity of demand for U.S. exports). The paper pointed out that there are political limits to the 
government deficit and economic limits to the private sector deficit, and that a reduction in these 
deficits was likely to lead to fall in growth. The paper concluded by noting that while a fiscal deficit 
could be required to prevent the economy falling into recession in the short-run, in the longer term 
sustainable growth would require a rebalancing away from private and public deficits and towards 
export-driven growth. 
Chilcote et al. (2006a) and Godley et al. (2004, 2005) also focused on the interactions between the 
public and current account deficits. Chilcote et al. (2006a) argued that an increase in interest rates 
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would lead to a further deterioration of the current account balance and, if employment was to be 
sustained, the government deficit. Godley et al. (2004, 2005) warned that the increase in the 
government and external deficits could lead to an unsustainable process if interest rates increased. 
In addition, they argued that there is no natural tendency for the current account deficit to return to 
balance without government intervention, as surplus countries can sterilise inflows of foreign 
currency and therefore prevent their currencies from appreciating.  
Godley and Izurieta (2004), Papadimitriou et al. (2005), Godley et al. (2005), and Hannsgen et al. 
(2006) focused their analysis on the deterioration of the private sector’s balance. The underlying 
message of these papers was that increasing private indebtedness could not be a source of 
sustainable growth. Papadimitriou et al. (2005) showed (via a series of simulations) that an increase 
in private indebtedness would lead to an increase in the current account deficit and the debt service 
burden of the private sector (given a stable government deficit).  
Godley et al. (2005) examined the increase in the U.S. household debt-to-income ratio, arguing that 
its primary causes were the easing of underwriting standards and an increase in speculation on 
property. They pointed out that the housing market was (at the time) exhibiting symptoms of a 
‘classic bubble’, and that the bursting of this bubble could have catastrophic effects on lending rates 
and accordingly, aggregate demand. Godley and Izurieta (2004) conducted a similar analysis for the 
U.K., identifying the high and growing private debt-to-income ratio as a potential problem. 
Chilcote et al. (2006b) focused on the effect that a fall in U.S. house prices would have on growth 
and private sector balance sheets. They warned that record debt-to-income ratios meant that house 
prices were unlikely to continue to rise and that any stabilisation or slowdown in house prices was 
likely to lead to lower growth or a recession. Simulations were conducted to assess possible future 
paths for the U.S. economy. They projected a large fall in growth (in 2006) and argued that a large 
increase in the government deficit would be required (to 10% of GDP) in order to keep 
unemployment stable. 
Papadimitriou et al. (2006) also looked at the link between U.S. house prices, household debt and 
output. The authors made a number of points. First, they argued that high house prices were fuelling 
household spending behaviour. Second, they pointed out that an increase in interest rates would 
further increase the already high household debt burden. Third, they noted that a fall in house prices 
would lead to a large reduction in households’ wealth (given high levels of mortgage debt). They 
went on to conduct a series of simulations that showed that further increases in household debt 
were unsustainable, and that a fall in house prices was likely to lead to a reduction in employment 
and growth, unless the government increased its spending to 10% of GDP.  
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Figure 3.1: Real U.S. GDP growth rates 2004-2015 
Source: OECD Stat Extracts 
The financial crisis of 2007 - 2008 led to the publication of a series of papers that examined the 
potential policy responses to the crisis and provided projections of future path of the economy. In a 
paper published after the collapse in the subprime mortgage market, but before the actual crisis, 
Godley et al. (2007a) argued that lending to the private sector was unlikely to recover in the near 
future, and that this would lead to a ‘growth recession’ and an increase in unemployment. The 
authors warned that this growth recession could evolve into a more serious recession unless the 
government significantly increased its fiscal deficit. 
Writing a few months later, but before the full scale of the crisis had become clear, Godley et al. 
(2007b) argued that a credit crunch would lead to the economy experiencing “three successive 
quarters of negative real GDP growth … next year”. These predictions were subsequently borne out, 
with the U.S. economy experiencing five quarters of negative GDP growth in 2008 - 2009, with four 
successive quarters of negative GDP growth from mid-2008 to mid-2009 (Figure 3.1). 
(c) Papers published during and after the global financial crisis (2008 - present) 
In the period during and after the 2007 - 2008 financial crisis, a series of Strategic Analysis papers 
were published that examined potential U.S. policy responses to the crisis and their likely impact. 
In an attempt to ascertain the best policies for the U.S. economy immediately following the crisis, 
Papadimitriou et al. (2008) simulated the effect of different levels of fiscal expenditure on the U.S. 
economy. They argued that the output loss due to the financial crisis/recession could be reduced by 
increasing the fiscal stimulus to 2% of GDP (rather than the proposed 1%). Their simulations also 
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showed that stimulus would be more effective if it was weighted in favour of final government 
purchases (rather than transfers).  
Examining the economic consequences of the crisis, Godley et al. (2008) made the assumption that 
private debt fell from over 170% of GDP in 2008 to 130% of GDP by 2013 (its level in 2001). They 
showed that under this assumption, “GDP will fall about 12 percent below trend between now and 
2010, while unemployment will rise to about 10 percent”. Consequently, “the virtual collapse of 
private spending will make it impossible for U.S. authorities to apply fiscal and monetary stimuli 
large enough to return output and unemployment to tolerable levels within the next two years” 
(Godley et al., 2008, p.4). 
Papadimitriou et al. (2009) outlined a series of conditional projections along with some potential 
policies for the U.S. economy. Their ‘baseline’ scenario assumed a declining budget deficit, in line 
with CBO estimates, resulting in a growth recession. Conversely, maintaining the fiscal stance led to 
a fall in unemployment, but a worsening of the current account deficit and the government debt-to-
GDP ratio. The second scenario looked at what could happen if the dollar continued to depreciate. 
They showed that a depreciation would lead to an increase in net exports, which would allow the 
government to address its own deficit while slowly reducing unemployment. However, 
Papadimitriou et al. (2009, p.1) also pointed out that “U.S. demand for petroleum products does not 
fall quickly when their prices rise”, so that a devaluation of the dollar would not rebalance the 
current account on its own. This stood in partial contrast to the claims made in Godley et al. (2004, 
2005), Chilcote et al. (2006a), and Hannsgen et al. (2006), who all argued that a devaluation would 
help restore the current account to surplus. Papadimitriou et al. (2009) went on to suggest that an 
international agreement to reduce fossil fuel consumption could help to improve global imbalances, 
as could increasing investment into renewable energy sources.  
The argument that the government deficit should be increased in order to stimulate demand and 
reduce unemployment was repeated in Zezza (2010) and Papadimitriou et al. (2011a, 2011b, 2012, 
2013a, 2013b), with the simulations in each study updated to take account of new data. 
Papadimitriou et al. (2011b, p.8) warned of “prolonged stagnation and flat employment”, while 
Papadimitriou et al. (2012, p.8) cautioned that without a larger stimulus “the nation is still likely to 
be producing at far below its potential output levels” (in early 2013). Papadimitriou et al. (2013a) 
presented a similarly bleak view of the future, although they also pointed out that that a fiscal 
expansion could ultimately lead to a reduction in the current account deficit in the longer term, if 
the spending targeted export-orientated research and development (and so affected relative 
import/export prices). 
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Post 2014, a series of strategic analysis papers were published that examined the role of inequality 
on the speed of the U.S. economic recovery. Papadimitriou et al. (2014, 2015, 2016) argued that 
rising inequality was a cause of slower U.S. growth. Referring to Godley’s (1999) discussion of ‘seven 
unsustainable processes’, Papadimitriou et al. (2014, p.2) identified the “path of income distribution 
over the last three and a half decades as an eighth unsustainable process that public policy has 
allowed to go unchecked, and that threatens the sustainability of the U.S. economic recovery”.  
Papadimitriou et al. (2014) went on to run two simulations that examined how high levels of 
inequality could affect the US economy given different assumptions about household behaviour. In 
the first simulation, the bottom 90% of households were assumed to increase their debt-to-income 
ratio over time, leading to “a repeat of the pre-2007 condition of debt-led growth, based on 
increased borrowing and debt and a new sort of speculative bubble” (Papadimitriou et al., 2014, p.9-
10). This process was deemed to be unsustainable in the long-run. In the second scenario, 
households continued to deleverage, and this led to secular stagnation and low growth. The authors 
concluded that “[t]he only way out of this dilemma is a reversal of the trend toward greater income 
inequality. A change in the income distribution is a necessary condition for sustainable growth in the 
future” (Papadimitriou et al., 2014, p.10). 
3.2.1.4 The Levy Institute’s Greece model 
More recently, the Levy Institute’s modelling team have produce a fully empirical SFC model of the 
Greek economy (Papadimitriou et al., 2013c). Using this model, Papadimitriou et al. (2013d, 2014a) 
analyse the effect of austerity policies on the Greek economy. Papadimitriou et al. (2013d, p.14) find 
that “austerity leads to a path of continuous recession, lower employment, declining incomes, and 
higher levels of poverty”. In order to increase employment and growth, they advocate enacting a 
new kind of Marshall Plan for Europe, using funds from the European Investment Bank or another 
EU institution. In their simulations, this leads to higher level of growth and employment, and a lower 
government deficit.  
Papadimitriou et al. (2014a) consider a variety of additional expansionary policy options. These 
include a temporary suspension of interest payments on public debt (with these payments instead 
used to increase demand and employment), the introduction of a parallel financial system (to 
finance additional domestic expenditure), and the adoption of an employer-of-last-resort program. 
The authors find that the employer-of-last-resort approach is the most beneficial in terms of its 
effects on GDP. 
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3.2.2 The Ireland model 
Kinsella and Tiou-Tagba Aliti (2013a) are critical of the failure of orthodox Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium (DSGE) models to predict the 2007 - 2008 financial crisis, despite the national 
accounts data clearly showing an increase in the financial fragility of the private sector. As they put 
it, “[m]acroeconomic models which uncritically rely on assumptions like the representative agent to 
drive their predictions will fail, and fail again, to understand the role of debt and default in shaping 
the growth trajectories of developed economies” (Kinsella and Tiou-Tagba Aliti, 2013a, p.6). They 
argue that an empirical macroeconomic model based on the Irish economy should be able to 
forecast an increasing probability of crisis between 2004 and 2007 due to an increase in private 
sector debt. Kinsella and Tiou-Tagba Aliti (2013b) create an SFC model of the Irish economy that 
attempts to understand the consequences of the Irish government's austerity policies. They use this 
model to trace the effect of the reduction in government spending on the financial balance sheets of 
each sector. 
3.3 The theoretical stock-flow consistent literature 
This section reviews the closed economy theoretical SFC literature, ordered by topic. Section 3.3.1 
covers the general growth models, Section 3.3.2 the fiscal and monetary policy models, Section 3.3.3 
the financialisation models and Section 3.3.4 the financial fragility and recession models. 
3.3.1 General growth models 
Godley and Lavoie (2001) is the first example of an SFC growth model – so called because the 
model’s steady state coincides with a growth in output. The model is heavily influenced by the work 
of Nicholas Kaldor and Michal Kalecki, and includes many of the elements that would go on to 
become standard features of SFC models, such as mark-up pricing, multiple assets and rates of 
return, ‘Tobinesque’ portfolio allocation and buffer stocks for each sector. The model contains three 
sectors (households, firms and banks), and two assets (equities and bank deposits). Simulations are 
used to investigate a variety of economic phenomenon, including changes in consumption, interest 
rates, liquidity preference, real wages, and the financing of investment. The authors demonstrate 
the sensitivity of the results to initial parameter values by conducting simulations under two 
different economic ‘regimes’, which differ only in the value of the parameters on the investment 
function. In the normal regime, investment reacts more to a change in the rate of utilisation than to 
Tobin’s q, whereas in the ‘puzzling’ regime the opposite is the case. 
Godley and Lavoie’s (2001) model is extended by Zezza and Dos Santos (2004) to include a 
government, a central bank, and conflict inflation. Simulations are run to ascertain whether the 
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results of the simulations from Godley and Lavoie (2001) hold in a more general context. The 
effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy is examined, with fiscal policy found to be more effective 
at stabilising output than monetary policy (due to contractionary monetary policy stimulating the 
economy through higher interest payments on debt). Finally, inflation is endogenised by allowing 
changes in sales to affect prices. This leads to the economy displaying cyclical tendencies around its 
long-run growth rate.  
3.3.2 Fiscal and monetary policy models 
Godley and Lavoie (2007b) present a simple, three sector model (government, firms, households) in 
order to investigate the effectiveness of fiscal policy at sustaining full employment and a zero output 
gap. They find that the government must run both a nominal and a real deficit relative to GDP in 
order to maintain output and employment. Interestingly, in contrast to the commonly held view 
(e.g. in Galbraith, 2011), they find that real interest rates (net of taxes) in excess of the economy’s 
growth rate do not necessitate that the government impose a large primary surplus to prevent its 
debt from increasing relative to GDP. The authors also investigate the effectiveness of fiscal policy in 
stabilising output around its full employment level. They find that fiscal policy is able to quickly bring 
about full employment at a target rate of inflation. These results lead the authors to question the 
emphasis placed upon monetary policy as a means to regulate aggregate demand. 
Chatelain (2010) investigates the effects of contractionary fiscal and monetary policy when firms are 
constrained in their ability to acquire finance for investment. This is in contrast to much of the SFC 
literature, in which the overall level of investment (and output as a whole) is determined solely by 
the demand for investment. Chatelain (2010) finds that the addition of financing constraints means 
that fiscal policy is unable to stabilise output and employment (as firms are unable to respond to 
higher demand). These results, therefore, contrast with those of Godley and Lavoie (2007b). 
Chatelain (2010) also finds that monetary policy is ineffective at increasing aggregate demand when 
government spending is reduced. This is because the reduction in spending causes firms to be 
demand constrained.  
Ryoo and Skott (2013) investigate the fiscal conditions necessary for the maintenance of full 
employment in an SFC model with four sectors (firms, households, government, banks) and three 
assets (bank deposits, government bonds, stocks). Unlike much of the SFC literature, the authors 
solve the model analytically rather than via numerical simulation. The authors find that fiscal policy 
is an effective means of ensuring full employment in the short-run (thus supporting the position of 
Godley and Lavoie, 2001). However, they also find that the sustainability of this position is 
dependent on the exact specification of fiscal policy (e.g. the balance of taxation between different 
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income streams) and household behaviour (e.g. the propensity to consume). Ryoo and Skott’s (2013) 
analysis therefore clarifies the conditions under which unsustainable government debt dynamics will 
not result from an interest rate in excess of an economy’s growth rate (which was identified as a 
possibility by Godley and Lavoie, 2007b). The result that fiscal policy is an effective means of 
ensuring full employment in the short-run is also found in Zezza and Dos Santos (2004) and Godley 
and Lavoie (2007b).  
3.3.3 Financialisation models 
Dos Santos and Zezza (2006) extend the model in Zezza and Dos Santos (2004) in order to look at 
how changes in income distribution might affect growth. They conduct a number of simulations in 
which changes to the income distribution are caused by changes in the firm sector’s markup and 
changes in the banking sector’s lending and deposit rates. They find that the effects of a change in 
the income distribution ultimately depend on what caused the income distribution to change and 
the values taken by the parameters in the investment function. For example, if firms try to increase 
their distributed profits by lowering their retained earnings then the sector’s cash flow falls as its 
demand for bank loans increases. External debt and cash flow both appear in the investment 
function, leading to a fall in investment. The lower level of investment, along with a lower propensity 
to consume out of profits and interest income, leads to lower growth and ultimately a lower level of 
profits (even as the profit share increases). Likewise, if banks increase their income share by 
lowering the deposit rate, then household spending will fall (due to the lower propensity to consume 
out of profits and interest income). This leads to a fall in the firm sector’s utilisation ratio and cash 
flow ratio, (both of which enter the investment function). As a result, investment falls. However, the 
lower deposit rates will incentivise households to place more of their wealth into the firm sector’s 
equities, which will increase Tobin’s q and stimulate investment. The overall effect on investment 
will therefore depend on the values of the parameters in the investment function. If banks instead 
try to increase their income share by increasing interest rates, then “the probability of ending on a 
lower growth path increases” (Dos Santos and Zezza, 2006, p.116). This is largely because the 
increase in interest rates negatively affects investment, even as Tobin’s q increases due to a fall in 
the supply of equities. The results in this paper, therefore, show the importance of the choice of 
parameter values in certain functions for the model's results.  
Lavoie (2008) is interested in the changes in income distribution associated with financialisation. 
Using a version of the growth model from Godley and Lavoie (2007a), Lavoie (2008) runs a series of 
simulations to investigate the effect of increasing firms’ retained earnings and dividend payments, 
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and households’ equity purchases and borrowing for consumption. Financialisation is found to 
increase economic activity in the short-run, but decrease it in the long-run.  
Van Treeck (2009) presents an SFC model inspired by Lavoie and Godley (2001) and which is able to 
reproduce a number of stylised facts about financialisation, including Stockhammer’s (2005) 
‘investment-profit puzzle’ and Rappaport’s (2005) ‘short-term performance obsession’. The model is 
used to investigate the economic impact of share buybacks and higher dividend payments. Share 
buybacks are found to increase economic activity at first before having some negative effects later 
on. Whether or not the long-term negative effects outweigh the short-term positive ones is found to 
depend on bank behaviour. If banks have high levels of personal lending and demand low repayment 
rates, then the effect on output is found to be positive. Conversely, if banks have low levels of 
personal lending and high repayment rates, this leads to negative output effects.  
As with the share buybacks, higher dividend payments are found to have positive short-term effects, 
as the economy is initially ‘debt-led’ (as in Lavoie, 2008). However, in the long-run, the overall effect 
is found to depend on the relative weight of Tobin’s q in the investment function, and the level of 
loan repayments required by banks in each period. Lower values of Tobin’s q and higher repayment 
rates lead to lower profits and output. Overall, the authors find that higher dividend payments are 
more likely to have negative long-term economic effects than share buybacks.  
Dallery and Van Treeck (2011) look at the issue of capacity utilisation and fully versus partially 
adjusted positions in a conflicting claims inflation model. The authors extend Lavoie and Godley’s 
(2001) model to incorporate conflict inflation and adjustment mechanisms. Simulations are 
conducted under two different capitalist ‘regimes’. The first of these is a ‘Fordist’ regime, in which 
managers dominate shareholders, so that the growth and survival of the firm is paramount. In this 
regime, an increase in the wage share leads to an increase in capacity utilisation, a reduction in 
unemployment and an increase in the profit rate. The second simulation portrays a ‘financialised’ 
world where shareholders dominate managers, so that firms’ primary objective is to increase the 
profit share. An increase in the profit share leads to lower investment, and consequently, lower 
output and employment (and also profit).  
The authors also simulate share buybacks and increases in dividend payments. As in Dos Santos and 
Zezza (2006), this results in firms increasing their reliance on debt financing from banks, which leads 
to higher interest payments and rentier income. Although the economy ends up in steady state that 
is consistent with a ‘fully-adjusted position’, it also becomes increasingly fragile due to the increase 
in firm leverage. This issue is taken up in an additional simulation, which finds that the unwillingness 
of banks to grant loans to firms with higher leverage limits profitability. The model, therefore, shows 
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that the ability of shareholders to meet their objectives will depend on the actions of the banking 
sector. 
Ryoo and Scott (2013) also investigate two issues related to financialisation. They find that a 
reduction in retained earnings will increase firm indebtedness (as do Dos Santos and Zezza [2006] 
and Dallery and Van Treeck [2011]), and that this will lead to a reduction in the government debt-to-
capital ratio. An increase in stock buybacks has a similar effect. These relationships (between 
government debt and private sector borrowing) are also observed in the empirical SFC literature 
(e.g. see Godley [1999]).  
3.3.4 Financial fragility and recession models 
Caverzasi and Godin (2014) build a model to investigate the role financialisation and inequality 
played in the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis, drawing on aspects of Hyman Minsky’s Financial 
Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1992) and Jan Toporowski’s Theory of Capital Market Inflation 
(Toporowski, 2000). The authors present a model with two household sectors (workers and 
rentiers), a firm sector and a banking sector. The model captures the process of financialisation by 
extending the firm sector’s investment decision to encompass financial assets, so that both firms 
and households can make portfolio allocation decisions. Household lending can lead to either 
property bubbles (when the lending is for house purchases) or growth (when households borrow to 
realise capital gains). Financial instability also enters the model via a ‘keeping up with the Jones’ 
term in the consumption function, which causes workers to imitate rentiers’ consumption patterns, 
with this spending financed via borrowing.  
The authors find that an increase in firms’ demand for financial assets (over investment goods) leads 
to a fall in investment and a continual decline in GDP. A second simulation looks at the role of 
inequality in the 2007 - 2008 crisis. An attempt by workers to imitate rentiers’ consumption patterns 
financed by borrowing initially leads to an increase in investment, GDP and an asset price boom.  
However, over time, workers’ debts increase (as does financial fragility), and this leads to lower 
consumption and an economic downturn. This finding is similar to the warnings issued by the 
empirical SFC literature (e.g. Papadimitriou et al. 2014, 2015, 2016). 
Dafermos (2012) investigates the role of liquidity preference and uncertainty in causing recessions. 
As in Caverzasi and Godin (2014), portfolio allocation decisions are extended beyond the household 
sector to include both firms and banks. However, the main innovation in the paper is the inclusion of 
a ‘perceived degree of uncertainty’ term in a number of the model’s behavioural equations. 
Simulations are then conducted in which the value of the perceived degree of uncertainty term is 
increased. This is found to lead to an increase in the household sector’s liquidity preference (and so 
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an increase in the demand for assets with a higher ‘liquidity premium’) and a reduction in target 
levels of debt/lending. The shift into more liquid assets and away from equities leads to an increase 
in interest rates, a reduction in target debt levels, credit rationing by banks and lower equity prices. 
Taken together, these effects cause the economy to enter a recessionary phase.  
Zezza (2008) investigates the fall in the U.S. saving rate since 1985, in light of the shift in the 
distribution of income towards the top 5% of income earners. Zezza’s model, which extends the 
model found in Dos Santos and Zezza (2006), explores how an increase in house prices might affect 
the savings rate. The model is able to replicate a number of the economic processes that 
characterised the run-up to the 2007 - 2008 financial crisis, such as a housing boom, higher 
inequality, and lower savings rates. However, despite the additional complexity, Zezza’s model does 
not endogenously generate an economic downturn (as does Caverzasi and Godin [2014] and Ryoo 
[2010]).  
Le Heron (2011) investigates the possible transmission mechanisms from the 2007 - 2008 financial 
crisis to the French economy. He notes that while there is a clear transmission mechanism to several 
European countries28, the links to others are less clear-cut. For example, he points out that most 
European banks were not overly involved in U.S. subprime markets, that European household 
savings/pensions were not overly linked to the stock market, that the private sector had low debt 
levels in relation to the U.S., and that the U.S. was not a major export market for many European 
countries. Consequently, Le Heron (2011) postulates that the transmission mechanism from the U.S. 
financial crisis to the French economy must have been via changes in expectations. In order to test 
this hypothesis, he builds a model that is partially calibrated to the French economy. While the 
model is relatively complex (with nine assets and five sectors), there is no foreign sector. Instead, the 
effect of the financial crisis enters the model via the firm, household and banking sector’s 
expectations. The values for the expectations parameters are derived from a series of surveys that 
investigate French household and firm confidence between 2005 and 2009. The model shows that 
the majority of the variation in French GDP over the period 2005 - 2009 can be explained by changes 
in firms’ expectations (which affect investment and therefore output), with changes to bank and 
household expectations relatively unimportant in comparison.  
Le Heron (2012) utilises a similar model to that presented in Le Heron (2011) in order to explore two 
alternative policy responses to the recession that followed the 2007 - 2008 financial crisis. The first 
                                                          
28 Britain and Iceland have large banking sectors, Spain, Ireland and the U.K. were experiencing a property 
boom, Ireland relies heavily on U.S. investment and Greece has serious structural problems. 
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policy response is broadly Keynesian, and assumes the government’s fiscal policy includes automatic 
stabilisers alongside a monetary policy that targets inflation and growth (so that monetary policy 
supports the government’s fiscal policy). The second policy response is meant to imitate the 
European Union’s fiscal and monetary arrangements, so that fiscal policy targets a balanced budget 
while monetary policy targets inflation.  
In order to replicate the effect of the sub-prime crisis, Le Heron simulates a drop in confidence and 
an increase in the liquidity preference of all private sectors. He finds that the recession is around half 
as big under the ‘Keynesian’ policy mix as it is under the ‘European’ policy mix. In the European 
policy mix, lower government spending affects output growth via the firm sector’s cash flows, which 
lower the supply of credit from banks. In the Keynesian policy mix, the increase in cash flows allows 
firms to finance their investment expenditures internally rather than through banks loans. 
Consequently, in this simulation government debt increases as firm debts fall.  
Ryoo (2010) presents a continuous time model without a steady state. Instead, the model exhibits a 
short-run cycle that fluctuates around a longer wave. The short-run cycle is based on Harrod’s 
‘instability principle’, while the long waves are based on Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis 
(Minsky, 1992). The short cycles result from changes in demand relative to capacity utilisation, and 
are constrained by labour market dynamics, while the long waves depend on the interaction 
between two stable subsystems – one that determines firms’ debt structures, and another that 
determines households’ expectations of equity prices (and hence their portfolio allocation 
decisions). The upswing of the long wave is caused by steady increases in firms’ debt-capital and 
equity-deposit ratios, fuelled by positive expectations resulting from a stable economic 
environment. These expectations modify the acceptable leverage ratio of firms over time (so that 
tranquil economic periods result in increases in acceptable leverage ratios). However, increases in 
the debt-to-capital ratio ultimately reduce the profit-interest ratio. When the profit-interest ratio 
stabilises, expectations shift, and this leads firms to reduce their debt accumulation, resulting in a 
long downturn. The model, therefore, generates a business cycle within a long-term financial crisis 
cycle. Interestingly, in contrast, the majority of SFC models, equities are the flexible element in firm 
financing, rather than bank loans. 
Tymoigne (2006) models a ‘Minskyian’ system with one financial asset (demand deposits) and one 
real asset (capital). Two models are presented. The first contains firms, banks and households, while 
the second adds a central bank. The first model is only able to generate constant expansions or 
contractions (unless the model is shocked). This model is used to illustrate a number of insights from 
Minsky’s work, including the importance of matching the maturity of assets and liabilities on firms’ 
balance sheets, the role that the removal of debt from bank and firm balance sheets plays in 
90  
economic recoveries, and the asymmetric effect of changes in interest rates in economic expansions 
versus contractions. The second model (with a central bank sector) generates a cycle rather than a 
steady state. However, unlike in Ryoo (2010), this cycle is a result of the central bank attempting to 
stabilise the economy via monetary policy.  
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the SFC methodological approach to macroeconomic modelling and 
reviewed the empirical and theoretical SFC literature.  
Section 3.1 introduced the SFC methodology. It was argued that the defining feature of the SFC 
methodology is that it is based on a comprehensive accounting framework that logically and 
consistently integrates flows and stocks. Another characteristic of SFC models is that they include 
several sectors and are able to include a large number of different assets (each with their own rates 
of return). These qualities of SFC models make it possible to model the interactions between the 
‘financial side’ and the ‘real side’ of the economy in an integrated way. As was pointed out at the 
start of the chapter, this makes SFC models particularly suited to the investigation of the stranded 
assets thesis, since stranding is likely to affect the economy via financial markets (Battiston et al. 
[2016], Carney [2015], CTI [2011, 2013], Gros et al. [2016], Weyzig et al. [2014]). 
Section 3.2 and 3.3 presented some of the literature on SFC models. Section 3.2 looked at the 
empirical SFC literature. The Levy Institute’s U.S. model was shown to have predicted both the early 
2000s recession and the recession associated with the 2007 - 2008 financial crisis. Papadimitriou et 
al. (2009) discuss how reaching an international agreement on climate change and green investment 
might improve the U.S. current account deficit and as a result, global imbalances.  
Section 3.3 introduced some of the theoretical SFC literature. Models were categorised into four 
groups: growth models, fiscal and monetary policy models, financialisation models, and financial 
fragility models. A common feature of the models solved via numerical simulation was that the 
results depended on the values taken by the parameters – emphasising the importance of using 
realistic or empirically calibrated parameter values.   
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Chapter 4: A stock-flow consistent model for the analysis of 
stranded assets and the transition to a low carbon economy 
This chapter presents a stock-flow consistent (SFC) model with an embedded input-output (IO) 
model that is able to explore issues related to the stranding of capital assets. Section 4.1 introduces 
the model along with the transactions, balance sheet and revaluation matrices. Section 4.2 presents 
the equations that make up the model. Section 4.3 concludes. 
4.1 Model overview  
This section proceeds as follows. Section 4.1.1 provides an introduction to the model. Section 4.1.2 
introduces some of the nomenclature used in the model. Section 4.1.3 presents the model’s balance 
sheet, transactions and revaluation matrices. 
4.1.1 Introduction to the model 
The motivation for this dissertation is to better understand the macroeconomic and financial 
implications of a transition to a low carbon economy and the stranding of capital assets. Section 2.5 
of Chapter 2 summarised the main claims of the stranded assets literature regarding both the 
probable causes of stranded assets and its potential effects, while Section 2.6 presented the 
research questions that this dissertation will attempt to answer. The aim of this chapter is to present 
a SFC model that it is able to explore some of the claims from Section 2.5, and in doing so answer the 
research questions from Section 2.6. As such, this chapter presents an SFC model that it is able to 
explore: 
(1) How different transitions to a low carbon economy might strand capital assets (i.e. fast vs 
slow transitions, expected vs unexpected transitions – as discussed in Chapter 2 Section 2.2). 
This relates to research questions (i) to (ii), (x) and (xi).  
(2) How unexpected changes in market conditions might strand capital assets (i.e. a change in 
market conditions caused by a change in economic conditions, an energy innovation, a 
change in regulation or policy, a change in financing conditions, or a change in social norms – 
as discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3). This relates to research questions (iv) to (viii), (x) and 
(xi).  
(3) The macroeconomic and financial effects of stranded assets, different transitions to a low 
carbon economy, and different changes in market conditions. This relates to research 
questions (iii) and (ix). 
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The model presented in this chapter is a theoretical SFC model, rather than an empirical SFC model. 
As outlined in Chapter 3, theoretical models investigate issues related to a particular economic 
theory or idea. They are not intended to provide a realistic representation of a particular economy, 
or make economic predictions or projections for a particular economy. Consequently, in building the 
model, the aim was to only include those sectors, assets, and relationships that were deemed 
absolutely necessary for the theoretical study of (1) to (3). The approach is therefore influenced by 
Caverzasi and Godin (2015, p.180), who argue that:  
“…more parameters allow for the representation of more subtle behaviours. However, this is at 
the cost of more complexity when trying to estimate or analytically solve the model. If one 
believes that PK-SFC modelling should be used merely as a reference within an argumentative 
theoretical debate … or for simple didactical purposes, a just balance between realistic behaviours 
and the number of parameters has to be found. This joins the call of Dos Santos and Zezza (2008), 
among others, for simple models targeted at specific subjects, rather than large models including 
numerous sectors or assets.” 
In this spirit, the model is made up of three firm sectors (‘green’, ‘brown’ and ‘other’), two 
household sectors (‘ethical’ and ‘normal’) and one banking sector, but excludes both a government 
sector and an external (i.e. foreign) sector. More will be said on these exclusions in a moment. The 
financial assets included in the model are equities (issued by the green, brown and other firm 
sectors), and deposits and loans (issued by banks). The real assets included in the model are the 
capital assets produced by the green, brown and other firm sectors. The model does not include 
fossil fuel reserves or resources. Again, more will be said on this exclusion in a moment. The model 
presented is therefore that of a pure credit economy consisting of six sectors, five financial assets 
and three real (physical) assets.  
The basic structure of the model is summarised by Figure 4.1. The green sector produces low carbon 
energy goods, the brown sector produces high carbon energy goods, and the other sector produces 
‘everything else’ – i.e. all non-energy goods. Each firm sector sells its output to the household 
sectors and to each firm sector (this requires the inclusion of an input-output model into the SFC 
model). The production of output requires labour (which is purchased from households), capital 
(which firms produce themselves) and intermediate goods. Firms finance themselves through 
retained earnings, by borrowing from banks, and by issuing equities (which are purchased by 
households).  
Turning to the household sectors, both ethical and normal households buy goods from firms, sell 
their labour to firms, and invest in different financial assets. Although they have different names, 
ethical and normal households actually behave identically in the initial stationary state. However, in 
93  
certain simulations the behaviour of a household sector may be altered – e.g. ethical households 
may be forced to divest from the brown sector’s goods or financial assets.  
Finally, the banking sector makes loans to firms and issues deposits (which end up being held by the 
household sectors). Firms pay interest to banks on their loans, and banks pay interest on deposits to 
households. Bank profits, which are made from the spread between loan and deposit rates, are paid 
to households. More will be said on the behaviour and the structure of each sector in sections 
(4.1.1.1) to (4.1.1.3). 
The structure of the model allows different types of transitions (Section 2.2) and changes in market 
conditions (Section 2.3) to be investigated. For example, three firm sectors are necessary in order to 
investigate a transition from one form of energy production to another, while two household sectors 
are needed to investigate the distributional effects that might arise from one household sector 
divesting from a firm sector’s goods or financial assets (Section 2.3.4 and 2.3.5).  
As was mentioned above, the model does not include either a government sector, an external sector 
(or a second economy), or fossil fuel reserves. Not including a government sector may seem 
surprising, given that in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3) policy changes are identified as something that might 
strand assets. However, climate change policies can be introduced without including a government 
sector (see Section 4.2.1). Consequently, it was felt that a government sector could be excluded 
without any loss to the model’s functionality. 
Not including an external sector or second economy might also be considered problematic, as asset 
stranding is likely to impact on different countries in different ways. While these distributional 
impacts are likely to be important, it was felt that including an external sector or an additional 
economy would have greatly complicated an already complex model, with negative implications for 
the understanding of the model’s causality. However, including a foreign sector or second economy 
is an interesting avenue for future research (see Chapter 8).  
Not including fossil fuel reserves (or resources) may also seem surprising, given that the stranded 
assets literature argues that the stranding of proved reserves is likely to have a significant impact on 
fossil fuel companies (Chapter 2, Section 2.4). Reserves were excluded to keep the model as simple 
as possible, and because the stranding of proved reserves will often be associated with the stranding 
of capital assets. For example, the cost of developing reserves accounts for around 85% of the total 
capital expenditures of the upstream oil industry (IEA, 2013a). Hence part of the effect of reserve 
stranding can be proxied through capital stranding – which is what this model focusses on. However, 
reserves that are not yet developed do contribute to the valuation of publicly listed fossil fuel 
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Figure 4.1: Simple model overview 
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companies. Consequently, not including these reserves removes a potentially important feedback 
mechanism from asset stranding to the economy. As such, including reserves is an interesting 
avenue for future research (see Chapter 8 for more details, as well as a discussion of some of the 
model’s other shortcomings).  
Although the aim of the model is to understand the theoretical impacts of stranded assets and 
different transitions to a low carbon economy, where possible the values of the parameters in the 
model are based on empirical estimates of these parameters for the UK economy (in 2016). When 
these are not available, parameter values are based on empirical estimates from other advanced 
economies, and when these are not available, parameter values are taken from equivalent 
parameters in other SFC models. Chapter 5 discusses the calibration of the model in more detail. The 
rest of this section describes the features of the household, firm and banking sectors in more detail.  
4.1.1.1 The household sectors 
Within the model, households are classified as being either ethical or normal. Ethical households 
make up 30% of the total household sector, while normal households make up the remaining 70%. 
Because unemployment is not modelled, the underlying assumption is that the proportion of ethical 
and normal households employed by each firm sector will follow the 30 - 70% ethical-normal split. 
The ethical/normal classification pertains to potential, rather than actual behaviour. For example, 
the equations that govern the behaviour of the normal household sector are the same as those that 
govern the behaviour of the ethical household sector, while the parameters that appear in the 
equations are identical across household sectors (at least in the initial stationary state). Parameter 
values can however be varied in order to simulate a change in behaviour. For example, simulations 
are conducted in which ethical households divest from brown goods or brown financial assets.  
The reason for splitting the household sector along behavioural lines relates to the desire to 
investigate the economic effects of households divesting from a particular firm sector’s goods or 
securities. While it is possible to simulate these processes with a single household sector, splitting 
the household sector means that the distributional effects of divestment can be examined. In 
addition, splitting the household sectors in this way means that the effects of divestment become 
non-trivial. For example, in a model where two household sectors hold financial assets, the 
divestment from a firm sector’s assets by only one sector will probably mean a fall in the market 
value of the firm sector in question. However, this outcome is not guaranteed because it depends 
upon the response of the non-divesting sector. Conversely, in a model in which only one sector holds 
financial assets, divestment will always lead to a reduction in the market value of the divested 
sector. 
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The 30 - 70% split between ethical and normal households is informed by Eurosif’s Sustainable and 
Responsible Investment study (Eurosif, 2016). The study reports that approximately 48% of 
European professionally managed assets exclude certain securities from their portfolios on ethical 
grounds, and that approximately 25% of professionally managed assets in the EU area are subject to 
norms based screening. Given these figures, it seems plausible that 30% of households could choose 
to divest from fossil fuel assets, at least under certain conditions.  
Within the model, the two household sectors undertake a variety of important functions. They offer 
their labour to each firm sector in exchange for a wage, and spend part of their income on the 
consumption goods produced by these firms. Any income not spent is allocated into either firm 
equities or bank deposits. As is usual in SFC models, these portfolio allocation decisions are 
determined along the lines laid out by Brainard and Tobin (1968) (although the approach is modified 
due to the presence of more than one household sector).  
Because there is more than one type of good available for purchase, households have to choose how 
to split their spending between each consumption good. The equations that determine how 
consumption is split are based on Deaton and Muellbauer’s (1980) Almost Ideal Demand System 
(AIDS). The AIDS equations allocate demand as a function of relative prices (an increase in the 
relative price of a good results leads to a fall in the demand for that good, and vice-versa).  
4.1.1.2 The firm sectors 
There are three (nonfinancial) firm sectors in the model: ‘brown’, ‘green’ and ‘other’. Green firms 
produce low carbon energy goods, brown firms produce high carbon energy goods, and other firms 
produce all the other goods – i.e. all the non-energy goods. Thus, green firms are assumed to emit 
very little or no carbon in the production of their output, while brown firms produce significant 
amounts of carbon as a by-product of their production processes. Taken together, the green and 
brown firm sectors make up the energy sector. 
Each firm sector also includes the firms that produce that sector’s capital equipment, along with the 
firms that produce the materials necessary to produce that sector’s output (e.g. mining, oil and gas 
companies in the case of the brown sector). An alternative approach would have been to have the 
other firm sector produce all the capital and have the brown and green sectors purchase this capital 
from them. This approach was rejected for two reasons. 
The first of these reasons is related to the number of sectors that are likely to be affected by asset 
stranding – it is not only those firms that extract and produce energy goods that are at risk of their 
assets becoming stranded. Just as a transition to a low carbon economy implies a reduction in the 
demand for fossil fuel assets, it also implies a reduction in the demand for the capital used in the 
97  
extraction, processing and transportation of fossil fuels, as well as the capital that is used to turn 
these fuels into energy. Hence, the firms and sectors that produce these forms of capital are also at 
risk of their assets becoming stranded. As such, it makes sense to include these firms in the brown 
sector, so that the effects of stranding are isolated to one sector.  
The second reason is related to the calibration of the input-output model and the calibration of the 
parameter values within the A-matrix29 (which is based on Berg et al. [2015], albeit with higher 
energy requirements for green firms – see Chapter 5).30 However, the A-matrix values from Berg et 
al. (2015) make little sense if energy firms purchase their capital from the other firm sector. One of 
the features of renewable energy (wind turbines, solar panels, etc.) is that they require very little in 
the way of inputs (including energy inputs) in order to produce their output once the wind 
turbine/solar panel etc. is up and running. One way round this would be to have the other sector 
produce all the capital goods and have separate A-matrices for each sector’s capital and other goods 
outputs. This approach was however rejected because it would have greatly increased the 
complexity of the model. 
The structure of the equations that determine each firm sector’s behaviour are, with a few 
exceptions, the same across each firm sector (e.g. the equations that determine the investment 
behaviour of green firms are the same as those that determine the investment behaviour of brown 
firms and other firms). Conversely, parameter values can and are varied between sectors to reflect 
differences in preferences and technology. For example, parameter values are set so that energy 
firms are more capital intensive, have different rates of capital depreciation (Herman et al., 2003) 
and require different intermediate goods inputs than do other firms (Berg et al., 2015). Likewise, 
each sector’s starting stocks and initial period flows are also different (to reflect differences in sector 
size). For example, in the initial stationary state brown firms make up approximately 6.4% of the 
economy’s output, green firms 1.6%, and other firms the remaining 92% (BIS, 2012). Hence, in the 
initial stationary state green firms produce approximately 20% of the economy’s energy output 
while brown firms produce the remaining 80%. 
                                                          
29 In input-output models, the A-matrix determines the amount of goods required by each sector from each of 
the other sectors to produce a unit of its output. 
30 This reflects the idea that green firms require more energy inputs than brown firms to produce a unit of 
their output. See Hall et al. (2014) for a summary of the energy return on energy invested (EROEI) of different 
energy sources. 
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The output of each firm sector consists of consumption, capital and intermediate goods. 
Consumption goods are sold to each household sector, whereas intermediate consumption goods 
are sold to each firm sector (for use in the production process). Capital goods are slightly different 
from the other two types of goods in that they are not sold between firm sectors. Instead, each 
sector produces its own capital equipment (for use in its production process). As there are no 
inventories in the model, the underlying assumption is that firms produce all goods to order, or 
conversely, that firms are able to correctly estimate the demand for their goods and produce just 
enough to satisfy this demand. There is however a caveat to this assumption. Each firm sector has a 
level of maximum output that is determined by its stock of capital. In the case of energy firms, these 
capacity limits are binding.31 If the demand for an energy sector’s output exceeds its maximum 
supply then firms (including energy firms) and households will have to purchase the residual demand 
from the other, non-capacity constrained energy sector. The imposition of these capacity constraints 
prevents unrealistic elasticities emerging when prices or preferences change.  
Disaggregating the non-financial firm sectors into green, brown and other firm sectors means that 
the production process can be made to include, along with labour and capital, the consumption of 
intermediate goods. This requires the addition of an input-output model into the larger SFC model. 
The inclusion of intermediate demand is important, as a significant proportion of energy sales are to 
firms (including energy firms). Likewise, energy firms also purchase goods and services produced by 
the other firm sector.  
The structure of the equations that form the input-output model are based (in part) on those in 
Hudson and Jorgenson (1974). The underlying assumption used in constructing these equations is 
that firms require an exogenously determined quantity of goods to produce a unit of their output, 
but that they can substitute between these goods when relative prices change.32 The calibration of 
the demand for intermediate goods is based on Berg et al. (2015), albeit with higher energy 
                                                          
31 Here, the term ‘binding’ refers to the nature of the equations that determine the actual amount of goods 
supplied by each sector. For example, energy firms are unable to provide goods in excess of their capacity 
limits. Conversely, there is no mechanism that limits the supply of goods from the other sector (and there are 
also no substitute goods available). However, it should be noted that at no point in any of the simulations does 
the demand for the other sector’s goods exceed its supply constraint. Therefore an equation which limits the 
output of the other sector is not required. 
32 Although this is not the ‘standard’ approach to input-output analysis, the lack of substitutability between 
inputs has long been criticised (see for example Christ, 1955). Substitution between inputs is particularly 
important here as the model is concerned with the transition from one form of energy production to another.  
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requirements for green firms, reflecting the idea that green firms require more energy inputs to 
produce a unit of their output than do brown firms. 
As well as intermediate goods, firms also require labour and capital to produce their output. The 
level of capital firms choose to target is a function of the expected demand for their output and their 
target capital-output ratio (which depends on both their expected weighted cost of capital and an 
exogenously determined risk premium).  
Capital has two functions in the model. First, it sets the maximum level of output a firm can produce 
in a period. If the demand for energy goods from an energy sector exceeds the amount it can supply, 
firms and households are forced to purchase energy goods from the other, non-capacity constrained 
energy sector. Second, capital – in conjunction with the level of employment in a sector – 
determines sectoral labour productivity (more will be said about this in a moment).  
Each firm sector’s investment expenditures are financed out of retained earnings, equity issues and 
banks loans. Following Ryoo (2010), it is assumed that the amount of investment financed by 
retained earnings is determined exogenously, while the amount of investment financed by equities 
and bank loans is determined endogenously (as a function of their expected relative costs). Hence, 
an increase in the interest rate banks charge on their loans will lead to more equity financing, while 
an increase in the return on equity will lead to more borrowing from banks. Any profits that are not 
retained to finance investment are distributed to shareholders (i.e. households).  
Along with capital (and intermediate goods), each firm sector also requires labour to produce its 
output. It is assumed that firms are indifferent (or cannot differentiate) between workers from each 
household sector and that each household sector has the same level of labour productivity. Thus, 
the proportion of ethical and normal households hired by each firm sector will reflect the proportion 
of ethical and normal households in the population as a whole. Although labour productivity does 
not vary between household sectors, it can vary between firm sectors. For a firm sector, labour 
productivity is determined as a function of the sector’s capital-labour ratio (with higher capital-
labour ratios leading to higher levels of labour productivity).  
As outlined above, capital has two functions in the model: the level of capital sets the maximum 
amount of output a sector can produce, while the capital/labour ratio determines a sector’s labour 
productivity. These two functions are important as they mean that each firm sector benefits from 
holding capital. Without these benefits, the production and maintenance of capital machinery (via 
investment expenditures) would be a cost without a corresponding benefit. Thus an increase in 
capital would only lead to an increase in costs, and consequently either higher prices (and so lower 
demand) or lower profits. Therefore, a firm sector that increased its capital would actually see a fall 
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in the demand for its output or a fall in its profits (while a firm sector that reduced its capital would 
experience an increase in profits or sales). Hence, the inclusion of multiple firm sectors that compete 
on price (and for funding) requires a more realistic treatment of capital than is commonly found in 
most SFC models.  
The wage rate paid by firms is a function of the average level of labour productivity in the economy. 
The use of the average level of labour productivity (rather than sectoral productivity) in the wage 
equations is related to Baumol’s cost disease (Baumol and Bowen [1966], Nordhaus [2008]). For 
example, in an empirical study of the US economy, Nordhaus (2008, p.38) finds that: “For the most 
part, industrial wage and profit trends are determined by the aggregate economy and not by the 
productivity experience of individual sectors”. Prices are then set by each firm sector as a fixed 
mark-up over unit costs, where unit costs consist of wage payments and purchases of intermediate 
consumption goods. 
4.1.1.3 The banking sector  
In the model banks have two functions. First, they finance a proportion of firms’ investment 
expenditures by issuing loans. Second, they allow households to hold a part of their wealth in the 
form of bank deposits. Banks pay interest on deposits and charge interest on loans. Both loan and 
deposit rates are determined exogenously. Bank profits are made from the spread between loan and 
deposit rates. While banks are owned by the private sector, they do not issue any equities or bonds, 
and they have no capital. As a result, bank profits are distributed to the household sectors, with 
profits split between each household sector based on each household sector’s relative size.  
The banking sector in the model is quite simple. The main reason for this is to avoid complicating an 
already complex model (and so to aid economic intuition). For example, bank equities could have 
been added to the model, and lending and deposit rates could have been endogenised. Likewise, 
bank lending could have been extended to the household sector. These extensions and 
modifications were however rejected, as they were felt to be unnecessary for the study of asset 
stranding. Nevertheless, and as is discussed in Chapter 8, extensions to the banking sector (in 
particular endogenising lending rates) are one way in which the model could be developed in future.  
4.1.2 An introduction to model nomenclature  
This section briefly describes some of the model’s nomenclature. Appendix 3 provides a full list of 
the notation used in the dissertation. 
In this chapter, real variables are in lowercase and nominal variables are in uppercase. Subscripts 
attached to variables indicate firm or household type: (o) stands for other firms, (g) stands for green 
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firms, (b) stands for brown firms, (e) stands for ethical households, (n) stands for normal households 
and (t) stands for a total. For example, nominal consumption of green goods by ethical households is 
represented by the variable (Cg e).  
The subscript (x) is used when a variable is common to more than one household sector, so that (x) 
will be either (e) or (n). The subscript (j) is used when a variable is common to more than one firm 
sector. For variables that appear in equations related to an input-output matrix, the subscript (i) 
refers to the row firm sector, whereas the subscript (j) refers to the column firm sector. Hence, the 
subscripts attached to the intermediate consumption variables refer to the sector producing and 
consuming the intermediate goods – the first subscript specifies the producing sector while the 
second subscript specifies the consuming sector. Hence (i) and (j) will either be equal to (o), (g), or 
(b). For example, (icgb) stands for real intermediate consumption goods produced by the green 
sector and consumed by the brown sector. 
Other subscripts are also attached to certain variables, although unlike those outlined above, these 
latter subscripts are not used to identify a firm or household sector. Instead, they are used to 
identify each variable, and as such these subscripts (and the variables they are attached to) will be 
explained as and when they appear. Subscripts can also be used to represent time periods. For 
example, the subscript (-1) indicates the previous period. The symbol (Δ) represents a change in the 
variable from the previous period. For example:  
Δy = y - y(-1)  
Superscripts attached to variables may refer to either expectations (e), targets (T), demand (D), or 
maximum supply (S). For example, (yde) stands for expected real disposable income, (kT) stands for 
target real capital, (cD) stands for real consumption goods demand, and (cS) stands for the maximum 
amount of real consumption goods that can be supplied.
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4.1.3 The transactions, balance sheet and revaluation matrices. 
This section presents the model’s transactions, balance sheet and revaluation matrices. An explanation of each type of matrix can be found in Chapter 3, 
Section 3.1.3 (including an above/below the line distinction). Appendix 3 provides a full list of the notation used in this dissertation. 
Matrix 4.1: The transactions matrix – part 1 (above the line) 
 
Ethical 
house-
holds 
Normal 
house-
holds 
Other firms Green firms Brown firms Banks 
Sum 
Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital 
Other 
Consumption 
- Co e - Co n 
+ Co e 
+ Co n 
       0 
Green 
consumption 
- Cg e - Cg n   
+ Cg e 
+ Cg n 
     0 
Brown 
consumption 
- Cb e - Cb n     
+ Cb e 
+ Cb n 
   0 
Carbon tax + CTPAY e +  CTPAY n     
- CTPAY e 
- CTPAY n 
   0 
Intermediate 
consumption  
  
- ICoo - 
ICbo - ICgo 
+ ICoo + 
ICob + ICog 
 
- ICog - 
ICbg - ICgg 
+ ICgo + 
ICgb + ICgg 
 
- ICob - 
ICbb - ICgb 
+ ICbo + 
ICbb + ICbg 
   0 
Investment   + Io - Io + Ig - Ig + Ib - Ib   0 
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Matrix 4.1: The transactions matrix – part 2 (above the line) 
 
Ethical 
house-
holds 
Normal 
house-
holds 
Other firms Green firms Brown firms Banks 
Sum 
Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital 
Amortisation 
funds 
  - AFo + AFo - AFg + AFg - AFb + AFb   0 
Wage bill 
+ WBo e 
+ WBg e 
+ WBb e 
+ WBo n 
+ WBg n 
+ WBb n 
- WBo e 
- WBo n 
 
- WBg e 
- WBg n 
 
- WBb e 
- WBb n 
   0 
Profits 
+ FDIS o e  
+ FDIS g e 
+ FDIS b e 
+ FDIS f e 
+ FDIS o n  
+ FDIS g n 
+ FDIS b n 
+ FDIS f n 
- FDIS o e 
- FDIS o n 
- FRET o 
+ FRET o 
- FDIS g e 
- FDIS g n 
- FRET g 
+ FRET g 
- FDIS b e 
- FDIS b n 
- FRET b 
+ FRET b 
- FDIS f e 
- FDIS f n 
 0 
Interest on 
loans 
  
- (ro(-1) 
∙ Lo(-1)) 
 
- (rg(-1) 
∙ Lg(-1)) 
 
- (rb(-1) 
∙ Lb(-1) 
 
+ (ro(-1) 
∙ Lo(-1)) 
+ (rg(-1) 
∙ Lg(-1)) 
+ (rb(-1) 
∙ Lb(-1)) 
 0 
Interest on 
deposits 
+ (rm(-1) ∙ 
Me(-1)) 
+ (rm(-1) ∙ 
Mn(-1)) 
      
- (rm(-1) 
∙ Me(-1)) 
- (rm(-1) 
∙ Mn(-1)) 
 0 
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Matrix 4.1: The transactions matrix – part 3 (below the line) 
 
Ethical 
house-
holds 
Normal 
house-
holds 
Other firms Green firms Brown firms Banks 
Sum 
Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital 
Change in 
Deposits 
- ΔMe - ΔMn        
+ ΔMe 
+ ΔMn 
0 
Change in   
Loans 
   + ΔLo  + ΔLg  + ΔLb  
- ΔLo 
- ΔLg 
- ΔLb 
0 
Change in 
Equities 
- (pE g  
∙ Δeg e) 
- (pE b  
∙ Δeb e) 
- (pE o  
∙ Δeo e) 
- (pE g 
∙ Δeg n) 
- (pE b  
∙ Δeb n) 
 - (pE o  
∙ Δeo n) 
 
+ (pE o  
∙ Δeo e) 
+ (pE o  
∙ Δeo n) 
 
+ (pE g  
∙ Δeg e) 
+ (pE g  
∙ Δeg n) 
 
+ (pE b  
∙ Δeb e) 
+ (pE b  
∙ Δeb n) 
  0 
Sum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Matrix 4.2: The balance sheet matrix 
Matrix 4.3: The revaluation matrix 
 Ethical 
households 
Normal 
households 
Other firms Green firms Brown firms Banks Sum 
Equities 
+ (Δ pE o ∙ eo e(−1)) 
+ (Δ pE g ∙ eg e(−1)) 
+ (Δ pE b ∙ eb e(−1)) 
+ (Δ pE g ∙ eg n(−1)) 
+ (Δ pE b ∙ eb n(−1)) 
+ (Δ pE o ∙ eo n(−1)) 
- (Δ pE o ∙ eo e(−1)) 
- (Δ pE o ∙ eo n(−1)) 
- (Δ pE g ∙ eg e(−1)) 
- (Δ pE g ∙ eg n(−1)) 
- (Δ pE b ∙ eb e(−1)) 
- (Δ pE b ∙ eb n(−1)) 
 0 
Capital   + (Δpo ∙ ko(-1))  + (Δpg ∙ kg(-1)) + (Δpb ∙ kb(-1))  
+ (Δpo ∙ ko(-1))  
+ (Δpg ∙ kg(-1)) 
 + (Δpb ∙ kb(-1)) 
 Ethical 
households 
Normal 
households 
Other firms Green firms Brown firms Banks Sum 
Deposits + Me + Mn    - Me - Mn 0 
Loans   - Lo - Lg - Lb + Lg + Lb + Lo 0 
Capital   + Ko + Kg + Kb  + Kg + Kb + Ko 
Equities 
+ (pE g ∙ eg e) 
+ (pE b ∙ eb e) 
+ (pE o ∙ eo e) 
+ (pE g ∙ eg n) 
+ (pE b ∙ eb n) 
+ (pE o ∙ eo n) 
- (pE o ∙ eo e) 
- (pE o ∙ eo n) 
- (pE g ∙ eg e) 
- (pE g ∙ eg n) 
- (pE b ∙ eb e) 
- (pE b ∙ eb n) 
 0 
Balance -VTOT e -VTOT n -VTOT o -VTOT g -VTOT b 0 - Kg - Kb - Ko 
Sum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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4.2 The model 
This section presents the equations that make up the model. Section 4.2.1 presents the equations 
that relate to the firm sectors, Section 4.2.2 presents the equations that relate to the household 
sectors, Section 4.2.3 presents the equations that relate to the banking sector, and Section 4.2.4 
presents the equations that relate to the stranded assets indicators.  
4.2.1 The firm sectors 
This section presents the equations relating to the firm sector. Section 4.2.1.1 presents some general 
accounting identities. Section 4.2.1.2 discusses the determination of aggregate demand and the 
limits to firm supply. Section 4.2.1.3 covers the output of consumer goods. Section 4.2.1.4 looks at 
the determination of firm investment. Section 4.2.1.5 looks at the financing of firm investment. 
Section 4.2.1.6 presents the equations that determine the output and consumption of intermediate 
goods (i.e. the input-output framework). Section 4.2.1.7 covers the equations that deal with 
employment, labour productivity and wages. Section 4.2.1.8 describes the cost and price structures 
employed by firms. Finally, Section 4.2.1.9 presents the equations that determine how carbon taxes 
are set and how the revenues they raise are distributed to households. 
4.2.1.1 Firms – accounting identities 
Before detailing the equations that determine firm behaviour, it is worth setting out some of the 
accounting identities that apply to firms and how these relate to final demand.  
Starting with the general accounting identities, total real output (st) is the sum of real output by 
green (sg) brown (sb) and other (so) firms (equation 1). For each firm sector real output is the sum of 
real consumption (cj), real gross investment (ij), and real output of intermediate goods (icij) (equation 
2).33  
1 st = sg + sb + so 
2 sj = cj + ij + icjo + icjg + icjb         
With the real values determined, the nominal value of a sector’s output (Sj) can be calculated by 
multiplying real sectoral output by the sector’s price level (pj) (equation 3). Total nominal output (St) 
is then equal to the sum of the nominal outputs of each firm sector (Sj) (equation 4).  
3 Sj = sj ∙ pj  
                                                          
33 Here and elsewhere, the (t) subscript indicates a total. 
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4 St = Sg + Sb + So  
Because intermediate goods are used in the production process, real final demand – real 
consumption expenditures by households and real investment expenditures by firms – is not equal 
to real total output (i.e. the sum of all real production by firms). Instead, real final demand (yt) is 
arrived at by netting out intermediate consumption from total output. This is what equation 5 
does.34 The (aij’s) represent the coefficients from the A-matrix (see Section 4.2.1.6). Total nominal 
final demand (Yt) is then equal to real final demand multiplied by the general price level (p) 
(equation 6). The general price level is determined by Equation 87. 
5 yt = ([1 - agg] ∙ sg) + ([0 - abg] ∙ sg) + ([0 - aog] ∙ sg) +      
 ([0 - agb] ∙ sb) + ([1 - abb] ∙ sb) + ([0 - aob] ∙ sb) +      
 ([0 - ago] ∙ so) + ([0 - abo] ∙ so) + ([1 - aoo] ∙ so)  
6 Yt = yt ∙ p 
4.2.1.2 Firms – supply and demand 
This section discusses the factors related to the demand and supply of each firm sector’s goods. In 
the model the supply of goods by green or brown firms will not necessarily be equal to the demand 
for these goods. Instead, green firms and brown firms have a maximum level of output that is 
determined by its capital stock. When the demand for an energy sector’s goods exceeds its capacity 
limit, firms and households are forced to buy from the other (non-capacity constrained) energy 
sector. As mentioned above, this prevents unrealistic elasticities emerging when prices change.  
The rest of this section proceeds as follows. Part (a) describes the equations that determine the 
aggregate demand for each sector’s goods. 35 Part (b) describes the equations that determine the 
maximum supply of each sector’s goods. Finally, part (c) describes the equations that determine the 
actual quantity of goods supplied by each sector.  
                                                          
34 Normally, matrix notation would be used to represent these equations and the other equations associated 
with the input-output matrix. However, to aid transparency, the equations in this chapter are reproduced 
exactly as they appear in the computer program used to numerically simulate the model (Eviews). In addition, 
it should be noted that final demand is also equal to: Yt = cg + cb + co + ig + ib + io 
35 The determinants of the demand for investment, consumption and intermediate goods from each 
household and firm sector are discussed in detail in their respective sections (e.g. household demand for 
consumption goods is discussed in detail in the section on consumption demand). 
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(a) Aggregate demand  
In this section the demand for goods from each sector are summed together to give the aggregate 
demand for each firm sector’s output. Two sets of equations are specified. The first of these includes 
investment goods, whereas the second is net of investment goods. Both sets of equations are 
necessary due to the assumption that firms prioritise the demand for investment spending over all 
other types of output demand.  
Equation 7 says that the demand for a sector’s total real output (sDj) is equal to the demand for 
consumption goods (cDj x), investment goods (iDj), and intermediate goods (icDij) from that sector. 
Equation 8 says that the demand for a sector’s real output of consumption and intermediate goods 
(gdDj) is equal to the demand for the output of a sector net of the investment goods it produces.  
7 sDj = cDj e + cDj n + icDjo + icDjg + icDjb + iDj       
8 gdDj = cDj e + cDj n + icDjo + icDjg + icDjb       
(b) Maximum supply  
We now turn to the capacity constraints of each sector. Equation 9 says that a sector’s maximum 
supply of consumption and intermediate consumption goods (gdSj) (i.e. output net of investment) is 
equal to the product of its real capital (k) and maximum output to capital ratio (ζj), minus its level of 
desired investment. The principle here is that firms prioritise investment expenditures over all other 
forms of output, to ensure that they move as quickly as possible towards their target level of capital. 
This means that firm investment, and therefore the speed at which a sector increases its productive 
capacity, is not affected by the sector being at its capacity limit.  
9 gdSj = (kj ∙ ζj) - ij   
Equations 10 and 11 determine the maximum supply of consumption (10) and intermediate 
consumption (11) goods by a sector. Equation 10 says that the maximum supply of consumption 
goods by firm sector (j) to a household sector (x) (cSi x) is equal to the maximum amount of 
consumption and intermediate consumption goods the sector can supply (gdSi), multiplied by the 
demand for that sector’s consumption goods from that household sector (cDi x) divided by the total 
demand for that sector’s consumption and intermediate consumption goods (gdDi). Equation 11 says 
that the maximum amount of intermediate consumption goods firm sector (i) can supply to firm 
sector (j) (icSij) is equal to the maximum amount of consumption and intermediate consumption 
goods firm sector (i) can supply, multiplied by the demand for intermediate consumption goods from 
firm sector (i) by firm sector (j) (icDij), divided by the total demand for firm sector (i's) consumption 
and intermediate consumption goods.  
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10 cSi x = gdSi ∙ (cDi x / gdDi)  
11 icSij = gdSi ∙ (icDij / gdDi)  
(c) Logical functions 
The final part of this section describes a series of logical functions (equations 12 to 15) which are set 
either equal to zero or one depending on whether each energy sector is within or in excess of its 
capacity limits. These logical functions (z10 to z14) appear in the equations that determine the actual 
amount of goods supplied by each firm sector to each firm/household sector. They determine, along 
with the demand for a sector’s goods and that sector’s maximum supply, the quantity of goods 
produced by each sector (see Sections 4.2.1.6 and 4.2.2.3 for more details).  
12 z10 = 1   if: gdDg < gdSg;  and 0 otherwise. 
13 z11 = 1   if: gdDg > gdSg;  and 0 otherwise. 
14 z12 = 1   if: gdDb > gdSb;  and 0 otherwise. 
15 z13 = 1   if: gdDb < gdSb;  and 0 otherwise. 
4.2.1.3 Firms – consumption output 
This section discusses some identities related to the consumption goods produced by each firm 
sector (a full discussion of how consumption demand is determined will have to wait until the 
section on household behaviour). 
Within the model, firms hold no inventories. The underlying assumption is therefore that firms 
produce all goods to order, or conversely, that firms are able to correctly estimate the demand for 
their goods and produce just enough to satisfy this demand (as long as this quantity is within the 
firm sector’s output capacity). The output of real consumption goods by a firm sector (cj) is therefore 
equal to the sum of ethical (cj e) and normal households’ (cj n) real consumption (equation 16). Total 
real consumption (ct) is then equal to the sum of the real consumption goods produced by each firm 
sector (equation 17). 
16 cj = cj e + cj n  
17 ct = cg + cb + co  
Nominal consumption sales (Cj) by each firm sector are equal to the product of each firm sector’s 
real consumption output and its price level (equation 18). Total nominal consumption (Ct) is then 
equal to the sum of the nominal consumption output of each firm sector (equation 19). 
18 Cj = cj ∙ pj  
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19 Ct = Cg + Cb + Co  
4.2.1.4 Firms – investment output36 
This section discusses factors related to firm investment. Part (a) summaries the factors that 
influence each firm sector’s target level of capital. Part (b) explains how firms move towards their 
capital targets. Part (c) describes the outcomes of the investment process. 
(a) The target level of capital 
Each firm sector requires capital (along with labour and intermediate goods) in order to produce its 
output. Equation 20 says that each firm sector targets a stock of real capital (kTj) that is equal to the 
product of its target real capital-output ratio (κTj) and its expected real output (sKT ej), with 
expectations based on a simple extrapolation of the trend in (sKTj) over the previous periods 
(equation 21, which is similar to equation 5 in Jackson and Victor [2015]).37 The variable (sKT ej) is 
equal to the expected level of (sKTj) which is itself equal to the larger of either: i) a sector’s expected 
demand; or ii) its actual sales (equation 22). Setting up firm output expectations as an extrapolation 
of the trend in output was felt to be important as the simulations in Chapter 6 look at transitions, 
which involve large changes in expected output. As such, when firms set their capital targets they 
take into account the trend in their output. If instead, output expectations were backwards looking 
(so that they depended on output in the last period), energy firms would constantly be producing 
too little capital (in the case of green firms) or too much capital (in the case of brown firms) during 
the transition period. 
20 kTj = κTj ∙ sKT ej  
21 sKT ej = sKTj(-1) ∙ ( 1 + [ ( sKTj(-1) - sKTj(-2) ) / sKTj(-1) ] )   
22 sKTj = (sDj ∙ z02 j) + ([1 - z02 j] ∙ sj) 
23 z02 j = 1   if: sDj > sj  and 0 otherwise. 
Equations 22 and 23 determine the value of (sKT j). Taken together, these equations say that (sKTj) will 
equal a sector’s real output (sj) as long as the demand for a sector’s real output does not exceed the 
sector’s maximum capacity. In this case, a sector’s real output (sj) will also be equal to the demand 
for its real output (sDj) (i.e. sKTj = sDj = sj). However, if the demand for an energy sector’s output 
                                                          
36 Many of the equations in Section 4.2.1.4 and 4.2.1.5 draw on Godley and Lavoie (2007a, Ch.7). 
37 Here and elsewhere, the superscript (T) stands for target and the subscript (W) stands for weighted.  
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exceeds the amount it is able to supply then (sKTj) will be equal to the demand for that sector’s 
output.  
An example should help to clarify why this is the case. Take the situation where the ex-ante demand 
for the green sector’s output exceeds its maximum level of output. In this situation, the green sector 
will target a quantity of capital that will (eventually) allow it to fulfil this level of demand. However, 
because the green sector is currently not able to fulfil this level of demand for its output, the brown 
sector’s actual output will exceed the ex-ante demand for its output (because consumers are forced 
to substitute brown goods for green ones due to the green sector being at its maximum capacity). 
Because the brown sector wants to be able to fulfil the actual level of demand for its output, it 
targets a level of capital that allows it to fulfil its actual level of sales.  
Turning to the determination of (κTj), equation 24 says that for each sector the target capital-output 
ratio depends positively on that sector’s exogenously determined output elasticity of capital (αj), and 
negatively on its exogenously determined risk premium (εj), endogenously determined expected real 
weighted cost of capital (rre W j), and exogenously determined depreciation rate (δj).38 The first two 
terms in the denominator on the right hand side of the equation jointly make up the cost of capital: 
the expected real weighted cost of capital is a measure of each sector’s borrowing cost (to be 
explained in more detail subsequently), while (δj) is the depreciation rate of capital. The higher the 
cost of capital, the lower the capital-output ratio.  
The other variable that appears in the denominator on the right hand side of the equation is the risk 
premium. This measures the additional return, above the cost of capital, which firms require in order 
to undertake an investment project. As is the case with the cost of capital, the higher the risk 
premium, the higher the return required on an investment, and so the lower the capital-output 
ratio. 
24 κj = αj / (rre W j + δj + εj) 
Equation 24 can be derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function (although this type of 
production function does not appear in the model).39  
                                                          
38 The argument that capital-output ratio depends negatively on the cost of capital is also made by Carreras et 
al. (2016), although the form of the equation which determines their capital-output ratio is different to the 
one presented here.  
39 To see this, start with a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form: 
s = A ∙ kα ∙ n(1- α) 
112  
(b) The investment process 
Once a target level of real capital has been determined, a partial adjustment function (equation 25) 
determines the speed at which each firm sector moves towards its target level of real capital. In each 
period, each firm sector invests (iDj) just enough to cover part (γj) of the difference between the 
target level of real capital and the level of real capital in the previous period, as well as that required 
to cover losses on capital due to depreciation (daj).  
25 iDj = z01 j ∙ [γj ∙ (kTj - kj(-1)) + daj]  
Equation 25 also includes a logical function (z01 j) that stops real gross investment falling below zero. 
This logical function is specified by equation 26. It says that (z01 j) takes a value of one as long as a 
firm sector desires an amount of real gross investment greater than zero. When a firm sector desires 
a level of real gross investment that is less than zero, the variable (z01 j) takes a value of zero. Hence, 
a sector’s real gross investment cannot fall below zero, and therefore its real capital can only 
decrease as fast as it depreciates. 
26 z01 j = 1   if: [γj ∙ (kTj - kj(-1)) + daj] > 0; and 0 otherwise. 
                                                          
Where (s) is output, (A) is total factor productivity, (k) is capital, (n) is labour, and (α) takes a value between 
zero and one. Setting total factor productivity equal to one and then solving for the marginal product of capital 
(mpk) gives (i.e. taking the derivative of output, s, with respect to capital, k): 
mpk = ∂s / ∂k = α ∙ k(α-1) ∙ n(1- α) 
This can be rewritten as: 
mpk = α ∙ (s / k) 
Which can then be rearranged to get the capital-output ratio: 
k / s = α / mpk 
Under the assumption of perfect foresight, we would expect the real cost of capital to be equal to the marginal 
product of capital in equilibrium, so that: 
k / s = α / r 
Where (r) is the real cost of capital. This cost of capital includes the cost of borrowing, which could be either a 
cost of borrowing or an opportunity cost on own funds, as well as the rate at which income must be set aside 
to cover depreciation.  
Of course, in reality firms are unlikely to know with any certainty the returns to their investment expenditures. 
Hence they will require a return in excess of their cost of capital. This justifies adding an exogenous risk 
premium term (ε) to the denominator, so that:  
k / s = α / (r + ε) 
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It is assumed that firms prioritise investment expenditures over all other forms of output, so that in 
practice the demand for investment goods is equal to the actual amount of investment goods 
produced (ij) (equation 27). Real capital depreciates at a constant rate (δj) (equation 28).  
27 iDj = ij 
28 daj = δj ∙ kj(-1) 
(c) Realised investment outcomes  
The investment process results in firms accumulating real capital and making internal transfers 
between their current and capital accounts in line with their investment expenditures (as per the 
transactions matrix). The assumption here is that each sector produces its own capital. Equation 29 
describes how investment and depreciation alter the capital stock. It says that the change in real 
capital (kj - kj(-1)) is equal to real investment minus real depreciation.  
29 kj = kj(-1) + ij - daj 
Equations 30 to 32 detail the nominal outcomes associated with the investment process. Equation 
30 calculates the nominal capital stock (Kj), as a product of the real capital stock and the relevant 
price level (pj). Equations 31 and 32 determine the nominal flows of gross investment (Ij) and 
depreciation (DAj) between each sector’s capital and current account as the product of the relevant 
real value and price level. 
30 Kj = kj ∙ pj 
31 Ij = ij ∙ pj 
32 DAj = daj ∙ pj 
4.2.1.5 Firms – investment financing 
The previous section described the factors related to firm investment. This section describes the 
financial counterparts to those investment decisions. Part (a) discusses how firms chose between 
different forms of financing: i.e. retained earnings, bank loans and equities. Part (b) details the 
outcomes of each sector’s financing decisions. Part (c) describes how the cost of each form of 
financing can be converted into a single figure (the expected real weighted cost of capital) that can 
help to determine the investment decisions of firms.  
(a) Financing decisions  
Once firms have decided how much to invest they need to decide how to finance these investment 
expenditures. Gross investment includes the cost of capital depreciation. As in Godley and Lavoie 
(2007a, Ch.7), we assume that firms automatically set aside part of their income – the amortization 
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funds (AFj) – to cover these depreciation costs (equation 33). Subtracting amortisation funds from 
gross investment therefore gives the net investment (INET j) required to adjust the level of capital 
stock (equation 34).  
33 AFj = DAj  
34 INET j = Ij - AFj 
Firms finance their net investment expenditures out of retained earnings (FRET j), by issuing new 
equity (IEF j) and by borrowing from banks (ILF j). Following Ryoo (2010), it is assumed that firms 
finance an exogenously determined proportion (ιj) of net investment through retained earnings 
(equation 35), whereas bank and non-bank forms of financing are determined endogenously. 
35 FRET j = INET j ∙ ιj  
The part of net investment not financed by retained earnings is financed by equities and bank loans. 
The equations that determine the split between the two types of financing have some similarities to 
the portfolio allocation equations in Brainard and Tobin (1968), the Almost Ideal Demand System in 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), and the input-output equations in Hudson and Jorgenson (1974). 
From a purely mathematical perspective, each system of equations determines a series of 
proportions. These proportions are then multiplied by either a stock or a flow variable to acquire the 
proportion of that stock (e.g. wealth) or flow (e.g. spending) that is allocated to the variable of 
interest. In order to ensure economic and logical consistency, a set of adding up constraints are 
imposed on the parameters that appear in these equations. Amongst other things, these constraints 
ensure that the proportions calculated by each system of equations adds up to one. Similar systems 
of equations are also used in the sections that deal with splitting firm consumption between 
different intermediate goods (Section 4.2.1.6), household consumption between different 
consumption goods (Section 4.2.2.3), and household wealth between different financial assets 
(Section 4.2.2.4). 
Turning now to the equations themselves, equations 36 and 37 specify the proportion of investment 
financed by each liability type as a function of an exogenous preference for each liability type (λEF j , 
λLF j)40, the relative costs of each liability type ([rK j] is the return on equity, [rL j] is the rate of interest 
on bank loans), and the parameters attached to each cost (λFj11 , λFj12 , λFj13 , λFj14).41 Higher relative 
costs lead to lower levels of demand for that type of investment financing, and vice versa. For 
                                                          
40 The subscript (EF) stands for equity financing, while (LF) stands for loan financing. 
41 The use of the (K) subscript to signify the return on equity follows Godley and Lavoie (2007a, Ch.11). 
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example, the proportion of net investment financed by issuing new equities (equation 36) depends 
negatively on each sector’s dividend yield (rK j) and positively on the cost of financing via bank loans 
(rL j). The strength of the response to each cost is determined by the attached parameters (λFj11 , λFj12 , 
λFj13 , λFj14) (the signs on these parameters are given in Chapter 5).  
36 IEF j = (INET j - FRET j) ∙ (λEF j + λFj11 ∙ rK j + λFj12 ∙ rL j)) 
37 ILF j = (INET j - FRET j) ∙ (λLF j + λFj13 ∙ rK j + λFj14 ∙ rL j) = INET j - FRET j - IEF j 
A set of adding up constraints (38 and 39) are imposed on the model to ensure that for each sector, 
the proportion of loan and equity financing adds up to one. As outlined above, these constraints are 
also found in other similarly structured systems of equations (e.g. in Brainard and Tobin [1968], 
Deaton and Muellbauer [1980], and Hudson and Jorgenson [1974]). 
38 λEF j + λLF j = 1  
39 λFj11 + λFj12 = 0; λFj13 + λFj14 = 0  
(b) Financing outcomes 
The investment decisions of firms leads to a change in each firm sector’s liabilities. For example, an 
increase in loan financed investment (ILF j) will lead to an increase in the demand for loans (LD j) 
(equation 40), while an increase in equity financed investment (IEF j) will lead to an increase in the 
supply of equities (eS j) (equation 41). The total number of equities each firm sector issues will 
depend on the relevant equity price (pE j).  
40 LD j = LD j(-1) + ILF j  
41 eS j = eS j(-1) + (IEF j / pE j) 
(c) The cost of capital 
The section on investment output (Section 4.2.1.4) explained that the capital-output ratio is a 
function of several exogenous parameters (αj , δj , εj) and one endogenous parameter (rreW j) – the 
expected real weighted cost of capital. With the weight of financing from each source already 
determined, it is now possible to explain how the expected real weighted cost of capital is 
calculated.  
To summarise, the calculation proceeds in three steps. In the first step, real costs are derived from 
nominal costs using the Fisher equation (Fisher, 1977 [1930]). In the second step, real weighted costs 
are calculated by multiplying the weight of each type of financing by the relevant cost of financing. 
In the third step expected real weighted costs of capital are calculated. 
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Step 1: Calculate real rates of return  
In the first step, we use the nominal rates of return on each financial asset along with the rate of 
price inflation to calculate the real rate of return on each financial asset. Equation 89 determines the 
rate of price inflation (π), while equations 157 and 158 calculate the nominal rate of interest on 
loans (rL j) and deposits (rM).  
Equation 42 says that a sector’s return on equity (rK j) (dividend yield)42 is equal to its dividend 
payments (FDIS j) relative to its market capitalisation (pE j ∙ eS j).43 The reason for defining a sector’s 
return on equity as equal to its dividend payments relative to its market capitalisation, rather than to 
its market capitalisation in the previous period (pE j (-1) ∙ eS j (-1)) (as in Godley and Lavoie, 2007a) is to 
ensure the model’s stability. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 8 (Section 8.1.7). 
42 rK j = FDIS j / (pE j ∙ eS j)  
With the nominal rate of return on each financial assets and the rate of general price inflation in 
hand, it is possible to calculate real rates of return (i.e. real costs) using the Fisher equation 
(equations 43 to 45). Here (rrK j) is the real rate of return on equities, (rrL j) is the real rate of interest 
on bank loans, and (rrM) is the real rate of interest on bank deposits. 
43 rrK j = [ (1 + rK j) / (1 + π) ] - 1 
44 rrL j = [ (1 + rL j) / (1 + π) ] - 1  
45 rrM = [ (1 + rM) / (1 + π) ] - 1  
Step 2: Calculate real weighted costs   
In the second step, real weighted costs are calculated. The first part of this step requires the 
calculation of the weight of each type of investment finance: by loans (LW j), by equity (eW j) and by 
retained earnings (FRET W j) (equations 46 to 48). These weights are calculated by dividing each type of 
                                                          
42 In the model the dividend yield has three functions. First, it influences the portfolio allocation decisions of 
households, with higher yields increasing the demand for that equity class. Second, it influences how firms 
choose to borrow, with higher yields (relative to other forms of financing) indicative of higher relative costs 
(due to either low equity prices, high profits, or a combination of the two). Hence, firms with high dividend 
yields will tend to substitute away from equity financing. Third, the dividend yield enters into the weighted 
cost of capital and weighted cost of capital equations, which influence firms’ target capital-output ratio and 
therefore each sector’s capital target.  
43 Following Godley and Lavoie (2007a, Ch.11) the subscript (K) identifies the rate in question as the rate of 
return on equity. 
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net investment financing (ILF j , IEF j , FRET j) by the total level of net investment (ILF j + IEF j + FRET j).44 For 
each sector the sum of these weights must sum to unity (so that: LW j + eW j + FRET W j = 1). 
46 LW j = ILF j / (ILF j + IEF j + FRET j) 
47 eW j = IEF j / (ILF j + IEF j + FRET j) 
48 FRET W j = FRET j / (ILF j + IEF j + FRET j) 
These weights can be used to calculate the real weighted cost of capital (rrW j) for each firm sector. 
The real weighted cost of capital is arrived at by summing together the products of the cost (or 
opportunity cost in the case of retained earnings45) for each type of borrowing with the relative 
weight of each type of borrowing (equation 49). Costs are the real rate of interest on loans (rrl j), the 
real rate of return on equity (rrK j), and the real rate of interest on deposits (rrM).  
49 rrW j = (LW j ∙ rrL j) + (eW j ∙ rrK j) + (FRET W j ∙ rrM) 
Step 3: Calculate the expected real weighted costs  
Finally, in the third step, the expected real weighted cost of capital is calculated. Here, expectations 
are based on the value taken by the variable in the previous period (equation 50).  
50 rreW j = rrW j(-1) 
4.2.1.6 Firms – intermediate goods output  
The previous sections discussed the production of consumption and investment goods by firms. This 
section discusses the other type of firm output – intermediate consumption goods. The section is 
split into two parts. Part (a) discusses the input-output method, while part (b) lays out the actual 
equations that make up the input-output part of the model.  
(a) The input-output (IO) framework 
SFC models usually have one, highly aggregated firm sector, so that intermediate sales between 
sectors are aggregated away. Disaggregating the firm sector into green (g), brown (b) and other (o) 
sectors allows for the articulation of the interlinkages between each sector through an input-output 
(IO) model.  
                                                          
44 Here the subscript (W) stands for weighted, (RET) stands for retained, (LF) stands for loan financed and (EF) 
stands for equity financed. 
45 It is assumed that firms do not consider placing retained earnings into equities as they wish to remain liquid 
and reduce the risk of capital loss. 
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The IO approach specifies an (n) by (n) matrix of technical coefficients (the ‘A-matrix’), where (n) is 
the number of firm sectors in the model. The coefficients in the A-matrix determine the quantity of 
intermediate goods used by the n’th sector in order to produce one unit of its output. Hence, 
reading across an A-matrix from left to right, the value taken by each parameter specifies the 
quantity of goods required from the row sector (the i’th sector) by the column sector (the j’th sector) 
to produce one unit of that sector’s (the j’th sector’s) output. The sum of each column therefore 
specifies the total quantity of inputs required by a sector to produce a unit of its output.  
In standard input-output analysis, the coefficients in the A-matrix are usually treated as exogenously 
given parameters. However, this standard approach has long been criticised. As Christ (1955, p.140) 
puts it “[t]he assumption that there is no substitution among inputs is often attacked because 
economists expect to find, and do find, substitution among inputs when relative prices change”.46 
The potential for a sector to substitute between inputs is presumably a function of the period under 
consideration – while there may be limited scope for substitution in the short run, over longer 
periods of time new capital can be purchased and new methods and ways of working can be 
adopted in response to changes in relative prices. The model outlined here covers a period of time 
long enough that some substitution in inputs is likely to take place. It is for this reason, along with 
the fact that the subject of the model is (at least in part) the transition from one form of energy 
production to another, that the use of fixed technical coefficients within the A-matrix are rejected in 
favour of coefficients that vary with relative prices, as in Hudson and Jorgenson (1974).47  
                                                          
46 In a later section Christ (1955, p.159) argues that: 
“input-output analysis must stand condemned from the point of view of accepted economic theory. 
The “law” in this case is the proposition that the proportions in which inputs are combined in 
production depend upon the relative prices of the inputs; the charge is that the defendant has openly 
violated the law by assuming that the input proportions are fixed technologically. Counsel for the 
defense do not deny that the input-output assumptions are contrary to the law; in fact, they admit it 
freely. Their defense is based on two other, more pragmatically oriented, claims. One is that, even 
though substitution among inputs takes place, it is unimportant enough to be ignored in many 
instances. The other is that an input-output analyst need not really believe in these assumptions, 
since he can adjust his technical coefficients to take account of any important substitutions that he 
expects to take place.” 
47 The idea that the coefficients in the A-matrix should vary with relative prices can, according to Hudson and 
Jorgenson (1974), be traced all the way back to Walras’s 1874 book, ‘Elements of Pure Economics’. 
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There are two further differences between the standard IO approach and the approach followed in 
this paper. First, two A-matrices are specified (rather than just the one). A-matrix 1 (see below) is a 
2-by-3 matrix that determines the actual quantity of energy (i.e. green and brown goods together) 
and all other goods required by each sector to produce a unit of each sector’s output (as a function 
of the average price of energy and other goods). Conversely A-matrix 2 (see below) is a 3-by-3 matrix 
that determines the desired demand for green, brown and other goods required by each sector to 
produce one unit of their output (as a function of the price of green, brown and other goods). Thus 
the 2-by-3 matrix determines the overall demand for energy goods (i.e. green and brown goods 
together) and other goods, while the 3-by-3 matrix determines the demand for green and brown 
goods. In addition, the 2-by-3 matrix describes an ex-post relationship, while the 3-by-3 matrix 
describes an ex-ante set of desires (that may or may not be satisfied).  
The main benefit of specifying two matrices (over one) is that it allows the degree of substitutability 
between energy goods to be set independently of the degree of substitutability between energy 
goods and other goods. In practice, the model is calibrated so that firms are more able to substitute 
between energy goods than they are between energy goods and other goods.48  
(b) The input-output process 
The rest of this section describes how each firm sector’s demand for intermediate goods is 
determined. The method proceeds in five steps:49  
(1) In the first step the coefficients in the 2-by-3 A-matrix (A-matrix 1) are specified. This matrix 
determines the ex-post demand for goods from the other sector and the energy sector (i.e. 
                                                          
48 The alternative is to calculate the values of the coefficients that appear in the A-matrix in one-step. This 
approach was rejected because it did not allow the degree of substitution to vary between energy goods and 
energy goods and other goods. 
49 From a methodological perspective, the approach taken in this section mirrors the approach taken in Section 
4.2.2.3. In that section, total real consumption is determined by a real consumption function. The relative 
demand for green, brown and other goods is then determined as a function of relative prices. Similarly, in this 
section total real consumption of intermediate goods is determined by each firm sector’s real output 
decisions, while the relative demand for green, brown and other goods is determined as a function of relative 
prices. Hence, both sections utilise the same approach to determine the demand for goods. This can be 
summarised as: i) calculate the overall demand for energy and other sector goods is calculated; ii) calculate the 
ex-ante demand for each type of energy good; iii) ensure that any supply constraints are adhered to; iv) 
convert real magnitudes into nominal ones. 
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the green and brown sectors aggregated together) as a function of relative prices (the price 
of other goods and a weighted average price of energy goods).  
(2) In the second step, the coefficients in the 3-by-3 A-matrix (A-matrix 2) are specified. This 
matrix contains the coefficients that determine the ex-ante demand for goods from each 
sector (green, brown and other) as a function of their relative prices.  
(3) In the third step, the ex-ante real demands for each good are calculated using the values 
from the 3-by-3 A-matrix (A-matrix 2) and the expected level of real sales from each sector.  
(4) In the fourth step, the ex-ante demands meet the energy supply constraints of each sector. 
Demand for an energy sector’s output in excess of the maximum amount it can supply 
causes the sector demanding the goods to turn to the other energy sector to fulfil the excess 
demand.  
(5) In the fifth step, the real quantities of intermediate goods are converted into nominal 
values, by multiply the real value by the relevant price level.   
Step 1: Determine the values in the aggregated A-matrix 
Starting with step one of the two step process, A-matrix 1 specifies the 2-by-3 A-matrix that 
determines the overall quantity of energy and other goods inputs required by each sector to 
produce a unit of each sector’s output. The underlying assumption used to construct the matrix is 
that firms require an exogenously determined quantity of goods inputs to produce a unit of their 
output (i.e. the sum of the coefficients in each column of the A-matrix [at j] are exogenously 
determined), but that each input can be substituted for the other (with the amount of substitution 
depending on the relative prices of the inputs).50 The approach therefore displays some similarities 
to that taken by Hudson and Jorgenson (1974), in that the values taken by the coefficients in the A-
matrix depend upon the relative prices of the intermediate consumption goods. 
The rest of this section presents the equations that determine the values taken by the coefficients in 
A-matrix 1. Equation 51 determines the total quantity of inputs required by a sector to produce one 
unit of that sector’s output. Equations 52 and 53 determine the relative proportions (aenj PROP , aoj 
PROP) of intermediate consumption goods demanded by each sector. Equations 54 and 55 specify the 
constraints on equations 52 and 53 that ensure that the proportions (aenj PROP , aoj PROP) add up to one. 
Equation 56 specifies the aggregate energy price faced by each firm sector. Equations 57 to 59 
determine the total quantity of inputs required by a sector to produce a unit of its output (aTenj), and 
                                                          
50 It is also possible to vary the (at i) parameters exogenously to simulate changes in technological efficiency. 
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A-matrix 1: The 2-by-3 A-matrix 
A1  = 
 green firms (g) brown firms (b) other firms (o) 
energy firms (en) aeng aenb aeno 
other firms (o) aog aob aoo 
    
sum of inputs at g at b at o 
     
the parameters (λA en j) and (λA o j), which determine what the proportion of a firm sector’s 
expenditure on energy and other goods would be if energy and other prices were identical. Finally, 
equations 60 and 61 convert the proportions (aenj PROP , aoj PROP) into the values that appear in the 2-
by-3 A-matrix. 
Equation 51 determines the sum of each column in the 2-by-3 A-matrix. In most of the simulations 
(at j) is fixed (i.e. [at j ex] is set equal to zero). However, in the simulations that look at changes in the 
‘energy return on energy invested’ (EROEI) in each sector, it will be necessary to vary the total 
quantity of inputs required by a sector to produce a unit of its output. This equation allows us to do 
that. It says that the sum of each column in the A-matrix is equal to the sum of the column of the A-
matrix in the previous period, plus the exogenously determined parameter (at j ex). By setting the 
value of (at j ex), and with equations 57 to 59 (see below), it is possible to simulate a change in the 
quantity of energy inputs a sector requires to produce a unit of its output. For an energy sector, such 
a simulation would be equivalent to altering the amount of energy it needs to produce a unit of its 
energy output (i.e. its EROEI).51  
51 at j = at j(-1) + at j ex  
Equations 52 to 53 say that the relative proportion (aenj PROP , aoj PROP) of intermediate goods 
demanded by a sector is a function of the parameter (λA enj , λA oj ), the log52 of the energy price and 
the other sector price experienced by a sector (pen j , po), and the parameters (λA j11 , λA j12 , λA j13 , λA 
j14). The sign on each of the parameters attached to the price variables (given in the calibration 
section) determines how firms respond to price changes (e.g. if the price of a good gets relatively 
more expensive then the demand for that good will fall). The values on the parameters (λA j11 , λA j12 , 
                                                          
51 More will be said on this type of simulation in Chapter 7.  
52 So that the impact of a change in price on demand becomes smaller the larger the change in prices. 
122  
λA j13 , λA j14) are set to ensure that the price elasticity of demand for energy goods (overall) is 
inelastic. 
52 aenj PROP = λA enj + λA j11 ∙ [ln(pen j)] + λA j12 ∙ [ln(po)]  
53 aoj PROP = λA oj + λA j13 ∙ [ln(pen j)] + λA j14 ∙ [ln(po)]  
As is the case with similarly structured systems of equations (see Section 4.2.1.5),53 adding up 
constraints must be placed on the parameters in order to ensure economic and logical consistency 
(equations 54 to 55). The constraints ensure that the sum of the proportions for each sector equal 
one. 
54 λA j11 + λA j12 = 0;  λA j13 + λA j14 = 0   
55 λA enj + λA oj = 1   
The energy price (pen j) faced by a firm sector is calculated by weighting the price of each energy 
good (pj) by the real quantity of intermediate energy inputs (icgj ; icbj) used by that sector (equation 
56). 
56 pen j = [pg ∙ icgj / (icgj + icbj)] + [pb ∙ icbj / (icgj + icbj)] 
In equations 52 and 53, (λA en j) and (λA o j) are usually constants. However, this is not the case in the 
simulations that look at changes in the energy return on energy invested (i.e. in the simulations in 
which [at j] is changing – as per equation 51). In these equations, (λA en j) and (λA o j) are exogenously 
altered so as to preserve the quantity of goods a sector requires from the other sector to produce 
one unit of its output. For example, when simulating an increase in the energy return on energy 
invested in the green sector (i.e. when [at g] is falling), the values of (λA eng) and (λA og) also need to 
change. If they do not, the fall in (at g) will lead to a fall in both (aeng) and (aog), and not only in (aeng) 
(as desired).  
In order to alter (λA en j) and (λA o j) it is first necessary to specify a parameter that determines a kind of 
‘target’ quantity of other goods inputs required by sector (j) to produce one unit of its output. This 
target parameter (aToj) is exogenously determined and enters into equation 57. This equation then 
determines the target level of energy goods (aTenj) required by sector (j) to produce a unit of its 
output. Equation 57 says that the target quantity of energy goods required by sector (j) to produce 
one unit of its output is equal to the total quantity of goods it requires to produce one unit of its 
                                                          
53 These equations have a similar form to the equations that determine households’ portfolio allocation 
behaviour, household demand for consumption goods, and firm’s investment financing behaviour. 
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output minus the target quantity of other goods inputs it requires to produce one unit of its output. 
For example, when simulating an increase in the energy return on energy invested in the green 
sector (i.e. when [at g] is falling), the reduction in (at g) will only lead to a reduction in (aTeng) (because 
[aTog] is a constant).  
57 aTenj = at j - aToj  
Now that we have values for (aTenj) and (aToj), we can adjust the values of (λA en j) and (λA o j) so that 
only the quantity of intermediate energy consumption varies because of changes in (at j). The 
parameter (λA enj) determines the proportion of spending by sector (j) on energy goods when the 
price of energy goods and other goods are equal. Equation 58 says that the value of this parameter is 
equal to (aTenj) divided by (at j). Meanwhile (λA oj) determines the proportion of spending by sector (j) 
on other goods when the price of energy goods and other goods are equal. Equation 59 says that 
this parameter is equal to one minus (λA enj) (which is the same as aToj divided by at j). 
58 λA enj = aTenj / at j 
59 λA oj = 1 - λA enj = aToj / at j 
With the proportion of spending on energy and other goods determined, equations 60 to 61 
calculate the values of the coefficients that appear in the 2-by-3 A-matrix.54 This is done by 
multiplying (aenj PROP , aoj PROP) by the parameter (at j).  
60 aenj = at j ∙ aenj PROP 
61 aoj = at j ∙ aoj PROP  
Step 2: Determine the values in the disaggregated A-matrix   
We now have all the coefficients that appear in the 2-by-3 A-matrix. The next step is to use this 2-by-
3 matrix to obtain the 3-by-3 A-matrix (A-matrix 2).  
To obtain the values of the coefficients (aij) in A-matrix 2, all that is required is to disaggregate each 
energy coefficient parameter (aenj) from the 2-by-3 A-matrix into a green and brown energy  
                                                          
54 The approach taken here is similar, but not identical, to that taken by Hudson and Jorgenson (1974). As in 
Hudson and Jorgenson (op. cit.), a series of equations are used to determine expenditure proportions on each 
intermediate good. However, whereas there these proportions are converted into A-matrix values by dividing 
by the ratio of factor input prices to output prices, here these proportions are converted into A-matrix 
parameters by multiplying by an exogenous parameter (the sum of the relevant A-matrix column). The 
difference in approach is necessitated by differences in the structure of the respective models. 
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parameter (aij). This is achieved via equations 62 and 63.These equations say that the relative 
proportion (aij PROP) of intermediate energy goods demanded by the (j’th) sector is a function of an 
exogenously determined parameter (λA ij ), the log of the relative prices in each sector, and the 
parameters (λA j21 , λA j22 , λA j23 , λA j24) attached to each price.55 Higher relative prices lead to lower 
levels of demand for that type of good, and vice versa. For example, the proportion of spending on 
green goods depends negatively on green prices and positively on brown prices. The strength of the 
response to each price is determined by the attached parameters (the signs on these parameters are 
given in Chapter 5). 
62 agj PROP = λA gj + λA j21 ∙ [ln(pg)] + λA j22 ∙ [ln(pb)]  
63 abj PROP = λA bj + λA j23 ∙ [ln(pg)] + λA j24 ∙ [ln(pb)]  
A few words should be said about how to interpret the exogenous parameters in equations 62 and 
63. Essentially, these parameters are intended to capture some of the heterogeneity between green 
and brown forms of energy, and as such, they limit the ability of each household sector to substitute 
between energy sources when prices change.56 The differences between renewables and fossil fuel 
energy are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2.   
As is the case with similarly structured systems of equations (see Section 4.2.1.5), adding up and 
symmetry constraints (64 and 65) are placed on the parameters in order to ensure economic and 
                                                          
55 These equations have a similar form to the equations that determine households’ portfolio allocation 
behaviour, household demand for consumption goods, and firm’s investment financing behaviour. 
56 Conversely, if goods supplied by the green and brown sectors were assumed to be homogenous (and if 
agents had no preference between each energy source) then it would make sense that the equations were set 
up in such a way that the sector with the lowest price would sell all it could (up to its capacity limit), while the 
sector with the higher price would fulfil the residual demand. 
A-matrix 2: The 3-by-3 A-matrix 
  green firms (g) brown firms (b) other firms (o) 
A2  = 
green firms (g) agg agb ago 
brown firms (b) abg abb abo 
other firms (o) aog aob aoo 
     
 sum of inputs at g at b at o 
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logical consistency. The constraints ensure that the sum of the proportions for each sector are equal 
to unity. 
64 λA j21 + λA j22 = 0;  λA j23 + λA j24 = 0  
65 λA gj + λA bj = 1 
With the proportion of spending on green and brown energy goods in hand, along with the values of 
the coefficients from the 2-by-3 A-matrix, equations 66 to 68 can be used to calculate the values of 
the coefficients that appear in the 3-by-3 A-matrix (A-matrix 2). For the rows that deal with the 
supply of energy goods, this is achieved by multiplying the value of the relevant coefficient from the 
2-by-3 A-matrix (A-matrix 1) by the proportion of either brown or green energy goods demanded by 
that sector. For the rows that deal with the supply of other goods, the coefficients are the same as in 
2-by-3 A-matrix (A-matrix 1) (equation 68). The supply of other goods to each sector has already 
been calculated with equation 61.  
66 agj = aenj ∙ agj PROP  
67 abj = aenj ∙ abj PROP  
68 aog = aob = aoen 
Step 3: determine intermediate consumption demand 
Having obtained the values in the 3-by-3 A-matrix, it is now possible to calculate the real quantities 
of intermediate consumption goods demanded by each sector. Equation 69 gives the real 
intermediate consumption demands (icDij) of each sector for each good.  
69 icDij = sj ∙ aij 
Step 4: confront demand with maximum supply and substitute where necessary  
We have now specified the real demand for each set of intermediate consumption goods. In this 
section these real demands are confronted with the supply constraints of each sector, in order to 
calculate the actual quantities of goods supplied. Equations 70 to 72 contain the logical functions (12 
to 15) that were first presented in section on supply and demand (Section 4.2.1.2). These logical 
functions, which are reproduced here for convenience, are set equal to either zero or one depending 
on whether the level of demand for a sector’s goods is within or in excess of its supply constraint.  
12 z10 = 1   if: gdDg < gdSg;  and 0 otherwise 
13 z11 = 1   if: gdDg > gdSg;  and 0 otherwise 
14 z12 = 1   if: gdDb > gdSb;  and 0 otherwise 
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15 z13 = 1   if: gdDb < gdSb;  and 0 otherwise 
Equations 70 to 72 determine the demand for intermediate consumption goods from each firm 
sector. In each equation, one or two of the (z) terms will be set equal to zero. Hence, for each 
equation, the supply of intermediate consumption goods is established by the variable/s attached to 
any (z) term/s that is/are set equal to one.  
Take equation 71 as an example, and assume that the (j’th) sector is green (i.e. j = g). What this 
equation is saying is that the actual real quantity of brown goods supplied to the green sector (icbg) is 
either:  
(a) Equal to the demand for brown goods from the green sector, when the total demand for 
brown sector goods is less than its maximum supply (i.e. when: z10 = 1, z11 = 0, z12 = 0, z13 = 1). 
(b) Equal to the maximum amount of brown goods the brown sector can supply to the green 
sector, when the total demand for brown sector goods is in excess of its maximum supply 
(i.e. when: z10 = 1, z11 = 0, z12 = 1, z13 = 0). 
(c) Equal to the demand for brown goods from the green sector, when the total demand for the 
brown sector goods is less than its maximum supply, plus the difference between the 
demand for green goods from the green sector and the maximum amount of green goods 
the green sector can supply to itself, when the total demand for green goods from the green 
sector exceeds its maximum supply (i.e. when: z10 = 0, z11 = 1, z12 = 0, z13 = 1). 
70 icgj = (z10 ∙ icgjD) + (z11 ∙ icgjS) + (z12 ∙ [icbjD - icbjS])   (when: j = b; or when: j = g) 
71 icbj = (z13 ∙ icbjD) + (z12 ∙ icbjS) + (z11 ∙ [icgjD - icgjS])   (when: j = b; or when: j = g) 
The equations that govern the actual supply of other firm sector goods (equations 72 and 73) are of 
a different form to those that deal with the supply of goods from green and brown firms. This is 
because it is assumed that the demand for the other firm sector’s goods is always within its 
maximum capacity (which is true for all the simulations), so that the actual amount supplied is 
always equal to the quantity demanded (where [so] is the real output of the other sector).  
72 icoj = (z10 ∙ z13 ∙ icojD) + (z11 ∙ icojD) + (z12 ∙ icojD)    (when: j = b; or when: j=g) 
73 icoo = so ∙ aoo        
Step 5: calculate the nominal values of intermediate goods 
We now have the actual supply of real intermediate consumption goods consumed by each sector. 
With these in hand it is possible calculate the nominal value of intermediate consumption (ICij) by 
127  
each sector by multiplying each sector’s real consumption of intermediate goods (icij) by the relevant 
price level (pi) (equation 74). 
74 ICij = icij ∙ pi 
4.2.1.7 Firms – employment, productivity and wages 
Along with capital and intermediate goods, firms also require labour to produce their output. This 
section discusses the equations relating to the employment of labour by firms. Part (a) explains how 
firms decide how much labour to employ. Part (b) describes how labour productivity is determined. 
Finally, part (c) describes how wages and the wage bill are calculated.  
(a) Employment 
The number of workers a firm sector chooses to employ depends on the output the sector wishes to 
produce and the level of labour productivity in that sector. Formally, total employment (nt) is the 
sum of employment in the green (ng), brown (nb) and other (no) firm sectors (equation 75), while 
employment in each firm sector is determined by dividing that sector’s total real output by its labour 
productivity (prj) (equation 76) (as in Godley and Lavoie, 2007a, Ch.7).  
75 nt = ng + nb + no 
76 nj = sj / prj 
(b) Productivity 
Potential labour productivity (prPOT j) in each sector is a function of that sector’s real capital to 
employment ratio (equation 77). Higher levels of real capital (kj) relative to employment (nj) increase 
potential productivity, with the responsiveness of potential productivity to the capital to labour ratio 
determined by the exogenously determined parameter (αj). This parameter takes a value between 
zero and one, so that labour productivity displays decreasing returns to the capital-labour ratio.57 
The form of this equation can be derived from a Cobb-Douglas production.58 
                                                          
57 Where the subscript (POT) stands for potential. 
58 To see this, specify a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form: 
Y = A ∙ kα ∙ n(1-α)  
Where (Y) is output, (A) is total factor productivity, (k) is capital and (n) is labour, and (α) is the output elasticity 
on capital and takes a value between zero and one.  
Divide both sides by labour (n): 
Y/n = (A ∙ k(α) ∙ n(1-α)) ∙ n(-1) = A ∙ k(α) ∙ n(1-α-1) = A ∙ k(α) ∙ n(-α) 
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77 prPOT j = (kj / nj)αj     
Once potential productivity is determined, a partial adjustment function (equation 78) determines 
the speed of adjustment of productivity to its potential level. In each period the productivity of each 
firm sector adjusts by part (βj) of the difference between the potential level of productivity and the 
level of productivity in the previous period (prj (-1)). The idea here is that a change in the amount of 
capital per worker is not reflected in changes to actual productivity straight away, because new 
capital takes time to be integrated into the production process, managers take time to adjust 
working practices, and workers take time to learn how best to work with a new level of capital.59  
78 prj = prj (-1) + [βj ∙ (prPOT j - prj (-1))] 
Once the level of productivity in each sector is determined, the average level of productivity (prAVG) 
across the economy can be calculated as the sum of productivity in each sector weighted by the 
relative level of employment in that sector (equation 79).60 
79 prAVG = (prg ∙ ng / nt) + (prb ∙ nb / nt) + (pro ∙ no / nt) 
(c) Wages 
With average productivity determined it is now possible to calculate the wage rate paid by each firm 
sector (equation 80). It is assumed that the target wage rate (wTj) is a function of the average level of 
productivity (rather than sectoral productivity).61 The value taken by the exogenous reaction 
parameter (χj) determines the relationship between productivity across the economy as a whole and 
the target wage rate.  
80 wTj = χj ∙ prAVG  
Once a target wage is determined, a partial adjustment function, similar to one employed by Godley 
and Lavoie (2007a, Ch.11), determines the speed at which each wage rate moves towards its target 
                                                          
Simplify and set (A) equal to one:  
Y/n = (k/n)α     
59 The value taken by this parameter is set equal to the parameter which determines the speed of wages to 
their target level (βi = μi), to prevent firms or workers benefitting from the transition from one level of 
productivity to another. 
60 Where the subscript (AVG) stands for average. 
61 Reflecting Baumol’s cost disease (Baumol & Bowen [1966], Nordhaus [2008]). 
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level (i.e. wages are sticky in both directions) (equation 81). The parameter (μj) determines the 
speed of adjustment to the target level.62 
81 wj = wj(-1) + μj ∙ (wTj - wj(-1)) 
Finally, the total wage bill (WBt) is the sum of the wage bill from the green, brown and other firm 
sectors (equation 82). The wage bill (WBj) paid by each firm sector is calculated by multiplying the 
level of employment in each firm sector (ni) by the relevant wage rate (wj) (equation 83) (Godley and 
Lavoie, 2007a). 
82 WBt = WBg + WBb + WBo 
83 WBj = nj ∙ wj  
4.2.1.8 Firms – unit costs, prices and profits 
This section calculates each firm sector’s unit costs, prices and profits. Part (a) calculates unit costs 
as the sum of the wage bill and the cost of intermediate goods. Part (b) specifies how firms apply a 
mark-up to unit costs to set prices. In addition, the general price level and inflation are determined 
as functions of each firm sector’s price level. Finally, part (c) calculates distributed profits by 
subtracting total costs from total sales. 
(a) Unit costs 
Following Lavoie (2014, p.159) and Berg et al. (2015), unit costs (costs per unit of output) are 
comprised of unit direct labour costs (i.e. the wage bill) and unit material costs (i.e. intermediate 
goods). As is common in the post-Keynesian literature, interest costs are excluded from unit cost 
calculations (Godley and Lavoie, 2007a, p.265). Including an input-output model into the larger SFC 
model causes prices to become interdependent, because intermediate goods are used in each firm 
sector’s production process. Formally, unit costs are arrived at by dividing each sector’s wage bill 
(WBj) and cost of intermediate goods (ICij) by that sector’s total real output (equations 84).  
84 UCj = (WBj + ICgj + ICbj + ICoj) / sj 
(b) Prices and inflation 
With the unit costs determined, it is possible for each firm sector to set prices (pj) as a mark-up (φj) 
over unit costs (UCj) (equation 85).  
                                                          
62 This parameter is set equal to the parameter which determines the speed of productivity to its target level 
(βi), so as to prevent firms or workers benefitting from the transition from one level of productivity to another. 
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Brown firms may also need to adjust their prices to cover the cost of any carbon taxes that they have 
to pay. The second term in square brackets on the right hand side of equation 86 is the amount 
brown firms raise their prices by in order to cover any carbon tax payments (see equation 96). 
During the carbon tax simulations, the parameter (CTPT) is exogenously set to a value between zero 
and one.63 This parameter determines how much of the carbon tax is either absorbed by the firm 
sector or passed through to the sector’s customers: setting it to one means brown firms pass 
through the entire cost of the carbon tax to their customers, while setting it to zero means that 
brown firms absorb the entire cost of the tax themselves. 
85 pj = (1 + φj) ∙ UCj      (when: j = g; or when: j = o) 
86 pb = [(1 + φb) ∙ UCb] + (CTPT ∙ [CTPAY / (cb + ib + icbg + icbb + icbo)] ) 
With prices for all three sectors determined, it is possible to calculate the general price level (for 
consumer goods) by summing each sector’s price level (pj) weighted by each sector’s share of the 
consumption goods market (cj / ct) (equation 87). Likewise, the price level faced by a particular 
household sector can be found by summing the price level in each firm sector weighted by the 
household sector’s consumption of that firm sector’s goods (equation 88).  
87 p = (pg ∙ cg / ct) + (pb ∙ cb / ct) + (po ∙ co / ct)  
88 px = (pg ∙ cg x / cx) + (pb ∙ cb x / cx) + (po ∙ co x / cx)  
The rate of consumer price inflation (π) is then equal to the change in the general consumer goods 
price level (p) divided by the general consumer goods price level in the previous period (equation 
89). The rate of inflation experienced by a household sector is equal to the change in the price level 
(px) faced by that household sector divided by the price level faced by that household sector in the 
previous period (equation 90). 
89 π = (p - p(-1)) / p(-1) 
90 πx = (px - px(-1)) / px(-1) 
(c) Profits 
Equations 91 and 92 give the total profits of green, brown and other firms (Ft bgo) and the total profits 
of those firms plus the banking sector (Ft bgof).64 Equations 93 and 94 calculate each sector’s total 
profits by subtracting their costs from their sales. For each sector, total profits (Fj) are equal to sales 
                                                          
63 The subscript (PT) stands for ‘pass through’. 
64 Here the subscript (f) stands for the banking (financial) sector. 
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(Sj) minus spending to cover depreciation (AFj), the wage bill (WBj), interest payments on loans (LD j(-1) 
∙ rL j(-1)), intermediate goods (ICij), and (for brown firms) any carbon tax payments (CTPAY).  
91 Fbgo = Fb + Fg + Fo 
92 Fbgof = Fb + Fg + Fo + Ff 
93 Fj = Sj - WBj - AFj - (LD j(-1) ∙ rL j(-1)) - ICgj - ICbj - ICoj   (when: j = g; or when: j = o) 
94 Fb = Sb - WBb - AFb - (LD b(-1) ∙ rL b(-1)) - ICgb - ICbb - ICob - CTPAY 
Firms can retain profits to finance investment or distribute profits to shareholders. With the 
proportion of investment expenditure financed by retained earnings already determined, distributed 
profits (FDIS j) are a residual determined by firm investment decisions. Hence distributed profits are 
equal to total profits (Fj) minus retained earnings (FRET j) (equation 95). 
95 FDIS j = Fj - FRET j  
4.2.1.9 Firms - carbon taxes 
One of the simulations in Chapter 7 sees a carbon tax imposed on the brown sector. This section 
describes how the carbon tax is set, and how payments that result from the carbon tax are split 
between each household sector.  
Equation 96 describes how carbon taxes are set on the brown sector’s output. The carbon tax rate 
(CTRATE) is a fixed charge on each unit of brown sector output (which is set exogenously by the 
authorities). This rate is multiplied by the brown sector’s total output to get the total carbon tax 
payment (CTPAY t) that the brown sector needs to pay in each period. The funds raised by the carbon 
tax are then paid to each household sector (CTPAY x) in proportion to each sector’s relative size (nPROP 
x) (equation 97). Funds are distributed to households (rather than to a firm sector or banks) as this 
was considered the simplest and least distorting method of reintroducing the carbon tax payments 
back into the economy (particularly as there are no other taxes which can be reduced to offset the 
introduction of a carbon tax). 
96 CTPAY t = (cb + ib + icbg + icbb + icbo) ∙ CTRATE 
97 CTPAY x = CTPAY t ∙ nPROP x  
4.2.2 The household sectors 
This section describes the equations associated with the household sectors.  
Section 4.2.2.1 discusses how the relative size of each sector is determined. Section 4.2.2.2 outlines 
the equations that determine the inflows into the sector (i.e. nominal and real income). Section 
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4.2.2.3 comprises the equations that govern each sector’s outflows (i.e. consumption expenditures). 
Section 4.2.2.4 looks at the stocks held by households (i.e. household wealth). Finally, Section 4.2.2.5 
looks at how households allocate their wealth between different financial assets.  
4.2.2.1 Households - relative sector size  
There are two household sectors in the model, ethical and normal. Ethical households make up 30% 
of the total household sector, while normal households make up the remaining 70% (as outlined in 
Section 4.1). Because unemployment is not included in the model, the underlying assumption is that 
the proportion of ethical and normal households employed by each firm sector will follow the 30 - 
70% ethical - normal split. 
The exogenous parameter (nPROP x) determines the proportion of ethical or normal households 
employed by each firm sector (so that x = e, or x = n). Following this, the number of ethical and 
normal households employed by each firm sector (nj x) can be calculated by multiplying the total 
level of employment (nj) in a sector by the parameter (nPROP x) (equation 98). Likewise, the total 
employment of ethical or normal households (nx) in the economy can be calculated by multiplying 
the total level of employment (n) by the parameter (nPROP x) (equation 99). 
98 nj x = nj ∙ nPROP x  
99 nx = n ∙ nPROP x 
4.2.2.2 Households – inflows – income  
This section describes the inflows into each household sector – i.e. household income. Part (a) 
details each household sector’s nominal inflows. Part (b) converts these nominal inflows into real 
inflows.  
(a) Nominal inflows 
Following Godley and Lavoie (2007a, Ch.10 and Ch.11), we define two types of nominal disposable 
income. The first of these, regular nominal disposable income (equation 100), defines a household 
sector’s regular nominal disposable income as the sum of the payments it receives – i.e. wage 
payments, interest payments on deposits, dividend payments, and any payments related to a carbon 
tax. As there is no government sector the proceeds of the carbon tax are distributed directly to 
households in proportion to their relative sizes. The second definition, nominal Haig-Simmons 
disposable income, adds capital gains on securities to regular nominal disposable income (equation 
102).  
133  
The different definitions of disposable income enter into the model in different places. Regular 
nominal disposable income consists solely of flows from the bank and firm sectors. It is used to 
calculate regular real disposable income (equation 108), which enters into each household’s 
consumption function. Nominal Haig-Simmons disposable income enters into the equation that 
calculates the change in nominal wealth (equation 131). 
Equation 100 says that a household sector’s regular nominal disposable income is equal to the sum 
of the wage bill (WBx), interest income from deposits (rM(-1) ∙ MH x(-1)), profits distributed by firms (Fx) 
and any payments that result from a carbon tax (CTPAY x). Total disposable income (YDt) is then equal 
to the sum of each household sector’s regular nominal disposable income (equation 101).  
100 YDx = WBx + rM(-1) ∙ MH x(-1) + Fx + CTPAY x 
101  YDt = YDe + YDn 
Equation 102 determines nominal Haig-Simmons disposable income (YDHS x) by adding capital gains 
realised on equities (CGx) to regular nominal disposable income.   
102 YDHS x = YDx + CGx 
The components of disposable income are determined by equations 103 to 105. Equation 103 
determines the total wage bill paid to a household sector (WBx) as the sum of the wage bill paid by 
each firm sector (WBi ∙ nPROP x) to that household sector. Equation 104 determines a household 
sector’s capital gains (CGx) as the sum of the capital gains a sector receives on each type of equity. 
For each type of equity, capital gains are equal to the change in the equity price (ΔpE j) from the 
previous period multiplied by equity holdings from the end of the previous period (eDi i (-1)). Equation 
105 determines the total distributed profits received by a household sector (Fx) as the sum of the 
distributed profits that household sector receives from banks (FDIS f x)65 and each firm sector (FDIS j x). 
103 WBx = (WBg ∙ nPROP x) + (WBb ∙ nPROP x) + (WBo ∙ nPROP x) 
104 CGx = (ΔpE g ∙ eD g x(-1)) + (ΔpE b ∙ eD b x(-1)) + (ΔpE o ∙ eD o x(-1)) 
105 Fx = FDIS g x + FDIS b x + FDIS o x + FDIS f x 
Equation 106 determines the distribution of profits from a firm sector to a household sector by 
multiplying the firm sector’s total distributed profits by the proportion of equities that the 
household sector holds. For example, if a household sector holds 5% of a firm sector’s equities, it will 
receive 5% of its distributed profits.  
                                                          
65 The subscript (f) indicates the banking (financial) sector.  
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106 FDIS j x = FDIS j ∙ eD j x(-1) / eS j(-1) 
Unlike the firm sectors, the banking sector does not issue equities (i.e. banks are not publically listed 
companies). How then should the distribution of bank profits (Ff) between the two household 
sectors be determined? Here it is assumed that banks are owned by the household sectors, and that 
household ownership of banks is in proportion to the size of each household sector. Hence, the 
distribution of bank profits between household sectors is determined by multiplying total bank 
profits by the relative size of the household sector in question (equation 107) (it is assumed that 
banks distribute all their profits, see Section 4.2.3). For example, if ethical households make up 30% 
of the total household sector (i.e. nPROP e = 0.3), then they will own 30% of the banking sector and 
receive 30% of banks’ distributed profits.  
107 FDIS f x = nPROP x ∙ FDIS f 
(b) Real inflows 
The equations in this section convert the different types of nominal disposable income received by 
households into real values. As in Godley and Lavoie (2007a, Ch.10, p.323), two types of real 
disposable income are defined – regular real disposable income and real Haig-Simmons disposable 
income. The difference between these two forms of real income is that regular real disposable 
income does not include capital gains, whereas real Haig-Simmons disposable income does. Of the 
two definitions, only regular real disposable income enters into another set of equations in the 
model (the consumption function – equation 110). Real Haig-Simmons disposable income is 
therefore only included so as to track its value during the simulations.  
Both definitions of disposable income include a term which adjusts disposable income to take 
account of the losses to wealth due to inflation (πx ∙ Vx (-1) / px). Here (Vx) stands for a household 
sector’s nominal wealth (see equation 131). As explained in Godley and Lavoie (2007a, Ch.9), the 
inclusion of this term stems from the use of the Haig-Simmons definition of real disposable income. 
To summarise briefly, real Haig-Simmons disposable income is defined as the quantity of real 
expenditure that leaves real wealth constant. Hence, if real wealth is to be kept constant, an 
allowance must be made for any ‘inflation loss’ on wealth.  
Turning to the specification of the equations, regular real disposable income (ydx) (equation 108) is 
equal to the sum of regular nominal disposable income divided by the price level experienced by 
that household sector (px), plus a term (πx ∙ Vx (-1) / px) which adjusts for any losses (or gains) due to 
the effect of changes in the price level on the value of real wealth (the inflation tax/loss). Real Haig-
Simmons disposable income (equation 109) is then equal to regular real disposable income plus real 
capital gains (CGx / px).  
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108 ydx = (YDx / px) - (πx ∙ Vx (-1) / px)  
109 ydHS x = (YDx / px) - (πx ∙ Vx (-1) / px) + (CGx / px) 
4.2.2.3 Households – outflows – consumption  
The previous section looked at the inflows into the household sector i.e. household income. This 
section looks at the outflows from the household sector – i.e. household consumption expenditures. 
Part (a) discusses how households determine their aggregate consumption, while part (b) describes 
how households choose to split their consumption between different goods. 
(a) Real consumption decisions 
A household sector’s real consumption is determined by its real consumption function (equation 
110). Following Godley and Lavoie (2007a, Ch.9), the consumption function is made up of three 
terms: an autonomous term (ψ0 x), the product of expected real disposable income (ydex) and the 
marginal propensity to consume (ψ1 x), and the product of lagged real wealth (vx(-1)) and the marginal 
propensity to consume out of wealth (ψ2 x).66 Expected real disposable income is based on the value 
of real disposable income in the previous period (equation 111). 
110 cx = ψ0 x + ψ1 x ∙ ydex + ψ2 x ∙ vx(-1) 
111 ydex = ydx(-1) 
(b) Splitting real consumption 
With real consumption determined, the next step is to calculate how each household sector splits its 
spending between each firm sector’s goods. The approach taken in this section closely resembles the 
approach that was taken when determining the coefficients in the input-output model (Section 
4.2.1.6). In both that section and this section, the demand for all energy goods (i.e. green and brown 
goods together) and other sector goods is estimated separately from the demand for green and 
brown energy. The reason for proceeding in this way is that it allows the degree of substitutability 
between energy goods to be set independently of the degree of substitutability between energy 
goods and other goods. In practice, the model is calibrated so that households are more able to 
                                                          
66 Although here the consumption function includes a wealth term, whereas in Godley and Lavoie (2007a, 
Ch.9) the consumption function includes a money term rather than a wealth term (as in that model wealth 
consists solely of money). 
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substitute between energy goods than they are between energy goods and other goods.67 The 
approach taken therefore conforms to a theory of consumer behaviour in which: 
“large categories of consumer expenditures fulfil important needs that cannot be compensated 
one for another. Variations in their relative prices induce no change in consumption behaviour, or 
very small ones. Only within each one of these large spending categories could one possibly 
observe more substantial substitution effects. One can thus presume that the more disaggregated 
the analysis, the more likely we are to find high absolute values of price elasticities.” (Lavoie, 2014, 
p.119) 
The rest of this section describes how each household sector’s demand for goods is determined. The 
method proceeds in four steps: 
(1) The first step specifies the proportion of spending on other sector and energy sector goods 
as a function of relative prices (where the energy sector is the combined green and brown 
sectors). 
(2) The second step disaggregates the demand for energy into separate ex-ante demands for 
green and brown energy.  
(3) In the third step, the ex-ante demands meet the energy supply constraints of each sector. 
Demand for an energy sector’s output in excess of the maximum amount it can supply 
causes the sector demanding the goods to turn to the other energy sector to fulfil the excess 
demand.  
(4) Finally, in the fourth step, real consumption is converted into nominal consumption by 
multiplying each real value by the relevant price level.   
The form of the equations in step 1 and 2 are based on a modified version of the Almost Ideal 
Demand System (AIDS) from Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).68 
                                                          
67 The alternative is to calculate the values of the coefficients that appear in the A-matrix in one-step. This 
approach was rejected precisely because it did not allow the degree of substitution to vary between energy 
goods and energy goods and other goods. 
68 Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) construct a set of equations that attempt to determine the budget share 
allocated various classes of goods (housing, clothing, food, fuel, drinks, travel, entertainment and other 
services). In their equations, the budget share allocated to a good (wi) is a function of an exogenous parameter 
(αi), relative prices (pj) and real expenditure (x/kPi). The parameter (γ) gives the responsiveness of the budget 
share to changes in price, whereas (β) gives the response of the budget share to real expenditure. Finally, (x) is 
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Step 1: determine the proportion of spending on energy goods and other goods  
Equation 112 and 113 specify the proportion of spending on energy (cPROP en x) (i.e. green and brown 
goods, together) and other goods (cPROP o x) as a function of the exogenously determined parameters 
(λAIDS en x , λAIDS o x), relative prices (po , pen x) and the parameters attached to each price variable (λAIDS 
x11 , λAIDS x12 , λAIDS x13 , λAIDS x14). The signs on the parameters attached to each price variable (given in 
Chapter 5) determine how prices affect the consumption proportions. Higher relative prices lead to 
households allocating a lower proportion of their spending to that good and vice versa. The size of 
the parameter values (λAIDS x11 , λAIDS x12 , λAIDS x13 , λAIDS x14) determine how sensitive the consumption 
proportions are to a change in relative prices. 
112 cPROP en x = λAIDS en x + λAIDS x11 ∙ [ln(pen x) ] + λAIDS x12 ∙ [ln(po)]  
113 cPROP o x = λAIDS o x + λAIDS x13 ∙ [ln(pen x) ] + λAIDS x14 ∙ [ln(po)]  
The energy price (pen x) faced by a household sector is calculated by weighting the price of each 
energy good (pj) by the real quantity of consumption goods (cj x) consumed by that household sector 
(equation 114).  
114 pen x = (pg ∙ cg x / cx) + (pb ∙ cb x / cx) 
Consumer theory imposes a set of restrictions on a demand system, including homogeneity, adding 
up and symmetry (Deaton and Muellbauer [1980], Fujii et al. [1985]). By imposing these restrictions, 
the AIDS equations (equations 112 and 113) become a series of demand functions that are 
                                                          
expenditure, (k) measures household size and (P) is a price index. Hence Deaton and Muellbauer’s (1980) 
equation 8’’’ is: 
 wi = αi + ∑
j 
 γij ln(pj) + βi ln(x/kP) 
One of the features of this equation is that “changes in real expenditure operate through the βi coefficients; 
these add to zero and are positive for luxuries and negative for necessities” (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, 
p.314). Because there are only three types of goods in the model presented in this chapter, the inclusion of 
this term would require that at least one sector’s goods be specified as a necessity or a luxury. Rather than do 
this, instead it is assumed that energy goods (i.e. green and brown goods) and the other firm sector’s goods 
are neither necessities nor luxuries, so that a change in real income will affect all goods in the same way. This 
means that the (βi) parameter is set equal to zero, so that last term on the right hand side of the equation 
drops out entirely. Hence the modified version of the equation used in this paper follows the form:  
wi = αi + ∑
j 
 γij ln(pj) 
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homogenous to degree zero in prices (116) and respect the adding up constraints (115 and 116) and 
Slutsky symmetry (117).69 
115 λAIDS x11 + λAIDS x12 = 0;  λAIDS x13 + λAIDS x14 = 0 
116 λAIDS en x + λAIDS o x = 1 
117  λAIDS x12 = λAIDS x13 
Step 2: determine household energy consumption between the green and brown sectors 
The previous step determined how each household sector splits its consumption between energy 
and other goods. This step determines how households split their energy demand between green 
and brown energy goods. The step uses the same equation structure as was used to determine the 
split between energy and other good (i.e. the Almost Ideal Demand System of Deaton and 
Muellbauer [1980]).  
Equation 118 and 119 specify the proportion of spending on green and brown energy goods (cPROP j x) 
as a function of the exogenously determined parameters (λAIDS j x), relative prices (pj) and the 
parameters attached to each price variable (λAIDS x21 , λAIDS x22 , λAIDS x23 , λAIDS x24). The sign on the 
parameters attached to each price variable (given in Chapter 5) determine how prices affect each 
consumption proportion. Higher relative prices lead to households allocating a lower proportion of 
their spending to that good and vice versa. The size of the parameter values (λAIDS x21 , λAIDS x22 , λAIDS x23 
, λAIDS x24) determine how sensitive each proportion is to relative prices. 
As was the case with the IO equations 62 and 63, the exogenous parameters in equations 118 and 
119 are intended to capture some of the heterogeneity between green and brown forms of energy. 
As such they limit the ability of each household sector to substitute between energy sources when 
prices change (see also Footnote 57). The differences between renewables and fossil fuel energy are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2. 
118 cPROP b x = λAIDS b x + λAIDS x21 ∙ [ln(pb)] + λAIDS x22 ∙ [ln(pg)] 
                                                          
69 Being homogenous to degree zero means that the proportion of spending allocated to each type of good 
remains the same when prices and income increase in the same proportion – that is, households do not suffer 
from money illusion. The adding up constraints prevent households from spending more than the amount 
determined by the consumption function. Slutsky symmetry means that the cross-price parameters are equal 
to each other – so that, for example, the value taken by the parameter that determines the level of 
substitution between green energy goods and other goods is equal in value to the parameter that determines 
the level of substitution between other goods and green energy goods (Mongelli et al., 2010). 
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119 cPROP g x = λAIDS g x + λAIDS x23 ∙ [ln(pb)] + λAIDS x24 ∙ [ln(pg)] 
As in step 1 (and other similarly structured systems of equations), a set of restrictions (120 to 122) 
are imposed on the parameters in order to ensure economic and logical consistency.  
120 λAIDS x21 + λAIDS x22 = 0;  λAIDS x23 + λAIDS x24 = 0   
121 λAIDS b x + λAIDS g x = 1 
122  λAIDS x22 = λAIDS x23   
With the (cPROP j x) parameters in hand, it is possible to calculate the demand for real consumption 
goods (cDj x) by each sector on green, brown and other firm goods. Equation 123 says that a 
household sector’s demand for each energy good (cj x) is arrived at by multiplying that sector’s total 
real consumption (cx) by the proportion of spending it wishes to spend on energy goods (cPROP en x) 
and that type of energy good (cPROP j x). Equation 124 says that a household sector’s demand for the 
other sector’s goods (cDo x) is simply equal to the proportion of spending it wishes to spend on other 
goods (cPROP o x) multiplied by its total real consumption (cx). The sum of each set of proportions must 
equal one (so that: cPROP en x + cPROP o x = 1 , and: cPROP g x + cPROP b x = 1).  
123 cDj x = cPROP en x ∙ cPROP j x ∙ cx     (when: j = b; or when: j = g) 
124 cDo x = cPROP o x ∙ cx 
Step 3: confront demand with maximum supply and substitute where necessary  
We now turn to the equations which determine the actually quantity of goods supplied by each 
sector to each household sector (equations 125 to 127). These equations contain the logical 
functions (12 to 15) that were first presented in the section on supply and demand (Section 4.2.1.2). 
These logical functions, which are reproduced here for convenience, are set equal to either zero or 
one depending on whether the level of demand for a sector’s goods is within or in excess of its 
supply constraint.  
12 z10 = 1   if: gdDg < gdSg;  and 0 otherwise 
13 z11 = 1   if: gdDg > gdSg;  and 0 otherwise 
14 z12 = 1   if: gdDb > gdSb;  and 0 otherwise 
15 z13 = 1   if: gdDb < gdSb;  and 0 otherwise 
Equations 125 to 127 say that the quantity of goods supplied by a firm sector to a household sector 
is equal to either: a) the household sector’s demand for the firm sector’s goods; b) the maximum 
quantity of goods a firm sector can supply to a household sector; c) the household sector’s demand 
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for the firm sector’s goods, plus any demand that wasn’t fulfilled by the other energy sector due to 
capacity constraints. For example, take equation 126, and assume (x = e). What this equation is 
saying is that the actual quantity of brown goods supplied to the ethical household sector (ce b) is 
either:  
(a) Equal to the demand for brown goods from the ethical household sector, when the total 
demand for brown sector goods is less than its maximum supply (i.e. when: z10 = 1 , z11 = 0 , 
z12 = 0 , z13 = 1). 
(b) Equal to the maximum amount of brown goods the brown sector can supply to the ethical 
household sector, when the total demand for brown sector goods is in excess of its 
maximum supply (i.e. when: z10 = 1 , z11 = 0 , z12 = 1 , z13 = 0). 
(c) Equal to the demand for brown goods from the ethical household sector, when the total 
demand for the brown sector goods is less than its maximum supply, plus the difference 
between the demand for green goods from the ethical household sector and the maximum 
amount of green goods the green sector can supply to the ethical household sector, when 
the total demand for green goods from the ethical household sector exceeds the green 
sector’s maximum supply (i.e. when: z10 = 0 , z11 = 1 , z12 = 0 , z13 = 1). 
125 cg x = (z10 ∙ cDg x) + (z11 ∙ cSg x) + (z12 ∙ [cDb x - cSb x]) 
126 cb x = (z13 ∙ cDb x) + (z12 ∙ cSb x) + (z11 ∙ [cDg x - cSg x]) 
127 co x = cDo x  
Notice that the equation that governs the supply of goods from the other firm sector is of a different 
form to those that deal with the supply of goods by green and brown firms. The reason for this is 
that it is assumed that the demand for the other firm sector’s goods is always less than the sector’s 
maximum capacity (which is anyway true in all of the simulations).  
Step 4: calculate the nominal values of intermediate goods 
The real consumption decisions of households result in nominal outflows from each sector. For each 
household sector, consumption spending on each good is equal to that sector’s real consumption of 
each good (cj x) multiplied by the relevant price level (pj) (equation 128). 
128 Cj x = cj x ∙ pj  
Each household sector’s total nominal consumption is therefore equal to the sum of consumption 
spending on green, brown and other consumption goods (equation 129) while total household 
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nominal consumption (Ct) is equal to the sum of ethical and normal household sector consumption 
(Cx) (equation 130). 
129 Cx = Cg x + Cb x + Co x 
130 Ct = Ce + Cn  
4.2.2.4 Households – stocks – wealth  
With income and consumption determined, the only thing left for households to decide is how to 
allocate their wealth between bank deposits and green, brown and other firms’ equities. This section 
presents the equations that track household wealth in nominal and real terms. The next section 
looks at how households allocate their wealth between different financial assets.  
Following Godley and Lavoie (2007a, Ch.10 and Ch.11), the change in a household sector’s nominal 
wealth (Vx - Vx (-1)) is equal to its nominal Haig-Simmons disposable income (nominal disposable 
income from wages, interest and dividends plus the nominal value of capital gains) minus its 
consumption spending (equation 131). This is equivalent to saying that a sector’s change in nominal 
wealth is equal to its nominal saving (i.e. nominal Haig-Simmons disposable income minus nominal 
consumption equals nominal saving). Total wealth (Vt) is then equal to the sum of each household 
sector’s nominal wealth (equation 132). 
131 Vx = Vx (-1) + YDHS x - Cx  
132 Vt = Ve + Vn 
Given the values for nominal wealth, equation 133 says that real wealth (vx) is equal to nominal 
wealth (Vx) divided by the price level each household sector faces (px) (as specified by equation 88). 
133 vx = Vx / px 
4.2.2.5 Households – stocks – portfolio allocation 
This section looks at how households allocate their wealth between different financial assets.  
Because the households sectors are the only sectors that are able to hold financial assets, it is their 
portfolio allocation decisions that determine the demand for financial assets. The supply of financial 
assets has already been determined by the borrowing decisions of firms – equation 40 determines 
banks loans and so the stock of bank deposits (with bank deposits specified by equation 155), while 
equation 41 determines the stock of equities. Taken together, the supply and demand for financial 
assets determines both the price of each firm sector’s equities and the distribution of assets 
between each household sector. 
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This section is split into three parts. Part (a) discusses the portfolio allocation approach of Brainard 
and Tobin (1968). Part (b) introduces the modified set of portfolio allocation equations as they 
appear in the model. Finally, part (c) describes how the asset preference parameters and expected 
rates of return are determined.  
(a) Introduction to portfolio allocation  
Portfolio allocation decisions in SFC models usually follow the approach pioneered by Brainard and 
Tobin (1968). In a model where only one sector holds financial assets this approach can be broken 
down into three steps. In the first step the proportion of wealth that a sector wants to place into 
each financial asset is determined. Typically, these proportions are determined as a function of a set 
of exogenously determined preferences for holding each asset class and the relative rate of return 
on each asset class. Proportions may also be made to depend on other factors, such as the 
transactions demand for money or the expected future profitability of each sector. In the second 
step these proportions are multiplied by the allocating sector’s wealth in order to obtain the total 
monetary value of the ‘placements’ that the household sector wishes to make into each asset class. 
In the third step the monetary value placed into each asset class is divided by either the price of the 
asset, in order to find the quantity of financial assets demanded (e.g. when the asset’s price is fixed, 
as is the case with Treasury Bills), or by the quantity of assets demanded, in order to find the price of 
the asset (e.g. when the asset’s price floats, as is the case with equities). Therefore, when solving for 
price (i.e. when the price of the asset floats) an assumption needs to be made about the quantity of 
assets demanded. This usually takes the form of a financial market clearing condition that states that 
the quantity of assets demanded is always equal to the quantity of assets supplied.70 This condition 
forces the price of an asset to adjust so that the entire quantity of the assets is demanded.71 
                                                          
70 Where supplied means the quantity of financial assets currently in circulation. Thus, the supply of financial 
assets is determined by the historic financing decisions of firms.  
71 An example of this procedure can be found in Godley and Lavoie (2007a, p.395). The left hand side of 
equation 11.66 gives the proportion of wealth allocated to equities, i.e. the market value of equity divided by 
wealth. In order to determine the equity price both sides of the equation are multiplied by wealth and then 
divided by the quantity of equities demanded (with the quantity of equities demanded set equal to the 
quantity of equities supplied). Godley and Lavoie’s (2007a, p.395) equation 11.70 is the financial market 
clearing condition that gives the quantity of equities demanded. 
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(b) The portfolio allocation equations 
The procedure used in the following section is similar to that outlined above, with a few minor 
modifications. These are necessary because there are two household sectors allocating their wealth 
between assets with a variable price (i.e. equities). Without these modifications it would not be 
possible to solve the portfolio allocation equations as each equation would include two unknowns 
(more will be said on this in a moment).  
The portfolio allocation approach followed in this model consists of three steps:  
(1) In the first step, each household sector’s disaggregated portfolio allocation equations are 
specified in the conventional way (i.e. we set up a portfolio allocation equation for each 
household sector/asset type, as outlined in Section 4.2.2.5a). Note that each equity demand 
equation has two unknowns (equity price and equity demand). While a financial market 
clearing condition (i.e. equity demand equals equity supply) can be used to determine the 
total quantity of equities demanded across both household sectors, we cannot yet derive 
the breakdown of the demand for equities between individual household sectors. For this 
we need an equity price, but we can’t calculate an equity price without knowing the quantity 
of equities demanded by each household sector. This leads us to step two. 
(2) In the second step, the disaggregated portfolio allocation equations (from step one) for each 
financial asset type are aggregated together to form a set of aggregated household portfolio 
allocation equations for each financial asset type. For example, the equations that 
determine the ethical and normal household sector’ demand for green equities are 
aggregated together to form an equation which specifies total household demand for green 
equities. The aggregation leaves us with a set of four equations that determine the total 
household demand for bank deposits and green, brown and other equities. With only one 
set of equations for each asset class it is now possible to solve the equations for equity price, 
by using a financial market clearing condition that sets equity demand equal to equity supply 
for each firm sector. This reduces the number of unknowns in each equation to one, so that 
the equations can now be solved for equity price.  
(3) In the third step, the newly acquired equity prices are plugged into the original 
disaggregated portfolio allocation equations. This allows these equations to be solved for 
equity demand (for each household sector).  
The rest of this section discusses these steps in more detail.  
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Step 1: specify each household sector’s theoretical disaggregated portfolio allocation equations  
In this step the theoretical disaggregated portfolio allocation equations are specified. It is important 
to note that the equations specified in this step do not appear within the model in their current form 
(this is why the equation numbers are suffixed with the letter ‘a’). In order to be of use, each 
equation needs to be rearranged so that only one variable appears on the left hand side. This occurs 
in step 3. In addition, in the model the demand for money is set up as a residual equation, and hence 
the model does not include a rearranged version of equation 135a (this is discussed more fully in 
step 3). Nevertheless, in order to obtain the equations used in the model it is first necessary to 
specify each household sector’s theoretical disaggregated portfolio allocation equations. 
Equations 134a and 135a determine the theoretical disaggregated portfolio allocation decisions of 
each household sector.  
134a (eD j x ∙ pE j) / Vx = λPA j x + λPA jx 01 ∙ reM + λPA jx 02 ∙ reK g + λPA jx 03 ∙ reK b + λPA jx 04 ∙ reK o 
135a MH x / Vx = λPA m x + λPA jm 01 ∙ reM + λPA jm 02 ∙ reK g + λPA jm 03 ∙ reK b + λPA jm 04 ∙ reK o 
These equations say that the proportion of wealth each household wants to place into each asset 
class – i.e. the market value of an equity class held by a sector (eD j x ∙ pE j) divided by the wealth of 
that sector (Vx) – depends on two things:  
(1) A preference for holding each asset class (λPA j x) that is not related to the relative rate of 
return on each asset class. Following Caiani et al. (2014), these preferences, with the 
exception of (λPA m e , λPA m n), are endogenously determined as a positive function of the 
relative size of each sector (to be discussed in part [c] of this section – see equation 150). 
(2) The relative rate of return on each asset class – i.e. the expected rate of interest on money 
(reM) and the expected rate of return on firm equities (reK j) (also discussed in part [c] of this 
section – see equations 152 to 153), and the exogenously determined lambda parameters 
that are attached to them. 
Many of the parameters that appear within the portfolio allocation equations are endogenously 
determined. The exceptions are the lambda parameters which govern how households react to the 
rate of return on assets (λPA jx 01 , λPA jx 02 , λPA jx 03 , λPA jx 04 , λPA jm 01 , λPA jm 02 , λPA jm 03 , λPA jm) and the 
lambda parameters which determine household preferences for holding money (regardless of its 
relative rate of return) (λPA m x). However, despite the fact that many of the lambda parameters are 
endogenously determined, the equations that determine these parameters are structured in such a 
way that, following Tobin (1969), the adding up constraints (equation 136 and 137) are respected.  
136 λPA g x + λPA b x + λPA o x + λPA m x = 1  
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137 λPA jx 01 + λPA jx 02 + λPA jx 03 + λPA jx 04 = 0;  λPA jm 01 + λPA jm 02 + λPA jm 03 + λPA jm 04 = 0 
Step 2: Aggregate together the portfolio allocation equations for each asset to form a set of 
aggregated household portfolio allocation equations 
Following the procedure outlined above, equation 134a is rearranged so that the equity price 
appears on the left hand side. The ethical and normal household equations for each equity class are 
then aggregated together to produce a single equation for each equity class (equation 138).  
The lambda parameters are aggregated together by summing together the corresponding 
parameters from the disaggregated equations, weighted by the relative wealth of each household 
sector (equations 139 to 143). Structuring the equations in this way ensures the relevant adding up 
constraints are respected (145 and 146) (see below). 
Equation 138 is then modified in order to account for the idea that households are not necessarily 
aware of the value of their wealth when deciding how to allocate their portfolios (i.e. [Vt(-1)] replaces 
[Vt]). Instead, households base their portfolio allocation decisions on expected wealth (as in Godley 
and Lavoie, 2007a). Here expectations are formed adaptively, so that expected wealth is set equal to 
actual wealth in the previous period.  
138 pE j = Vt (-1) ∙ (λPA j t + λPA jt 01 ∙ reM + λPA jt 02 ∙ reK g + λPA jt 03 ∙ reK b + λPA jt 04 ∙ reK o) / eD j 
139 λPA j t = λPA j e ∙ (Ve(-1) / Vt(-1)) + λPA j n ∙ (Vn(-1) / Vt(-1)) 
140 λPA jt 01 = λPA je 01 ∙ (Ve(-1) / Vt(-1)) + λPA jn 01 ∙ (Vn(-1) / Vt(-1)) 
141 λPA jt 02 = λPA je 02 ∙ (Ve(-1) / Vt(-1)) + λPA jn 02 ∙ (Vn(-1) / Vt(-1))  
142 λPA jt 03 = λPA je 03 ∙ (Ve(-1) / Vt(-1)) + λPA jn 03 ∙ (Vn(-1) / Vt(-1)) 
143 λPA jt 04 = λPA je 04 ∙ (Ve(-1) / Vt(-1)) + λPA jn 04 ∙ (Vn(-1) / Vt(-1)) 
With the values of the various parameters now in hand, a financial market clearing condition is used 
to fix total equity demand equal to equity supply (eD j = eS j) (equation 144). This gives us the final 
unknown variable: equity demand (allowing us to solve for price – see step 3). 
144 eD j = eS j 
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Finally, and as outlined above, although almost all of the parameter values are determined 
endogenously, the structure of the equations is such that the aggregate adding up constraints (145 
and 146) are respected.72 
145 λPA g t + λPA b t + λPA o t + λPA m t = 1  
146 λPA jt 01 + λPA jt 02 + λPA jt 03 + λPA jt 04 = 0    
Step 3: Return to the original disaggregated portfolio allocation equations, rearrange and plug in the 
newly acquired equity price to solve for equity demand by household sector. 
Once equity prices are calculated it is possible to return to the disaggregated equations to solve for 
equity demand. Equation 147 is equation 134a rearranged so as to place equity demand on the left 
hand side the equation, and with actual wealth replaced with wealth in the previous period (i.e. 
expected wealth – as was the case with the equations from step 2, above). These equations 
determine the number of equities demanded by each household sector by dividing each household 
sector’s equity demand by the newly calculated equity price (pE j).  
147 eD j x = Ve(-1) ∙  (λPA j x + λPA jx 01 ∙ reM + λPA jx 02 ∙ reK g + λPA jx 03 ∙ reK b + λPA jx 04 ∙ reK o ) / pE j 
Because households form expectations adaptively, one asset demand equation for each household 
sector needs to be set up as a residual of the other two, so that the model remains stock-flow 
consistent when expected wealth (i.e. wealth in the previous period) is not equal to actual wealth. 
Here bank deposits are the financial asset that absorb unexpected changes in wealth, with the 
quantity of bank deposits held by each sector calculated by subtracting the value of each sector’s 
equity holdings from its wealth (equation 148). Real money balances (mH) are then equal to nominal 
money balances (MH) divided by the general price level (equation 149). 
148 MH x = Vx - (pE g ∙ eD g x) - (pE b ∙ eD b x) - (pE o ∙ eD o x) 
149 mH x = MH x / px 
                                                          
72 Two points are worth noting here. First, when both household sectors have the same underlying preference 
for holding a particular asset class (i.e. when: λPA g e = λPA g n; and/or when: λPA b e = λPA b n) the aggregated 
preference is equal to the relevant individual preference (i.e.: λ40 = λPA g e = λPA g n; and/or: λ50 = λPA b e = λPA b n), 
and weighting is not required. Second, (λPA m t) does not appear in any equations, as money balances are 
determined as a residual. 
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(c) Asset preference parameters and expected rates of return 
Most SFC models exogenously set the parameters that determine a household sector’s preference 
for holding an asset irrespective of its rate of return. However, as this model is at least partly 
concerned with the transition from one form of energy production to another, it does not make 
sense to fix these preference parameters, as doing so could bias the results.  
For example, in the initial stationary state brown firms account for approximately 6.5% of total 
output while green firms account for around 1.5% of total output. Hence, and assuming that 
investors expect these sectors to make and distribute an amount of profits that is approximately in 
proportion to their relative sizes, it makes sense for the preference parameters in the initial 
stationary state to be around 0.065 for brown firms and 0.015 for green firms. Yet we would not 
expect these preferences to remain fixed. Rather we would expect them to change to reflect the 
relative size of each sector. For example, if the green sector’s market share increased to 7.9% of 
total production and the brown sector’s market share fell to 0.1%, we would also expect the 
preference parameters to change (e.g. to around 0.079 for green firms and 0.001 for brown firms). 
Thus, partially following Caiani et al. (2014), we endogenise the value of these preference 
parameters (λPA j x). Equation 150 says that the preference parameters (λPA j x) depend upon the target 
level of capital in a sector (kT j) relative to the total target level of capital in the economy (kT t) 
(equation 151), multiplied by one minus the term that determines each household sector’s 
exogenous preference for holding money (1 - λPA m x). Using the target level of capital rather than the 
actual level of capital (as in Caiani et al., 2014) ensures that investors base their decisions on the 
expected size of the sector, rather than the size of the sector in the past. This is especially important 
when looking at transitions. Multiplying by (1 - λPA m x) ensures that these parameters (λPA o x , λPA g x , 
λPA b x) sum to each household sector’s exogenously determined preference for holding equities (1 - 
λPA m x). For example, if a household sector’s preference is to hold 30% of their wealth in the form of 
money (so that: λPA m x = 0.3) then their preference for holding other assets has to equal 70% (so that: 
1 - λPA m x = λPA o x + λPA g x + λPA b x = 0.7). Hence, the adding up constraints, as described by equations 
136 and 137, are respected.  
Finally, (λPA j x) equation 150 includes a variable (HHDIV j x) which allows households to change their 
preference for holding a particular asset class (as might occur if a household sector wanted to divest 
itself from a particular sector’s assets). Because households must place their wealth somewhere, the 
decision to divest from one asset implies a decision to ‘invest’ (i.e. place their wealth) somewhere 
else. Thus if households do not want to change the proportion of their wealth that they hold in 
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equities, the sum of the (HHDIV j x’s) will need to equal zero. The determination of this variable (HHDIV j 
x) is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.  
150 λPA j x = (kT j / kt) ∙ (1 - λPA m x) + HHDIV j x 
151 kTt = kTb + kTg + kTo  
Finally, equations 152 and 153 describe how the expected rates of return on equities and money are 
equal to the actual rates of return (i.e. household expectations about the return on financial assets 
are correct).  
152 reK j = rK j  
153 reM = rM  
4.2.3 The banking sector  
Compared to the household and firm sectors, the banking sector in this model is relatively simple.  
Banks lend to firms, provide bank accounts to households, pay an exogenously determined rate of 
interest on their deposits, and charge an exogenously determined rate of interest on their loans.  
Banks distribute their profits to households in proportion to the size of each household sector. The 
form of the equations in this section draw heavily on Godley and Lavoie (2007a, Ch9). 
4.2.3.1 Banks – stocks – assets and liabilities 
Equation 154 says that the change in lending to each sector (LS j - LS j (-1)) is a result of the change in 
the demand for loans from each sector (LD j - LD j (-1)) (i.e. loans are supplied by the banking sector on 
demand).  
154 LS j = LS j (-1) + (LD j - LD j (-1)) 
Bank lending creates deposits. Hence the change in the stock of deposits (MS - MS (-1)) is equal to the 
sum of the changes in the supply of loans to each firm sector (equation 155). The total level of bank 
deposits held by households is equal to the money held by each household sector (equation 156). As 
is usual in SFC models, the deposits supplied by banks are always equal to the total deposits held by 
households (i.e. MS = MH t), although there is no equation in the model that forces these two 
variables into equality with each other. 
155 MS = MS (-1) + (LD g - LD g (-1)) + (LD b - LD b (-1)) + (LD o - LD o (-1)) 
156 MH t = MH e + MH n  
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4.2.3.2 Banks – flows – interest rates and profits 
Equations 157 to 158 describe how banks set interest rates on loans and deposits. Equation 157 says 
that the rate of interest on deposits (rM) is set exogenously (i.e. rM BAR is an exogenous parameter), 
while equation 158 calculates the rate of interest on loans as a mark-up (addj) (i.e. a spread) over the 
deposit rate. 
157 rM = rM BAR 
158 rL j = rM + addj 
The profits of the banking sector (FDIS f) are arrived at by subtracting the interest paid on deposits 
from the interest received on loans (equation 159). It is assumed in the model that all bank profits 
are distributed to households (see equation 107).  
159 FDIS f = (LS g(-1) ∙ rL g(-1)) + (LS b(-1) ∙ rL b(-1)) + (LS o(-1) ∙ rL o(-1)) - (MS(-1) ∙ rM(-1)) 
4.2.4 The stranded assets indicators 
This section presents two equations that determine the quantity of stranded assets at a given point 
in time. Equation 160 says that the actual physical quantity of stranded assets at a point in time is 
equal to the difference between a sector’s actual level of real capital and its target level of real 
capital. Meanwhile, equation 161 expresses the stranded assets indicator (equation 160) as a 
percentage of that sector’s real capital.73 
160 SA = kj - kTj 
161 SAPC = (kj - kTj) / kj 
Equations 160 and 161 define stranded assets as the quantity (or percentage) of existing capital that 
is not necessary for the production of that sector’s output. These indicators capture the ‘meta’ 
definitions of stranded assets given by Paun et al. (2015) and Caldecott et al. (2013b) (see Chapter 2, 
Section 2.1) – for a firm to hold more capital than it needs to produce its output implies that the 
asset is operating at below its normal level of capacity utilisation. This implies that cash flow is also 
lower than what would have been expected at the investment decision point (recall that the capital 
target is a function of expected sales), and a lower than expected cash flow implies the asset should 
be classified as impaired and so written down – i.e. stranded.  
                                                          
73 Where the subscript (PC) stands for percentage. 
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4.3 Conclusion  
This chapter presented a stock-flow consistent model with an embedded input-output model that 
can be used to investigate issues related to the transition to a low carbon economy and the stranded 
assets thesis. The first section gave a brief overview of the model and provided a number of 
justifications for the model’s chosen structure. The second section presented the equations that 
make up the model. 
To summarise briefly, the model is made up of a green, a brown and an other firm sector, an ethical 
and a normal household sector, and a banking sector. The financial assets included in the model are 
green, brown and other firm sector equities, bank deposits and bank loans. The real assets included 
in the model are the capital assets produced by the green, brown and other firm sectors. Notable 
features of the model include:  
(1) A modified Input-Output (IO) model that determines each firm sector’s demand for 
intermediate consumption goods. The inclusion of the IO model causes prices to become 
interdependent. 
(2) A modified Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) that determines household demand for 
different types of consumption goods.  
(3) Related to points (1) and (2), a system of equations that allows households and firms to 
substitute more easily between green and brown energy goods than they are able to 
substitute between other goods and energy goods (i.e. green and brown goods together).  
(4) Labour productivity that is a function of each firm sector’s capital to employment ratio.  
(5) Firms that make financing decisions that depend on relative costs.  
(6) A separation between the demand for goods (from households and firms) and the supply 
of goods (by firms).  
(7) Firms that face capacity constraints, with output limited by capital. 
(8) Households and firms that are forced to substitute between similar goods when capacity 
limits are reached. 
(9) A set of portfolio allocation equations that specifies each household sector’s demand for 
financial assets separately. 
(10) A banking sector that is able to vary the interest rate it charges to different firm sectors.  
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As we will see, these features will be important in the simulations that look at different types of 
transitions to a low carbon economy (Chapter 6) and changes in market conditions (Chapter 7). The 
next chapter calibrates the SFC model presented in this chapter.  
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Chapter 5: Model calibration  
This chapter presents the calibration of the model from Chapter 4 and introduces the different 
parameter regimes the simulations are conducted under. The rest of this chapter is organised as 
follows. Section 5.1 describes the four parameter regimes that each simulation is conducted under. 
Section 5.2 presents a series of tables that contain the values of the exogenous parameters found in 
the model. 
5.1 The parameter regimes  
Each simulation is carried out under four different parameter regimes (using the language of Lavoie 
and Godley [2001]). These parameter regimes are created by varying the values taken by two sets of 
parameters. These are: i) the parameters that determine how sensitive households and firms are to 
the price of green and brown energy goods; and ii) the parameters that determine how sensitive 
household portfolio allocation decisions are to the returns on financial assets. Before discussing the 
regimes in more detail, a few word will be said on why these parameters are varied.  
As outlined in Chapter 2, Section 2.5, the primary motivation for varying these parameters is to 
investigate the extent to which the results of the various simulations are sensitive to different 
assumptions regarding: i) the level of renewable and storage technology; and ii) the sensitivity of 
agents to the returns on financial assets. Regarding (i), the stranded assets literature argues that the 
level of renewable and storage technology will influence the degree to which agents are able to 
substitute renewable energy for energy from fossil fuel sources, and that this will influence the 
demand for energy from different sources (and so stranding) (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3). Regarding 
(ii), the stranded assets literature argues that the effects of stranding are likely to affect the 
economy via financial markets. As a result, the sensitivity of agents to the returns on financial assets 
is likely to be important in determining the effects of stranding (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4). These 
assumptions are captured in research questions (x) and (xi) (see Chapter 2, Section 2.6). 
An addition motivation for varying these parameters is that there aren’t any empirical estimates of 
these parameters available. Altering these values therefore subjects the model to a degree of 
sensitivity analysis. It should also help to alleviate (at least partly) any concerns that the chosen 
values are not close enough to their real (but unobserved) empirical values, and that this 
discrepancy is unduly biasing the simulation results.  
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5.1.1 Types of parameter regime 
Each simulation is carried out under four different parameter regimes. As we will see in the 
simulation chapters (Chapters 6 and 7), the choice of parameter regime will significantly affect the 
results of some of the simulations.  
The parameter regimes, which are summarised in Table 5.1, are created by varying the values taken 
by two sets of parameters. The first set of parameters that are varied are those that determine how 
sensitive households and firms are to the price of green and brown energy goods (λA j21 , λA j22 , λA j23 , 
λA j24 , λAIDS x21 , λAIDS x22 , λAIDS x23 , λAIDS x24) (see Chapter 4, Equations 62, 63, 118, 119). The parameters 
(λA ij , λAIDS j x) are also varied to ensure that approximately the same proportion of goods are 
purchased from each firm sector by each household and firm sector in the initial steady state 
(because the prices of energy goods are not the same, changing the sensitivity of each sector to 
prices will also change the initial steady state demand for each sector’s goods). These regimes 
appear in the rows of Table 5.1, and will be referred to as the ‘high sensitivity to goods prices 
regimes’ (when the values taken by the parameters are higher) and ‘low sensitivity to goods prices 
regimes’ (when the values taken by the parameters are lower). Section 5.1.2 discusses the values of 
these parameters in more detail. 
The second set of parameters that are varied are those that determine the sensitivity of households 
to the relative rates of return on financial assets (λPA jx 01 , λPA jx 02 , λPA jx 03 , λPA jx 04) (see Chapter 4, 
equation 147). The parameter (λPA m x) is also varied to ensure that in each parameter regime 
approximately the same proportion of household wealth is placed into equities and money in the 
initial steady state (because the return on financial assets are not the same, increasing the sensitivity 
to the rate of return on each asset will lead to more wealth being placed into equities, which will 
lead to capital gains and an increase in household wealth and spending). These regimes appear in 
the columns of Table 5.1, and will be referred to as the ‘high sensitivity to asset returns regimes’ 
(when the values taken by the parameters are high) and the ‘low sensitivity to asset returns regimes’ 
(when the values taken by the parameters are low). Section 5.1.3 discusses the values of these 
parameters in more detail. 
Varying these two sets of parameters gives us four different regimes. Each regime has its own 
shorthand code, where (G) stands for goods, (A) stands for assets, the superscript (H) stands for high 
sensitivity and the superscript (L) stands for low sensitivity.  
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Table 5.1 Parameter regimes 
 
Sensitivity of households to relative returns on financial assets: 
Lower Higher  
 
Sensitivity 
of firms and 
households 
to relative 
goods prices 
Higher  
Parameter regime 1 (GH AL)  
(+) High sensitivity to goods prices 
(-) Low sensitivity to asset returns  
Parameter regime 2 (GH AH)  
(+) High sensitivity to goods prices 
(+) High sensitivity to asset returns 
Lower  
Parameter regime 3 (GL AL)  
(-) Low sensitivity to goods prices 
(-) Low sensitivity to asset returns 
Parameter regime 4 (GL AH)  
(-) Low sensitivity to goods prices 
(+) High sensitivity to asset returns 
     
5.1.2 Goods’ prices parameter regimes  
We now move on to discuss the regimes themselves, starting with those that determine the 
sensitivity of households and firms to brown and green energy prices (i.e. the rows in Table 5.1).  
Before discussing the parameter values themselves, a few words should be said about how to 
interpret the exogenous parameters in equations 118 and 119. Essentially, these parameters are 
intended to capture some of the heterogeneity between green and brown forms of energy, and as 
such they limit the ability of households and firms to substitute between energy sources when prices 
change. The values taken by the parameters are thus related to:  
(a) The intermittent nature of renewable energy versus the dispatchable nature of fossil fuel 
energy.74  
(b) The infrastructure that supports the distribution of fossil fuels to households (e.g. the petrol 
station network) versus, in some cases at least, the lack of equivalent infrastructure for 
competing renewable products.  
                                                          
74 For a discussion of this issue, as well as a critique of some of the solutions to it, see Trainer (2012). 
155  
(c) The lack of alternatives to fossil fuels in powering heavier vehicles (e.g. large road vehicles, 
freight ships, aeroplanes etc.) (Heinberg et al., 2016).  
(d) The preference for energy from a particular source (e.g. a preference for renewables due to 
environmental concerns).  
In the regimes in which agents are more sensitive to the price of energy goods, it is assumed that 
these issues have been at least partly overcome, in particular with regards to (a) and (b). That is, it is 
assumed that technological advances in battery technology and an increase in the infrastructure that 
supports electric vehicles (EVs) makes green energy easier to substitute with brown energy – both in 
electricity generation and because of an increase in the use of EVs. Conversely, in the regimes in 
which agents are less sensitive to the price of energy goods, the opposite is true and therefore 
brown and green goods are less easy to substitute with each other.  
In order to adjust the degree of substitutability between green and brown energy goods, four sets of 
parameters need to be adjusted: 
(1) The parameters that determine the ‘responsiveness of consumption by households to 
green/brown relative prices’ (λAIDS x21 , λAIDS x22 , λAIDS x23 , λAIDS x24)  are adjusted from 0.8 to 0.1 
(for the cross rates of return) and 0.8 to 0.1 (for the own rates of return). 
(2) The parameters that determine the ‘responsiveness of firm intermediate consumption 
expenditure to green/brown energy prices’ (λA j21 , λA j22 , λA j23 , λA j24) are adjusted from 0.8 to 
0.1 (for the cross rates of return) and 0.8 to 0.1 (for the own rates of return). 
(3) The parameter that determines the ‘proportion of green intermediate goods demanded by 
ethical/normal households when prices are equal’ (λAIDS g x) is adjusted from 0.23 to 0.2, 
while the parameter that determines the ‘proportion of brown intermediate goods 
demanded by ethical/normal households when prices are equal’ (λAIDS b x) is adjusted from 
0.77 to 0.8.   
(4) The parameter that determines the ‘proportion of green intermediate goods demanded by 
green/brown/other firms when prices are equal’ (λA gj) is adjusted from 0.23 to 0.2, while the 
parameter that determines the ‘proportion of brown intermediate goods demanded by 
green/brown/other firms when prices are equal’ (λA bj) is adjusted from 0.77 to 0.8.   
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Changes (3) and (4) ensure that in each regime the relative consumption of green (20%) and brown 
(80%) goods is approximately the same in the initial steady state.75  
5.1.3 Asset returns parameter regimes 
The second set of parameter variations involves varying the parameters that determine the 
sensitivity of household portfolio allocation decisions to the relative rates of return on different 
financial assets. This set of variations is related to the substitutability of different asset types for 
each other, which is itself a function of the level of segmentation of asset markets. A higher degree 
of sensitivity to returns on financial assets implies that markets for financial assets are less 
segmented – that is, that households are more concerned with returns than they are with other 
features of the financial assets (such as liquidity, duration, risk, the issuing sector, etc.). A lower 
degree of sensitivity to returns on financial assets implies the opposite – that markets for financial 
assets are more segmented, so that households are less concerned with returns than they are with 
the other features of financial assets.  
In order to adjust the degree of substitutability between financial assets, two sets of parameters 
need to be modified: 
(1) The parameters that determine the responsiveness of portfolio allocation decisions to the 
rate of return on financial assets (λPA jx 01 , λPA jx 02 , λPA jx 03 , λPA jx 04) are varied from 0.1 to 0.4 
(for the cross rates of return) and 0.3 to 1.2 (for the own rates of return). 
(2) The parameter that determines the proportion of household wealth placed into bank 
deposits when the rates of return are the same on all assets (λPA m x) is varied from 0.75 to 
0.69.  
Change (2) ensures that the amount of wealth placed into bank deposits and the level of economic 
activity is approximately the same in each regime in the initial steady state. This is because the 
higher the values taken by (λPA jx 01 , λPA jx 02 , λPA jx 03 , λPA jx 04) the stronger is the household sector’s 
response to the returns on financial assets, and therefore the greater the proportion of wealth that 
will be placed into equities (as equities have a higher rate of return than bank deposits in the initial 
steady state). The greater the proportion of wealth placed into these assets, the higher their price 
                                                          
75 Because lower values for (λAij) and (λAIDS j x) imply that household energy consumption decisions are less 
responsive to energy prices, which means that the exogenous components also need to be lowered to 
maintain the green-brown energy ratio, given that green prices are higher than brown prices in the initial 
steady state. 
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will be, and therefore the higher will be the overall level of financial wealth. Within the model, 
financial wealth affects the level of economic activity through the consumption function – hence the 
need to lower the relevant parameter (λPA m x) to ensure that in each regime asset prices and 
therefore the level of wealth remains approximately the same. 
5.2 The model calibration tables 
This section presents the calibration of the exogenous parameters in the model from Chapter 4. 
However, before the parameter values are presented, a few words need to be said about the 
principles that guided the calibration decisions. These principles relate to the aims of the study. 
As outlined in Chapter 2, Section 2.6, the primary motivation of this dissertation is to better 
understand the macroeconomic and financial implications of a transition to a low carbon economy 
and the stranding of fossil fuel assets. As such, the model presented in Chapter 4 is a theoretical SFC 
model, rather than an empirical SFC model. As a result, the model is not calibrated in reference to 
any particular economy. However, after experimenting with the model, it became clear that a steady 
state can be achieved under a range of plausible parameter values. Therefore, a decision needed to 
be made about how to calibrate the model. Without an objective reason for choosing one set of 
parameter values over another, it was decided that where possible the parameters would be 
calibrated on empirical estimates for the UK economy. Where these weren’t available, parameters 
were calibrated on empirical estimates from other advanced economies. If no empirical estimates 
were available, a value was chosen that was either equivalent to a parameter from another SFC 
model, or that seemed economically plausible and caused the endogenous variables in the model 
(e.g. final demand) to be equal to their value in the UK in 2016. However, despite calibrating many of 
the parameter values on the UK’s economy (and other advanced economies), the reader should 
keep in mind that the model is not meant to be an accurate representation of any particular 
economy. 
The rest of this section presents the values of the exogenously determined parameters of the SFC 
model presented in Chapter 4. 
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Table 5.2: Firm output capacity parameter values 
Variable Symbol Value Units Remarks 
Maximum output per unit of 
capital 
ζg 0.7 
- 
“Large companies plan the presence of excess capacity, operating at rates of 
utilization of practical capacity that oscillate between 65 and 95 per cent, and 
aiming for normal rates of utilization in the 80 to 90 per cent range” (Lavoie 
[2014, p150] citing: Eichner [1976, p. 37] and Koutsoyiannis  [1975, p. 273]). 
These parameter values imply a target a level of capacity utilisation of 
approximately 83%, given the steady state capital-output ratio (i.e. within the 
empirical estimates given by Lavoie [2014, p.150]). 
ζb 0.7 
ζo 0.85 
 
Table 5.3: Firm markup parameter values 
Variable Symbol Value Units Remarks 
Firm mark-up over unit cost 
φg 0.35 
- 
Within the normal range for SFC models (between 0.2 and 0.35). See for example: 
Godley and Lavoie (2007), Lavoie (2008), Van Treek (2009).  
φb 0.35 
φo 0.35 
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Table 5.4: Firm investment parameter values 
Variable Symbol Value Units Remarks 
Numerator in target capital-
output ratio 
σg 0.3 
- 
The equation that this parameter appears in is derived from a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. In a Cobb-Douglas production function this parameter 
represents the output elasticity on capital, empirical estimates of which are 
usually around 0.3. (Note that the equation that determines labour productivity is 
also derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function. As such it also includes 
this parameter). 
σb 0.3 
σo 0.3 
Depreciation rate of capital 
δg 0.04 
Rate 
Rates in advanced economies typically vary between 6 - 8% (Jackson and Victor, 
2015). Oulton and Srinivasan (2003) estimate the rate of capital depreciation in 
the UK to be 8%. The rate for the energy sectors is taken from the empirical 
estimates found in Herman et al. (2003). 
δb 0.04 
δo 0.08 
Risk premium 
εg 0.1 
Rate 
Given empirical estimates of the capital-output ratio and the values taken by the 
other variables that appear in the target capital-output ratio equation, the value 
of the risk premium is chosen so as to fix the steady state capital-output ratio at 
(approximately) its empirically observed level.  
Doblin (1991) estimates the capital-output ratio during the 1980s to be between 
2.5 and 2.8 (for the US, UK and the Federal Republic of Germany). Oulton and 
Wallis (2015) calculate the average capital-output ratio for the UK to be about 2 
(for the period 1950-2007), with the ratio peaking at 2.9 in 1980 “before declining 
to 1.91 (not much above its 1950 level) on the eve of the Great Recession in 2007” 
(Oulton and Wallis, 2015, p.14). 
εb 0.1 
εo 0.1 
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Table 5.5: Firm investment financing parameter values – part 1 
Variable Symbol Value Units Remarks 
Speed of capital to target 
capital 
γg 0.1 
- 
According to Jackson and Victor (2015) the typical range for advanced economies 
is between 0.08 and 0.15. The value (0.1) is also within the normal range for SFC 
models. See for example: Godley and Lavoie (2007a) (all chapters = 0.1). 
γb 0.1 
γo 0.1 
Proportion of net investment 
financed by retained 
earnings 
ιg 0.5 
Proportion 
Empirical estimates of the sources of investment finance vary. For example, for 
non-financial companies in France, Clévenot et al. (2009) estimate the proportion 
of total investment (including housing) financed by retained earnings to be 
between 0.35 and 1.1 (during the period 1978 - 2008). For companies in the US, 
Moore (2002, p.147) finds that “over the past few decades about one-half of total 
investment spending has been financed internally by retained earnings (business 
saving) and one-half financed externally by the issue of new debt and equities.”  
For the UK, Bank of England Survey (Saleheen et al., 2017) finds that retained 
earnings is the most important source of finance followed by bank lending. 
Around 20% of firms use capital markets to finance their investment expenditures 
(i.e. through bond and equity issuance), although this type of financing is found to 
fund less than 10% of total investment.  
The value of (ιi) implies that half of net investment is financed by retained 
earnings, while the other half is financed by bank loans and capital market issues. 
Because firms cover all of their depreciation costs using retained earnings (the 
‘amortisation funds’), in the steady state (when net investment is zero) gross 
investment (investment to cover deprecation costs) is entirely funded out of 
retained earnings. The calibration is therefore broadly in line with the evidence 
from the Bank of England survey (Saleheen et al., 2017). 
ιb 0.5 
ιo 0.5 
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Table 5.5: Firm investment financing parameter values – part 2 
Variable Symbol Value Units Remarks 
Proportion of financing by 
asset type when costs are 
equal  
λEF g 0.32 
Proportion 
Within the model the only source of non-bank external finance available to firms 
is equity (firms do not issue bonds or any other types of securities). However, in 
reality other securities (such as bonds) finance a significant proportion of firm 
investment expenditures. Rather than include bonds as a separate financial asset 
(which would create stability problems in household portfolio allocation, given 
the relative sizes of the green and brown energy sectors), the model is calibrated 
so that equity financed investment proxies for all non-bank forms of financing. 
The table below summarises this data. Data on securities is from Bank of England 
(2015) and reports gross issuance for private non-financial corporations (PNFCs) 
incorporated and operating in the UK. Data on bank finance is from the Bank of 
England Statistical database (series RPQZ8Y4) and reports average gross lending 
(excluding overdrafts) to all non-financial businesses by banks. All figures are in 
billions pound sterling.  
The values of the parameters are set so as to fix the steady state borrowing ratio 
at (approximately) its empirically observed level.  
 
Gross equity issuance Gross 
bond 
issuance 
Gross bank 
borrowing 
Non-bank 
to bank 
borrowing  
ratio 
IPO 
Other 
issuance 
2012 0.6 7.5 66.9 145.8 34:66 
2013 6.4 8.2 55.0 162.9 30:70 
2014 10.6 13.6 54.6 189.5 29:71 
Average 5.9 9.8 58.8 166.1 31:69 
 
λLF g 0.68 
λEF b 0.32 
λLF b 0.68 
λEF o 0.32 
λLF o 0.68 
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Table 5.5: Firm investment financing parameter values – part 3 
Variable Symbol Value Units Remarks 
Responsiveness of financing 
by asset type to cost of 
financing 
λFj 11 - 0.1 
- Chosen so that the demand for financing is inelastic with respect to its cost. 
λFj12 + 0.1 
λFj13  + 0.1 
λFj14 - 0.1 
Firms: The input-output A-matrix  
This section lays out the values taken by the various parameters that appear in the equations of the input-output model. The parameter values are set so 
that, in the initial steady state, the 3 by 3 A-matrix appears approximately as so:  
  Green Brown Other   Green Brown Other 
A  = 
Green agg agb ago  Green 0.0383 0.0255 0.0051 
Brown abg abb abo = Brown 0.1867 0.1245 0.0249 
Other aog aob aoo  Other 0.6000 0.6000 0.4800 
          
 
Sum of 
inputs 
at g at b at o  
Sum of 
inputs 
0.8250 0.7500 0.5100 
The values in the A-matrix are adapted from empirical estimates in Berg et al. (2015). An adjustment is required because Berg et al. (2015) only have two 
firm sectors (energy firms and other firms), while in this model the energy sector is disaggregated into green and brown firms (so that there are three firm 
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sectors in total). In addition, to aid model stability, in this model the demand for energy goods from the other sector is increased from 0.02 (its value in Berg 
et al., 2015) to 0.03 (so that: ago + abo = 0.03).  
The A-matrix in Berg et al. (2015) is as follows: 
 
 
The assumptions taken in disaggregating the two sector A-matrix in Berg et al. (2015) into a three sector A-matrix are: 
1. Green and brown firms require the same quantity of goods from the other sector to produce one unit of their output: aBerg 3 = aog = aob. 
2. Other firms require the same quantity of goods from the other sector to produce one unit of their output: aBerg 4 = aoo. 
3. Brown energy firms require the same quantity of energy inputs to produce a unit of output as do the energy firms in Berg et al. (2015): aBerg 1 = abb + 
agb. 
4. Green energy firms require more energy inputs to produce a unit of their output than do brown firms: aBerg 1 < (agg + abg) ; (agb + abb) < (agg + abg). This 
is intended to reflect a lower level of energy return on energy invested in the green sector versus the brown sector (Murphy and Hall [2010], Hall et 
al. [2014]).   
5. The split between green/brown energy consumption by firms mirrors the split between green/brown energy consumption by households in the 
initial steady state. Hence, firms consume approximately 20% green and 80% brown energy in the initial steady state: (abg / agg) = (abb / agb) = (cb / cg)  
  Energy Other 
= 
 Energy Other 
 Energy aBerg 1 aBerg 2 Energy 0.15 0.02 
ABerg  = Other aBerg 3 aBerg 4 Other 0.60 0.48 
       
 
Sum of 
inputs 
at Berg e at Berg o 
Sum of 
inputs 
0.75 0.51 
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Table 5.6: Firm input-output parameter values – part 1 
Variable Symbol 
Value 
Units Remarks 
Parameter regime 
1          
GH AL 
2          
GH AH 
3           
GL AL 
4          
GL AH 
Total quantity of 
inputs required by a 
sector to produce a 
unit of output 
at g 0.825 
Physical 
units 
Determines the total quantity of inputs required by a 
sector to produce one unit of its output. Based on the 
empirical estimates given in Berg et al. (2015).  
The higher value of the (at g) parameter versus the (at b) 
parameter is intended to reflect a lower level of energy 
return on energy invested (EROEI) in the green sector 
versus the brown sector. That is, the green sector requires 
a larger quantity of energy inputs to produce one unit of its 
output. While empirical estimates of EROEI vary by paper 
and energy source, renewable energy is usually found to 
have a lower EROEI than fossil fuels (see for example: 
Murphy and Hall [2010], Hall et al. [2014]).  
at b 0.750 
at o 0.510 
‘Target’ quantity of 
goods demand by 
firms from the other 
firm sector to 
produce one unit of 
their output 
aTog 0.585 
- 
Ensures that in the initial steady state the values of the 
parameters in the 3 by 3 A-matrix are approximately equal 
to those in the 3 by 3 A-matrix above.  
aTob 0.585 
aToo 0.47 
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Table 5.6: Firm input-output parameter values – part 2 
Variable Symbol 
Value 
Units Remarks 
Parameter regime 
1          
GH AL 
2          
GH AH 
3           
GL AL 
4          
GL AH 
Responsiveness of 
intermediate 
consumption by firms 
to aggregate 
energy/other relative 
prices 
λA j11 - 0.04 
- 
In their summary of the literature on the meta-analysis of 
the price elasticity of demand for energy goods, 
Labandeira et al. (2017) report price elasticities for energy 
products for the commercial and industrial sectors. For the 
industrial sector they report elasticities of between −0.168 
and −0.511, while for the commercial sector the reported 
elasticities are between −0.224 and −0.718. 
In their own meta-regression analysis Labandeira et al. 
(2017) report short term elasticities for the industrial 
sector of between 0.005 and 0.069 (not statistically 
significant at the 10% level), and short run elasticities for 
the commercial sector of between 0.004 (not statistically 
significant at the 10% level) and -0.242 (statistically 
significant at the 1% level). They report long run elasticities 
for the industrial sector of between 0.01 (not statistically 
significant) and 0.741 (statistically significant at the 1% 
level). For the commercial sector the long run elasticities 
are reported to range between 0.040 (not statistically 
significant) and 0.321 (statistically significant at the 1% 
level).  
Given the empirical estimates of elasticities discussed here, 
the values of the parameters are set to ensure an inelastic 
price elasticity of demand for intermediate energy goods. 
λA j12 + 0.04 
λA j13 + 0.04 
λA j14 - 0.04 
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Table 5.6: Firm input-output parameter values – part 3 
Variable Symbol 
Value 
Units Remarks 
Parameter regime 
1          
GH AL 
2          
GH AH 
3           
GL AL 
4          
GL AH 
Proportion of 
green/brown 
intermediate goods 
demanded by green 
firms when prices are 
equal 
λA gg 0.23 0.2 
Proportion 
Values chosen ensure that green energy makes up 
approximately 20% of total supplied to firms in the initial 
steady state, given relative prices and other parameter 
values.  
In the UK in 2016, the proportion of primary energy 
supplied from low carbon sources was 17% (BEIS, 2017). 
The difference between the observed value (17%) and the 
calibrated value (20%) is due to model stability: in certain 
parameter regimes the model becomes unstable if a sector 
gets too small. 
λA bg   0.77 0.8 
Proportion of 
green/brown 
intermediate goods 
demanded by brown 
firms when prices are 
equal 
λA gb   0.23 0.2 
λA bb   0.77 0.8 
Proportion of 
green/brown 
intermediate goods 
demanded by other 
firms when prices are 
equal 
λA go   0.23 0.2 
λA bo   0.77 0.8 
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Table 5.6: Firm input-output parameter values – part 4   
Variable Symbol 
Value 
Units Remarks 
Parameter regime 
1          
GH AL 
2          
GH AH 
3           
GL AL 
4          
GL AH 
Responsiveness of 
firm intermediate 
consumption 
expenditure to 
brown/green energy 
prices 
λA j21 - 0.8 - 0.1 
- 
In parameter regimes 1 and 2, households and firms are 
more sensitive to the price of energy goods (so that the 
price elasticity of brown energy is approximately unity). In 
parameter regimes 3 and 4, households and firms are less 
sensitive to the price of energy goods (so that the price 
elasticity of brown energy is relatively inelastic).   
λA j22 + 0.8 + 0.1 
λA j23 + 0.8 + 0.1 
λA j24 - 0.8 - 0.1 
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Table 5.7: Firm/household wage and productivity parameter values  
Variable Symbol Value Units Remarks 
Parameter determining 
relationship of wage to 
productivity 
χe 1 
- 
Sets prices at a level that causes real output to approximate reality in the initial 
steady state.  
χn 1 
Speed of wage to target 
wage 
μg 0.45 
- 
Value chosen approximates the relevant variable in Godley and Lavoie (2007a, 
Ch.11). 
μb 0.45 
μo 0.45 
Exponent on productivity  
equation 
σg 0.3 
- 
The equation that this parameter appears in is derived from a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. In this type of production function this parameter represents 
the output elasticity on capital, empirical estimates of which are usually close to 
0.3. Note that the equation that determines the capital-output ratio is also 
derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function. As such that equation also 
includes this parameter. 
σb 0.3 
σo 0.3 
Speed of productivity to 
target productivity 
βg 0.45 
- 
Set equal to the parameter that determines the speed of the wage to the target 
wage level. This prevents either firms or workers from temporarily benefitting 
from changes to the wage rate or level of productivity.  
βb 0.45 
βo 0.45 
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Table 5.8: Household size parameter values 
Variable Symbol Value Units Remarks 
Proportion of ethical 
households in population 
nPROP e 0.7 
Proportion 
Eurosif (2016), report that approximately 48% (€10 trillion) of professionally 
managed assets in Europe ‘exclude’ certain types of securities from their funds, 
where an ‘exclusion strategy’ is defined as the “elimination of companies or of 
sectors from the investment universe of the portfolio. Exclusions can be based on 
ESG criteria or have a Norms-based dimension, when screening excludes 
companies that fail to comply with international standards or conventions.” 
(Eurosif, 2016, p.25) 
Running a divestment simulation requires that households are split along 
behavioural lines. Of course, in reality it is not possible to neatly divide the 
population into ethical and normal groups. Thus, while the proportions of ethical 
to normal households are informed by Eurosif (2016), they are also somewhat 
arbitrary. 
As explained Chapter 4, the proportions are based on potential, rather than 
actual, behaviour, so that in the initial steady state the parameter values than 
govern each sector’s behaviour are identical. 
Proportion of normal 
households in population 
nPROP n 0.3 
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Table 5.9: Household consumption function parameter values 
Variable Symbol Value Units Remarks 
Autonomous factor in 
consumption function 
α0 175 - 
The ratio of total autonomous to total steady state consumption is within the 
normal range for SFC models. See for example, Godley and Lavoie (2007a): In Ch.7 
(α0 = 15) and (steady state consumption = 81), so that (15/81 = 0.185), while in 
Ch.9 (α0 = 25) and (steady state consumption = 166), so that (25/166 = 0.15). Here 
steady state real consumption is approximately equal to 1500, so that 175/1500 = 
11.67% 
Propensity to consume out 
of income 
α1 e 0.7 
- 
Within the normal range for SFC models. See for example: Godley and Lavoie 
(2007a): Ch.3: α1 = 0.6, Ch.4: α1 = 0.6, Ch.5: α1 = 0.8, Ch.6: α1 = 0.6 & 0.7, Ch.7: α1 
= 0.75, Ch.9: α1 = 0.8, Ch.10: α1 = 0.95, Ch.11: α1 = 0.75, Ch.12: α1 = 0.75 & 0.75; 
Godley and Lavoie (2006): α1 = 0.75; Godley and Lavoie (2007b): α1 = 0.9 Ryoo 
(2010): α1 = 0.65; Van Treek (2009): α1 = 1 (out of wage income). α1 n 0.7 
Propensity to consume out 
of wealth 
α2 e 0.03 
- 
In their survey of the literature, Labhard et al. (2005, p.23) find that estimates for 
the MPC out of wealth “range between 1% and 5% for most of the euro-area 
countries in our data set”. In a separate survey, Altissimo et al. (2005) find that 
empirical estimates of the MPC to consume out of wealth vary between 0.7% (for 
Belgium – as estimated in Labhard et al. [2005]) and 8.3% (for Canada – as 
estimated in Bertaut [2002]).  
In SFC models for which calibration data is available, the MPC out of wealth (α2) 
varies between 0.04 and 0.2. In Godley and Lavoie (2007a), Ch.3: α2 = 0.4, in Ch.4: 
α2 = 0.4, in Ch.5: α2 = 0.2, in Ch.6: α2 = 0.4 & 0.3, in Ch.7 and 9: α2 = 0.1, in Ch.10: 
α2 = 0.05, in Ch.11: α2 = 0.064, while in Ch.12: α2 = 0.13333. In Godley and Lavoie 
(2006): α2 = 0.064, while in Godley and Lavoie (2007b): α2 = 0.2. In Ryoo (2010): α2 
= 0.04. 
α2 n 0.03 
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Table 5.10: Household AIDS model parameter values – part 1 
Variable Symbol 
Value 
Units Remarks 
Parameter regime 
1          
GH AL 
2          
GH AH 
3           
GL AL 
4          
GL AH 
Proportion of 
energy/other 
intermediate goods 
demanded by the 
ethical household 
sector when prices 
are equal 
λAIDS en e 0.1 
Proportion 
Empirical estimates suggest that UK households spend 
around 8% of their total income on energy: 
Advani et al. (2013) find that energy makes up 8.1% of 
household spending in the U.K., while Platchkov and Pollitt 
(2011) find that between 1970 and 2008 the average total 
energy expenditure as a share of GDP was around 8%.  
Hence the values of the parameters are set so that 
household consumption of energy goods is equal to 
approximately 8% of total consumption in the initial steady 
state (given relative prices). 
λAIDS o e 0.9 
Proportion of 
energy/other 
intermediate goods 
demanded by the 
normal household 
sector when prices 
are equal 
λAIDS en n 0.1 
λAIDS o n 0.9 
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Table 5.10: Household AIDS model parameter values – part 2 
Variable Symbol 
Value 
Units Remarks 
Parameter regime 
1          
GH AL 
2          
GH AH 
3           
GL AL 
4          
GL AH 
Responsiveness of 
consumer 
expenditure to 
relative aggregate 
energy/other goods 
prices 
λAIDS x11 - 0.04 
- 
In their summary of the literature on the meta-analysis of 
the price elasticity of demand for energy goods, Labandeira 
et al. (2017) report short run price elasticities for energy 
products of between -0.09 and -0.76 and long run price 
elasticities of between -0.31 and -1.16. In their own meta 
regression analysis they report an average short term price 
elasticity of energy demand of -0.21, with a range between 
-0.29 and -0.02; and an average long term price elasticity of 
energy demand of -0.61, with a range between -0.77 and -
0.19. 
Given these estimates, the values taken by the parameters 
in the AIDS of equations are set so that the price elasticity 
of demand for energy goods is inelastic in the initial steady 
state. 
λAIDS x12 + 0.04 
λAIDS x13 + 0.04 
λAIDS x14 - 0.04 
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Table 5.10: Household AIDS model parameter values – part 3 
Variable Symbol 
Value 
Units Remarks 
Parameter regime 
1          
GH AL 
2          
GH AH 
3           
GL AL 
4          
GL AH 
Proportion of 
green/brown goods 
demanded by ethical 
households when 
prices are equal 
λAIDS g e 0.23 0.2 
Proportion 
According to the Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy (BEIS, 2017) the proportion of primary 
energy supplied from low carbon sources was 17% in the 
UK in 2016.  
According to International Energy Agency (IEA) data, 
approximately 80% of the UK’s share of total primary 
energy consumption was provided by fossil fuels in 2014, 
with the remaining 20% made up of nuclear, renewables 
and biofuels/waste. These shares are reflected in the 
parameter values that determine the split between green 
and brown forms of household energy consumption. 
Values chosen ensure that green energy makes up 
approximately 20% of total energy demand in the initial 
steady state, given relative prices and other parameter 
values. The reason for the discrepancy between the 
empirical estimates provided by BEIS (2017) and the actual 
values used in the model is related to the model stability 
issues. In short, increasing the demand for green energy 
increases the size of the green sector and so increases 
model stability.  
λAIDS b e  0.77 0.8 
Proportion of 
green/brown goods 
demanded by normal 
households when 
prices are equal 
λAIDS g n 0.23 0.2 
λAIDS b n 0.77 0.8 
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Table 5.10: Household AIDS model parameter values – part 4 
Variable Symbol 
Value 
Units Remarks 
Parameter regime 
1          
GH AL 
2          
GH AH 
3           
GL AL 
4          
GL AH 
Responsiveness of 
consumption by 
households to 
green/brown relative 
prices 
λAIDS x21 - 0.8 - 0.1 
- 
In parameter regimes 1 and 2, households and firms are 
more sensitive to the price of energy goods (so that the 
price elasticity of brown energy is approximately unity). In 
parameter regimes 3 and 4, households and firms are less 
sensitive to the price of energy goods (so that the price 
elasticity of brown energy is relatively inelastic).   
λAIDS x22 + 0.8 + 0.1 
λAIDS x23 + 0.8 + 0.1 
λAIDS x24 - 0.8 - 0.1 
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Table 5.11: Household portfolio allocation parameter values – part 1  
Variable Symbol 
Value 
Units Remarks 
Parameter regime 
1          
GH AL 
2          
GH AH 
3           
GL AL 
4          
GL AH 
Determines the 
proportion of 
household wealth 
placed into bank 
deposits when the 
rates of return are the 
same on all assets  
λPA m e 0.25 0.31 0.25 0.31 
Proportion 
According to data from Eurostat76, in 2015 UK households 
held financial assets in the following proportions (all 
figures are approximate):  
25% bank deposits (30% for the EU-28). 
60% insurance, pensions and other standardised 
guarantees (40% for the EU-28) 
15% equity, investment fund shares and debt securities 
(30% for the EU-28)  
Because pension funds and insurance companies hold 
approximately 7% of their assets in the form of bank 
deposits (source: ECB, 2017) the actual share of bank 
deposits as a percentage of household assets is 
(approximately) 28.5%.  
Given the values taken by the other parameters in the 
portfolio allocation equations, these values ensure that 
households hold approximately 28.5% of their wealth in 
bank deposits in the initial steady state.  
λPA m n 0.25 0.31 0.25 0.31 
                                                          
76 Source: Data series: Total financial assets of households for the EU-28, breakdown in % for 2015, by financial instrument (Table 720). Accessed 2.6.2017. 
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Table 5.11: Household portfolio allocation parameter values – part 2 
Variable Symbol 
Value 
Units Remarks 
Parameter regime 
1          
GH AL 
2          
GH AH 
3           
GL AL 
4          
GL AH 
Determines the 
responsiveness of 
portfolio allocation to 
the real rates of 
return on financial 
assets 
λPA gx 01 - 0.1 - 0.4 - 0.1 - 0.4 
- See Section 5.1.3.   
λPA gx 02 + 0.3 + 1.2 + 0.3 + 1.2 
λPA gx 03 - 0.1 - 0.4 - 0.1 - 0.4 
λPA gx 04 - 0.1 - 0.4 - 0.1 - 0.4 
λPA bx 01 - 0.1 - 0.4 - 0.1 - 0.4 
λPA bx 02 - 0.1 - 0.4 - 0.1 - 0.4 
λPA bx 03 + 0.3 + 1.2 + 0.3 + 1.2 
λPA bx 04 - 0.1 - 0.4 - 0.1 - 0.4 
λPA ox 01 - 0.1 - 0.4 - 0.1 - 0.4 
λPA ox 02 - 0.1 - 0.4 - 0.1 - 0.4 
λPA ox 03 - 0.1 - 0.4 - 0.1 - 0.4 
λPA ox 04 + 0.3 + 1.2 + 0.3 + 1.2 
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Table 5.12: Bank parameter values  
Variable Symbol Value Units Remarks 
Exogenous part of loan 
mark-up over deposit rate 
rL BAR b 0.05 Interest 
rate 
Chosen to ensure the rate of interest on loans is consistent with current levels 
(Bank of England, 2015, 2016). 
rL BAR g 0.05 
Bank deposit rate rM BAR 0.003 
Interest 
rate 
Consistent with current UK levels (Bank of England, 2015, 2016). 
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Chapter 6: Transition simulations and results 
This chapter introduces and presents the results of the transition simulations.77  
As discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5), the stranded assets literature makes a number of claims 
regarding both the probable causes of stranded assets and their potential macroeconomic and 
financial effects. The aim of this chapter is to investigate the claims that relate to a transition to a 
low carbon economy, in order to answer research questions (i) to (iii), and (x) and (xi) (see Chapter 2, 
Section 2.6). These research questions are reproduced here for convenience: 
(i)  Does the extent to which a transition to a low carbon economy is anticipated by fossil fuel 
firms affect the level of capital asset stranding that takes place?  
(ii)  Does the speed of a transition to a low carbon economy affect the level of capital asset 
stranding that takes place? 
(iii)  What are the economic and financial effects of different types of transitions to a low carbon 
economy and the stranding of capital assets these transitions bring about? 
(x)  To what extent are the answers to research questions (i) to (ix) sensitive to assumptions 
about the degree of substitutability between different sources of energy?  
(xi)  To what extent are the answers to research questions (i) to (ix) sensitive to assumptions 
about the responsiveness of agents to the returns on financial assets? 
To this end, this chapter presents the results of a series of transition simulations that look at 
different types of transitions to a low-carbon economy. 
Two types of transition simulation are carried out: slow versus fast transitions, and expected versus 
unexpected transitions. Varying the speed of the transition is intended to test whether the speed of 
a transition to a low-carbon economy is an important determinant of: i) the quantity of stranding, as 
argued by IEA (2016) and IEA/IRENA (2017) (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.4); and ii) the effects of asset 
stranding, as is argued by Carney (2015), CTI (2013, 2015), Weyzig et al. (2014), Battiston et al. 
(2016), and Gros et al. (2016) (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4).  
Varying the degree to which firms are able to foresee the transition (the expected versus the 
unexpected transitions) is intended to test whether firms (particularly fossil fuel firms) will be able to 
avoid stranding their assets if they adapt their investment expenditures in line with the transition’s 
                                                          
77 Appendix 1 presents a number of charts for the key stock and flow variables from each transition simulation. 
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demand trajectory. The alternative is for firms to continue to invest as though it is ‘business as 
usual’. The argument that firms will be able to reduce the risk of their capital and reserve assets 
being stranded if they invest appropriately (i.e. for a 1.5 - 2°C world) is made by CTI (2014a, 2014b), 
Grant et al. (2017), Leaton and Grant (2017) and Grant (2018). See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2 for a 
summary of these arguments. 
Similarly, Weyzig et al. (2014) state that the level of uncertainty surrounding a transition is likely to 
be a key determinant of the losses felt by large European investors, while IEA (2016) and IEA/IRENA 
(2017) point out that ‘disjointed’ transitions are likely to lead to more stranding than those in which 
the transition is anticipated in advance. See Chapter 2 Section 2.2.3 for a summary of these 
arguments. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.1 defines the term ‘simulation period’ and 
‘transition period’. Section 6.2 introduces the different transition simulations. Section 6.3 presents 
the results of the transition simulations. Section 6.4 concludes. 
6.1 The ‘simulation period’ and the ‘transition period’ 
Before describing the simulations, we first need to describe two terms that will be used throughout 
this section: the ‘simulation period’ and the ‘transition period’.  
The ‘simulation period’ refers to the period the simulation results are presented for (i.e. from 2016 
to 2066). Thus regardless of the simulation under discussion, the ‘simulation period’ will always refer 
to the 50-year period from 2016 to 2066.  
The ‘transition period’ refers to the period of time it takes for the economy to transition to a low-
carbon economy. As such, this term will only be used with reference to the transition simulations 
(not the market conditions simulations in Chapter 7). Because the exogenous changes that drive the 
transition simulations start in 2020, every transition period also starts in 2020. However, in each of 
the four transition simulations, the length of time it takes to complete a transition differs. As such, 
the transition period is also different for each transition simulation. Even within a given transition 
simulation, a transition period may vary depending on the parameter regime in place. Therefore, 
each transition period is unique to each parameter regime and each transition simulation.  
In some cases, the transition period may not be clearly defined. For example, in the fast transition 
simulations (see below), the output of the green and brown sectors changes relatively quickly 
between 2020 and 2040, and then more slowly between 2041 and 2066. When this happens, we will 
usually define the transition period as the period in which the demand for each sector’s goods is 
changing relatively quickly. Thus, in the example below, we define the transition period as 2020 - 
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2040. In any case, to avoid unnecessary confusion, the transition period will be specified when it is 
first discussed. 
6.2 Transition simulations descriptions 
‘Transition simulations’ force the economy to transition to a low-carbon economy. These simulations 
explore how different transitions to a low carbon economy might lead to different economic 
outcomes, and what these outcomes might mean for the stranding of brown capital assets. Each 
simulation involves numerically simulating the model from Chapter 4 using the EViews computer 
program. Parameter values are taken from Chapter 5. 
In each transition simulation, the demand for green energy is steadily increased from around 20% to 
around 80% of total energy demand, while the demand for brown energy is steadily decreased from 
around 80% to around 20% of total energy demand. These changes happen over either a 10-year 
period (the fast transitions) or a 30-year period (the slow transitions). The changes are induced by 
changing the values of the exogenous parameters in the input-output equations and almost ideal 
demand system equations that determine the proportion of spending by firms and households on 
each type of energy good.  
Two justifications can be put forward for these changes. First, and most straightforwardly, one could 
simply assume that households and firms adjust their preferences in favour of green energy. This 
could be due to a change in their perception of the risks associated with climate change. Second, the 
change could be conceived as being a result of a government action (such as a change in the law) 
which forces households and firms to alter their consumption of green and brown energy. 
Regardless, the cause of the change in demand is not overly important – the point of these 
simulations is to see what the effects of a transition to a low carbon economy are.  
Four different transitions are simulated. The differences between each transition simulation relates 
to either the speed of the transition, or how brown firms form their expectations. These differences 
are summarised in Table 6.1. Starting with the columns, we can see that the parameter changes that 
force the transition can either take 10 years (the fast transition simulations) or 30 years (the slow 
transition simulations). Hence, the parameter changes are carried out between either 2020 and 
2030, or 2020 and 2050. Varying the speed at which the parameters change is intended to test 
whether the speed of the transition to a low-carbon economy influences the level of asset stranding 
(as argued by IEA [2016] and IEA/IRENA [2017]) or the effects of asset stranding (as argued by 
Carney [2015], CTI [2013, 2015], Weyzig et al. [2014], Battiston et al. [2016] and Gros et al. [2016]). 
(See Chapter 2, Section 2.2 and 2.4).  
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The row options relate to the way in which brown firms form their expectations about the transition 
to a low-carbon economy. In the top row (the baseline transition simulations), firms form their 
expectations ‘normally’. Essentially, this means that firms’ investment expenditures are determined 
endogenously through the equations specified in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.1.4). That section describes 
how each firms sector’s target capital stock is a function of their expected sales in the next period 
and their target capital-output ratio. Therefore, in this simulation, brown firms are unable to 
anticipate the full extent of the transition and adjust their capital targets and investment 
expenditures accordingly. That is, they invest as though it is ‘business as usual’. 
In the bottom row (the ‘alternate transition simulations’), brown firms’ expectations are 
exogenously adjusted so that they significantly reduce their investment expenditures. The 
underlying assumption here is that, unlike in the other transition simulations, brown firms can 
approximately estimate (at the point at which the transition starts) the demand for their output at 
the end of the transition period. As a result, they greatly reduce their capital investment. The lower 
Table 6.1: Transition simulations 
   Speed of parameter changes: 
   Fast (10 years) Slow (30 years) 
     
Expectation 
formation of 
brown firms: 
Normal 
expectations 
(Baseline) 
 
Baseline fast 
(Transition simulation 1) 
Normal investment 
10-year parameter change 
Baseline slow 
(Transition simulation 2) 
Normal investment 
30-year parameter change  
Exogenously 
altered 
expectations   
(Alternate) 
 
Alternate fast 
(Transition simulation 3) 
Lowered investment 
10-year parameter change 
Alternate slow 
(Transition simulation 4) 
Lowered investment 
30-year parameter change 
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level of investment lasts until the sector’s capacity utilisation rate moves close to its normal range 
(i.e. around 80%).78 When this happens brown firms begin investing again.  
The expectations simulations are intended to highlight the importance of firms investing 
‘appropriately’ – i.e. not investing more than is necessary, given the demand trajectory for their 
output during the transition. The importance of fossil fuel firms investing appropriately is 
emphasised in Chapter 2, Section 2.2. In that section it is pointed out that a large number of fossil 
fuel firms’ planned investment expenditures are in excess of what is required in a 2°C world (e.g. 
see: CTI [2014a, 2014b], Grant et al. [2017], Leaton and Grant [2017], Grant [2018]). Additionally, 
Chapter 2 Section 2.4.3 states that the level of uncertainty surrounding a transition is likely to be a 
key determinant of the losses felt by large European investors (Weyzig et al., 2014). Likewise, 
‘disjointed’ transitions are likely to lead to more stranding than those in which the transition is 
anticipated (IEA [2016], IEA/IRENA [2017]). 
6.3 Transition simulation results 
In this section, the results of the various transition simulations are presented and discussed.  
As outlined in Chapter 5, each simulation is carried out under four parameter regimes. To recap 
briefly, these regimes vary the values taken by two sets of parameters – how sensitive households 
and firms are to the price of green and brown energy goods, and how sensitive households are to 
the relative rate of return on financial assets. The symbol (GH) represents the ‘high sensitivity to 
goods’ prices regimes’, while (GL) represented the ‘low sensitivity to goods’ prices regimes’. Similarly 
the symbol (AH) represents the ‘high sensitivity to asset returns regimes’, while (AL) represented the 
‘low sensitivity to asset returns regimes’. These parameter regimes appear as different coloured 
lines in each chart, as per Figure 6.1: 
Figure 6.1: Parameter regimes  
 
                                                          
78 It is important to note that the normal range of capacity utilisation refers to the normal range in this model, 
and not the capacity utilisation rates observed in real life. 
981002
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026Parameter regime 1: (Gᴴ Aᴸ) High sensitivity to goods’ prices, low sensitivity to asset returns.
Parameter regime 2: (Gᴴ Aᴴ) High sensitivity to goods’ prices, high sensitivity to asset returns.
Parameter regime 3: (Gᴸ Aᴸ) Low sensitivity to goods’ prices, low sensitivity to asset returns.
Parameter regime 4: (Gᴸ Aᴴ) Low sensitivity to goods’ prices, high sensitivity to asset returns.
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The rest of this section is organised as follows. Section 6.3.1 discusses the results of the baseline fast 
transition. Section 6.3.2 discusses the results of the baseline slow transition. Section 6.3.3 discusses 
the results of the alternate fast transition. Finally, Section 6.3.4 discusses the results of the alternate 
slow transition. The results of these simulations are also available in Appendix 1. 
6.3.1 Transition simulation 1 (T1): Baseline fast transition (normal expectations) 
We now present the results of the baseline fast transition simulation. The simulation has two key 
features. First, the parameter changes that alter the demand for green and brown goods take 10 
years to reach their final values. Second, the brown firm sector’s investment expenditures are not 
exogenously adjusted – instead the sector invests as though it is ‘business as usual’, targeting a level 
of capital that is dependent on expected sales and its target capital-output ratio. The underlying 
assumption is, therefore, that the brown sector is unable to fully anticipate the transition and adjust 
its investment expenditures accordingly.  
In this transition simulation, firms and households increase their consumption of green goods and 
decrease their consumption of brown goods. As discussed previously, two justifications can be put 
forward for these changes. First, we can assume that households and firms adjust their preferences 
in favour of green energy. Second, the change can be conceived as being a result of a government 
action that forces households and firms to alter their consumption of green and brown energy. In 
the context of these transition simulations, what causes the change in preferences is not important – 
the aim is to force a transition in order to better understand its effects. 
This transition simulation proceeds by forcing firms and households to increase their consumption of 
green goods and decrease their consumption of brown goods. This involves altering the exogenous 
parameters in the AIDS and IO equations that deal with energy consumption (equations 62, 63, 118 
and 119 in Chapter 4). Between 2020 and 2029, the exogenous parameters that determine green 
energy demand (λA gg , λA gb , λA go , λAIDS g e , λAIDS g n) are increased by 0.065 a year, while the exogenous 
parameters that determine brown energy demand (λA bg , λA bb , λA bo , λAIDS b e , λAIDS b n) are decreased 
by 0.065 a year. These changes are summarised in Figure 6.2. 
What are the effects of these changes on our model economy? Unsurprisingly, changing the 
exogenous parameters that influence household and firm demand for brown and green energy 
goods leads to a large decrease in the output of the brown sector (Figure 6.3) and a large increase in 
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Figure 6.2: Change in exogenous parameters in AIDS and IO equations 
 
the output of the green sector (Figure 6.4).79 By the end of the simulation period, the demand for 
brown goods has fallen from approximately 80% to 20% of total energy output, while the demand 
for green goods has increased from approximately 20% to 80% of total energy output.  
Interestingly, while the parameter changes that drive the transition reach their final values within 10 
years, the transition period lasts for around 16 years (that is, the transition period runs from 2020 - 
2036). The lag between the change in demand and the change in output is a result of two factors. 
First, each sector’s output is limited by its capital, so that changes in demand may not be translated 
into changes in output straight away. Second, investment proceeds according to a partial adjustment 
accelerator function, with firms only making up 10% of the difference between their target level of 
capital and their actual capital level in each period. These two factors combine to limit the speed at 
which the transition can take place. They also explain why the green sector’s output increases in the 
year 2020, then plateaus, and then rises again, and why the brown sector’s output falls and then 
levels off before falling again. This is because green firms reach their capacity limit immediately after 
the start of the transition, and because it then takes them some time to build up their capital so that 
they can increase their output.  
 
 
                                                          
79 Here and elsewhere, BF stands for ‘brown firms’, GF stands for ‘green firms’, and OF stands for ‘other firms’. 
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The green firm sector actually remains at its capacity limit between the years 2021 and 2037. As 
such, during this period the ex-ante demand for green goods exceeds the amount the green sector is 
able to sell while the ex-ante demand for brown sector goods is below the amount it ends up selling. 
This is because green firms are unable to fulfil the demand for their output and, therefore, 
households and firms are forced to buy from brown firms instead.  
Before moving on to the next set of charts, it is worth pointing out that after the year 2040 the (GH) 
regimes have slightly higher levels of brown sector output than do the (GL) regimes (although these 
output differences decrease towards the end of the simulation period). The reason for the 
temporary discrepancy relates to the proportion of spending firms and households allocate to brown 
and green goods under each regime (Figure 6.5). These differences in spending come about due to a 
fall in brown prices (Figure 6.7) relative to green prices (Figure 6.8). These price changes happen in 
all the parameter regimes, however, households and firms react more strongly to these price 
changes in the (GH) regimes. 
Why do brown prices fall? Essentially, the rapid fall in the demand for brown sector output leads 
brown employment to fall at a faster rate than brown capital, as the supply of labour adjusts 
instantly to the demand for labour, whereas capital can only fall as fast as it depreciates. This leads 
to a decrease in the sector’s capacity utilisation (Figure 6.6) and an increase in its capital-labour 
ratio. The increase in the capital-labour ratio leads to an increase in the sector’s productivity. Higher 
productivity means the brown sector can employ less people, which lowers unit costs and therefore 
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
1: Gᴴ Aᴸ 2: Gᴴ Aᴴ 3: Gᴸ Aᴸ 4: Gᴸ Aᴴ
Figure 6.3 (T1): Real total output (BF) 
 
Figure 6.4 (T1): Real total output (GF) 
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Figure 6.7 (T1): Price of output (BF) 
 
Figure 6.8 (T1): Price of output (GF) 
 
 
prices. This leads to higher demand (Figure 6.7). In the (GH) regimes, lower brown prices lead to a 
temporary increase in the demand for brown energy goods, which delays the transition to a low-
carbon economy when compared to the (GL) regimes.80 Interestingly, the increase in productivity is 
larger in the (GL) regimes, and as a result brown prices fall by more in these regimes. However, 
because households and firms are less sensitive to prices, there is a smaller increase in the demand 
for brown goods. 
                                                          
80 This result depends upon a sector’s level of capital falling at a slower rate than its level of employment. If 
instead employment falls at a slower rate than capital, then productivity would decrease (assuming that 
productivity depends upon some function of the capital to labour ratio), and this would lead to an increase in 
prices and an even bigger fall in brown sector output (and potentially therefore brown sector stranding).  
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Figure 6.5 (T1): Brown spending proportion  
 
Figure 6.6 (T1): Capacity utilisation (%) (BF)             
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As the previous section made clear, the transition to a low-carbon economy implies an increase in 
the demand for green goods and a decrease in the demand for brown goods. As each firm sector’s 
output is limited by its capital, the transition to a low-carbon economy requires that green energy 
firms increase their investment, while brown firms decrease their investment.  
Starting with brown firms, we can see that during the transition the decrease in the demand for 
brown goods causes a large decrease in brown investment expenditures (Figure 6.9). Initially 
investment declines by around 20%, before increasing slightly between the years 2022 and 2024. 
This temporary increase comes about as green firms are unable to meet the demand for their goods 
(as their output is limited by their capital). This forces households and firms to substitute brown 
goods for the green goods they initially demanded, which causes the demand for brown goods (and 
accordingly, brown investment) to increase for a short period.  
The increase in the demand for green goods from the beginning of the simulation period leads to a 
large increase in green investment (Figure 6.10) and green capital (Figure 6.12). The increase in 
green capacity allows more green goods to be sold, and, as a result, after 2024 the demand for 
brown goods starts to fall again, leading to further reductions in brown investment and brown 
capital (Figure 6.11). Brown investment continues to decline until around 2032, at which point the 
ex-post demand for brown goods falls to such a low level (due to increases in green capacity) that 
the targeted decrease in the level of brown capital is greater than the amount of brown capital 
depreciation that will occur in that period. At this point, brown investment to falls to zero, where it 
remains until 2048 - 2056 (depending on the parameter regime). After this point, the amount of 
capital starts to approach its target level, and this causes investment to pick up slightly.  Meanwhile,  
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Figure 6.9 (T1): Real investment (BF) 
 
Figure 6.10 (T1): Real investment (GF) 
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green investment increases rapidly until its peak in 2031, before falling back somewhat once the gap 
between the target and actual levels of green capital starts to close. 
The changes in investment and capital depend in part on the parameter regime. As explained 
previously, the demand for brown output is larger in the (GH) regimes than it is in the (GL) regimes. 
This leads to higher levels of brown investment and brown capital in the (GH) regimes, and lower 
levels of green investment and green capital.  
The transition to a low-carbon economy causes brown sector assets to become stranded (Figure 6.13 
and 6.14). As explained in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.4), in these simulations the quantity of stranded 
assets in a firm sector is defined as the difference between the sector’s actual level of capital and its 
target level of capital in that period. The percentage of stranded assets for a sector is simply a 
sector’s quantity of stranded assets divided by its capital in the previous period. 
Figure 6.13 shows the actual quantity of stranded assets, while Figure 6.14 show the quantity of 
stranded assets in percentage terms. Stranding peaks around 2036, at 60 - 70% of brown capital 
assets. Interestingly, while this period does coincide with relatively low values of some brown sector 
variables (e.g. the sector’s return on equity, market capitalisation and real sales), it does not exactly 
coincide with any of the lowest values of these variables. The only exception to this is brown sector 
investment, which is closely linked to the definition of stranded assets.  
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Figure 6.11 (T1): Real capital (BF) 
 
Figure 6.12 (T1): Real capital (GF) 
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Turning once more to the differences between the parameter regimes, it is interesting to note that 
significantly more assets are stranded in the (GL) regimes than in the (GH) regimes (Figures 13 and 
14). As before, this is related to demand for brown goods being lower in the (GL) regimes around the 
end of the transition period.  
The transition to a low-carbon economy has a significant effect on financial markets. By the end of 
the transition period, the market value of the brown firm sector has fallen by between 70 - 90% of 
its initial value (Figure 6.15). By the end of the simulation period, the market value is around 70% 
lower than its initial value. Over the same period, the increase in the demand for green goods causes 
the green sector’s market value to increase by around 350% (Figure 6.16).  
Interestingly, there is a slight pickup in the market valuation of green firms at the beginning of the 
transition, followed by a levelling off, and then a steady increase over the rest of the transition 
period. This feature is related to a change in the green firm sector’s return on equity, which is itself 
caused by a change in the sector’s distributed profits and investment expenditures. At the beginning 
of the transition period, the green sector’s distributed profits increase sharply due to an increase in 
sales. This increase in demand leads to an increase in the sector’s target capital level and investment 
expenditures. At this point, green firms start to reduce the amount of profits they distribute to their 
shareholders in favour of retaining them to finance their investment expenditures. This lowers the 
return on green equities, and households respond to this by buying fewer green equities, pushing 
down their market value. Eventually, the green sector’s market value starts to increase again, as 
households increase the proportion of their wealth that they allocate to green equities. This happens  
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Figure 6.13 (T1): Asset stranding (BF)     
 
Figure 6.14 (T1): Asset stranding (%) (BF) 
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for two reasons. First, the return on green equity increases, while the return on brown equity falls. 
Second, the quantity of green capital starts increasing, while the quantity of brown capital starts 
decreasing. (As explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.5, one of the factors that determines the 
demand for a sector’s equities is the target amount of capital of that sector).  
Turning to the differences between the regimes, we can see that in the (GL) regimes brown firms 
suffer from larger falls in their market capitalisation (Figure 6.15) than in the (GH) regimes. This can 
be explained with reference to the different levels of demand for each sector’s goods in each 
parameter regime: in the (GL) regimes the demand for brown goods falls by more than it does in the 
(GH) regimes, and this affects each firm sector’s profitability and, therefore, its market value. In the 
(AL) regimes the green sector’s market capitalisation increases faster than it does in the (AH) regimes. 
This is because in these regimes, household behaviour is being driven more by the target level of 
capital in each sector, rather than the relative rate of return on assets, and because green firms have 
a lower return on equity during the transition period because they are using their profits to invest 
rather than to distribute to shareholders. 
The reduction in the market capitalisation of brown firms is partly driven by the reduction in the 
return on brown firm equity (Figure 6.17), which is itself a result of the reduction in the distributed 
profits of the brown sector (Figure 6.18). The brown sector’s return on equity reaches its lowest 
point towards the end of the transition period (around 2036) before largely recovering by the end of 
the simulation period. This recovery, which coincides with a slight upturn in the level of distributed 
profits, comes about as the sector repays its bank loans. This reduces the sector’s interest payments 
and so increases the income available to distribute to shareholders.  
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Figure 6.15 (T1): Market capitalisation (BF) 
 
Figure 6.16 (T1): Market capitalisation (GF) 
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It is interesting to note that the brown firm sector’s distributed profits get very close to zero towards 
the end of the transition period. In Godin et al. (2017), a sector’s profits falling below zero forces the 
sector to default and permanently cease production. However, were a sector’s profits to fall below 
zero in this model, default might not be the correct interpretation. This is because in this model a 
reduction in profits (below zero) is likely to be caused by a firm sector repaying its bank debt. 
However, these debts are more akin to overdrafts or lines of credit, rather than bank loans with 
fixed repayment dates (with the structure of the equations relating to debt repayments ensuring 
that firms will repay these overdrafts whenever their level of capital falls). This means that profits 
could fall below zero due to the firm sector repaying an overdraft that it might not need to repay 
right then. On the other hand, if we assume that banks reduce overdrafts/credit limits in line with a 
firm sector’s sales, then negative profits and default (as defined by Godin et al. [2017]) is a 
possibility, at least towards the end of the transition period. Interestingly, at the point at which the 
brown sector’s profits are lowest, brown loans account for approximately 5.9% of total bank assets. 
Although in this model banks hold no capital (and firms are unable to default), the loss of almost 6% 
of bank assets could, in a model with bank capital and firm default, lead to the banking sector 
becoming insolvent (with potential knock on effects on financial instability, lending and so GDP). 
However, the banking sector’s balance sheet is not empirically calibrated (in particular, there are no 
loans to households), and consequently, the actual exposure of a country’s banking sector to the 
fossil fuel sector may be smaller than what is simulated here. On the other hand, the model only 
includes a very simple banking sector, and so potentially underestimates effects that might occur 
due to indirect exposures, links between financial institutions, indirect asset holdings and second-
round effects (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.4, and Battiston et al. [2016]).  
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Figure 6.17 (T1): Return on equity (BF) 
 
Figure 6.18 (T1): Distributed profits (BF) 
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Two things stand out. First, the transition leads to a significant and permanent increase in real final 
demand (Figure 6.19) and real total output (Figure 6.20). Second, the transition is inflationary and 
leads to a permanently higher price level (Figure 6.21). The increase in final demand comes about for 
three reasons. The first of these relates to the level of investment by green and brown firms during 
the transition period. As we have seen, during the transition, investment increases in the green 
sector and falls in the brown sector. However, these changes in investment are not symmetric: the 
increase in green investment more than offsets the decrease in brown investment. This is because 
green investment is responding to the ex-ante demand for green goods (which is higher than the ex-
post level of demand for green goods), while brown investment is responding to the actual demand 
for brown goods (which is higher than the ex-ante level of demand for brown goods). The reason for 
Figure 6.19 (T1): Real final demand 
 
Figure 6.20 (T1): Real total output 
 
Figure 6.21 (T1): General price level  
 
  
The risk of an individual bank becoming 
insolvent is, of course, more likely the more 
brown assets it holds as a proportion of its total 
assets. One reason a bank might end up holding 
a disproportionately large number of brown 
loans (relative to its size) is due to a successful 
divestment campaign that causes other banks 
and investors to stop lending to the brown 
sector. (Divestment campaigns are discussed in 
Chapter 2, Section 2.3.4).  
We now turn our attention to the broader 
macroeconomic outcomes of the transition. 
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this is that each firm sector’s target level of capital is a function of whichever is higher out of actual 
sales and ex-ante sales demand. Hence, during the transition period, green investment increases 
faster than brown investment falls (i.e. the effect of the transition on green and brown investment 
expenditures are non-symmetric), and this leads to a temporary increase in final demand.  
The second reason for the increase in final demand relates to the zero lower bound on firm 
investment, and the (additional) effect this has on the non-symmetry of overall energy firm 
investment expenditures. During the transition, green investment increases and brown investment 
falls. However, while green investment can theoretically rise without limit, brown investment cannot 
fall below zero. This zero lower bound on investment means that brown investment is higher during 
the period 2032 - 2048/56 (i.e. when there is no brown investment) than it would be if brown 
investment could fall below zero. Consequently, final demand is higher than it would otherwise be.  
The third reason for the increase in final demand – and the main reason that final demand is 
permanently increased – is that the model is calibrated so that green firms require more energy 
goods to produce a unit of their output than do brown firms (i.e. the green sector’s energy return on 
energy invested – or EROEI – is lower than the brown sector’s). Thus, in this model, a low-carbon 
energy regime requires more intermediate goods than does a high-carbon energy regime. The 
increase in intermediate consumption means that total output increases by more than real final 
demand (compare Figure 6.19 and 6.20). The increase in intermediate goods production necessitates 
a larger quantity of capital (and so investment), as well as a higher level of employment. The 
additional employment leads to an increase in consumption (and, thus, further increases in 
investment), both of which lead to further increases in final demand.   
The higher quantity of intermediate inputs required for the production of green energy is also the 
source of the increase in prices across the simulation period (because prices are set as a markup on 
unit costs, which include intermediate inputs). However, unlike in some of the other simulations 
(e.g. those that look at carbon taxes), here higher prices do not lead to a reduction in final demand. 
This is because the increase in economic activity that comes about during the transition more than 
offsets the negative effect on economic activity that comes about due to higher prices.  
Figure 6.19 and 6.20 show that final demand and total output are higher in each of the (AL) regimes 
(compared to the equivalent (AH) regimes). The reason for this difference relates to the change in 
the demand for brown and green goods, and the effect this has on green investment, green and 
brown profits, the return on equity of each firm sector, household portfolio allocation decisions and 
consequently, overall household wealth and consumption expenditures. Essentially, what happens is 
that as the transition proceeds, brown firms’ profits fall, and this leads to a reduction in the return 
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on brown equities and, therefore, in the market capitalisation of the brown sector. Although the 
green sector’s market capitalisation increases during this period, it does not increase by enough to 
offset the fall in the brown sector’s market capitalisation. This is because green firms increase their 
investment during the transition period, and this depresses their distributed profits and, therefore, 
their return on equity. Consequently, the return on equity across all three firm sectors falls slightly. 
Households respond to this fall by placing more of their wealth into the now relatively higher 
yielding bank deposits. This causes capital losses on equity, a fall in household wealth, and 
consequently slightly less consumption spending and, by extension, final demand. Crucially, the shift 
into bank deposits is larger in the (AH) regimes – leading to a greater reduction in wealth and, 
accordingly, consumption and final demand.  
Before moving on, it is worth pointing out that the transition’s positive effect on final demand is in 
part conditional on firms being able to draw on a pool of unemployed labour (in the model, firms can 
always find someone willing to work at the going wage). If, instead, the model incorporated a more 
realistic labour market, in which output was limited by the availability of labour and the wage rate 
responded to the unemployment rate, then the transition could potentially lead to a reduction in 
real final demand and/or an increase in inflation. In addition, the transition’s positive effects on final 
demand are also conditional on the transition and asset stranding not having any disruptive effects 
on financial markets that cause a loss of confidence, a credit crunch or even a financial crisis. If, 
instead, the model was able to simulate these outcomes, the overall effect of a transition to a low 
carbon economy might not be so positive. These ideas will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. 
6.3.2 Transition simulation 2 (T2): Baseline slow transition (normal expectations) 
The following section presents the results of the baseline slow transition simulation. In this transition 
simulation, brown firms’ investment expenditures are not exogenously adjusted. As a result, they 
continue to invest as though it is ‘business as usual’, so that they target an amount of capital that is 
dependent on their expectations of sales in the next period and their target capital-output ratio. This 
means that at each stage in the transition process, brown firms are unable to perceive the extent to 
which the demand for their products will have fallen by the end of the transition.  
In order to save space and avoid unnecessary repetition, considerably less time will be spent 
discussing the results of this transition simulation where these results (and the reasons for them) are 
similar to those in the baseline fast transition. More space will, however, be devoted to the 
differences between the two regimes and the reasons for these differences. 
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Figure 6.22 shows the exogenous changes imposed on the model. The transition simulation 
proceeds by forcing firms and households to increase their consumption of green goods and 
decrease their consumption of brown goods. Between the years 2020 and 2050, the exogenous 
parameters that determine green energy demand (λA gg , λA gb  λA go , λAIDS g e , λAIDS g n) are increased by 
0.0216666 a year, while the exogenous parameters that determine brown energy demand (λA bg , λA 
bb , λA bo , λAIDS b e , λAIDS b n) are decreased by 0.0216666 a year. (These values ensure that the 
parameters change by the same amount as they do in the fast transition). 
Changing the exogenous parameters that influence household and firm demand for brown and 
green energy goods leads to a transition from a high-carbon to a low-carbon economy (Figure 6.23 
and 6.24). The transition is largely finished by around 2052, two years after the exogenous 
parameters reach their final values (i.e. the transition period runs from 2020 - 2052). As in the 
baseline fast transition, there are higher levels of green sector output and lower levels of brown 
sector output towards the end of the transition period in the (GL) regimes when compared to the 
(GH) regimes (due to differences in productivity between the regimes that leads to changes in unit 
costs and prices). These price changes (Figure 6.25 and 6.26) alter the demand for each sector’s 
goods, with the demand responses larger in the (GH) parameter regimes. 
A key difference between the fast and slow transition simulations is the length of the transition 
relative to the time it takes the parameters to change. For example, in the fast transition, the 
transition takes around 16 years (i.e. 60% longer than it takes the parameters to change), whereas in 
the slow transition the transition takes around 32 years (i.e. around 6.5% longer than the 
parameters take to change). As explained previously, the delay between the end of each set of 
Figure 6.22: Change in exogenous parameters in AIDS and IO equations 
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Figure 6.25 (T2): Price of output (BF) 
 
Figure 6.26 (T2): Price of output (GF) 
 
 
parameter changes and the end of each transition is due to the partial adjustment accelerator 
function, and the green sector being unable to foresee, at the beginning of the transition period, 
how much capital they will need at the end of the transition period. The reason the fast transition 
has a longer delay between the end of the change in the parameter values and the end of the 
transition is because these factors have a larger effect on a sector’s investment expenditures (and, 
thus, the speed of the transition) the faster a sector tries to change its level of capital. 
The transition from a high to a low-carbon economy requires an increase in green capital (Figure 
6.30) and, therefore, an increase in green investment (Figure 6.28). Meanwhile, the reduction in the 
demand for brown output leads to a reduction in brown investment (Figure 6.27) and brown capital 
(Figure 6.29). The small levelling off in brown investment that occurs around 2024-25 is a result of 
green firms reaching their capacity limit (this also happened in the baseline fast transition). 
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Figure 6.23 (T2): Real total output (BF) 
 
Figure 6.24 (T2): Real total output (GF) 
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One difference between the baseline fast and slow transitions is that, in the fast transition, green 
investment peaks at a higher level than it does in the slow transition. The reason for this relates to 
the speed of the change in the demand for the green sector’s output – in the fast transition, the 
demand for green goods increases at a faster rate than it does in the slow transition, and this 
increase in demand translates into a higher target level of green capital and, consequently, a higher 
level of green investment (see equation 25). Ultimately, this higher level of green investment is one 
reason that final demand is higher during the transition period in the fast transition. 
The change in the demand for green and brown sector output leads to changes in the capacity 
utilisation of the brown sector and to some of the brown sector’s capital assets being stranded. 
Figure 6.31 shows the capacity utilisation of the brown sector, while Figure 6.32 shows the overall 
percentage of brown capital that is stranded in each year. The charts show that stranding peaks in 
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
1: Gᴴ Aᴸ 2: Gᴴ Aᴴ 3: Gᴸ Aᴸ 4: Gᴸ Aᴴ
Figure 6.27 (T2): Real investment (BF) 
 
Figure 6.28 (T2): Real investment (GF) 
 
Figure 6.29 (T2): Real capital (BF) 
 
Figure 6.30 (T2): Real capital (GF) 
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2052, with around 50 - 63% of brown firm capital assets stranded (depending on the parameter 
regime). The point of peak stranding occurs around the end of the transition period, at the point at 
which the ratio of real brown capital to the real demand for brown output is at its highest.  
If we compare the results of the fast and slow transitions, we can see that the stranding of brown 
capital assets is around 10 percentage points lower in the slow transition. Further, brown sector 
capacity utilisation is higher in the slow transition than it is in the fast transition. The reasons for 
these differences are related to the speed at which the demand for goods (and so the target level of 
capital) can change relative to the actual level of capital. While the demand for goods (and so the 
target level of capital) can change very quickly, the speed at which the actual level of capital can 
change is limited by both the partial adjustment mechanism and (on the downside) by how fast 
capital can depreciate (i.e. the depreciation rate). In the fast transition, the demand for brown 
goods, and so the target level of brown capital, falls more quickly relative to the actual reduction in 
the quantity of capital, and this leads to higher levels of stranding.  
As in the fast transition, in the slow transition more assets are stranded in the (GL) regimes than in 
the (GH) regimes. This is again due to lower demand for brown goods in the (GL) parameter regimes. 
Another similarity between the baseline fast and slow transitions is that stranding temporarily stops 
increasing around 2023 to 2026. As before, this is related to the green sector reaching its capacity 
limit, which leads to the demand for brown sector output temporarily levelling off.  
The transition significantly affects the market value of green and brown firms. As was the case in the 
fast transition, the market value of brown firms falls (Figure 6.33) while the market value of green 
firms increases (Figure 6.34). The change in the market capitalisation of brown (Figure 6.33) and 
green (Figure 6.34) firms is partly driven by the fall in brown firms’ return on equity (Figure 6.35), 
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Figure 6.31 (T2): Utilisation (%) (BF) 
 
Figure 6.32 (T2): Asset stranding (%) (BF) 
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Figure 6.35 (T2): Return on equity (BF) 
 
Figure 6.36 (T2): Distributed profits (BF) 
 
 
which is caused by a fall in brown firms’ distributed profits (Figure 6.36). Notice the fall in the return 
on equity is larger in the fast transition. This is because in the fast transition brown firms’ incomes 
fall faster relative to their liabilities (i.e. their bank debt), which then leads to a lower level of 
distributed profits until these firms are able to reduce their debt to income ratios. The larger fall in 
the brown sector’s return on equity translates into a larger fall in brown firms’ market capitalisation 
(in the faster transition). In addition, the market capitalisation of brown firms falls more quickly in 
the (AH) regimes, as households respond more aggressively to changes in asset returns. 
We now turn to the two major macroeconomic effects of the slow transition: a significant and 
permanent increase in real final demand (Figure 6.37) and a permanent increase in the price level  
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Figure 6.33 (T2): Market capitalisation (BF) 
 
Figure 6.34 (T2): Market capitalisation (GF) 
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Figure 6.37 (T2): Real final demand 
 
Figure 6.38 (T2): General price level 
 
 
(Figure 6.38). Both effects also occurred in the fast transition. The increase in final demand is a result 
of two factors. First, green investment increases by more than brown investment falls. Second, the 
green energy sector requires more intermediate inputs than the brown sector to produce the same 
amount of energy (which leads to an increase in employment, investment, incomes and spending). 
Both of these factors are also important in the fast transition. The increase in the price level is a 
result of the green sector requiring more intermediate goods than the brown sector to produce a 
unit of energy (which leads to an increase in energy prices and, accordingly, unit costs). 
There is, however, an important difference between the baseline fast and slow transitions: in the 
fast transition the peak level of final demand is slightly higher than it is in the slow transition 
(although the final stationary state values are very similar). As we have already seen, in both of the 
baseline transition simulations, final demand increases due to the non-symmetric nature of firm 
investment, as well as because of the increase in the consumption of intermediate goods by the 
energy sector (and the effect this has on investment and employment). While the overall change in 
the consumption of intermediate goods is similar in both transitions, the same cannot be said about 
firm investment expenditures, which turn out to be less symmetric in the shorter transitions than 
they are in the longer ones. There are two reasons for this. First, in the shorter transitions, green 
investment peaks at a much higher level than it does in the longer transitions (as discussed 
previously). Second, in the fast transition, the zero lower bound on firm investment binds for 
considerably longer than it does in the slow transition.  
Turning to the differences between the parameter regimes, there is a slight divergence in total 
output towards the end of the transition period, as brown investment starts to increase. However, 
99
100
101
102
103
2
0
1
6
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
4
2
0
2
8
2
0
3
2
2
0
3
6
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
4
2
0
4
8
2
0
5
2
2
0
5
6
2
0
6
0
2
0
6
4
99
100
101
102
103
2
0
1
6
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
4
2
0
2
8
2
0
3
2
2
0
3
6
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
4
2
0
4
8
2
0
5
2
2
0
5
6
2
0
6
0
2
0
6
4
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
1: Gᴴ Aᴸ 2: Gᴴ Aᴴ 3: Gᴸ Aᴸ 4: Gᴸ Aᴴ
201 
 
unlike in the baseline fast transition (T1), here the differences in output are very small, with the 
maximum difference at the end of the simulation period only around 0.5 percentage points. 
6.3.3 Transition simulation 3 (T3): Alternate fast transition (altered expectations)  
This section discusses the results of the alternate fast transition. In this fast transition, the brown 
firm sector’s investment expenditures are exogenously reduced – the idea being that brown firms 
are able to foresee the reduction in the demand for their goods and so reduce their investment 
expenditures (to try to prevent their capital assets from being  stranded). To avoid unnecessary 
repetition, only a brief summary of the key features of the transition will be given here (as they are 
quite similar to those obtained for the baseline fast transition simulation). However, the differences 
between the two transitions will be discussed in some detail.  
The parameter changes that drive the transition are as follows. First, over a 10-year period the 
exogenous parameters that determine green energy demand (λA gg , λA gb , λA go , λAIDS g e , λAIDS g n) are 
increased by 0.065 a year, while the exogenous parameters that determine brown energy demand 
(λA bg , λA bb , λA bo , λAIDS b e , λAIDS b n) are decreased by 0.065 a year. These changes start in 2020 and 
continue until 2029, and are summarised in Figure 6.2. Second, brown investment expenditures are 
endogenously determined between the beginning of the simulation period and 2020, exogenously 
set to zero between 2020 and 2053, and then endogenously determined again from 2054 until the 
end of the simulation period (Figure 6.39). (In 2054, the capital of the brown sector would fall below 
its target level if it was still exogenously set to zero – this is why it is endogenously determined after 
this point). 
We will begin by briefly summarising the main similarities of the alternate fast transition with the 
baseline fast transition simulation. First, the transition takes around 16 years to complete (i.e. the 
transition period runs from 2020 to around 2040), with the reason for the delay (between the 
change in the parameter values and the actual time it takes to complete the transition) again related 
to the speed of green firm investment. Second, during the transition, the output of the brown sector 
suffers a steep drop, before levelling off and then falling again, while the green sector’s output is a 
mirror image of this – its output increases suddenly, before plateauing for a short period and then 
increasing again. This pause in the transition process is again related to the green sector reaching its 
capacity limit (only once the green sector’s capital stock increases is the transition able to continue).  
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Figure 6.39 (T3): Real investment (BF) 
 
Figure 6.40 (T3): Real final demand   
 
 
Third, the transition affects the market value of each firm sector – brown firms lose around 70 - 80% 
of their market value, while the market value of green firms increases by around 380 - 420%.  
We now turn to the question of how the results of the alternate fast transition differ from those 
obtained for the baseline fast transition. One of the main differences between the two transition 
simulations relates to firm investment expenditures. The exogenous change in brown investment 
expenditures in the alternate fast transition means that brown sector investment is considerably 
lower than it is in the baseline fast transition (at least up until around 2032, which is the point at 
which brown investment in the baseline fast transition reaches zero). The lower level of brown firm 
investment means that final demand is also lower than it is in the baseline transition – final demand 
actually falls below its initial stationary state value until 2036 - 2042 (in the baseline fast transition it 
increased) (Figure 6.40). The eventual increase in final demand is related to the increase in 
intermediate goods consumption in the energy sector, as well as the pickup in brown investment in 
2054. The kink in the final demand chart in 2054 can also be explained by the pickup in investment 
expenditures in this period (and the corresponding increases in employment, consumption and 
intermediate consumption spending). Real final demand eventually ends up reaching a new 
stationary state value around 2080 (i.e. after the end of the simulation period), with the exact date 
depending on the parameter regime. 
As was the case in the baseline fast transition, in the alternate fast transition, the reduction in brown 
investment leads to a reduction in the quantity of brown capital. However, the lower level of 
investment in this alternate fast transition means that the level of capital falls at a faster rate than it  
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Figure 6.41 (T3): Asset stranding (%) (BF)  
         
Figure 6.42 (T3): Utilisation (%) (BF) 
 
 
does in the baseline transition. The lower level of investment and capital leads to differences in 
stranded assets (Figure 6.41) and brown firms’ capacity utilisation (Figure 6.42). With regards to 
stranding, there are two main differences between the baseline and the alternate fast transition 
simulations. First, after a temporary increase in stranded assets (due to the capital target falling 
suddenly), the percentage of stranded assets falls back to zero, before then increasing again from 
around 2026 onwards. Second, the percentage of stranded assets is considerably lower, at around 
50 - 60% of total assets, rather than 70 - 80%. With regards to capacity utilisation, in this transition 
the brown sector’s capacity utilisation only falls to around 35 - 45%, whereas in the baseline fast 
transition it falls to around 25 - 35%. All of these differences can be attributed to the brown firm 
sector drastically cutting its investment expenditures. 
6.3.4 Transition simulation 4 (T4): Alternate slow transition (altered expectations)  
This section discusses the results of the alternate slow transition. In this transition simulation, the 
brown sector’s investment expenditures are exogenously altered. As was the case in the alternate 
fast simulation, the aim of this transition simulation is to see if brown firms can prevent their assets 
from becoming stranded by cutting their investment expenditures. Due to the many similarities 
between this transition simulation and the baseline slow transition, only a brief description of the 
transition is given here. However, considerably more time will be spent discussing the differences 
between the different transition simulations. 
The actual transition simulation changes are as follows. First, over a 30-year period, the exogenous 
parameters that determine green energy demand (λA gg , λA gb , λA go , λAIDS g e , λAIDS g n) are increased by 
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Figure 6.43 (T4): Real investment (BF) 
 
Figure 6.44 (T4): Real final demand 
 
 
0.0216666 a year, while the exogenous parameters that determine brown energy demand (λA bg , λA 
bb , λA bo , λAIDS b e , λAIDS b n) are decreased by 0.0216666 a year. These changes start in 2020 and 
continue until 2049 (Figure 6.22). Second, brown investment expenditures are endogenously 
determined between the beginning of the simulation period and 2020, exogenously set to zero 
between 2020 and 2056, and then endogenously determined again from 2057 until the end of the 
simulation period (Figure 6.43). 
The main similarities between the alternate slow transition and the baseline slow transition are as 
follows. First, the alternate slow transition takes around 32 years to complete (i.e. the transition 
period runs from 2020 to 2052), with the reason for the delay between the change in the parameter 
values and the actual time it takes to complete the transition relating to the speed of green firm 
investment. Second, the transition involves the output of the brown sector steadily decreasing 
towards its steady state value, while the green sector’s output does the opposite. Third, the 
transition significantly affects the market value of each firm sector – brown firms lose around 70% of 
their market value, whereas green firms see increases of around 380%.  
We now turn to the question of how the results of the alternate transition simulations differ from 
the baseline simulations. As Figure 6.43 shows, brown sector investment is considerably lower than 
it is in the baseline slow transition. The reduction in brown investment means that final demand 
actually falls between the years 2020 and 2035 (Figure 6.44), before starting to pick up from 2036 
onwards (due to the increase in intermediate goods consumption in the energy sector and the 
corresponding increases in investment, employment and consumption). Final demand eventually 
surpasses its initial level between 2052 and 2064.  
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These results contrast with those of the baseline slow transition. There, the higher level of brown 
investment meant that final demand actually increased over the whole of the simulation period. 
These results also contrast with the alternate fast transition, where final demand started to increase 
(after an initial fall) in around 2027. The reason final demand picks up quicker in the alternate fast 
transition is due to the higher level of investment from green firms, which is itself a result of the 
faster change in demand for green and brown goods (as explained in Section 6.3.2).  
The exogenous reduction in brown firms’ investment expenditures means the level of capital falls at 
a faster rate than it does in the baseline slow transition. A lower level of capital means that the level 
of capacity utilisation (Figure 6.45) and the quantity of stranded assets (Figure 6.46) differs from the 
alternate slow transition. Starting with Figure 6.45, we can see that the reduction in the brown 
sector’s capital pushes its capacity utilisation to around 93 - 97% in 2038 (after a temporary fall in 
2020). After this point, the sector’s capacity utilisation falls back towards its normal range. This 
contrasts with the baseline slow transition, in which the sector’s capacity utilisation steadily declined 
from 2020 until around 2052, before increasing back towards its normal level towards the end of the 
simulation period. It also contrasts with the alternate fast transition, where the capacity utilisation 
of the brown sector decreased after some initial fluctuations, before finally increasing again towards 
the end of the simulation period.  
The slow transition and large reduction in brown investment means that only a small quantity of 
brown capital is stranded at the beginning and the end of the simulation period (Figure 6.46). The 
sector actually experiences predominantly negative stranding between around 2024 and 2048. It is 
worth noting that the stranding at the end of the simulation period is both temporary and partly the 
result of the brown firm sector’s target level of capital fluctuating as the sector’s investment  
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Figure 6.45 (T4): Utilisation (%) (BF)  
 
Figure 6.46 (T4): Asset stranding (%) (BF) 
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Figure 6.47 (T4): Real capital and target capital (BF) 
 
expenditures return to being endogenously determined. This can be seen by looking at Figure 6.47, 
which compares the average amount of real brown capital (across the four parameter regimes) to 
the average target level of brown capital (across the four parameter regimes). As such, it is probably 
not worth reading too much into the increase in stranding during this period. These results therefore 
contrast with those obtained in the baseline slow transition and alternate fast transition (where a 
considerable quantity of brown assets are stranded).  
To sum up, this transition simulation shows that it is possible for brown firms to prevent most of 
their assets from being stranded, as long as they move early enough and are able to accurately 
predict the future demand for their output. However, as Figure 6.45 shows, the reduction in 
investment leads to a very high level of capacity utilisation in the brown sector. It is worth 
remembering that during the transition period the green sector is operating at its maximum 
capacity. As such, these simulations suggest that if brown firms take action to prevent their assets 
from being stranded, it may lead to energy shortages during the transition period. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the results of the transition simulations. Taken together, the results of these 
simulations illustrate that the overall quantity of stranded assets is likely to be influenced by both 
the speed of a transition to a low-carbon economy and the extent to which the transition is 
anticipated by fossil fuel firms. 
Transitions in which brown firms overestimated the demand for their future output were found to 
lead to greater levels of stranding, supporting the arguments made by CTI (2014a, 2014b), Weyzig et 
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al. (2014), IEA (2016), Grant et al. (2017), IEA/IRENA (2017), Leaton and Grant (2017), and Grant 
(2018) (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2). Similarly, transitions in which the demand for green and brown 
forms of energy changed at a faster pace were shown to lead to greater levels of stranding, as 
argued by IEA (2016) and IEA/IRENA (2017) (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3).  
The effects of stranding were shown to be contingent on the speed of the transition and the extent 
to which the transition was anticipated. For example, faster transitions were shown to have a 
significantly larger negative effect on the brown firm sector’s market capitalisation and return on 
equity, as were the transitions in which brown firm investment expenditures were not exogenously 
adjusted. The results in this section therefore give some support to the argument that more abrupt 
and unexpected transitions are likely to have larger negative effects on financial markets (as argued 
by Carney [2015], CTI [2013, 2015], Weyzig et al. [2014], Battiston et al. [2016], and Gros et al. 
[2016]) (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3). 
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Chapter 7: Market conditions simulations and results 
This chapter introduces and presents the results of the simulations that look at changes in market 
conditions.81  
As discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3), many of the capital assets in the fossil fuel sector have 
relatively long lifespans and payback periods, and this puts these assets at risk of stranding due to 
unexpected changes in market conditions. The aim of this chapter is to investigate the effects of 
different changes in market conditions, with a particular focus on asset stranding. This approach 
contrasts with the approach that was taken in the previous chapter, which looked at the effects of 
different types of transitions to a low carbon economy (again with a focus on asset stranding).  
More specifically, the aim of this chapter is to investigate the research questions related to changes 
in market conditions (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5). These research questions are reproduced here for 
convenience: 
(iv)  To what extent is the introduction of a carbon tax (i.e. a change in policy) likely to lead to 
the stranding of capital?  
(v)  To what extent is a change in agents’ preferences for purchasing securities from the fossil 
fuel sector (i.e. a change in financing conditions) likely to lead to the stranding of capital?  
(vi)  To what extent is a change in banks’ preferences regarding the interest rate they charge 
energy firms (i.e. a change in financing conditions) likely to lead to the stranding of capital?  
(vii)  To what extent is an increase in the energy return on energy invested (EROEI) (i.e. a change 
in energy innovation) in the renewables sector likely to lead the stranding of capital?  
(viii)  To what extent is a change in households’ preferences for purchasing goods from the fossil 
fuel sector (i.e. a change in social norms) likely to lead to the stranding of capital assets?  
(ix)  What are the economic and financial implications of these changes in market conditions 
and the stranding of capital assets these changes bring about? 
(x)  To what extent are the answers to research questions (i) to (ix) sensitive to assumptions 
about the degree of substitutability between different sources of energy?  
(xi)  To what extent are the answers to research questions (i) to (ix) sensitive to assumptions 
about the responsiveness of agents to the return on financial assets? 
                                                          
81 Appendix 2 presents charts of the key stock and flow variables for each of the market conditions simulations. 
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The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 7.1 introduces the different simulations. Section 
7.2 presents the results of these simulations. Section 7.3 concludes. 
7.1 Market conditions simulations descriptions 
This section introduces the simulations that look at changes in market conditions. The aim of these 
simulations is to investigate the economic effects of a change in market conditions that is caused by 
either a change in policy (research question iv), a change in financing conditions (research questions 
v and vi), a change in energy innovation (research question vii), or a change in social norms (research 
question viii). These changes in market conditions are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, Section 
2.3. 
As was the case in the previous chapter, and as discussed in detail in Chapter 5, each simulation is 
carried out under four parameter regimes. These regimes vary the values taken by two sets of 
parameters – how sensitive households and firms are to the price of green and brown energy goods, 
and how sensitive households are to the relative rate of return on financial assets. Varying these 
parameters allows us to answer research questions x and xi. Once again, the symbol (GH) represents 
the ‘high sensitivity to goods’ prices regimes’, the symbol (GL) represents the ‘low sensitivity to 
goods’ prices regimes’, the symbol (AH) represents the ‘high sensitivity to asset returns regimes’, and 
the symbol (AL) represents the ‘low sensitivity to asset returns regimes’. These parameter regimes 
appear as different coloured lines in each chart, as per Figure 6.1 (Chapter 6).  
7.1.1 Policy simulations 
Market conditions simulation 1 (MC1): Baseline carbon tax (brown firms pass on 100% of tax). 
Relates to research question iv.  
This simulation involves the introduction of a carbon tax on brown sector output. The carbon tax 
takes the form of a charge the brown sector has to pay on each unit of output it produces. The value 
of the charge is set so that the introduction of the tax means that the brown firm sector has to pay 
approximately 10% of the price of its output (in the initial steady state) per unit of output. As there is 
no government sector in the model, payments from the carbon tax are passed on to each household 
sector in proportion to their size. In the ‘baseline carbon tax’ simulation, brown firms pass on the 
whole of the cost of the carbon tax to their customers. 
Market conditions simulation 2 (MC2): Alternate carbon tax (brown firms pass on 50% of tax). 
Relates to research question iv.  
This simulation is the same as the baseline carbon tax simulation apart from one thing: in this 
simulation, brown firms only pass on half of the cost the of the carbon tax to their customers. The 
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carbon tax simulations are intended to explore how the effects of a carbon tax might vary depending 
on how firms react to the tax.  
7.1.2 Financing conditions simulations  
Market conditions simulation 3 (MC3): Ethical households divest from brown equities. Relates to 
research question v.  
In this simulation, the ethical household sector completely divests from brown equities and 
reallocates its divested wealth into green equities. This simulation is intended to show the direct 
impact of a divest/invest campaign on asset stranding and the broader economy. 
Market conditions simulation 4 (MC4): Bank interest rate discrimination. Relates to research 
question vi.  
In this simulation, banks increase the interest rate they charge on loans to the brown sector and 
decrease the interest rate they charge on loans to the green sector. This simulation aims to 
demonstrate what might happen if banks start to perceive the risks associated with lending to each 
energy sector differently, so that they require more compensation to lend to brown firms and less 
compensation to lend to green firms.  
7.1.3 Energy innovation simulation 
Market conditions simulation 5 (MC5): Increase in green sector energy return on energy invested 
(EROEI). Relates to research question vii.  
In this simulation, the green sector’s energy requirements (per unit of output) fall until they are 
equal to the brown sector’s energy requirements. This simulation is intended to explore the effects 
of an improvement in technology in the green sector (that manifests itself as an improvement in 
EROEI).  
7.1.4 Social norms simulation 
Market conditions simulation 6 (MC6): Ethical households divest from brown goods. Relates to 
research question viii.  
In this simulation, the ethical household sector stops buying from the brown sector and instead buys 
from the green sector. This simulation is intended to show the effect of a change in social norms that 
leads to households reducing their demand for energy from fossil fuels.  
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7.2 Market conditions simulations results 
This section presents the results of the market conditions (MC) simulations. The first (7.2.1) and 
second (7.2.2) sections look at changes in policy. Section 7.2.1 presents the ‘baseline carbon tax’ 
simulation while Section 7.2.2 presents the ‘alternate carbon tax’ simulation. The third (7.2.3) and 
fourth (7.2.4) sections look at changes in financing conditions. Section 7.2.3 presents the ‘ethical 
households divest from brown equities’ simulation, while Section 7.2.4 presents the ‘bank interest 
rate discrimination’ simulation. Section 7.2.5 looks at a change in energy innovation – the ‘increase 
in green sector EROEI’ simulation. Finally, Section 7.2.6 presents the change in social norms 
simulation, in which ethical households stop buying from brown firms (the ‘ethical households divest 
from brown goods’ simulation). 
7.2.1 Market conditions simulation 1 (MC1): Baseline carbon tax (brown firms 
pass on 100% of tax) 
In this simulation, a carbon tax of approximately 10% of the price of brown firm output (in the initial 
steady state) is levied on the brown sector. Brown firms respond to the carbon tax by increasing 
their prices so as to pass on the entire cost of the tax to their customers. As there is no government 
sector in the model, the funds raised by the carbon tax are distributed directly to each household 
sector, with the payments split between ethical and normal households in proportion to their size 
(i.e. 30% of payments go to ethical households, while 70% go to normal households). 
The simulation itself proceeds as follows. Starting in 2020, a carbon tax (CTRATE) of £0.12 per unit of 
output is imposed on the brown sector. This tax is then increased by £0.12 a year, until it reaches 
£0.60 per unit of output in 2024. The tax then remains at £0.60 per unit of output from 2024 until 
the end of the simulation period. Figure 7.1 shows the evolution of the carbon tax rate (CTRATE). As 
already mentioned, brown firms pass on the entire cost of the carbon tax to their customers – i.e. 
the parameter (CTPT) is set to one.  
Figure 7.2 presents the total revenues from the carbon tax, or equivalently, the total value of the 
payments that are paid to the household sector (CTPAY t). These payments are significantly higher in 
the (GL) regimes. This is because in these regimes the increase in brown prices leads to a smaller fall 
in the demand for brown goods. 
The implementation of a carbon tax leads to brown prices increasing by approximately 13.3% (Figure 
7.3). Of the 13.3% increase, approximately 10.3 percentage points can be directly attributed to the 
carbon tax. The other three percentage points are due to an increase in the price of the brown 
sector’s intermediate inputs. Brown, green (Figure 7.4) and other (Figure 7.5) prices increase 
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Figure 7.1 (MC1): Carbon tax rate  
 
Figure 7.2 (MC1): Total carbon tax payments 
 
Figure 7.3 (MC1): Price of output (BF) 
 
Figure 7.4 (MC1): Price of output (GF) 
 
 
because each sector uses brown goods as an input in its production process, and an increase in the 
price of brown goods (from the carbon tax) means an increase in each sector’s unit costs and, 
therefore, in each sector’s prices. Green prices are slightly lower in the (GL) regimes due to the 
higher level of green sector productivity in these regimes – which is itself the result of a change in 
the capital-labour ratio that is driven mainly by a fall in employment in the green sector. 
Employment falls in the (GL) regimes due to a small fall in the demand for green goods (see below). 
Interestingly, the price of green goods increases by almost 4%. If we exclude the price increase that 
is a direct result of the carbon tax, the price of brown goods only increases by around 3%. The 
reason green prices increase by more than brown prices (once the direct effect of the carbon tax has 
been netted out) is because green firms use more energy goods than brown firms to produce a unit  
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Figure 7.5 (MC1): Price of output (OF) 
 
Figure 7.6 (MC1): General price level 
 
Figure 7.7 (MC1): Real total output (BF) 
 
Figure 7.8 (MC1): Real total output (GF) 
 
 
of output. The other firm sector, which requires significantly lower energy inputs, is less affected. 
Nevertheless, the carbon tax leads to an increase in the general price level (Figure 7.6) of almost 
2.5%, which is around one percentage point more than the increase in the price of the other sector’s 
goods. 
One of the key features of this model is that changes in relative prices lead to changes in demand. 
Figure 7.7 and 7.8 illustrate how the price changes that result from a carbon tax lead to changes in 
the level of demand for green and brown goods. As is clear from the charts, the degree to which 
demand changes is highly dependent on the parameter regime in place. In the (GL) regimes, the 
change in relative prices leads to a brown output falling by more than green output (so that the  
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Figure 7.9 (MC1): Asset stranding (%) (BF) 
 
Figure 7.10 (MC1): Real final demand 
 
Figure 7.11 (MC1): Real wealth 
 
 
ratio of green-to-brown output increases). 
Conversely, in the (GH) regimes, the change in 
prices leads to a large increase in green output 
and a larger fall in brown output than occurs in 
the (GL) regimes, due to the increased 
sensitivity of agents to prices in the (GH) 
regimes. The change in the demand for brown 
sector goods leads to brown capital being 
stranded (Figure 7.9). Approximately 12% of 
brown assets are stranded in the (GH) regimes, 
versus just over 8% in the (GL) regimes. The 
reason for the discrepancy in the degree of 
stranding relates to the larger reduction in  
brown demand in the (GH) regimes.  
Interestingly, in the (GL) regimes, the demand for green output falls even as the relative price of 
green goods falls. This fall in green output is largely driven by the fall in real final demand. Real final 
demand decreases because the increase in prices (due to the carbon tax) causes real wealth (Figure 
7.11) and real disposable income to fall (see equations 133 and 108), and real wealth and real 
disposable income both enter into the consumption function. Thus, the increase in prices leads to a 
lower level of real consumption and consequently a lower level of real final demand (Figure 7.10). 
Thus, even as green goods get relatively cheaper, the demand for green goods is lower. 
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Figure 7.12 and 7.13 show the effect of introducing a carbon tax on the market valuation of brown 
and green firms. Unsurprisingly, the fall in demand for the brown sector’s goods leads to a reduction 
in the brown sector’s return on equity (Figure 7.14) and, thus, its market capitalisation. The 
reduction in the brown sector’s market capitalisation is significantly larger in the (GH) regimes. 
The relative increase in the demand for green goods in the (GH) regimes leads to an increase in the 
green sector’s return on equity (Figure 7.15) and market capitalisation (Figure 7.13). Conversely, in 
(GL) regimes the market value of the sector falls by just over 2%, reflecting the small drop in the 
demand for green goods in these regimes.  
 
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
1: Gᴴ Aᴸ 2: Gᴴ Aᴴ 3: Gᴸ Aᴸ 4: Gᴸ Aᴴ
Figure 7.12 (MC1): Market capitalisation (BF) 
 
Figure 7.13 (MC1): Market capitalisation (GF) 
 
Figure 7.14 (MC1): Return on equity (BF) 
 
Figure 7.15 (MC1): Return on equity (GF) 
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7.2.2 Market conditions simulation 2 (MC2): Alternate carbon tax (brown firms 
pass on 50% of tax)  
In the previous simulation, the brown sector passed on the entire cost of the carbon tax to its 
customers. In this simulation, we assume the same carbon tax, but that the brown sector instead 
only passes on 50% of the cost of the carbon tax to its customers and absorbs the other 50% of the 
cost of the tax itself. The simulation proceeds along the same lines as the first carbon tax simulation, 
the only difference being that the parameter (CTPT) is set to 0.5 (rather than to 1). Everything else is 
the same: starting in 2020, a carbon tax (CTRATE) of £0.12 per unit of output is imposed on the brown 
sector. The tax rate is then increased by £0.12 a year, until it reaches £0.60 per unit of output in 
2024. The tax remains at £0.60 per unit of output from 2024 until the end of the simulation period. 
Figure 7.1 shows the evolution of the carbon tax rate.  
Because brown firms absorb half the cost of the carbon tax, brown prices only increase by around 
half as much (6%) as they do in the baseline simulation (Figure 7.16). This smaller increase in the 
price of brown goods leads to smaller increases in the price of green (Figure 7.17) and other goods 
(Figure 7.18), and, consequently, the general price level (Figure 7.19). The smaller increase in brown 
prices means that the reduction in the demand for brown goods is not as large as it is in the baseline 
carbon tax simulation. Likewise, the increase in the demand for green goods is smaller in this 
simulation than it is in the baseline simulation (Figure 7.20 and 7.21).  
Figure 7.20 and 7.21 show that real output is higher in the (AL) regimes than it is in the (AH) regimes 
(conversely, in the baseline simulation only the (GH/GL) regimes affected real output). The reason 
real output is higher in the (AL) regimes is related to how households respond to the return on 
brown assets. Absorbing 50% of the carbon tax leads to a significant fall in the brown sector’s 
distributed profits and, therefore, the brown sector’s return on equity (Figure 7.22 and 7.23). The 
other sector’s return on equity also falls during this period, as the increase in the price level leads to 
a reduction in real interest rates and, accordingly, an increase in the other sector’s capital-output 
ratio. This leads to an increase in investment by the other sector and, consequently, a reduction in 
its distributed profits (as part of its investment is financed using retained earnings). The fall in the 
return on equity in the brown sector and the other sector means that the average return on equity 
across all three firm sectors falls (at least in the period directly after the introduction of the carbon 
tax), even as the return on equity in the green sector’s increases. Households respond to these 
changes by reallocating some of their wealth towards the relatively higher yielding bank  
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Figure 7.16 (MC2): Price of output (BF) 
 
Figure 7.17 (MC2): Price of output (GF) 
 
Figure 7.18 (MC2): Price of output (OF) 
 
Figure 7.19 (MC2): General price level 
 
Figure 7.20 (MC2): Real total output (BF) 
 
Figure 7.21 (MC2): Real total output (GF) 
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 Figure 7.22 (MC2): Distributed profits (BF) 
 
Figure 7.23 (MC2): Return on equity (BF) 
 
Figure 7.24 (MC2): Real final demand 
 
Figure 7.25 (MC2): Real wealth 
 
 
deposits, leading to capital losses and so a fall in real wealth (Figure 7.25). Capital losses on equities 
are larger in the (AH) regimes, which leads to larger falls in real wealth and so consumption and final 
demand. 
In the (AL) regimes, final demand initially falls, before increasing back towards its initial stationary 
state value. The eventual increase in final demand related to the green sector producing a larger 
proportion of the overall energy supply (due to the carbon tax changing relative prices). The green 
sector needs more intermediate goods than the brown sector to produce a unit of its energy output, 
and this has a positive effect on investment, employment, and incomes. These positive effects offset 
the negative effects that result from the increase in the general price level.  
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Figure 7.26 (MC2): Asset stranding (%) (BF) 
 
Figure 7.27 (MC2): Market capitalisation (BF) 
 
 
Another difference between the baseline (MC1) and alternate (MC2) carbon tax simulations is that 
final demand is higher in MC2 than it is in MC1. The main reason for this is that the increase in the 
general price level is smaller in the alternate carbon tax simulation, and a smaller increase in prices 
means that real wealth does not fall as much. Hence, household consumption falls by less and real 
output is higher. 
As brown firms absorb part of the cost of the carbon tax, brown prices don’t increase by as much as 
they do in the baseline simulation. As a result, the demand for the brown firm sector’s goods falls by 
less, and this causes the stranding of brown capital assets to be around 50% lower (Figure 7.26). 
However, compared to the baseline simulation, there is a larger fall in the brown sector’s profits and 
market valuation – absorbing part of the carbon tax means brown firms have fewer profits to 
distribute to shareholders, and the subsequent fall in the brown sector’s return on equity leads 
households to reduce their holdings of brown equities. This causes a reduction in the price of brown 
equities and, consequently, the market capitalisation of brown firms (Figure 7.27).  
This fall in the price of brown equities is partially offset by two factors. First, the demand for brown 
goods falls by less than it does in the baseline simulation. The higher level of brown sector output 
means a higher level of brown capital, and this translates into households allocating more of their 
wealth into brown equities. Second, the increase in brown prices is smaller in this simulation, and 
this means that the increase in the general price level is also smaller. As a result, the fall in real 
wealth is smaller, and this leads to a smaller fall in real consumption. Unsurprisingly, the reduction in 
the market capitalisation of the brown sector is smaller in the (AL) regimes.   
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7.2.3 Market conditions simulation 3 (MC3): Ethical households divest from 
brown equities 
In this simulation, the ethical household sector divests from the brown sector’s equities and ‘invests’ 
in the green sector’s equities. This simulation is intended to model a divest/invest campaign in which 
30 percent of the population (in this model the ethical household sector) decide to divest from the 
fossil fuel sector and instead invest their funds in financial assets issued by the renewable sector. 
The section itself is split into two parts. Section 7.2.3.1 describes the additional equations needed to 
simulate the divest/invest campaign. Section 7.2.3.2 presents the results of the simulations.   
7.2.3.1 MC simulation 3: additional equations 
In order to simulate ethical households divesting from brown equities and investing in green 
equities, it is necessary to alter the value of (λPA g e) and (λPA b e). These parameters appear in the 
ethical household sector’s portfolio allocation equation (equation 147), and determine the 
proportion of wealth that ethical households would like to allocate to green (λPA g e) and brown (λPA b 
e) equities, regardless of their relative rates of return (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.5). The equation 
that determines the value of (λPA g e) and (λPA b e) is reproduced here for convenience:  
150 λPA j x = (kT j / kt) ∙ (1 - λPA m x) + HHDIV j x 
To recap briefly, (kTj) is the target level of capital in sector (j), (kTt) is the total level of capital in the 
economy, and (λPA m e) is the proportion of wealth ethical households want to hold as bank deposits 
(regardless of their relative rate of return). Hence (1 - λPA m e) is the proportion of wealth ethical 
households want to hold as equities regardless of their relative rates of return. Finally, (HHDIV j e) is a 
variable that allows the simulation of a divest/invest campaign, as changing its value will lead to a 
change in the variable (λPA j e) (i.e. the ethical household sector’s preference for holding a particular 
financial asset). 
Because households must place their wealth somewhere, the decision to divest from one class of 
assets must imply a decision to ‘invest’ somewhere else. The equations in this section are structured 
so that the decision to divest from brown equities is matched by a decision to invest in green 
equities. Thus, in this simulation, the parameter (HHDIV b e) takes a negative value, so that households 
divest from brown firm equities, while the parameter (HHDIV g e) takes a positive value, so that 
households ‘invest’ in green firm equities. The equations that determine the values of the (HHDIV g I’s) 
are set up in such a way that the sum of these terms is equal to zero. This ensures that the 
simulation does not change the proportion of wealth that households want to place into equities 
(independent of their relative rates of return).  
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Equations 162 and 163 show how (HHDIV b e) and (HHDIV g e) are determined. 
162 HHDIV b e = ϑEQ DIV ∙ ( [ (kTb / kTt) ∙ (1 - λPA m e) ] + [λPA be 01 ∙ rreM + λPA be 02 ∙ rreK g + λPA be 03 ∙ rreK b + 
λPA be 04 ∙ rreK o] ) 
163 HHDIV g e = ϑEQ INV ∙ ( [ (kTb / kTt) ∙ (1 - λPA m e) ] + [λPA be 01 ∙ rreM + λPA be 02 ∙ rreK g + λPA be 03 ∙ rreK b + 
λPA be 04 ∙ rreK o] ) 
These equations can be separated into three distinct parts. The first part of each equation consists of 
the exogenously determined parameters (ϑEQ DIV) and (ϑEQ INV).82 These parameters are used to 
exogenously adjust the ethical household sector’s preference for holding brown and green equities 
(more will be said on this in a moment). The ‘investing’ parameter (ϑEQ INV) takes a value between 
zero and one, while the divesting parameter (ϑEQ DIV) takes a value between zero and minus one. The 
sum of the parameters is equal to zero (ϑEQ DIV + ϑEQ INV = 0). Given the other terms in the equations, 
these conditions force (HHDIV g e) and (HHDIV b e) to sum to zero (HHDIV g e + HHDIV b e = 0). 
The second part of each equation consists of everything inside the first set of square brackets (i.e. 
the ratio of target sectoral capital to total target capital, all multiplied by the proportion of wealth 
households want to hold in equities regardless of their rates of return). This part of the equation is 
lifted directly from the equation that determines the values of the (λPA j e’s) (equation 150). It 
determines the proportion of wealth that a household sector would like to place into a particular 
asset class independent of the relative rate of return on that asset (and without any exogenous 
divestment/investment adjustments).  
The third part of each equation consists of everything inside the second set of square brackets. This 
part of the equation is lifted from the part of the ethical household sector’s portfolio allocation 
equations that determine the proportion of wealth the household sector wants to place into a 
particular asset because of the relative rate of return on that asset (see equation 147). The sum of 
the two terms in square brackets will therefore be equal to the proportion of wealth a household 
sector’s wants to allocate into a particular asset class (absent any modifications due to a 
divest/invest campaign). With this information in hand, we can now return to the interpretation of 
(ϑEQ DIV) and (ϑEQ INV).  
Starting with equation 162, (ϑEQ DIV) determines the proportion by which ethical households would 
like to reduce their holdings of brown assets relative to the proportion of wealth they would 
normally place into brown equities (i.e. in the absence of a divest/invest campaign). The parameter  
                                                          
82 Where the subscript (EQ) stands for equity, (INV) stands for invest, and (DIV) stands for divest. 
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Figure 7.28 (MC3): Evolution of ϑDIV and ϑINV 
 
(ϑEQ DIV) is therefore a proportion of a proportion. For example, when (ϑEQ DIV) takes a value of minus 
one, the parameter (HHDIV b e) will take a value that exactly offsets the terms in the ethical 
household’s portfolio allocation equation (equation 147) that determines the proportion of wealth 
that ethical households want to place into brown equities. Hence, the portfolio allocation equation 
that determines the ethical household sector’s demand for brown equities will take a value equal to 
zero, and as such ethical households will allocate none of their wealth into brown equities (i.e.  eD b e 
= 0). Hence, ethical households will sell all their brown equities to the normal household sector. 
What about equation 163? This equation ensures that the proportion of wealth that households 
have divested from brown equities is reinvested in green equities. Hence, when the parameter (ϑEQ 
INV) takes a value of (positive) one the parameter (HHDIV g e) will take a value that will exactly offset 
the term (HHDIV b e). Thus the proportion of wealth that households would have allocated to brown 
equities (but do not due to the divestment campaign) is reallocated to green equities.  
7.2.3.2 Market conditions simulation 3: Results  
With the equations that determine household divestment in place, we can now move on to 
discussing the results of the divestment simulation itself. Figure 7.28 shows the evolution of (ϑEQ DIV) 
and (ϑEQ INV). Starting in 2020, ethical households start to divest from brown equities and invest in 
green equities. Ethical households reduce/increase the proportion of their wealth they allocate to 
brown/green assets by 20% each period, so that by 2024 (five years after the start of the simulation) 
they have completely divested from brown assets (and increased the proportion of wealth that they 
allocate to green assets by the same amount). 
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The change in the value of (ϑEQ DIV) means that over a five-year period, the ethical household sector 
reduces the proportion of wealth it allocates to brown sector equities to zero – i.e. the ethical 
household sector completely divests itself of brown sector equities (Figure 7.29). The change in the 
value of (ϑEQ INV) means that ethical households increase the proportion of wealth they allocate to 
green sector equities (Figure 7.30).  
Of course, if ethical households are selling brown equities then normal households must be buying 
brown equities. Likewise, the normal household sector must be selling green equities if the ethical 
household sector is buying green equities. The changes to normal households’ equity holdings are 
presented in Figure 7.31 and 7.32. 
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
1: Gᴴ Aᴸ 2: Gᴴ Aᴴ 3: Gᴸ Aᴸ 4: Gᴸ Aᴴ
Figure 7.29 (MC3): Ethical households demand 
for brown equity 
 
Figure 7.30 (MC3): Ethical households demand 
for green equity 
 
Figure 7.31 (MC3): Normal households demand 
for brown equity 
 
Figure 7.32 (MC3): Normal households demand 
for green equity 
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As described above, the simulation forces ethical households to decrease their demand for brown 
equities and increase their demand for green equities. The increase in the demand for green equities 
pushes up their price, while the decrease in the demand for brown equities leads to a fall in their 
price. These price changes lead to changes in the relative rates of return on each equity class, and 
these changes induce normal households to increase their purchases of brown equities and sell part 
of their holdings of green equities (more will be said about how the divest/invest campaign affects 
the wealth and incomes of each household sector in a moment).  
The divest/invest campaign thus leads to a change in each sector’s equity price, market capitalisation 
and return on equity (Figure 7.33 - 7.36). The green firm sector’s market capitalisation increases by  
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
1: Gᴴ Aᴸ 2: Gᴴ Aᴴ 3: Gᴸ Aᴸ 4: Gᴸ Aᴴ
Figure 7.33 (MC3): Market capitalisation (BF) 
 
Figure 7.34 (MC3):Market capitalisation (GF) 
 
Figure 7.35 (MC3): Return on equity (BF) 
 
Figure 7.36 (MC3): Return on equity (GF) 
 
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
2
0
1
6
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
4
2
0
2
8
2
0
3
2
2
0
3
6
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
4
2
0
4
8
2
0
5
2
2
0
5
6
2
0
6
0
2
0
6
4
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
2
0
1
6
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
4
2
0
2
8
2
0
3
2
2
0
3
6
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
4
2
0
4
8
2
0
5
2
2
0
5
6
2
0
6
0
2
0
6
4
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
2
0
1
6
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
4
2
0
2
8
2
0
3
2
2
0
3
6
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
4
2
0
4
8
2
0
5
2
2
0
5
6
2
0
6
0
2
0
6
4
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
2
0
1
6
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
4
2
0
2
8
2
0
3
2
2
0
3
6
2
0
4
0
2
0
4
4
2
0
4
8
2
0
5
2
2
0
5
6
2
0
6
0
2
0
6
4
225 
 
Figure 7.37 (MC3): Target capital-output ratio 
(BF) 
 
Figure 7.38 (MC3): Target capital-output ratio 
(GF) 
 
Figure 7.39 (MC3): Real investment (BF) 
 
Figure 7.40 (MC3): Real investment (GF) 
 
Figure 7.41 (MC3): Labour productivity (BF) 
 
Figure 7.42 (MC3): Labour productivity (GF) 
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Figure 7.43 (MC3): Price (BF) 
 
Figure 7.44 (MC3): Price (GF) 
 
 
between 30 - 60%, whereas the brown firm sector’s market capitalisation decreases by around 15 -
23%. These changes in market capitalisation are reflected in changes in each sector’s return on 
equity: the green firm sector’s return on equity decreases by between 15 - 40%, whereas the brown 
firm sector’s return on equity increases by between 25 - 40%. 
The market value of each firm sector changes by more in the (AL) regimes than in the (AH) regimes. 
This is because the fall (increase) in the market capitalisation of brown (green) firms leads to an 
increase (a decrease) in the return on brown (green) equities, and households respond more 
aggressively to these changes in the (AH) regimes. The more aggressive response prevents the 
market capitalisation of brown firms falling/the market capitalisation of green firms increasing as 
much in the (AH) as they do in the (AL) regimes. 
The divest/invest campaign affects relative prices, and this leads to a small increase in the demand 
for green goods relative to the demand for brown goods. Essentially, changes to each firm sector’s 
return on equity affects each firm sector’s weighted cost of capital, and consequently each firm 
sector’s target capital-output ratio (Figure 7.37 and 7.38) (see equation 20). These changes lead to a 
surge in green investment (and green capital) and a fall in brown investment (and brown capital) 
(Figure 7.39 and 7.40). Consequently, there is an increase in the green firm sector’s capital-output 
ratio and capital-labour ratio, as well as a decrease in the brown firm sector’s capital-output ratio 
and capital-labour ratio. These changes to the capital-labour ratios affect each sector’s labour 
productivity (Figure 7.41 and 7.42). As labour productivity influences the number of workers firms 
need to produce a unit of their output (see equation 77, Chapter 4), brown unit costs and prices rise 
(Figure 7.43), while green unit costs and prices fall (Figure 7.44). The change in prices  
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labour productivity, which then influence relative prices and, through this channel, the level of 
demand for each sector’s goods. As a result, brown output is lower in the (AL) regimes than it is in 
the (AH) regimes. These discrepancies in demand have important implications for the quantity of 
capital assets that are stranded in each parameter regime, as can be seen below. 
As well as leading to an overall fall in the demand for energy goods, the divest/invest campaign also 
leads to a fall in the output of the other sector, as well as in the overall level of final demand (Figure 
7.47). The fall in final demand (and total output) comes about primarily for two reasons. First, the 
divest/invest campaign has an asymmetric effect on energy firms’ investment expenditures (brown 
investment falls by more than green investment increases). Second, the divest/invest campaign 
leads households to slightly reduce the proportion of their wealth that they allocate to equities and 
Figure 7.45 (MC3): Real total output (BF) 
 
Figure 7.46 (MC3): Real total output (GF) 
 
Figure 7.47 (MC3): Real final demand 
 
 
causes the demand for brown goods to fall 
relative to the demand for green goods (Figure 
7.45 and 7.46), even as the demand for energy 
goods decreases overall. 
As was pointed out earlier, the change in the 
return on brown and green equities is larger in 
the (AL) regimes. As a result, in these regimes, 
brown firms’ weighted cost of capital is higher 
(and investment lower), while green firms’ 
weighted cost of capital is lower (and 
investment higher). These differences in 
investment have important implications for 
each sector’s capital-labour ratio and level of  
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increase the proportion they allocate to bank deposits. This leads to capital losses, a fall in real 
wealth and, consequently, a fall in real consumption. 
Why does green investment fall by more than brown investment rises? As we have already seen, the 
divest/invest campaign leads to an increase in green investment and a decrease in brown 
investment. These changes are largely driven by changes to each sector’s target capital-output ratio 
– the green sector’s target capital-output ratio increases by approximately 2 - 2.5%, while the brown 
sector’s target capital-output ratio falls by approximately 1.5 - 2%. However, despite the green 
sector’s target capital-output ratio increasing by more than the brown sector’s target capital-output 
ratio falls (for reasons that will be explained subsequently), the overall effect on green and brown 
investment (together) is negative. This is because a sector’s investment also depends upon the 
higher of either the expected demand for that sector’s output, or the sector’s actual output (sKT ej) 
(equation 20, Chapter 4). Thus, while the green sector does see an increase in its target capital-
output ratio, the sector’s relatively small size (compared to the brown sector) means that the 
increase in green investment is smaller than the fall in brown investment. Hence, the overall effect 
on investment in the energy sector is negative.  
The divest/invest campaign also causes real final demand (Figure 7.47) to fall, as the campaign leads 
households to increase the proportion of their wealth that they place in bank deposits. This is 
because while the divest/invest campaign leads to an increase in the return on brown equities and a 
decrease in the return on green equities, the decrease in the return on green equities is larger than 
the increase in the return on brown equities. As a result, equities become slightly less attractive, and 
bank deposits become slightly more attractive. This results in households increasing the proportion 
of wealth they place into bank deposits. The reason the divest/invest campaign has an asymmetric 
effect on equity returns is again related to the green sector being smaller than the brown sector. 
Thus, an increase in the demand for green equities will have a proportionately larger effect on green 
equity prices (and, therefore, on the return on green equities) than an equivalently sized decrease in 
demand for brown equities.  
So far, we have looked at how the divest/invest campaign affects total output, final demand and the 
output of energy firms. We have seen that the campaign leads to a small decrease in total output 
and final demand, and that this leaves the household sectors slightly worse off. However, until now, 
we have not looked at how the divest/invest campaign affects each household sector individually. 
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To sum up, the divest/invest campaign makes the ethical (divesting) households relatively worse off, 
and the normal households relatively better off (although both sectors end up worse off overall) 
(Figure 7.48 to Figure 7.51). To understand why this happens, recall that normal households are 
holding the portfolio of financial assets they want to hold as the divest/invest campaign gets 
underway. To induce normal households to sell green equities and buy brown equities, either the 
return on brown equities will have to increase or the return on green equities will have to fall. The 
increase/decrease in the demand for green/brown equities from the ethical household sector (with 
no change in demand from the normal household sector) leads to a decrease/increase in the return 
on green/brown equity. As the changes in demand are exogenously imposed upon the model and 
not the result of a change in a sector’s distributed profits, ethical households are forced to buy green 
equities at a premium, and sell brown equities at a discount (where the discount/premium is relative 
to the price that would exist in the absence of the divest/invest campaign). Given this, the 
divest/invest campaign leads to an increase in the quantity of financial assets held by normal 
households and a decrease in the quantity of financial assets held by ethical households. These 
assets pay interest income/dividends, so that the divest/invest campaign leads to a decrease in the 
level of interest income/dividends received by ethical households and an increase in the level of 
interest income/dividends received by normal households.  
Figure 7.48 and 7.49 show the how the profits distributed to each household change due to the 
divest/invest campaign. The increase in the quantity of financial assets held by the normal  
 
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
1: Gᴴ Aᴸ 2: Gᴴ Aᴴ 3: Gᴸ Aᴸ 4: Gᴸ Aᴴ
Figure 7.48 (MC3): Distributed profits, ethical 
HHs 
 
Figure 7.49 (MC3): Distributed profits, normal 
HHs 
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household sector means that their income from financial assets increases (even as their total income 
falls because of the fall in final demand). Meanwhile, ethical households see their income from 
financial assets fall. These changes to household income also affect the real wealth of each 
household sector – by the end of the simulation period the real wealth of the ethical household 
sector has fallen relative to the real wealth of the normal household sector (Figure 7.50 and 7.51). 
However, between 2020 and 2025, the ethical household sector’s real wealth increases, while the 
normal household sector’s real wealth falls (i.e. during the period in which ethical households are 
divesting from brown equities). These changes are due to capital gains – during this period green 
equity prices are increasing (and the ethical household sector is increasing its ownership of green 
assets), while brown equity prices are falling (and ethical households are decreasing their ownership  
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
1: Gᴴ Aᴸ 2: Gᴴ Aᴴ 3: Gᴸ Aᴸ 4: Gᴸ Aᴴ
Figure 7.50 (MC3): Real wealth, ethical HHs 
 
Figure 7.51 (MC3): Real wealth, normal HHs 
 
Figure 7.52 (MC3): Asset stranding (BF) 
 
Figure 7.53 (MC3): Asset stranding (%) (BF) 
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of brown assets). Initially, these price changes more than offset the changes in distributed profits. 
However, from 2024 onwards, asset prices stabilise, and this leads to a fall in ethical households’ 
wealth relative to normal households. 
Figure 7.52 shows the actual quantity of stranded capital, while Figure 7.53 presents the stranded 
assets indicator in percentage terms. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the level of stranding is rather low 
(peaking at around 1.5 - 3% of brown capital). This is because stranding is largely a function of the 
level of demand for brown goods, and the divest/invest campaign only has a relatively small impact 
on brown sector output. The higher level of stranding in the (AL) regimes is because the fall in the 
brown firm sector’s output is larger in these regimes (the reasons for this are given above). 
7.2.4 Market conditions simulation 4 (MC4): Bank interest rate discrimination  
In this simulation, banks increase interest rates on brown sector debt and decrease interest rates on 
green sector debt. The simulation is intended to help us understand what might happen if banks 
start to perceive the risks associated with lending to each energy sector differently.  
In order to carry out the simulation, the exogenous parameters that control the margin on bank 
loans (addb , addg) are altered, so that over a five-year period (2020 - 2024), the interest rate on 
brown loans increases by 50% and the interest rate on green loans decreases by 50%. These changes 
are summarised in Figure 7.54 and 7.55 (the y-axis is the interest rate spread/interest rate). 
The changes to interest rates leads to a fall in the output of the brown sector and an increase in the 
output of the green sector (Figure 7.56 and 7.57). These changes in output happen for two reasons. 
First, the change in interest rates affects the weighted cost of capital of each sector, and this affects 
each sector’s target capital-output ratio (Figure 7.58 and 7.59), and so each sector’s level of 
investment. Second, the change in investment leads to a change in each sector’s capital-labour ratio, 
and this affects each sector’s labour productivity (Figure 7.60 and 7.61). Labour productivity 
determines the level of employment required by each sector to produce a unit of its output, which 
influences unit costs. Unit costs affect the price of each sector’s output (Figure 7.62 and 7.63), and 
prices affect the relative demand for green and brown goods. The changes in demand are of course 
larger in the (GH) regimes. 
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Figure 7.54 (MC4): Bank margins 
 
Figure 7.55 (MC4): Bank interest rates 
 
Figure 7.56 (MC4): Real total output (BF) 
 
Figure 7.57 (MC4): Real total output (GF) 
 
Figure 7.58 (MC4): Target capital-output ratio 
(BF) 
 
Figure 7.59 (MC4): Target capital-output ratio   
(GF)  
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Figure 7.60 (MC4): Labour productivity (BF) 
 
Figure 7.61 (MC4): Labour productivity (GF) 
 
Figure 7.62 (MC4): Price of output (BF) 
 
Figure 7.63 (MC4): Price of output (GF) 
 
 
Financial markets are also affected by the changes in interest rates. The increase in interest rates on 
brown sector loans reduces the brown sector’s nominal profits (Figure 7.64), while the reduction in 
the interest rate on green loans increases the green sector’s profits (Figure 7.65). The effect on 
profits is a result of firms setting their mark-up over wages and intermediate goods, rather than over 
interest payments (see equation 84).  
The increase in green profits boosts the green sector’s return on equity, while the decrease in brown 
profits reduces the brown sector’s return on equity. These changes lead households to reallocate 
their wealth towards green equities and away from brown equities. This leads to an increase in the 
price of green equities and a fall in the price of brown equities. As a result, the market capitalisation 
of the brown sector falls (Figure 7.66), while the market capitalisation of the green sector increases 
(Figure 7.67). Finally, Figure 7.68 shows the actual quantity of stranded assets, while Figure 7.69  
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Figure 7.64 (MC4): Distributed profits (BF) 
 
Figure 7.65 (MC4): Distributed profits (GF) 
 
Figure 7.66 (MC4): Market capitalisation (BF) 
 
Figure 7.67 (MC4): Market capitalisation (GF) 
 
Figure 7.68 (MC4): Asset stranding (BF) 
 
Figure 7.69 (MC4): Asset stranding (%) (BF) 
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show the quantity of stranded assets in percentage terms. The amount of stranding is relatively 
small (around 4.5% of brown assets at its peak), and comes about due to the small changes in 
demand described above.  
7.2.5 Market conditions simulation 5 (MC5): Increase in green sector energy 
return on energy invested (EROEI) 
In this simulation, the green sector’s energy return on energy invested (EROEI) increases over a five-
year period until it is equivalent to the EROEI of the brown sector. This simulation is intended to 
show what might happen if green firms become more efficient in terms of their energy inputs, so 
that they can produce their output with the same quantity of energy inputs as the brown sector. As 
outlined in Chapter 5, empirical estimates of current EROEIs tend to find that renewable energy 
generation technologies have lower EROEIs than fossil fuels (Murphy and Hall [2010], Hall et al. 
[2014]). 
In order to carry out the simulation, the exogenous parameter (At g ex) is altered (see Chapter 4, 
Section 4.2.1.6, equation 51). This parameter controls the sum of the A-matrix column for green 
firms, so that over a five-year period (2020 - 2024), the sum of the column (At g) decreases from 
0.825 to 0.750. This implies that the quantity of goods inputs required by green firms to produce one 
unit of their output falls from 0.825 to 0.750. Equations 57 to 59 (Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1.6) ensure 
that the reduction in (At g) only reduces the green sector’s consumption of energy goods (per unit of 
output) – the green sector’s consumption of goods from the other sector (per unit of output) 
remains the same. The changes to (At g) are summarised in Figure 7.70 
Figure 7.71 presents the values taken by the parameters in the 3-by-3 A-matrix (A-matrix 2, Chapter 
4, Section 4.2.1.6) that determine the quantity of energy goods required by each energy sector to 
produce a unit of their output. In order to avoid cluttering the figure, only the average of each A-
matrix value is taken (across the four parameter regimes). The figure shows a fall in the green 
sector’s consumption of both brown and green intermediate goods per unit of output. However, 
(Abg) falls by more than (Agg), because of a change in relative prices (more will be said on this price 
change below). Meanwile, (Abb) also falls slightly, while (Agb) increases. Again, these changes are due 
to the change in relative prices.  
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Figure 7.70 (MC5): Sum of the 3-by-3 A-matrix column for green firms (At g)83 
 
                                                          
83 I.e. the total quantity of real inputs required by the green sector to produce one unit of its output. 
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Figure 7.71 (MC5): Average 3 by 3 A-matrix values, energy firms’ consumption of energy goods 
 
 
Figure 7.72 (MC5): Price of output (BF) 
 
Figure 7.73 (MC5): Price of output (GF) 
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Figure 7.74 (MC5): Real total output (BF) 
 
Figure 7.75 (MC5):  Real total output (GF) 
 
Figure 7.76 (MC5): Market capitalisation (BF) 
 
Figure 7.77 (MC5): Market capitalisation (GF) 
 
 
The reduction in the quantity of intermediate goods required by the green sector to produce a unit 
of its output leads to a reduction in green prices (as unit costs include intermediate inputs). This 
leads to a fall in each firm sector’s unit costs (as green energy is an input in each sector’s production 
process), which leads to a fall the price of each sector’s goods, and, therefore, further falls in unit 
costs and prices. 
The reduction in green prices relative to brown prices leads to an increase in the output of the green 
sector and a decrease in the output of the brown sector (Figure 7.74 and 7.75). These variations in 
demand impact on investment, the capital stock, and the level of employment in each firm sector. As 
is to be expected, the change in demand is larger in the (GH) regimes. 
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Figure 7.78 (MC5): Asset stranding (BF) 
 
Figure 7.79 (MC5): Asset stranding (%) (BF) 
 
 
The change in demand also leads to a change in the market capitalisation of each energy sector. In 
the (GH) regimes, the market capitalisation of green firms increases (by around 25 - 30%), while the 
market capitalisation of brown firms falls (by around 8%) (Figure 7.76 and 7.77). However, in the (GL) 
regimes, the market capitalisation of green firms actually falls, and by more than it does for brown 
firms. This fall happens because the supply of green equities increases at a faster rate than the 
demand for green equities (as green firms issue equities in order to finance part of their investment 
expenditures). Conversely, in the (GH) regimes, the increase in the demand for green goods leads to 
a larger increase in green profits and return on equity, so that the demand for green equities 
increases faster than the supply of green equities. 
Finally, the change in demand for green and brown goods leads to a part of the brown sector’s 
capital stock being stranded. Stranding is higher in the (GH) regimes (peaking at around 5.5 - 6% of 
brown capital assets) than it is in the (GL) regimes (where stranding peaks at around 1% of brown 
capital assets).  
7.2.6 Market conditions simulation 6 (MC6): Ethical households divest from 
brown goods 
In this simulation, ethical households completely divest from brown sector goods and increase their 
purchases of green sector goods. This simulation looks at what might happen if a change in social 
norms leads around 30% of the population (i.e. the ethical household sector) to stop purchasing 
brown goods and purchase green goods instead. The section itself is split into two parts. Section 
7.2.6.1 describes the additional equations needed to simulate the ethical household sector divesting 
from brown goods. Section 7.2.6.2 presents the results of the simulations.   
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7.2.6.1 Market conditions simulation 6: Additional equations 
Two equations from Chapter 4 (118 and 119) need to be altered to make households ‘divest’ from 
brown goods and increase their purchases of green goods. These equations determine how 
households split their consumption decisions (and are reproduced here for convenience). 
118 cPROP b e = λAIDS b e + λAIDS 21 ∙ [ln(pb)] + λAIDS 22 ∙ [ln(pg)] 
119 cPROP g e = λAIDS g e + λAIDS 23 ∙ [ln(pb)] + λAIDS 24 ∙ [ln(pg)] 
To recap, the parameters (λAIDS b e) and (λAIDS g e) specify the proportion of spending by ethical 
households on brown (cPROP b e) and green (cPROP g e) energy goods that would occur if green and 
brown prices were equal. The parameters (λAIDS 21 ,  λAIDS 22 , λAIDS 23 , λAIDS 24) determine the sensitivity of 
the ethical sector to relative prices, while (pj) is the price of sector (j’s) goods.  
In this simulation, these equations are altered by replacing the parameter (λAIDS j e) in equations 118 
and 119 with new, endogenously determined variables (λAIDS j e END). This gives us equations 164 and 
165.84 
164 cPROP b e = λAIDS b e END + λAIDS 21 ∙ [ln(pb)] + λAIDS 22 ∙ [ln(pg)] 
165 cPROP g e = λAIDS g e END + λAIDS 23 ∙ [ln(pb)] + λAIDS 24 ∙ [ln(pg)] 
The endogenous parameters (λAIDS g e END) and (λAIDS b e END) are determined by equations 166 and 167. 
166  λAIDS b e END = λAIDS b e + [ϑGD DIV ∙ (λAIDS b e + λAIDS 21 ∙ [ln(pb)] + λAIDS 22 ∙ [ln(pg)] ) ] 
167 λAIDS g e END = λAIDS g e + [ϑGD INV ∙ (λAIDS b e + λAIDS 21 ∙ [ln(pb)] + λAIDS 22 ∙ [ln(pg)] ) ]  
These equations follow a similar logic to equations 162 and 163 (see Section 7.2.3.1). Essentially, by 
endogenising the (λAIDS j e’s) we are able to reduce the proportion of spending that would normally be 
allocated to brown goods (by the proportion ϑGD DIV)  and increase the proportion of spending on 
green goods by the same amount (by ϑGD INV).85 The parameter that increases spending (ϑGD INV) takes 
a value between zero and one, while the parameter that decreases spending (ϑGD DIV) takes a value 
between zero and minus one. The sum of the parameters is equal to zero (ϑGD INV + ϑGD DIV = 0). Given 
the other terms in the equations, these conditions force (λAIDS b e END) and (λAIDS g e END) to sum to zero 
(λAIDS b e END + λAIDS g e END = 0). 
                                                          
84 Where the subscript (END) stands for endogenous. 
85 Where the subscript (GD) stands for goods. 
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7.2.6.2 Market conditions simulation 6: Results 
With the equations that determine household divestment from brown goods in place, we can now 
move on to discussing the simulation itself. Figure 7.80 shows the evolution of (ϑGD INV) and (ϑGD INV). 
Starting in 2020, ethical households start to reduce their consumption of brown goods and increase 
their consumption of green goods. They reduce the proportion of spending that they would normally 
allocate to brown goods (by 20% a year) and buy green goods instead, so that by 2024 (five years 
after the start of the simulation), they no longer purchase any brown goods and instead purchase 
only green energy goods.  
Figure 7.81 and 7.82 show how the simulation affects household consumption patterns. Over an 
eight to ten year period, brown consumption falls by around 30%, while green consumption 
increases by around 123 - 129%. These changes are almost completely driven by the change in the 
consumption patterns of ethical households. Interestingly, while ethical households’ ex-ante 
demand for brown goods is zero from 2024 onwards, between 2024 and 2030 they still end up 
purchasing a small amount of brown goods. This is because the increase in demand for green goods 
pushes the green sector to its capacity limit (Figure 7.83). As a result, the sector is unable to fulfil all 
the demand for its output between 2022 and 2030. Thus, ethical households are forced to substitute 
green goods for brown ones. This substitution stops once green firms have increased their capital by 
enough to satisfy the demand for their goods (in around 2030). 
 
Figure 7.80 (MC6): Evolution of ϑGD INV and ϑGD INV 
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falls by around 30%, the real output of brown  firms only decreases by around 11%. 
There are some small differences in output between some of the parameter regimes: in the (GL) 
regimes the demand for brown goods (from normal households and firms) is lower after 2030 than 
in the (GH) regimes (although this difference gets smaller towards the end of the simulation period). 
The reason for the difference relates to the evolution of the capital-labour ratio in each sector, and 
the impact this has on sectoral labour productivity and, through this, on each sector’s unit costs and 
prices. Essentially, the fall in the demand for brown output and the increase in the demand for green 
output leads to a reduction in brown employment and an increase in green employment. These 
changes occur quicker than green capital increases and brown capital falls, and this leads to changes 
Figure 7.81 (MC6): Real brown consumption 
 
Figure 7.82 (MC6): Real green consumption 
 
Figure 7.83 (MC6): Utilisation (%) (GF) 
 
 
Figure 7.84 and 7.85 show the impact on total 
output. The fall in the total output of the brown 
sector is smaller than the fall in the brown 
sector’s output of consumption goods. The 
reason for this is quite simple: while ethical 
households stop buying from brown firms, 
normal households and firms do not. So, while 
ethical households only purchase energy goods 
from green firms, normal households, green 
firms, other firms and brown firms still 
purchase energy goods from brown firms. Thus, 
while household consumption of brown  goods  
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Figure 7.84 (MC6): Real total output (BF) 
 
Figure 7.85 (MC6): Real total output (GF) 
 
Figure 7.86 (MC6): Price of output (BF)  
 
Figure 7.87 (MC6): Price of output (GF) 
 
Figure 7.88 (MC6): Asset stranding (BF) 
 
Figure 7.89 (MC6): Asset stranding (%) (BF) 
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in the capital-labour ratio of each firm sector.86 The change in the capital-labour ratio affects sectoral 
labour productivity (increasing for brown firms, decreasing for green firms), which alters unit costs 
and, through the fixed markup, the prices of brown and green goods (Figure 7.86 and 7.87). These 
price changes affect the relative demand for green and brown goods from firms and normal 
households. 
Figure 7.88 and 7.89 present the stranded assets indicators. Only around 7 - 9% of brown capital 
assets are stranded, despite the fact that by 2030 ethical households have completely divested from 
brown sector goods. The reason for the relative lack of stranding, at least when compared to the 
transition simulations, is that normal households and firms do not reduce their consumption of 
brown goods.  
7.3 Conclusion  
This chapter presented the results of the market conditions simulations.  
The results of the simulations contained in this chapter illustrate that different changes in market 
conditions will lead to different levels of stranding and cause different types of economic effects. In 
addition, the impact of each change in market conditions is shown to depend on the parameter 
regime. In general, the regimes in which households and firms were more sensitive to goods prices 
tend to lead to larger changes in demand and consequently greater levels of stranding, while the 
regimes in which households are more sensitive to asset prices tend to lead to greater changes in 
firms’ market values and therefore larger financial effects. These results suggest that these changes 
in market conditions are unlikely to have a large effect on the demand for different types of energy 
(and therefore on stranding) unless renewable energy becomes a close substitute for fossil fuel 
energy (e.g. in terms of its functionality). The results therefore support the arguments made in Paun 
et al. (2015), who point out that advances in technology associated with renewable energy 
(specifically storage technology) could lead to significant increase in demand for renewable energy  
and a fall in the demand fossil fuels (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2). 
Looking at the individual simulations, the carbon tax simulations (MC1, MC2) showed that the 
success of a carbon tax in reducing the demand for fossil fuels is likely to depend on the fossil fuel 
firms’ response to the implementation of the tax. As expected, the more of the tax they absorb (i.e. 
the less of the cost of the tax they pass on to their customers) the less the demand for their output is 
                                                          
86 Because the supply of labour is always equal to the demand for it, while the change in capital depends on a 
partial adjustment mechanism. 
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likely to fall. However, choosing to absorb part of the cost of the tax is likely to lead to a reduction in 
profits, which then leads to a large fall in these firms’ market values.  
The divest/invest simulation (MC3) showed that there is the potential for a divest/invest campaign 
to have a large effect on fossil fuel companies’ market values (assuming enough funds are divested, 
and that agents are not more responsive to changes in the return on financial assets in real life than 
they are in the simulations – which they could be). However, in the simulation the divest/invest 
campaign did not significantly affect the demand for different types of energy or the quantity of 
stranded assets. One reason for this was that firms were able to fund themselves using other 
sources (e.g. bank loans, retained earnings). If firms were however unable to fund themselves using 
other sources, then a divest/invest campaign could significantly affect the ability of firms to finance 
their investment – with potentially larger effects on output. The results of the simulation were 
therefore somewhat in line with the literature, which argues that the direct impacts of divestment 
campaigns are likely to be small (e.g. see Ansar et al. 2013).  
The bank interest rate discrimination simulation (MC4) led to a moderate change in the output of 
green and brown firms. These changes were largely driven by changes in investment that led to 
lower unit costs and prices for the green firms, and higher unit costs and prices for the brown firms. 
One reason the change in investment is larger in this simulation (compared to the equity 
divest/invest simulation) is that the model is calibrated so that each firm sector finances a larger 
proportion of their investment expenditures through banks loans (compared to equities). This 
simulation therefore showed that a divestment campaign is more likely to be successful in directly 
affecting fossil fuel firms if it targets their main source of external financing.  
The EROEI simulation (MC5) showed that a reduction in the energy inputs required by the renewable 
energy sector to produce a unit of its output could reduce the sector’s unit costs and therefore its 
prices. A change in relative prices is shown to have a large effect on the demand for energy from 
different sources, as long as these energy sources can be easily substituted for each other (as then 
agents will be more responsive to changes in relative prices). However, if renewable and fossil fuel 
energy are not good substitutes for each other, the effect on demand is likely to be more limited. 
This of course ties in with the argument (as discussed at the beginning of this section) that 
improvements in storage technology will be required to increase in the demand for renewable 
energy (Paun et al., 2015).  
The social norms simulation (MC6), in which ethical households divest from brown sector goods, 
shows that a proportion of households divesting from fossil fuel goods is likely to have a significant 
effect on the output of fossil fuel firms. However, despite 30% of the household sector divesting in 
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the simulation, demand for brown goods only fell by around 11%. This is largely because the firm 
and normal household sectors continue to buy from the brown firms, even as ethical households 
divest. The simulation therefore showed the importance of including energy consumption by firms 
(i.e. including an input-output model) when considering changes in the demand for fossil fuels.   
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Chapter 8: Analysis, policy, model limitations and extensions 
This chapter draws together the findings of the simulation experiments from Chapters 6 and 7 with 
reference to the model’s limitations and the stranded assets literature. It also discusses the policy 
implications of the simulation results, along with some potential avenues for future research. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 8.1 analyses and compares some of the key 
results from Chapters 6 and 7 against the stranded assets literature. It also discusses whether these 
results are likely to hold in reality or whether they are just artefacts of the model. Section 8.2 
presents some of the models other limitations, along with a number of potential extensions that 
could address these limitations. Section 8.3 discusses the policy implications of the simulation results 
from Chapters 6 and 7. Finally, Section 8.4 concludes.  
8.1 Analysis 
This section looks at some of the key findings of the simulation experiments from Chapters 6 and 7, 
compares them to the findings in the rest of the stranded assets literature, and discusses the extent 
to which these results are caused by limitations in the model. A number of the factors that are 
discussed in this section are presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 (both of which are found in Section 
8.1.1). Table 8.1 summarises a selection of the simulation results from Chapter 6, while Table 8.2 
summarises a selection of the simulation results from Chapter 7.  
The rest of this section is split into seven parts. Section 8.1.1 looks at the factors that influence asset 
stranding. Section 8.1.2 discusses the potential trade-off between asset stranding and energy 
shortages. Section 8.1.3 talks about how the structure of the equations that determine firms’ 
investment expenditures influence the speed of the transition to a low carbon economy. Section 
8.1.4 considers some of the factors that cause final demand to change. Section 8.1.5 examines the 
relationship between sectoral productivity and asset stranding. Section 8.1.6 talks about the 
financial side of the model and the financial impacts of asset stranding. Finally, Section 8.1.7 explains 
how the form of the return on equity equation helps to maintain model stability.  
8.1.1 Asset stranding  
Chapter 2 argued that fossil fuel reserves and capital assets are likely to be stranded by both a 
transition to a low carbon economy and by unexpected changes in market conditions. In the section 
that discussed how a transition to a low carbon economy might lead to asset stranding (Chapter 2, 
Section 2.2), it was argued that two factors would be likely to affect the overall quantity of assets at 
risk of being stranded:  
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(1) The speed of a transition to a low carbon economy. It was pointed out that although a rapid 
transition is unlikely, the longer action on climate change is delayed the more likely and 
necessary a rapid transition will become (to keep warming within a particular carbon 
budget) (Grant and Spedding [2015], IEA [2015a], IEA [2016], IEA/IRENA [2017]). 
(2) The extent to which fossil fuel firms are able to anticipate the demand trajectory for their 
outputs and adjust their investment expenditures accordingly. The section pointed out that 
a  significant quantity of fossil fuel assets will be at risk of stranding if fossil fuel firms are 
unable to anticipate the full extent of the transition as it starts (CTI [2014a, 2014b], Grant et 
al. [2017], Leaton and Grant [2017], Grant [2018]). 
Chapter 6 utilises a SFC model to investigate how these factors are likely to influence asset stranding 
during a transition to a low carbon economy. In the faster transitions (T1, T3), the demand for brown 
goods was found to fall at a faster rate relative to the rate at which the brown sector’s capital 
depreciates. This led to excess capital and stranding. In the unanticipated transitions (T1, T2), brown 
firms overestimate the amount of capital they require in the future, which again leads to excess 
capital and stranding. The results of the transition simulations therefore largely support the 
arguments made in the stranded assets literature – namely that faster transitions and unanticipated 
transitions are likely to lead to more stranding than slower transitions and anticipated transitions.  
Chapter 7 uses the same SFC model to look at how changes in market conditions are likely to 
influence asset stranding. Unlike in Chapter 6, brown firms do not anticipate the changes in market 
conditions. However, as in Chapter 6, the results of the market conditions simulations suggest that 
changes in market conditions that lead to larger and faster falls in the demand for brown goods will 
strand more assets than those changes in market conditions that lead to smaller or slower falls in 
the demand for brown goods. The results of the simulations from Chapters 6 and 7 therefore imply 
that the stranding of brown capital is likely to depend on two key factors: 
(1) The rate at which the demand for the brown sector’s output falls relative to the rate at 
which its capacity declines due to its capital depreciating.  
(2) The amount of new capital the brown sector thinks it needs (and therefore produces) 
relative to the amount of capital it actually requires. 
These factors will now be discussed in turn.  
Factor (1) consists of two components – the depreciation rate of capital and the rate of change of 
output. As discussed in Chapter 5 (Table 5.4), estimates of the depreciation rates of energy sector 
capital assets can be very low (Herman et al., 2003) (see Chapter 5, Table 5.4). This relates to the 
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87 As pointed out earlier, these levels of stranding only last for a small number of periods, and are largely due 
to fluctuations in the brown sector’s target capital around the end of the transition period. For most of the 
simulation period the actual level of stranding is negative. 
Table 8.1: Transition simulations, selected results 
Transition 
simulation 
(T) 
Peak level 
of brown 
capital 
asset 
stranding  
Peak level 
of brown 
capacity 
utilisation  
Peak loss 
in brown 
sector 
market 
value  
Peak 
reduction 
in brown 
return on 
equity  
Peak 
increase in 
final 
demand  
Increase in 
final 
demand 
from the 
beginning 
to the end 
of 
simulation 
period 
T1 
Baseline fast  
Normal 
expectations 
60% 
to 
70% 
Excess 
brown 
capacity 
75% 
to 
90% 
28% 
to 
43% 
2% 
to 
4% 
2.5% 
to 
3% 
T2 
Baseline 
slow  
Normal 
expectations 
50% 
to 
63% 
Excess 
brown 
capacity 
70% 
to 
80% 
20% 
to 
30% 
2% 
to 
3% 
2% 
to  
2.7% 
T3 
Alternate 
fast  
Altered 
expectations 
50% 
to 
60% 
Excess 
brown 
capacity 
70% 
to 
80% 
18% 
to 
25% 
2% 
to 
3% 
2% 
to 
3% 
T4 
Alternate 
slow  
Altered 
expectations 
20% 
to 
 40% 87 
95% 
to 
97% 
65% 
to 
75% 
8% 
to 
15% 
0% 
to 
2.5% 
0% 
to 
2.5% 
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Table 8.2: Market conditions simulations, selected results   
Market conditions 
simulation 
(MC) 
Peak level 
of brown 
stranding  
Peak 
change in 
brown 
output 
Peak 
change in 
green 
output 
Peak 
change in 
brown 
sector 
market 
value 
Peak 
change in 
brown 
sector 
return on 
equity 
MC1 
Baseline carbon tax     
(100% pass through) 
+ 9% 
to 
+ 12.5% 
- 13% 
to 
- 17% 
- 7% 
to 
+ 26% 
- 10% 
to 
- 15% 
- 3% 
to 
- 5% 
MC2 
Alternate carbon tax    
(50% pass through) 
+ 2.5% 
to 
+ 6% 
- 5% 
to 
- 10% 
- 5% 
to 
+ 15% 
- 11% 
to 
- 23% 
- 20% 
to 
- 26% 
MC3 
Ethical household’s divest 
from brown sector assets 
+ 1.5% 
to 
+ 2.7% 
- 2.5% 
to 
- 4% 
- 1% 
to 
- 3% 
- 15% 
to 
- 23% 
+ 16% 
to 
+ 28% 
MC4 
Bank interest rate 
discrimination 
+ 4.5% 
- 1% 
to 
- 2% 
1% 
to 
+ 3% 
- 5% 
to 
- 6% 
- 1% 
to 
- 1.5% 
MC5 
Increase in green sector 
energy return on energy 
invested 
+ 1% 
to 
+ 6% 
- 2% 
to 
- 10% 
+ 6% 
to 
+ 44% 
- 1% 
to 
- 8% 
- 1.5% 
to 
- 2.5% 
MC6 
Ethical household's divest 
from brown sector goods 
+ 5% 
to 
+ 9% 
- 11% 
to 
- 13% 
+ 52% 
- 10% 
to 
- 13% 
- 2.5% 
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relatively long lifespans of many of these assets. For example, the average lifespan of a fossil fuel 
power plant is 40 years (Pfeiffer et al., 2016). The downstream oil industry also has very long lived 
capital assets (IEA [2013a], Grant et al. [2017]). The low depreciation rates/long lifespans of fossil 
fuel capital assets makes these assets vulnerable to asset stranding due to unexpected changes in 
market conditions. Ultimately, the model is calibrated so that the depreciation rate of brown and 
green capital is lower than the deprecation rate of other sector capital.  
The second component in factor (1) is the rate at which the brown sector’s output falls. In reality, 
the rate at which the brown sector’s output is likely to fall will depend upon a number of factors, 
including:  
(a) The speed at which the output of the low carbon energy sector can be increased (the green 
sector in the model). In the model, this idea is captured by placing supply constraints on 
each sector, so that output is constrained by the level of capital and speed at which a 
sector’s capital can be increased. These supply constraints affect the speed at which the 
transition to a low carbon economy can occur (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1.2). 
(b) The extent to which energy users can reduce their overall demand for energy (i.e. make 
efficiency savings). In the model, energy demand is determined through the AIDS equations 
(for households) and the coefficients in the 3 by 2 A-matrix (for firms) (see Chapter 4, 
Section 4.2.1.6 and 4.2.2.3). 
(c) The extent to which it is possible to substitute different types of energy for each other (i.e. 
switch between high and low carbon forms of energy). In the model, the ease of 
substitutability is captured through the parameters attached to the price variables in the 
AIDS and IO equations (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1). The values of these parameters are 
varied in each simulation (the GH and GL parameter regimes).  
In the transition simulations in Chapter 6, factor (a) significantly affects the speed at which the 
economy is able to transition to a low carbon economy, and consequently the quantity of assets that 
are stranded. In the market conditions simulations in Chapter 7, factor (c) is very important in 
determining how a change in market conditions affects the demand for green and brown energy, 
and, through this, the quantity of stranded assets. Indeed, the results in Chapter 7 suggest that the 
demand for brown energy will be more resilient to changes in relative prices if energy from brown 
and green sources are not very good substitutes for each other, with concomitant effects on the 
stranding of brown capital.  
Factor (2) emphasises the importance of expectations in determining the level of stranding. It says 
that a sector will see its assets stranded if it produces more capital than it needs to produce its 
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output. In the market conditions simulations (Chapter 7), each change in market conditions is 
unexpected, and, as such, the results in this chapter show how different and unexpected changes in 
market conditions might strand capital assets. Conversely, in the transition simulations (Chapter 6) 
two of the transitions are expected while two are unexpected. These simulations thus look at what 
might happen if fossil fuel firms are able to anticipate the transition to a low carbon economy (at the 
point at which the transition starts) compared to when they carry on as though it is ‘business as 
usual’. The results of these simulations suggest that less assets will be stranded if brown firms are 
able to anticipate the transition, compared to when they are unable to anticipate the transition (see 
Table 8.1).  
However, being able to anticipate the transition at the point at which it starts may not protect 
brown firms from asset stranding: in the alternate fast transition (T3) some assets are stranded 
(albeit far less than in the baseline fast transition [T1]), despite brown firms reducing their 
investment expenditures to zero (because in this transition brown output falls more quickly than 
brown capital depreciates). Hence, for the brown sector, investing appropriately is a necessary 
condition to avoid asset stranding, although in some cases it may not be sufficient.   
It is worth noting that each transition simulated in Chapter 6 could have been completed faster if 
green capital had increased at a faster rate. Of course, this implies that the demand for brown 
energy would also have fallen more quickly, so that more brown assets would have been stranded. 
Thus, we can also say that brown firms will see more of their assets stranded if the green sector is 
able to anticipate the energy transition and increase their investment expenditures accordingly. 
Thus, the results of the transition simulations could be underestimating the overall level of stranding 
that might be possible. 
Chapter 7 looks at how changes in market conditions might lead to the stranding of fossil fuel assets. 
Each simulation is based on one of the changes in market conditions identified in Chapter 2 (Section 
2.3). The results from these simulations are summarised in Table 8.2. As can be seen by comparing 
Tables 8.1 and 8.2, in general the market conditions simulations lead to less stranding than the 
transition simulations. This lower level of stranding is a result of the demand for brown goods falling 
by less in the market conditions simulations. This is itself related to the nature of the market 
conditions simulations, the functional form of the equations that determine the demand for green 
and brown goods (Chapter 4, equations 51 - 65, 112 - 122), and the sensitivity of demand to the 
change in relative prices that is engendered by each change in market conditions.   
Concerning the nature of each change in market conditions, each simulation alters the value of a 
particular parameter from one level to another, over a five-year period. As such, the magnitude of 
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each change in market conditions is limited, and, given the structure of the demand equations, a 
step change in a parameter (i.e. a change in market conditions) is only able to produce a step change 
in the level of demand for green and brown goods. In addition, the model may not be able to pick up 
the full effect of some the changes in market conditions. For example, as outlined in Chapter 2 
(Section 2.3.4), divestment campaigns are likely to have a number of indirect effects. For example, a 
divestment campaign could stigmatise the fossil fuel industry, which could then lead to new 
legislation and regulations, an increase in ‘legislative uncertainty’, or divestment by other investors 
(including banks) (Ansar et al., 2013). Consequently, each market condition simulation’s ability to 
affect demand is limited by both the magnitude of the change in market conditions, the structure of 
the demand equations, and, given the structure of the demand equations, the sensitivity of demand 
to changes in relative prices (which is captured through the GH and GL parameter regimes). 
It is possible that agents will be more sensitive to prices than is assumed in the simulations, at least 
in the long run. For example, Davis and Kilian (2011) argue that the price elasticity of demand (for 
gasoline) might vary depending on the cause of the price change. As they put it:  
“Price changes induced by tax changes are more persistent than other price changes and thus may 
induce larger behavioural changes. In addition, gasoline tax increases are often accompanied by 
media coverage that may have an effect of its own.” (Davis and Kilian, 2011, p.1188) 
Hence, changes in prices that are perceived as permanent (e.g. due to the introduction of a carbon 
tax) are likely to elicit larger changes in demand than when a price change is perceived as temporary. 
Thus, a change in brown prices that is caused by the introduction of a carbon tax might lead to a 
larger change in demand than one might expect from looking at price elasticities that are derived 
from price changes that are either smaller or perceived as being temporary. Sorrell (2009, p.32) also 
cautions against reading too much into empirical estimates of price elasticities: 
“Whatever their scope and origin, estimates of price elasticities should be treated with caution. 
Aside from the difficulties of estimation, behavioural responses are contingent upon technical, 
institutional, policy and demographic factors that vary widely between different groups and over 
time. Demand responses are known to vary with the level of prices, the origin of the price changes 
(for example, exogenous versus policy induced), expectations of future prices, government fiscal 
policy (for example, recycling of carbon tax revenues), saturation effects, and other factors ... The 
past is not necessarily a good guide to the future in this area, and it is possible that the very long-
run response to price changes may exceed those found in empirical studies that from relatively 
short time periods.” (Sorrell, 2009, p.32) 
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Price changes might affect agents in a number of ways. For example, a price hike that is seen as 
permanent might lead agents to economise their fossil fuel consumption by purchasing an electric 
vehicle, retrofitting the buildings they own, or installing solar panels. Likewise, a carbon tax may 
encourage utilities companies to move towards exposing their customers to wholesale energy 
market prices, to incentivise them to consume energy when it is at its cheapest (i.e. when 
renewables are generating large amounts of energy). Firms may also change their behaviour in 
response to high energy prices, by changing their methods of production so that they are less energy 
intensive. In addition, higher fossil fuel energy prices may drive innovation and investment in the 
renewable energy, energy storage and electric vehicle sectors. This could then lead to a fall in 
renewable and electric vehicle prices (Lewis et al., 2014b), or an increase in the times at which 
renewable energy is available for consumption (due to advances in storage technology overcoming 
renewable energy’s intermittency issue). 
Unfortunately, these dynamic and potentially non-linear responses to one-off changes in market 
conditions are precluded from occurring by the model’s structure and the exogenous nature of some 
of the model’s parameters. For example, while some of the responses outlined in the previous 
paragraph might be best represented within the model by making households and firms more 
sensitive to green and brown energy prices, others would be better represented by making 
households and firms more sensitive to energy prices overall (so that they are better able to reduce 
overall energy consumption when energy prices rise). Others still would be best represented by 
changing the values taken by the exogenous parameters in the AIDS and IO equations (λA gg , λA gb , λA 
go , λAIDS g e , λAIDS g n). Finally, an improvement in storage technology that makes renewable energy a 
perfect substitute for fossil fuel energy might even imply a change in the structure of the demand 
equations themselves (as discussed below). Thus, in reality there may be complex, dynamic, and 
non-linear interactions between changes in prices that are perceived as being permanent and the 
demand for energy goods. Thus, the impact on demand and asset stranding could be larger than is 
suggested by the market conditions simulations.  
As outlined above, another factor that might limit the impact of a change in market conditions on 
demand is the structure of the demand equations themselves (see Chapter 4, equations 51 - 65, 112 
- 122). In the model presented in Chapter 4, the structure of the demand equations implies that 
green and brown goods (and energy and other goods) are not perfect substitutes for each other. For 
example, each energy demand equation contains a parameter (λAIDS g x , λAIDS b x , λA gj , λA bj) that 
determines the proportion of spending on green and brown goods when green and brown prices are 
equal. In Chapter 5 (Section 5.1.2), it was argued that these parameters capture some of the 
heterogeneity between green and brown forms of energy. As such, these parameters limit the ability  
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of households and firms to substitute between energy sources when prices change. Conversely, if 
green and brown goods were perfectly homogenous (and households were indifferent between 
green and brown energy) then it would make more sense for the demand equations to be set up in 
such a way so that the sector with the lower price sells all it can (up to its capacity limit), while the 
sector with the higher price fulfils the residual demand. In this situation, small price changes could 
have very large effects on energy demand and asset stranding.  
In conclusion, there are two main reasons why the market conditions simulations only generate a 
relatively small amount of stranding (when compared to the transition simulation). First, the model 
assumes that renewable and fossil fuel energy sources are not perfect substitutes for each other 
(due to the reasons outlined in Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2). Second, the model is structured in such a 
way so that changes in market conditions are unable to set off a chain of events that leads to a 
continuous change in the demand for green and brown goods.  
8.1.2 Energy shortages  
An interesting result from the transition simulations (and one that is not picked up in the literature) 
is that there may be a trade-off between the level of asset stranding and the likelihood of energy 
shortages. Table 8.1 includes the findings of the transition simulations from Chapter 6 regarding this 
trade off. It shows how the fast transitions (T1, T3) are associated with higher levels of stranding, 
while the alternate transitions (T3, T4) are associated with higher levels of brown sector capacity 
utilisation (recall that the green sector is operating at 100% capacity utilisation for almost the whole 
of each simulation’s transition period). Notice that the transition simulation with the lowest amount 
of asset stranding – the alternate slow simulation (T4) – is the simulation in which the brown sector’s 
capacity utilisation is highest (Figure 8.1 and 8.2). 
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
1: Gᴴ Aᴸ 2: Gᴴ Aᴴ 3: Gᴸ Aᴸ 4: Gᴸ Aᴴ
Figure 8.1 (T4): Capacity utilisation (%) (BF)   Figure 8.2 (T4): Capacity utilisation (%) (GF) 
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Figure 8.3 (T1): Real total output (BF) 
 
Figure 8.4 (T1): Real total output (GF) 
 
 
Therefore, while brown firms are able to reduce asset stranding by cutting their investment 
expenditures, this lower level of stranding might come at the ‘cost’ of considerably higher levels of 
energy sector capacity utilisation. As such, one possible side effect of an attempt by brown firms to 
limit stranding could be energy shortages, at least during the transition period (and assuming there 
is no policy response to a reduction in spare capacity). Of course, if green firms are able to anticipate 
the transition (and rapidly increase their capital) then this will alleviate these capacity issues. 
However, as pointed out above, a faster increase in green capital will increase the stranding of 
brown capital assets. 
Several factors might make energy shortages more or less likely to crystallise. Energy shortages are 
more likely if energy firms’ expectations prove to be incorrect, so that brown firms cut their 
investment expenditures by too much or for too long. Energy shortages may also occur if green firms 
do not increase their investment expenditures fast enough. Likewise an unexpected increase in 
overall energy demand (e.g. due to exceptionally cold weather or an increase in economic activity), 
could push the demand for energy above the energy sector’s maximum capacity.  
8.1.3 Expectations and investment  
An important result from Chapter 6 was that each transition takes slightly longer than the change in 
demand (due to green capital not increasing ‘quickly enough’). This is because the green sector’s 
output is restricted by its capital. Consequently, the fast transitions take around 16 years to 
complete, even though demand changes over a 10-year period (Figure 8.3 and 8.4), while the slower 
transitions take around 32 years to complete, even though demand changes over a 30-year period. 
This implies that early action will be crucial to ensuring that warming is kept within a particular 
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threshold, or that policy action will need to be taken to ensure the transition happens in a timely 
manner. 
In the model, the ‘blame’ for the slow transition lies with the way in which firm’s form their 
expectations regarding the demand for their output (equation  21, Chapter 4) and the partial 
adjustment function (equation 25, Chapter 4). As discussed previously, firms’ expectations of 
demand are based on a simple extrapolation of the trend in demand over the previous periods. 
Thus, when the demand for green goods is increasing (as it is at the beginning of the transition 
period) green firms’ target level of capital will lag behind the ‘correct’ capital target. As such, green 
firms end up increasing their capital target too slowly at the beginning of the transition period.  
In addition, the partial adjustment function ensures that each firm sector only makes up 10% of the 
difference between its current level of capital and its target level of capital in each period. As such, it 
takes some time for a firm sector to reach its target level of capital. Consequently each transition 
takes a significant amount of time to come about, regardless of how expectations are formed.  
8.1.4 Final demand   
In each of the transition simulations, final demand (i.e. GDP) is higher in the final steady state than it 
is in the initial steady state (see Table 8.1) (although in some cases the final steady state is reached 
after the end of the simulation period). The reason for this is relatively simple: the green sector 
requires more intermediate energy goods than the brown sector to produce a unit of its output (see 
Chapter 5). The higher level of intermediate goods production requires a higher level of capital and 
employment, which means more investment and consumption (which implies a higher level of final 
demand). The increase in investment and intermediate goods inputs also leads to an increase in 
prices (because prices are set as a mark-up over unit costs). This is explained in more detail in 
Chapter 6, Section 6.3.1.  
Are these increases in final demand likely to hold in reality? It turns out that in each simulation the 
long run positive effects on final demand are conditional on firms being able to draw on a pool of 
unemployed labour (in the model, firms can always find someone willing to work at the going wage). 
If, instead, the model incorporated a more realistic labour market, in which output was limited by 
the availability of labour and the wage rate responded to the unemployment rate, then the 
transition could potentially lead to a reduction in real final demand and/or an increase in inflation.  
To see why this might be the case, imagine the economy is at full employment at the beginning of 
the transition period. As the transition proceeds, the energy sector’s demand for intermediate 
energy goods increases (i.e. the overall EROEI of the energy sector declines), due to the assumption 
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that green firms require more energy inputs than brown firms to produce a unit of their output. Of 
course, the production of these additional intermediate goods requires an increase in labour and 
capital in the energy sector. However, because the economy is already at full employment, this 
increase in employment in the energy sector necessitates a decrease in employment in the other 
sector. Because firms require labour to produce their output, the decrease in labour in the other 
sector limits the quantity of goods the other sector can produce. Hence, in an economy already at 
full employment, a transition to a low-carbon economy could be characterised by the production of 
less consumption goods, so that final demand falls even as total output remains constant. It may 
also be characterised by an increase in inflation, as the increase in the demand for labour leads to an 
upwards pressure on wages. This is particularly concerning, given that a finding from Chapter 6 is 
that the transition is likely to create its own inflationary pressures, so that the possibility exists that 
these two sources of inflation could feed on each, in the process creating a large increase in prices 
across the transition period.  
In addition to these long run effects, each simulation also sees some short-run effects on final 
demand. In each of the baseline transitions (T1, T2) there is a positive short-run impact on final 
demand, while in each of the alternate transitions (T3, T4) the short run impact on final demand is 
negative. The impact of each transition on short run demand is mainly caused by the green and 
brown sector’s investment expenditures (and the impact these expenditures have on employment 
and consumption). For example, in the baseline transitions (T1, T2), brown firms’ invest as normal, 
and, as such, in these simulations the overall energy sector’s investment is higher than it is in the 
alternate transitions (T3, T4), in which brown firms drastically cut their investment expenditures as 
the transition starts. What is interesting about this is that in the baseline transition simulations 
stranding is higher than it is in the alternate transition simulations. Hence, in the transition 
simulation experiments presented in Chapter 6, the quantity of stranded assets is positively 
correlated with final demand. This positive correlation occurs because asset stranding is associated 
with excess capital in the brown sector, and therefore an overcapitalisation of output as a whole 
(the production of capital requires investment, which is a component in final demand). Hence, one 
of the real effects of asset stranding is to increase final demand (GDP) (although the capital the 
investment produces is subsequently stranded). 
This result should of course be treated with a note of caution – that asset stranding might lead to an 
increase in GDP in both the short and long run stands in contrast to much of the stranded assets 
literature, which argues that asset stranding is likely to negatively affect GDP (e.g. see Chapter 2, 
Section 2.4, and Carney [2015], CTI [2013, 2015], Weyzig et al. [2014], Battiston et al. [2016], and 
Gros et al. [2016]). These negative impacts are assumed, however, to occur through financial 
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markets. For example, a quick transition to a low-carbon economy, the associated stranding of fossil 
fuel assets, and the impact this has on the market value of fossil fuel firms could lead to self-
reinforcing cycles of capital losses and tightening financial market conditions. Losses on financial 
markets and defaults on loans might also affect the banking system. This is more likely if certain 
banks hold a disproportionately large amount of fossil fuel firms’ debt (which is itself more likely if a 
divestment campaign is successful in getting certain banks and households to divest their holdings of 
brown debt and equity assets, so that brown assets are concentrated on a smaller number of 
balance sheets). In extremis, the disruption to financial markets might even lead to a bank failure 
and/or a financial crisis. Of course, any disruption to financial markets is likely to affect both 
consumer confidence and firms’ investment plans.  
Unfortunately, the model is unable to simulate the behaviours that might lead to a number of these 
negative financial effects. As such, it should be noted that each transition’s positive effect on final 
demand is conditional on the transition and asset stranding not having any disruptive effects on 
consumers, firms, or financial markets (e.g. via a loss of confidence, a credit crunch or even a 
banking or financial crisis). If any of these occur, then the overall effect of asset stranding and a 
transition to a low carbon economy might not be positive. 
Another factor that significantly affects final demand is the general price level. An increase in the 
general price level tends to reduce final demand, while a decrease in the general price level tends to 
increase final demand. These changes in final demand operate through the definition of real 
disposable income and the consumption function (Equations 108 and 110, Chapter 4), both of which 
are reproduced here for convenience. The consumption function says that real consumption (cx) 
depends on an autonomous term (ψ0 x), the product of expected real disposable income (ydex) and 
the marginal propensity to consume out of income (ψ1 x), and the product of lagged real wealth (vx(-
1)) and the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth (ψ2 x). The definition of regular real 
disposable income says that regular real disposable income (ydx) is equal to the sum of regular 
nominal disposable income (YDx) divided by the price level (px), plus a term (πx ∙ Vx (-1) / px) which 
adjusts for any losses (or gains) due to the effect of inflation (πx) on the value of real wealth (the 
inflation tax/loss). 
162 ydx = (YDx / px) - (πx ∙ Vx (-1) / px) 
110  cx = ψ0 x + ψ1 x ∙ ydex + ψ2 x ∙ vx(-1) 
These equations imply that higher prices will lead to a fall in real wealth and an increase in the value 
of the inflation loss term, while lower prices will see an increase in real wealth and a decrease in the 
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value of the inflation loss term. Thus, higher prices lead to a fall in real consumption, while lower 
prices lead to an increase in real consumption.   
The impact of a change in prices on final demand is particularly visible in the baseline carbon tax 
(MC1) simulation. In this simulation, the introduction of a carbon tax leads to an increase in the 
general price level of around 4%, which then causes final demand to fall by around 3%. However, the 
effect on final demand is partially offset by changes in the EROEI – the increase in brown prices 
causes agents to switch from brown to green energy goods. Because green goods require more 
intermediate energy goods to produce than brown goods, the switch leads to an increase in 
investment and employment, both of which positively affect final demand.  
There is a question as to whether a change in prices will lead to the types of changes in final demand 
that are observed in the simulations. As outlined above, prices affect final demand via real 
household wealth, which affects household consumption. An increase in prices negatively affects 
real consumption because households have a positive real wealth. Conversely, firms have negative 
real wealth. However, whereas real wealth affects households’ consumption decisions, the real 
value of debt does not affect firms’ investment decisions. This asymmetry causes a change in prices 
to impact on final demand. The extent to which a change in prices impacts on final demand depends 
on the calibration of the consumption function and the value of household wealth. It is worth noting 
that in the model households have no liabilities (in part because they do not borrow from banks) 
and, as such, their wealth may be greater than it otherwise would be. Thus, one limitation of the 
model that may be affecting the results (at least concerning the impact of prices on final demand) is 
that households do not borrow from banks. It should also be noted that this limitation is common to 
most SFC models.  
8.1.5 Productivity  
In the model specified in Chapter 4, each firm sector’s labour productivity is endogenously 
determined as a function of its capital-labour ratio (Equation 77, Chapter 4): 
77 prPOT j = (kj / nj)αj  
Where (prPOT j) is potential labour productivity, (kj) is real capital, (nj) is employment, and (αj) is an 
exogenously determined parameter that takes a value between zero and one (so that labour 
productivity displays decreasing returns to the capital-labour ratio).88 
                                                          
88 This equation can be derived from a Cobb-Douglas production, with (αj) the output elasticity on capital.  
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Endogenously determining labour productivity in a SFC model is relatively unusual – most SFC 
models either exogenously fix labour productivity (in stationary state models) or set it to grow at an 
exogenous rate (in growth models) (see Chapter 3, Section 3.1.4). One consequence of endogenising 
labour productivity is that investment expenditures benefit the investing firm: investment increases 
the capital-labour ratio, the increase in the capital-labour ratio leads to an increase in labour 
productivity, the increase in labour productivity lowers the cost of production, and a lower cost of 
production mean lower prices and so an increase in demand. Conversely, if instead the capital-
labour ratio did not affect labour productivity, the increase in investment would increase both costs 
and prices (see Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1.2). This increase in costs and prices would then lead to a fall 
in demand, so that an increase in investment would ultimately hurt the investing firm. As a result, 
failing to endogenise labour productivity could lead to some counterintuitive results in the market 
conditions simulations that look at a change in the cost of capital (e.g. MC3 and MC4). 
However, there are potentially some issues with specifying labour productivity in this way. Most 
obviously, a fall in the demand for a sector’s goods that leads to a reduction in employment might 
lead to an increase in the sector’s capital-labour ratio and so its level of labour productivity. This is 
because the level of employment in a firm sector is always equal to the demand for labour by that 
firm sector, whereas capital can only fall as fast as it depreciates. This dynamic can be seen in a 
number of the simulations from Chapters 6 and 7. 
For example, in the baseline fast transition simulation (T1), the decline in the demand for brown 
goods leads to changes in the capital-labour ratio that causes productivity in the brown sector to 
peak at 40 - 60% above its initial steady state value. At the same time, brown prices fall by around 
4%. Similarly, in the baseline slow transition (T2) and alternate fast (T3) transitions, productivity in 
the brown sector peaks at around 30 - 40% above its initial steady state value, which causes brown 
prices to fall by around 2 - 3%. Conversely, in the alternate slow transition (T4) the sharp reduction 
in brown investment means that brown firm productivity only increases by around 5 - 10%. In 
addition, the reduction in investment means that these increases in productivity happen more 
towards the end of the transition period. By this point, brown firms have significantly increased their 
intermediate consumption of the more expensive green energy. This leads to an increase in unit 
costs that offsets the fall in prices caused by the increase in labour productivity, so that in this 
simulation brown prices actually increase by 1 - 3%.  
A number of the market condition simulations also see a fall in demand for brown goods that leads 
to an increase in labour productivity in the brown sector: in MC1 productivity increases by 2.5 - 
4.5%, in MC2 productivity increases by 1.5 - 2.5%, in MC5 productivity increases by 0.5 - 2%, and in 
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MC6 productivity increases by 2.5 - 3% (in both MC3 and MC4 the brown sector’s productivity falls 
slightly). In these simulations, the increase in productivity does not necessarily translate to a fall in 
brown prices, as other factors may cause brown prices to increase (e.g. the carbon tax in MC1 and 
MC2). Nevertheless, an increase in labour productivity still puts downward pressure on brown 
prices, even if it does not cause brown prices to decrease.  
Thus, in both the transition and the market conditions simulations the specification of the labour 
productivity equations means that labour productivity tends to increase when the demand for 
brown goods falls. This leads to downward pressure on brown prices and so an increase in the 
demand for brown goods relative to what it would have been if prices had remained constant. Of 
course, without this downward pressure on brown prices, the demand for brown goods would have 
been even lower, and consequently, the level of stranding would have been higher. This leads to the 
question as to whether the relationship between labour productivity and employment – particularly 
concerning the effect that a reduction in employment has on labour productivity – is likely to hold in 
reality, or whether it is just an artefact of the model.  
One potential issue is that the level of employment in a firm sector is always equal to the demand 
for labour from that firm sector. Conversely, in the real world, firms may find it difficult to fire 
workers, or may hoard labour in downturns to avoid both the costs of firing workers in the downturn 
and the costs of hiring and training workers when demand picks up again. If labour instead was 
made to respond more slowly to changes in demand, the changes in productivity might be smaller, 
or may even move in the opposite direction.  
Another issue is whether it is realistic to assume that the level of capital per employee influences 
labour productivity (particularly when this ratio changes due to a fall in employment rather than due 
to an increase in investment). In the real world, there are a number of different types of capital, not 
all of which can be substituted with labour (Susskind, 2017). For those types of capital that can be 
substituted with labour, a change in the capital-labour ratio will affect labour productivity. 
Conversely, the operation of certain types of capital might require a specific quantity of labour. For 
these types of capital, a reduction in employment relative to capital will not lead to an increase in 
labour productivity. However, if a firm that employs only this type of capital is able to respond to a 
fall in demand by shedding some overhead labour, or labour that is not directly involved in the 
production process, then labour productivity at the firm level will increase, even as the productivity 
of direct labour remains constant.  
Another possibility would have been to assume that the level of capital per employee did not 
influence labour productivity (i.e. the implicit production function was Leontief rather than Cobb-
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Douglas). In this case, a reduction in employment that led to an increase in the capital-labour ratio 
would not affect labour productivity and so prices. As such, brown sector stranding would 
presumably be higher than it is in those simulations in which the brown sector’s capital-labour ratio 
increases. In addition, if overhead labour were included in the model then overall labour 
productivity (i.e. the productivity of direct and overhead labour together) would in fact decrease 
when the capital-labour increased due to a fall in employment, which would lead to an increase in 
prices. In this case, labour productivity would be positively rather than negatively correlated with 
capacity utilisation. This is of course the opposite of what occurs in the model. Once again, this 
would presumably cause brown sector stranding to be higher than is found in the simulations in 
Chapters 6 and 7 in which labour productivity increases due to a fall in the capital-labour ratio.  
To sum up, while some economic theories assume that labour productivity can be influenced by the 
capital-labour ratio, others assume the opposite. As such, the formulation of the labour productivity 
function could be considered a limitation of the model that leads to an underestimation of asset 
stranding in the brown sector. However, despite these limitations, endogenising labour productivity 
was felt to be important – when labour productivity is exogenously determined an increase in green 
investment (as occurs in MC3 and MC4) leads to an increase in the green sector’s costs and prices, 
and so a fall in the demand for its goods. Hence, an increase in green investment harm green firms.  
8.1.6 Financial markets   
Section 2.4 in Chapter 2 argued that the stranding of fossil fuel assets might have a number of 
negative economic effects, with these effects occurring primarily via financial markets. In particular, 
it argued that asset stranding, or the recognition that asset stranding is likely to occur in the future, 
could lead to a sudden reduction in the market value of fossil fuel firms, which could then lead to 
self-reinforcing cycles of capital losses and tightening financial market conditions (Carney [2015], 
Battiston et al. [2016]). Overall, the simulations from Chapters 6 and 7 support the view that asset 
stranding is likely to lead to a reduction in the market value of fossil fuel firms, although the model 
was unable to produce self-reinforcing cycles of capital losses or tightening financial market 
conditions.  
In each of transition simulations the brown energy sector’s market value falls by at least 60% 
between the beginning and the end of each simulation period, with the market value falling further 
in the faster transitions and baseline transitions (see Table 8.1). The brown sector’s return on equity 
also falls between the beginning and the end of the simulation period, with larger reductions in the 
faster transitions (T1, T3) when compared to the slower transitions (T2, T4), and in the baseline  
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transitions (T1, T2) when compared to the alternate transitions (T3, T4) (Figure 8.5 to 8.8). 
Interestingly, the reduction in brown investment in the alternate transitions means that the brown 
sector’s return on equity initially increases, before falling again towards the end of the simulation 
period.  
The larger reduction in the brown sector’s return on equity in the faster transitions is because the 
sector’s income falls faster in these transitions relative to their liabilities (i.e. their bank debts). This 
leads to a reduction in the sector’s distributed profits, which continues until these firms reduce their 
debt to income ratios. The smaller reductions in the anticipated transitions are due to brown firms 
reducing their investment expenditures so that they have more funds to distribute to shareholders. 
However, it is important to note that rather than pay out higher dividends, as brown firms do in the 
alternate simulations, these firms could instead choose to buy back some of their shares. If this were 
to happen, the market value of brown firms would fall by less. 
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Figure 8.5 (T1): Return on equity (BF) 
 
Figure 8.6 (T2): Return on equity (BF) 
 
Figure 8.7 (T3): Return on equity (BF) 
 
Figure 8.8 (T4): Return on equity (BF) 
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The results of the transition simulations therefore support the idea that a transition to a low carbon 
economy could lead to a significant reduction in the market value of fossil fuel firms (as discussed in 
Chapter 2, Section 2.4), and that more abrupt and unexpected transitions are likely to have larger 
negative effects on financial markets (as argued by Carney [2015], CTI [2013, 2015], Weyzig et al. 
[2014], Battiston et al. [2016], and Gros et al. [2016]) (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3). However, asset 
prices are not revalued immediately, and there are no self-reinforcing cycles of capital losses and 
tightening financial market conditions. One reason for this is that the transition takes time89, so that 
brown firms continue to make (and distribute) profits (albeit at a reduced level) throughout the 
simulation period. These distributed profits prevent the market value of brown firms falling below a 
certain level. Thus, the model provides some limited support for some of the arguments made by 
IPIECA (2014) and Meyer and Brinker (2014) – namely that fossil fuel asset prices are unlikely to be 
revised suddenly. However, the support for the arguments in IPIECA (2014) and Meyer and Brinker 
(2014) should be placed into the context of the model’s limitations – namely that the model lacks 
the features that might produce an immediate revision in asset prices. 
While the demand for fossil fuels is unlikely to fall at a significant pace, at least not in the immediate 
future, some of the market conditions simulations did suggest that asset prices could change quickly 
for other reasons (e.g. due to a carbon tax or a change in fossil fuel prices). For example, in the 
alternate carbon tax simulation (MC2) the decision by brown firms to only pass through 50% of the 
cost of the carbon tax leads to a significant fall (11% - 23%) in the market value of brown firms. 
Similarly, in the simulation in which ethical households divest from brown equities (MC3), the 
market value of brown firms falls by 15 - 23%. The other market conditions simulations saw smaller 
reductions in brown firms’ market values, although in some cases these reductions were still 
significant (e.g. the market value of brown firms fell by 10 - 15% in the baseline carbon tax 
simulation [MC1], and by 10 - 13% in simulation in which ethical household's divest from brown 
sector goods [MC6]). Crucially, each change in market conditions occurs over a relatively short 
period of time, which means a faster change in the brown firm sector’s market capitalisation. Of 
course, unlike the transition simulations, these changes in market conditions (with the possible 
exception of the simulations that look at changes in green firms’ EROEI [MC5] and ethical 
households divesting from brown goods [MC6]) could conceivably occur over even shorter periods – 
                                                          
89 Although this result is undoubtedly influenced by the specification of each firm sector’s capital target and 
investment functions. See Section 8.1.3. 
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leading to even faster revaluations in market values. Needless to say, the faster market values 
change the greater the chance that these losses will significantly affect financial markets and other 
parts of the economy (CTI [2013, 2015], Weyzig et al. [2014], Carney [2015], IEA [2015a], Battiston et 
al. [2016], Gros et al. [2016], IEA [2016] IEA/IRENA [2017]). Table 8.2 summarises some of the 
financial impacts of the market conditions simulations. 
One of the interesting results from the market conditions simulations is that in certain circumstances 
brown firms may be able to decide between stranding their assets and suffering significant losses in 
their market value – that is, in certain circumstances, asset stranding and a reduction in the market 
value of brown firms may be negatively correlated rather than positively correlated. For example, in 
the alternate carbon tax simulation (MC2) brown firms choose to pass on half the cost of the carbon 
tax to their customers. As a result, this simulation leads to a significantly lower quantity of stranded 
assets, but a much larger decrease in the market value of brown firms (when compared to the 
baseline carbon tax simulation [MC1]). This implies that a carbon bubble could burst – i.e. there 
could be a rapid revaluation of fossil fuel company values – without a significant quantity of fossil 
fuel assets being stranded. This is in contrast to some of the claims made in the stranded assets 
literature, which sees the rapid revaluation in asset prices as being caused by asset stranding (CTI, 
2011).  
However, it is worth noting that firms without much market power may not be able to pass on much 
(if any) of the cost of the carbon tax to their customers (e.g. any firm that is a price taker – such as 
those in the upstream oil sector). Thus, another interpretation of the alternate carbon tax simulation 
is that it simulates what might happen if a carbon tax is implemented on a subset of fossil fuel firms 
(e.g. the firms in a particular region or country) that have little or no market power. Interestingly, 
Spedding et al. (2008, 2013) argue that OECD oil refineries are more at risk of being targeted by 
climate change legislation than refineries located in other regions, while the IEA 450 scenario (IEA, 
2015b) assumes that a CO2 price is first adopted in in OECD countries before being extended to other 
major economies later on (see Footnote 17).  
The alternate carbon tax simulation is also able to illustrate, with a little imagination, how a fall in 
the market price of oil might affect the market value of oil companies (as discussed in Chapter 2, 
Sections 2.3 and 2.4.2). This is because by absorbing part of the cost of the carbon tax, brown firms 
are in effect lowering their markup (which is also what happens when market prices fall relative to 
costs). The results of the alternate carbon tax simulation (if interpreted as a forced reduction in the 
markup due to a fall in the market price) are in line with the results of a number of studies presented 
in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.2). For example, Canoils (2015) report that 50 of the largest Canadian oil 
266 
 
and gas companies saw their market capitalisation fall from Can$151bn to Can$84bn due to a $30 
fall in the price of oil. 
The proportion of the cost of a carbon tax that firms pass on to their customers will depend on a 
number of factors, including the market power of the affected firms and the relative power of the 
affected firms’ shareholders. Firms with more market power will be able to pass through more of the 
cost of a carbon tax to customers, although whether they chose to do this or not will depend on 
what they perceive the likely demand response to be in both the short and the long run, the relative 
power of shareholders, and the extent to which their shareholders prioritise short-term returns over 
maintaining market share. Indeed, as Lewis et al. (2014b) point out, higher fossil fuel prices may lead 
to innovation in renewable and storage technology that leads to the stranding of fossil fuel assets.   
The proportion of any cost that is passed through to consumers is also likely to impact on inequality, 
especially when the ownership of energy firms is unequally distributed and energy is a higher 
percentage of costs for low-income consumers. As such, and although it is not modelled explicitly, 
the baseline carbon tax simulation (MC1) (with 100% pass-through) might be expected to lead to 
higher inequality than the alternate carbon tax simulation (MC2) (with 50% pass-through). This 
implies that there may need to be some kind of additional policy response to the introduction of a 
new policy or a change in market conditions that leads to an increase in energy prices. 
The simulation that looked at ethical households divesting from brown equities (MC3) saw some of 
the largest falls in brown equity prices. This isn’t overly surprising, given that: i) the simulation itself 
saw 30% of brown equity holders (the ethical households) divest from brown equities; and ii) the 
calibration of the portfolio allocation equations is such that, even in the (AH) regimes, the increase in 
the brown sector’s return on equity does not incentivise an increase in the demand for brown 
equities from normal households that completely offsets the fall in demand due to the divestment 
by ethical households. This second point raises a question as to whether these large changes in 
equity prices are realistic.  
Interestingly, in the brown equity divestment simulation (MC3), large falls in brown equity prices 
only slightly affect the level of demand for brown goods and so the level of stranding. The reason for 
this is quite simple – brown firms only finance a small amount of their net investment expenditures 
using equities, and are also able to substitute away from equity financing as the return on equity 
increases. As such, the results of these simulations support the arguments put forward in much of 
the divestment literature – namely that divestment is unlikely to have a significant direct effect on 
the demand for fossil fuels (Ansar et al., 2013). 
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The model was also able to provide some qualified support for the idea that asset stranding might 
negatively affect the banking system. In particular, the baseline fast transition simulation (see 
Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1) showed that the transition pushes the profits of the brown firm sector 
close to zero. This suggests that brown firms could be at risk of defaulting on their loans – Godin et 
al. (2016) assume that brown firms default on their loans when their profits fall to zero. 
Interestingly, at this point around six percent of the banking sector’s assets are loans to brown firms. 
Now, in this model banks have no equity capital, and firms cannot default on their loans, but if banks 
did have capital, and if firms were able to default on their loans, then the transition could potentially 
generate a banking crisis. However, it should be borne in mind that the banking sector’s balance 
sheet is not empirically calibrated. As such, the model may overstate the exposure of the banking 
sector to fossil fuel firms. Even so, these results indicate that faster (and unexpected) transitions 
could be associated with significant losses for the banking sector. In addition, these losses could be 
magnified through indirect and second round effects (such as those described in Battiston et al. 
[2016]). The model used here was unfortunately unable to simulate these second round and indirect 
effects. 
8.1.7 Model stability 
In the model in Chapter 4, the return on equity equation (equation 42) is set up so that a firm 
sector’s return on equity (rK j) (the dividend yield) is equal to its dividend payments (FDIS j) divided by 
its market capitalisation (pE j ∙ eS j): 
42 rK j = FDIS j / (pE j ∙ eS j)  
Conversely, in Godley and Lavoie (2007a), the return on equity equations are set up so that the firm 
sector’s return on equity is equal to its dividend payments divided by its market capitalisation in the 
previous period (pE j(-1) ∙ eS j(-1)) (equation 42a): 
42a rK j = FDIS j / (pE j(-1) ∙ eS j(-1))  
In Chapter 4, Section 4.1.2.5(c), it was mentioned that equation 42 is used rather than equation 42a 
in order to maintain model stability. This section will briefly discuss why instability arises when 
equation 42a is used, and, as such, will provide a justification for the chosen form of the return on 
equity equation as it appears in the model (i.e. equation 42).   
The model in Chapter 4 can become unstable when both equation 42a is used and when the values 
taken by the parameters that determine the sensitivity of households to the return on financial 
assets in the household portfolio allocation equations are set too high (the parameters that are 
varied in the AH/AL regimes). This instability is a result of: i) the way households make their portfolio 
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allocation decisions; ii) the structure of equation 42a; and iii) the small size of the green and brown 
firm sectors relative to the size of the other firm sector (recall from Chapter 5 that the model is 
calibrated so that in the initial steady state the green and brown sectors are around 1.3% and 6.7% 
of total output, respectively, with this calibration based on the relative size of these sectors in the UK 
economy).  
Essentially, when one firm sector is relatively small (so that its profits and market capitalisation are 
also relatively small), even a relatively small reallocation of household wealth into (or out of) that 
sector’s equities can lead to a large change its equity price, and through this its return on equity. 
Because each firm sector’s return on equity determines household portfolio allocation decisions, a 
change in a sector’s return on equity can lead to further changes in household portfolio allocation 
decisions, and therefore equity prices. A change in the price of a sector’s equities will then affect the 
sector’s return on equity in the following period (because the return on equity equation depends on 
the market capitalisation of a firm in the previous period), which will then affect households’ 
portfolio allocation decisions and so equity prices. These changes can get larger period-to-period, so 
creating destabilising cycles that can ultimately crash the model.  
An example might help to clarify how such a destabilising cycle might occur. In this example, the 
model starts in a steady state, before a change in household preferences causes households to 
reduce the amount of wealth that they place into green equities: 
In period 1: The model is in a steady state. 
In period 2: Households reduce the amount of wealth they place into green equities, leading to a fall 
in the sector’s market capitalisation. 
In period 3: The green sector’s return on equity increases (because a sector’s return on equity is 
equal to its distributed profits divided by its market capitalisation in the previous period). Ceteris 
paribus, this leads households to increase the proportion of wealth they place into green equities. If, 
however, the green sector is ’too small’, or if the responsiveness of households to the change in the 
green sector’s return on equity is ‘too large’, then more wealth will be allocated into the green 
sector’s equities than was allocated away from green equities in period 2. Consequently, the green 
sector’s market capitalisation will increase by more than it initially fell, so that the green sector’s 
market capitalisation is now larger than it was in the initial steady state (in period 1). 
In period 4: The increase in the market capitalisation of the green sector means the green sector’s 
return on equity is now lower than it was in the initial steady state (assuming the level of distributed 
profits is the same). Further, because the increase in the amount of wealth placed into green 
equities in period 3 was larger than the amount removed from green equities in period 2, the 
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reduction in the green sector’s return on equity in this period is larger than the increase in the green 
sector’s return on equity was in period 3. The reduction in the green sector’s return on equity leads 
household to reallocate their wealth out of green equities and into other financial assets, with the 
size of the change in the return on equity meaning that more wealth is removed from green equities 
in this period than was placed into green equities in period 3. As such, the market capitalisation of 
the green sector falls by more than it previously increased. 
In period 5: The fall in the market capitalisation of the green sector in the previous period leads to 
an increase in the green sector’s return on equity in this period. Because the fall in the market 
capitalisation of the green sector in the previous period (period 4) was larger than the increase in 
period 3, the green sector’s return on equity is now higher than it was in period 3. The high return 
on green equity leads households to reallocate some of their wealth into green equities – with the 
increase in the amount of wealth allocated to green equities larger than the previous decrease.  
Period 6, 7, 8, etc.:  Absent another shock that stabilises the model, the changes in the green 
sector’s market capitalisation and return on equity will continue to get larger period to period. This 
explosive cycle can ultimately destabilise the model and cause it to crash.  
- 
As outlined above, the main cause of this destabilising cycle is the form of the equation that 
determines each sector’s return on equity (equation 42a), in combination with the very small size of 
at least one of the energy sectors. In equation 42a, a firm sector’s return on equity depends on the 
market capitalisation of the firm sector in the previous period. This equation is from Godley and 
Lavoie (2007a), who follow the convention used in the national accounts. Unfortunately, as outlined 
above, following this convention can destabilise the model when one sector is ‘too small’. It is also 
unrealistic – in reality the decision by an investor to purchase an equity will change the purchased 
equity’s price, and subsequent investors will take into account the new equity price when making 
their own portfolio allocation decisions (i.e. investors do not make their portfolio allocation 
decisions at the same time). Hence, if the market value of a sector increases, investors will consider 
this new information when estimating the potential return on equity. They are unlikely to continue 
to use the market capitalisation from the ‘previous’ period – especially if the previous period was a 
year ago.  
Therefore, in the model in Chapter 4, equation 42 is used rather than 42a. As such, there is mutual 
(circular) causation between (rK j) and (pE j). For example, an increase in the demand for a sector’s 
equities that leads to an increase in (pE j) will lead – in the same period – to a fall in (rK j). This 
reduction in (rK j) will partially offset the initial increase in the demand for the sector’s equities, so 
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that (pE j) ends up increasing by less. By specifying the equation in this way, households take into 
account the impact of their equity purchases on the return on equity (which offsets some of the 
issues caused by investors all making their portfolio allocation decisions at the same time), and firms 
take account of the impact of issuing more equities on the equity price (and therefore the number of 
equities they will have to issue and the dividends they will have to pay) when they choose to finance 
their investment expenditures using equities. This intra-period feedback loop between (rK j) and (pE j) 
prevents some of the destabilising cycles discussed above from emerging. Consequently, the model 
can be calibrated so that households are more responsive to changes in the return on assets without 
destabilising the model.  
8.2 Other model limitations, model extensions 
The SFC model presented in Chapter 4 has a number of limitations, some of which are discussed in 
Section 8.1. This section discusses some additional limitations, and some extensions to the model 
that might address these limitations. The section is split into three parts. Section 8.2.1 discusses the 
limitations and extensions related to the real side of the model, Section 8.2.2 the limitations and 
extensions related to the financial side of the model, and Section 8.2.3 the limitations and 
extensions related to the government and external sectors. 
8.2.1 Limitations and extensions related to the real side of the model 
One of the main limitations of the model, given the subject matter, is that it only focusses on capital 
assets and does not include reserves or resources. This is important, as the stranding of reserves is 
likely to have different effects from the stranding of capital assets. For example, oil and gas 
companies market valuations depend primarily on the value of their proved reserves (see Chapter 2, 
Section 2.4.2). As such, the stranding of these assets is likely to affect the market value of these 
companies. Thus, the inclusion of reserves would allow for more realistic portfolio allocation 
behaviours to be introduced, and so a potentially more realistic modelling of the carbon bubble 
thesis.  
Another limitation of the model is that unemployment is not modelled, and the household wage 
setting relationships do not generate inflation. As outlined in Section 8.1.4, not modelling 
unemployment may be influencing the results of the transition simulations, so that each transition 
leads to an increase in final demand (due to the green sector requiring more intermediate inputs 
than the brown sector to produce a unit of its output). However, the increase in final demand is only 
possible because there is an infinite pool of unemployed labour ready and willing to work at the 
going wage. If this were not the case, the transition to a low carbon economy could actually lead to a 
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reduction in final demand (if the economy started from a position of full employment). Additionally, 
it might lead to significant inflationary pressures. As pointed out in Section 8.1.4, this is particularly 
concerning given that the transition is likely to create its own inflationary pressures. As such, the 
model could be improved by including unemployment and wage setting equations that are able to 
generate inflation. 
Another of the model’s potential limitations relates to the input-output model and the production of 
capital, consumption and intermediate consumption goods. The model assumes that firms require 
the same quantity of intermediate inputs to produce capital, consumption and intermediate 
consumption goods. However, this is unlikely to be true – one of the features of renewable energy is 
that it requires very little in the way of inputs (including energy inputs) in order to produce a unit of 
output, once the capital assets are in place. Thus, the model could be made more realistic by having 
separate A-matrices for each sector’s capital and goods outputs.  
Another of the model’s limitations relates to the aggregated nature of the brown energy sector. As 
outlined in Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1, the model is set up so that the brown energy sector consists of 
the coal, oil, gas and fossil fuel energy generation sectors. There are a number of issues with this. 
First, the likelihood of asset stranding and the risks associated with asset stranding are likely to vary 
between fossil fuel sectors. For example, a major theme in the energy transitions literature (e.g. 
Bowen and Fankhauser [2012], CCC [2013], IEA [2013a], National Grid [2014]), is that a transition to 
a low carbon economy will first require the replacement of coal-fired power plants with gas-fired 
power plants, before these are subsequently replaced with even lower carbon forms of electricity 
generation later on (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2). Thus, coalmines and coal power plants are more 
at risk of stranding in the immediate future, whereas gas fields and gas-fired power plants may be 
more at risk of stranding later on. However, the aggregated nature of the brown energy sector 
means that the model is unable to simulate these possibilities. As such, the model could be 
improved by disaggregating the brown sector into oil, gas and coal sectors. 
Second, the likelihood of asset stranding and the risks associated with asset stranding are likely to 
vary within the coal, oil, gas and fossil fuel energy generation sectors. For example, although coal 
reserves and coal power plants are most at risk of stranding (Caldecott et al. [2015], McGlade and 
Ekins [2015]), IEA (2015a) point out that coal mining is primarily a labour intensive (rather than a 
capital-intensive) activity, and as such the risks to coal mines from their reserves being stranded are 
relatively small (due to lower upfront capital costs). Likewise, oil assets in the downstream sector 
tend to be longer lived than those in the upstream sector (IEA, 2013a). As such, there are different 
risks to upstream and downstream sectors from stranding. Once again, the aggregated nature of the 
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brown energy sector means that the model is unable to pick up these types of stranding. As such, 
the model could be improved by disaggregating the oil, gas and coal sectors into upstream, 
downstream, mining and electricity generation sectors. 
Third, even within a particular sector (e.g. the upstream oil sector, the coal fired power plant sector, 
etc.) differences between firms mean that the likelihood of asset stranding and the risks associated 
with asset stranding will vary from firm to firm. For example, upstream oil firms with higher costs are 
more likely to find their assets stranded by a change in market conditions (e.g. a fall in demand for 
oil/the price of oil) than are upstream oil firms with lower costs (this is the focus of the carbon 
supply cost curve approach). Similarly, firms that produce more pollution (e.g. sub-critical coal 
plants) are more likely to be targeted by climate change legislation, and therefore have their assets 
stranded, than firms that produce less pollution (e.g. super-critical coal plants) (Nelson et al. [2014], 
Caldecott et al. [2015]). Finally, firms located in more developed countries are more likely to be the 
subject of climate change legislation, and therefore have their assets stranded, than those located in 
less developed countries (Spedding et al. [2008, 2013], IEA [2015b]). However, the aggregated 
nature of the brown energy sector means that the model is unable to look into these types of 
stranding. As such, the model could be improved by disaggregating each brown sector (e.g. the coal 
fired power plant sector, the upstream oil sector, etc.) into a number of subsectors (e.g. 
super/subcritical coal fired power plants, low/medium/high cost upstream oil firms, etc.). In 
addition, the introduction of additional firm sectors would enable the modelling of the relationship 
between private and publically owned fossil fuel assets. This is particularly important for modelling 
the effects of a carbon bubble, given the high proportion of fossil fuel assets in public ownership 
(CTI, 2011). 
8.2.2 Limitations and extensions related to the financial side of the model 
As outlined in Chapter 4, the model’s banking sector is quite simple. This simplicity precluded the 
testing of a number of the theories discussed in the literature regarding how asset stranding might 
affect banks. For example, it was not possible to simulate the potential for the banking sector to be 
destabilised through its asset holdings, through interbank lending, and through other indirect and 
second round effects (as described in Battiston et al. [2016]).  
For instance, if a small number of banks are overly exposed to the fossil fuel sector (either in terms 
of their loans or other financial assets), problems in the fossil fuel sector (e.g. due to a fast and 
unexpected decline in fossil fuel firms’ revenues) could lead to problems with loan repayments and 
therefore bank solvency. Moreover, depending on the connections between banks, the insolvency of 
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one bank could lead to defaults elsewhere, and even destabilise the entire banking system (this 
possibility is the reason for the analysis in Battiston et al. [2016]).  
Another limitation is that the model lacks the features that might produce immediate revisions in 
asset prices and self-reinforcing cycles of capital losses and tightening financial market conditions (as 
discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.4). Once again, this limitation precluded the testing of a number of 
the theories discussed in the literature regarding how asset stranding might affect the economy via 
the potential negative effects on financial markets. In particular, there is no speculative behaviour by 
households or banks that might lead to an immediate drop in asset prices (say over one or two 
periods) or capital flight and instability. Further, brown firms ability to finance themselves is never 
seriously put in doubt by the worsening financial conditions they experience during the transition 
and market conditions simulations.  
A number of extensions could be made to the model in order to address these issues. Regarding the 
banking sector, the model could be extended so that: i) banks have their own equity capital; ii) banks 
can own equities and other financial assets; iii) there is more than one banking sector; iv) banks can 
lend to each other; v) firms can default on their loans to banks; and vi) banks can endogenously alter 
borrowing and lending rates and ration credit based on financial conditions.  
Regarding financial markets, the model could be extended so that the portfolio allocation decisions 
of agents include a speculative element. The simplest way to do this would be to have agents take 
account of capital gains and losses when making their portfolio allocation decisions. The model 
might also be extended so that firms, or at least a particular subset of firms, are affected by 
tightening financial conditions. As Ansar et al. (2013) point out, coal firms are more likely to be 
affected by a divestment campaign than are the oil and gas majors (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.4). 
However, this would require the addition of extra firm sectors (see Section 8.2.1).  
8.2.3 Limitations and extensions related to the government and external sectors 
The model does not include a government or external (i.e. a foreign) sector. As outlined in Chapter 4, 
Section 4.1.1, these sectors were excluded to avoid complicating an already complicated model.  
Including a government sector would have a number of benefits. First, it would allow for a more 
realistic calibration of the model. Second, the carbon tax could be treated in a more realistic manner 
(currently the carbon tax is distributed directly to households). For example, the carbon tax could be 
used to reduce taxes elsewhere, reduce the government debt, or subsidise green energy. Third, the 
government could own some of the fossil fuel firms in the economy, which would be particularly 
important for the study of the carbon bubble thesis given the high proportion of fossil fuel assets in 
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public ownership (CTI, 2011). Fourth, it could allow for the introduction of a new financial asset into 
the model (government bonds) that could show interesting interactions with the existing asset 
classes.  
Including a foreign sector (or an additional economy) would also have a number of benefits. First, 
and as with including a government sector, including a foreign sector would allow the model to be 
calibrated more realistically. Second, it would allow for the study of some of the international issues 
related to asset stranding and the transition to a low carbon economy. For example, one of the 
issues raised in the literature is that fossil fuel firms’ capital and reserve assets are often located in a 
difference place from where these firms raise their capital. For example, around a third of the value 
of the U.K. stock market is made up of resource and mining companies, yet most of these companies 
operations are not located in the U.K. (CTI, 2011). Thus stranding is likely to have important 
distributional effects between countries. Furthermore, and as pointed out in Chapter 3 (Section 
3.2.1.3), if a country was to increase investment into renewable energy sources or energy efficiency, 
the subsequent reduction in its fossil fuel consumption could help to improve global imbalances 
(Papadimitriou et al., 2009). 
8.3 Policy 
This section discusses some of the policy implications of the results of the simulation experiments 
from Chapters 6 and 7.  
A number of points should be noted about the transition simulations. First, delaying a transition to a 
low carbon economy, so that any subsequent transition has to be completed quicker, will lead to 
higher levels of asset stranding (i.e. faster transitions lead to more stranding than slower 
transitions). Second, if fossil fuel firms are unable to anticipate the extent of a transition, so that 
they end up producing more capital than they require, asset stranding will be higher (i.e. 
unanticipated transitions lead to more stranding than anticipated transitions). Third, unanticipated 
transitions and faster transitions are likely to be more disruptive in terms of their effects on financial 
markets, when compared to anticipated transitions and slower transitions (and these disruptive 
effects could reinforce each other – see Chapter 2, Section 2.4). Fourth, each transition takes longer 
than the change in demand, because of how firms form expectations around their target level of 
capital, and because of how firms move towards their target level of capital (Section 8.1.3). Fifth, 
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brown firms might be able to avoid their assets being stranded, but this could lead to energy 
shortages during the transition (Section 8.1.2).  
All of these issues suggest the need for policy action to ensure that green and brown firms invest 
appropriately so as to minimise the quantity of stranded assets, prevent energy shortages, and make 
sure the transition to a low carbon economy happens in a timely manner. In addition, government 
should ensure that the transition pathway is both clear and credible, so that financial investors have 
all the necessary information to invest appropriately.  
Along with providing context and guidance at the macro level, policy can also help to ensure that 
investors are able to invest appropriately at the firm level. For example, appropriate policy could 
help to ensure greater transparency from fossil fuel companies regarding how much carbon is 
embedded in their reserves (CTI, 2013) and how their business models will be affected by staying 
with the 2°C warming threshold (Lewis et al., 2014). Likewise, more research is needed to 
understand both the direct exposures of individual institutions and how these exposures and effects 
might affect and reinforce each other. Indeed, Carney (2015, p.12) argues that “[a]ny efficient 
market reaction to climate change risks as well as the technologies and policies to address them 
must be founded on transparency of information”.  
Turning to the policy implications of the market conditions simulations, the carbon tax simulations 
(MC1, MC2) show that a carbon tax could be effective at both reducing the demand for brown 
energy and increasing the demand for green energy. However, these effects depend on both how 
much of the cost of the carbon tax brown firms pass on to their customers, and on the ability of 
agents to substitute between different sources of energy when prices changes. It is also worth 
noting that unless a carbon tax is introduced globally, agents may simply substitute cheaper, 
untaxed brown energy for more expensive, taxed brown energy. Carbon taxes will therefore be 
more effective in increasing the demand for green energy when agents’ choices are between brown 
energy with a carbon tax and green energy, rather than between these two forms of energy and 
untaxed brown energy.  
The results of the alternate carbon tax simulation also suggest that governments should be wary of 
implementing a carbon tax on sectors or companies that are price takers, especially when 
households and firms are able to substitute these taxed brown energy sources with untaxed brown 
energy sources. This is because the carbon tax could lead to a very large reduction in the market 
capitalisation of the taxed firms, without overly affecting the demand for brown energy (see MC2). 
The large reduction in the market value of brown firms could then potentially set in motion a series 
of events that destabilise financial markets.  
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Governments should also be aware that any policy that increases the price of brown energy (such as 
a carbon tax) might lead to an increase in inequality, given that low-income households spend a 
greater proportion of their incomes on energy. This could be a particular problem if green and 
brown energy sources are not good substitutes for each other, so that low income (and indeed all) 
households are unable to substitute away from brown energy when prices increase. In this situation, 
the carbon tax would disproportionally redistribute income from the lowest income households to 
the government. In such a situation an additional policy response may be required.  
Along with the carbon tax, the other market conditions simulation that is particularly successful in 
reducing the demand for brown energy and increasing the demand for green energy is the increase 
in green sector EROEI simulation (MC5).90 As such, this simulation suggests that a focus on research 
and development that leads to a reduction in the price of green energy might be effective in 
reducing the demand for brown energy and increasing the demand for green energy. However, and 
as is the case in all the market conditions simulations, the overall effect on demand depends heavily 
on the parameter regime (with the GH regimes seeing far greater changes in green/brown energy 
demand than the GL regimes). This implies that an important factor in determining whether a policy 
change will affect demand is the degree to which green energy can be substituted with brown 
energy. Hence, policy should also encourage the development of storage technologies for use in 
transport (e.g. electric vehicles) and with energy generation (e.g. renewable power plants). In 
addition, policy should ensure the construction of charging infrastructure for electric vehicles, so 
that electric vehicles are better able to compete with gasoline-powered vehicles. 
The change in market conditions simulations that are less successful in affecting the demand for 
brown energy are those that focus on influencing the financial, rather than the real side of the 
economy (i.e. the equity divestment and bank interest rate simulations [MC3, MC4]). This indicates 
that policy may be more successful if it focusses on affecting technology and prices, rather than 
borrowing costs. However, this finding should be placed in the context of the model’s limitations. In 
the model, brown firms are able to substitute one method of financing with another when relative 
costs change. However, in reality, and as outlined in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.4, some fossil fuel 
companies (e.g. coal companies) and some financial markets may be less liquid than others. When 
financial markets and companies are less liquid, actions that impact on firms’ borrowing costs (e.g. a 
                                                          
90 Of course, the simulation in which ethical households divest from brown sector goods [MC6] also leads to a 
large fall in the demand for brown goods. 
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divestment campaign) are more likely to be successful in affecting investment, and, as such, brown 
capacity and output (Ansar et al., 2013).  
Looking across the transitions and market conditions simulations, a significant finding is that while 
the authorities can use policy to manage a transition to a low carbon economy that avoids asset 
stranding and energy shortages, they may be powerless to stop stranding that is caused by a change 
in market conditions (other than policy related changes in market conditions). This is because a 
change in market conditions can lead to a rapid and unexpected change in demand and/or costs that 
leaves fossil fuel firms with excess capital, while a transition to a low carbon economy can be 
managed in such a way so that fossil fuel firms do not produce excess capital. However, it is worth 
noting that an unexpected change in market conditions could occur during a well-managed 
transition to a low carbon economy. As such, even good policy and a clear and credible transition 
pathway may not protect against asset stranding.  
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the results of the transition and market conditions simulations in light of the 
stranded assets literature and the model’s limitations. It also attempted to draw out some policy 
implications and discuss some avenues for future research. 
Regarding the analysis of the results, a number of factors were discussed, including: i) the factors 
that are important in determining the level of asset stranding; ii) the potential trade-off between 
energy shortages and asset stranding; iii) whether fast (i.e. 10 year) transitions are possible without 
significant policy interventions (given the way firms form expectations and move towards their 
target level of capital); iv) the impact of asset stranding on final demand and whether these impacts 
are likely to hold in reality; v) the relationship between asset stranding and labour productivity and 
whether this is realistic; vi) the financial impact of different types of transitions, changes in market 
conditions, and asset stranding; and vii) the specification of the return on equity function and the 
role this plays in destabilising the model.  
The policy section argued that policy action could be used to help minimise asset stranding and 
energy shortages during a transition to a low carbon economy, whilst also ensuring that any 
transition happens in a timely manner. The section also pointed out that policy could be used to 
provide clear and credible information to investors to help them invest appropriately. The section 
noted that the effectiveness of policy in reducing the demand for brown energy will depend on the 
ability of agents to substitute away from brown energy when conditions change. Hence, policies that 
focus on improving storage technology and integrating storage solutions with renewable energy 
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sources could be important in determining both the effectiveness of other policies and the impact of 
a change in market conditions. Finally, it was pointed out that while policy should be able to manage 
a transition to a low carbon economy that avoids asset stranding, changes in market conditions 
during, before, or after a well-managed transition might still stranded fossil fuel assets.  
The final part of this chapter discussed some of the model’s other limitations along with some 
avenues for future research. In particular, it was pointed out that adding additional sectors or 
further disaggregating the green and brown sectors could increase the model’s realism and so 
enable the investigation of a number of different types and impacts of asset stranding. However, it 
should be borne in mind that while extending the model could make it more realistic, this added 
realism is likely to come at the cost of an increase in the model’s complexity that makes the causal 
structures of the model more difficult to determine. Hence, and as outlined by Caverzasi and Godin 
(2015), in extending the model a balance will need to be struck between simulating more realistic 
behaviours and understanding and conveying the model’s causalities and intuitions.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
The stranded assets thesis relates the stranding of real assets (i.e. capital and reserves) to economic 
outcomes via financial markets. However, while there is a significant amount of research on 
stranded assets, only a small number of papers have explored the economic effects of asset 
stranding using an economic model (Chapter 2, Section 2.6). Crucially, none of these models includes 
a well-developed financial sector. This is an important omission, given that much of the literature on 
stranded assets argues that stranding is likely to affect the economy via financial markets (Chapter 2, 
Section 2.4). Consequently, modelling the macroeconomic and financial implications of stranded 
assets is somewhat of a gap in the literature. The primary aim of this dissertation has been to fill this 
gap.  
Because the stranded assets thesis relates the stranding of real assets to economic outcomes via 
financial markets, the modelling approach used in this dissertation needed to be able to incorporate 
both real and financial assets, along with a number of interactions and feedback effects between the 
real and financial sides of the economy. For this reason, the stock-flow consistent (SFC) 
methodological approach was used to produce a model that was able to investigate a number of the 
macroeconomic and financial implications of stranded assets (Chapter 3 discusses the SFC 
methodology in more detail).  
The literature on stranded assets (Chapter 2) emphasises that asset stranding can be caused by both 
a transition to a low carbon economy and a change in market conditions. Regarding stranding that is 
caused by a transition to a low carbon economy, the literature highlights two factors that are likely 
to influence the overall level of asset stranding. First, the speed of the transition, with faster 
transitions assumed to produce a higher quantity of stranded assets. Second, the degree to which 
fossil fuel firms are able to anticipate the transition (and so estimate the amount of investment and 
capital they require), with unanticipated transitions assumed to produce a higher quantity of 
stranded assets. Regarding stranding that is caused by a change in market conditions, the literature 
argues that a change in market condition can come about due to: i) a change in government policy 
or regulations; ii) a change in economic conditions; iii) an energy innovation; iv) a change in financing 
conditions; or v) a change in social norms. 
The SFC model developed for this dissertation (as presented in Chapter 4) was used to investigate 
the economic effects of different types of transitions to a low carbon economy and different changes 
in market conditions, and how these relate to and cause stranded assets. The model itself is made 
up of three firm sectors (green, brown and other), two household sectors (ethical and normal) and 
one banking sector. The model includes several financial assets (equities issued by the green, brown, 
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and other firm sectors, and deposits and loans issued by banks) and several real assets (capital 
assets produced by the green, brown and other firm sectors). Within the model, the green sector 
produces low carbon energy goods, the brown sector produces high carbon energy goods, and the 
other sector produces non-energy goods. Each firm sector sells its output to each household sector 
and to each firm sector. For each sector, the production of output requires labour, capital and 
intermediate goods. Firms finance themselves through retained earnings, by borrowing from banks, 
and by issuing equities. 
The model itself has a number of notable features. For example, an input-output (IO) model is 
incorporated into the SFC model to enable the modelling of intermediate consumption of energy 
goods by firms. Similarly, an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) is incorporated into the SFC model 
to enable the splitting of household consumption between different types of consumption goods. 
Both of these systems of equations are modified so that agents can substitute more easily between 
green and brown energy goods than they can between energy goods and other goods (the AIDS 
equations from Deaton and Muellbauer [1980], the IO equations from Hudson and Jorgenson 
[1974]). Other notable features of the model include labour productivity that responds to each firm 
sector’s capital-labour ratio, firms whose output is constrained by their capital, and substitution 
between energy sources when an energy firm sector’s capacity limit is reached. These features of 
the model (and others not mentioned here) are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, Section 4.3. 
The calibration of the model’s parameters is presented in Chapter 5.  
The model is used to investigate how different types of transitions and different changes in market 
conditions might affect the economy and lead to the stranding of fossil fuel assets. Each simulation is 
carried out under four different parameter regimes, to establish whether the results are sensitive to 
different assumptions regarding: i) the level of renewable and storage technology; and ii) the 
sensitivity of agents to the returns on financial assets. The parameters that are varied are those that 
determine: i) how sensitive households and firms are to the price of green and brown energy goods 
(the GH / GL regimes); and ii) how sensitive household portfolio allocation decisions are to the 
returns on financial assets (the AH / AL regimes). The results of the transition simulations are 
presented in Chapter 6, while the results of the market conditions simulations are presented in 
Chapter 7.  
Four types of transitions are simulated. The differences between each transition simulation relates 
to either the speed of the transition (i.e. fast vs slow transitions), or the extent to which brown firms 
are able to anticipate the transition (unanticipated vs anticipated transitions). The results of the 
transition simulations suggest that: i) faster transitions and anticipated transitions will lead to lower 
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levels of asset stranding than slower transitions and unanticipated transitions; ii) faster transitions 
and unanticipated transitions are likely to be more disruptive in terms of their effects on financial 
markets compared to slower transitions and anticipated transitions; iii) the speed of a transition may 
be slower than expected, unless policy action is taken to encourage green investment; and iv) there 
may be a trade-off between asset stranding and energy shortages during the transition, absent a 
policy intervention that ensures the energy system has adequate capacity (see Section 8.1.2). It is 
worth noting that the brown sector is able to prevent the majority of its assets from being stranded 
when it is able to anticipate the transition and when the transition happens slowly (T4). Further, 
while the brown firm sector sees a significant reduction in its market value during each of the 
transition simulations, in the alternate transitions (T3 and T4) the sector’s distributed profits 
increase during the first part of the transition. This suggests that these types of transition need not 
lead to such a large reduction in fossil fuel firms’ market values, if these firms use part of the profits 
that they would otherwise distribute to shareholders to buy back some of their shares or invest in 
other areas (such as renewable energy).  
The market conditions simulations found that changes in market conditions that affect the real side 
of the economy are likely to lead to larger impacts on demand and asset stranding than changes in 
market conditions that primarily affect firms’ borrowing costs. However, these results need to be 
placed into the context of the model’s limitations. For example, within the model firms are able to 
substitute between different forms of investment financing when one source of financing becomes 
more expensive. In addition, firms are not price takers and so are able to set prices at a level that 
allows them to finance their investment expenditures using their retained earnings. Conversely, in 
reality, some firms or sectors may not be able to finance themselves internally, and so may be more 
exposed to changes in financing conditions than the simulation results suggest. Similarly, some firms 
may find themselves more exposed to changes in financing conditions due to their outstanding 
liabilities (Chapter 2, Section 2.3.4).  
The results of the market conditions simulations were shown to depend on the sensitivity of agents 
to goods prices and the return on financial assets. For example, when green energy is not a good 
substitute for brown energy, changes in market conditions will lead to much smaller effects on 
demand and asset stranding. As such, these simulations suggest that an advance in storage 
technology that allows agents to more easily substitute green energy for brown energy (and electric 
vehicles for gasoline-powered vehicles) could lead to a rapid reduction in the demand for brown 
energy that strands a significant quantity of brown assets.  
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Similarly, when agents are more sensitive to the returns on financial assets, changes in market 
conditions that affect a sector’s dividend payments will have more of an impact on each sector’s 
market capitalisation. Conversely, under these conditions, a divestment campaign is likely to be less 
effective in affecting the divested firm or sector’s market capitalisation or access to funding. It 
should be noted that the sensitivity of financial investors to the return on financial assets is likely to 
be greater than is the case in this model. As such, a transition or a change in market conditions that 
affects a sector’s dividends could have even larger effects on that sector’s market capitalisation than 
is simulated here.    
The simulations also provide two findings than run counter to the stranded assets literature. First, 
the carbon tax simulations (MC1, MC2) show that firms could chose to absorb part of the cost of a 
carbon tax to prevent some of their assets from becoming stranded. Said another way, firms could 
face a choice between stranding their assets and seeing a fall in their market capitalisations. This 
implies that a ‘carbon bubble’ could burst without the stranding of a significant quantity of fossil fuel 
assets. This finding runs somewhat contrary to much of the stranded assets literature, which usually 
argues that asset stranding (or expectations thereof) is likely to be associated with a rapid reduction 
in the market value of fossil fuel firms (CTI, 2011). 
Second, the transition simulations show that asset stranding is positively correlated with final 
demand. This is because asset stranding implies an overcapitalisation of output as a whole, which 
itself implies that there has been excessive investment in the past. This investment, plus the 
increased level of employment it generates, leads to an increase in final demand. Indeed, the 
transition simulation with the highest level of asset stranding (T1) also experiences the largest peak 
increase in final demand. In contrast, the stranded assets literature argues that asset stranding may 
destabilise financial markets, with potentially negative impacts on the broader economy (Chapter 2, 
Section 2.4). Unfortunately, the model is currently unable to simulate some of the factors that might  
destabilise financial markets and so negatively affect final demand. Extending the model so that it is 
able to simulate these negative impacts is an important avenue for future research.   
The results of the simulations have a number of implications for policy (Chapter 8, Section 8.3). In 
particular, the negative effects associated with faster transitions suggest the need for concerted 
policy action to ensure the transition happens in a timely manner. This is especially important given 
that faster transitions may themselves be out of reach without policy interventions that incentivise 
renewables investment (Chapter 8, Section 8.1.3). Likewise, policy should ensure that firms are 
aware of the chosen transition pathway, in order to prevent unnecessary investment, asset 
stranding and energy shortages (Chapter 8, Section 8.1.2). Finally, policy should also be used to 
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increase the amount of information investors have access to regarding the carbon embedded in 
fossil fuel companies reserves and the amount of carbon power stations are likely to emit over their 
lifetimes, so that they are able to make informed decisions regarding the risks facing individual 
companies (e.g. with regards to future policy action on climate change). It is worth noting that while 
policy should be able to effectively manage a transition to a low carbon so that significant asset 
stranding is avoided, stranding may still occur due to an unexpected change in market conditions. 
While the results of some of the transition simulations (e.g. T4) suggest that the worst effects of 
asset stranding can be avoided if the transition happens slowly and brown and green firms invest 
appropriately, current evidence suggests that brown firms will produce more capital than is needed 
for a 1.5 - 2°C emissions pathway (Chapter 2, Section 2.2), while green firms will not produce enough 
(IEA, 2018). As such, absent a sudden decrease in fossil fuel investment, a significant amount of 
unnecessary asset stranding is likely to occur. In addition, the relative lack of green investment 
means that the transition to a low carbon economy will have to happen over a shorter period of 
time than would otherwise be the case. Both of these factors are likely to increase the negative 
effects of stranding on financial markets (Chapter 2, Section 2.4), with countries in which fossil fuel 
firms raise a significant amount of their capital – such as the U.K. – particularly at risk. 
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Appendix 1: Transition simulations results 
 
Simulation chart
Transition simulation 1 (T1): Baseline fast transition (normal expectations)
Macroeconomic charts
all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
ni: not indexed b: brown firms
r: real value g: green firms
nom: nominal value o: other firms
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nom: nominal value o: other firms
all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
r: real value
Firm level charts
b: brown firms
g: green firms
ni: not indexed
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Simulation chart
Transition simulation 2 (T2): Baseline 30-year transition (normal expectations)
Macroeconomic charts
all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
ni: not indexed b: brown firms
r: real value g: green firms
nom: nominal value o: other firms
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nom: nominal value o: other firms
all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
r: real value
Firm level charts
b: brown firms
g: green firms
ni: not indexed
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Simulation chart
Transition simulation 3 (T3): Alternate 10-year transition (altered expectations) 
Macroeconomic charts
all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
ni: not indexed b: brown firms
r: real value g: green firms
nom: nominal value o: other firms
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nom: nominal value o: other firms
all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
r: real value
Firm level charts
b: brown firms
g: green firms
ni: not indexed
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Simulation chart
Transition simulation 4 (T4): Alternate 30-year transition (altered expectations) 
Macroeconomic charts
all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
ni: not indexed b: brown firms
r: real value g: green firms
nom: nominal value o: other firms
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Appendix 2: Market condition simulations results 
 
Simulation chart
Market conditions simulation 1 (MC1): Baseline carbon tax (brown firms pass on 100% of tax)
Macroeconomic charts
all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
ni: not indexed b: brown firms
r: real value g: green firms
nom: nominal value o: other firms
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all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
r: real value
Firm level charts
b: brown firms
g: green firms
ni: not indexed
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Simulation chart
Market conditions simulation 2 (MC2):: Alternate carbon tax (brown firms pass on 50% of tax)
Macroeconomic charts
all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
ni: not indexed b: brown firms
r: real value g: green firms
nom: nominal value o: other firms
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all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
r: real value
Firm level charts
b: brown firms
g: green firms
ni: not indexed
nom: nominal value o: other firms
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Simulation chart
Market conditions simulation 3 (MC3): Ethical households divest from brown equities
Macroeconomic charts
all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
ni: not indexed b: brown firms
r: real value g: green firms
nom: nominal value o: other firms
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all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
r: real value
Firm level charts
b: brown firms
g: green firms
ni: not indexed
nom: nominal value o: other firms
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all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
ni: not indexed
real: real value
nom: nominal value
e: ethical households
n: normal households
Household level charts
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Simulation charts
Market conditions simulation 4 (MC4): Bank interest rate discrimination
Macroeconomic charts
all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
ni: not indexed b: brown firms
r: real value g: green firms
nom: nominal value o: other firms
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nom: nominal value o: other firms
all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
r: real value
Firm level charts
b: brown firms
g: green firms
ni: not indexed
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Simulation chart
Market conditions simulation 5 (MC5): Increase in green sector energy return on energy invested
Macroeconomic charts
all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
ni: not indexed b: brown firms
r: real value g: green firms
nom: nominal value o: other firms
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all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
r: real value
Firm level charts
b: brown firms
g: green firms
ni: not indexed
nom: nominal value o: other firms
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Simulation chart
Market conditions simulation 6 (MC6): Ethical households divest from brown goods
Macroeconomic charts
all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
ni: not indexed b: brown firms
r: real value g: green firms
nom: nominal value o: other firms
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nom: nominal value o: other firms
all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
r: real value
Firm level charts
b: brown firms
g: green firms
ni: not indexed
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all charts indexed unless otherwise stated (2016 = base year)
ni: not indexed
real: real value
nom: nominal value
e: ethical households
n: normal households
Household level charts
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Appendix 3: Notation used in this dissertation 
 Real Nominal 
Amortisation funds af AF 
Proportion of spending on brown goods by a firm sector abj PROP 
Proportion of spending on green goods by a firm sector agj PROP 
Proportion of spending on other goods by a firm sector aoj PROP 
Proportion of spending on energy goods by a firm sector aenj PROP 
Exogenous bank spread between deposit and lending rates addj 
A-matrix values aij 
Sum of A matrix column at 
Parameter that alters the (at) parameter at j ex 
Target amount of other goods required by a sector to produce one unit of 
its output 
aTo 
Target amount of energy goods required by a sector to produce one unit of 
its output 
aTen 
Actual consumption c C 
Demand for consumption goods cD  
Maximum supply of consumption goods cS  
Capital gains  CG 
Proportion of consumption on spending on a sectors goods energy goods cPROP 
Carbon tax payment  CTPAY 
Proportion of the cost of a carbon tax firm pass through to customers CTPT 
Carbon tax charge per unit of brown output levied on brown firms CTRATE 
Depreciation cost da DA 
Demand for equities eD 
Supply of equities eS 
Total profits  F 
Distributed profits  FDIS 
Retained earnings/profits  FRET 
Demand for consumption and intermediate consumption goods gdD  
Maximum supply of consumption and intermediate consumption goods gdS  
Actual investment i I 
Demand for investment goods iD  
Maximum supply of investment goods iS  
Actual intermediate consumption ic IC 
Demand for intermediate consumption goods icD  
Maximum supply of intermediate consumption goods icS  
Equity financed investment  IEF 
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 Real Nominal 
Loan financed investment  ILF 
Net investment  INET 
Capital k K 
Demand for loans  LD 
Supply of loans  LS 
Holdings of deposits (demand for deposits) mH MH 
Supply of deposits  MS 
Employment n 
Proportion of population in each household sector nPROP 
Price of output p 
Price of equity pE 
Energy price faced by a sector pen 
Productivity pr 
Average productivity prAVG 
Potential productivity prPOT 
Return on equity rK  
Rate of interest on loans rL  
Rate of interest on deposits rM  
Exogenous deposit rate of interest rM BAR  
Real return on equity  rrK 
Real rate of interest on loans  rrL 
Real rate of interest on deposits  rrM 
Real weighted cost of capital  rrW 
Output s S 
Stranded assets indicator SA  
Stranded assets indicator in percentage terms SAPC  
Larger of a sector’s expected demand or its actual sales. sKT  
Unit costs  UC 
Wealth v V 
Wage bill  WB 
Target wage wT  
Final demand y Y 
Disposable income yd YD 
Haig-Simons disposable income ydHS YDHS 
Logical function z 
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Greek letters  
Output elasticity of capital α 
Partial adjustment parameter in productivity equation β 
Partial adjustment parameter in investment equation γ 
Depreciation rate δ 
Risk premium ε 
Maximum output to capital ratio ζ 
Proportion of net investment financed through retained earnings ι 
Target capital-output ratio κT 
Parameter in input-output equation λA 
Parameters in AIDS equation λAIDS 
Parameter in firm financing equation λEF 
Parameter in firm financing equation λLF 
Parameter in firm financing equation λF 
Parameter in portfolio allocation equation λPA 
Partial adjustment parameter in wage equation μ 
Price inflation π 
Firms markup rate on unit costs φ 
Relationship between target wages and productivity χ 
Autonomous parameter in consumption function ψ0 
Marginal propensity to consume out of income ψ1 
Marginal propensity to consume out of wealth ψ2 
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Subscripts Superscripts 
Total t  Demand D 
Green firm sector g  Maximum supply S 
Brown firm sector b  Target T 
Other firm sector o  Expected e 
Energy sector en    
Normal household sector n    
Ethical household sector e    
Weighted W    
Retained RET    
Net NET    
Equity financed EF    
Loan financed LF    
Proportion PROP    
Percentage PC    
Pass through PT    
 
